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Editorial Preface
Since 2010 and the publication by the European Parliament of the “Harmonisation 
of Insolvency Law at EU Level” policy document, harmonisation of insolvency 
law has continued to gain in importance as considered in practice and by 
academics. Only a decade prior to the publication of that document, the 
harmonisation of insolvency law in Europe seemed an impossible, and perhaps, 
unwanted task. As Professor Fletcher noted in the second edition of his text 
in 2005, Insolvency in Private International Law: National and International 
Approaches, “National attitudes toward the phenomenon of insolvency are 
extremely variable, as are the social and legal consequences for the debtors 
concerned.” However, given the continued aspects of globalisation, multi-
national enterprises, and the concomitant need for a robust framework for cross-
border insolvency coordination, not only have we seen the introduction of the 
European Insolvency Regulation to help coordinate cross-border insolvency in 
the EU in 2002, but 15 years later this regulation has been recast in Regulation 
2015/848 to clarify and codify existing practice and case law. While it does not 
aim to harmonise, it does recognise the need for greater efficiency in cross-
border coordination of insolvency procedures. 
Seven years ago, it was recognised in the report on “Harmonisation of Insolvency 
Law at EU Level” that in order to build a crisis management framework for the 
internal market and for structural measures to be efficient at an EU level, it was 
equally important to establish the extent to which insolvency laws throughout the 
EU may be required. While harmonisation may only be desirable and achievable 
in limited circumstances, it was acknowledged that harmonisation should be 
sought where possible. Among the circumstances identified were: a common 
test of insolvency; the formal aspects of lodging and dealing with claims in 
formal insolvency; the manner in which reorganisation plans are adopted; rules 
regarding detrimental acts; the inter-relationship between contractual rights of 
termination and insolvency; and directors’ responsibilities. There have been a 
number of developments in these areas in since the publication of that document, 
which merit discussion. 
The purpose of this text, which consists of papers delivered at the INSOL Europe 
Academics Forum annual conference entitled “Harmonisation of European 
Insolvency Law” held in Cascais, Portugal on 21 and 22 September 2016, is 
to showcase a number of perspectives on the current state of harmonisation 
in various aspects of European insolvency law. The particular focus of 
the conference was on challenges of harmonised insolvency proceedings, 
including opening requirements, filing, and verification of claims; substantive 
harmonisation and aspects of avoidance actions and directors’ liability; creditor 
ranking in insolvency and possible approaches and obstacles to harmonisation; 
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and challenges for preventive restructuring frameworks, in particular regarding 
new finance and treatment of executory contracts. 
Contributions range from comparative analyses of various aspects of potentially 
harmonised or harmonizable areas of insolvency law, to inter-disciplinary 
perspectives, and investigations of other legal areas that intersect insolvency and 
the potential impact of harmonisation upon them. Contributors range from early 
career academics and PhD students, to eminent judges and professors, offering 
a colourful perspective on the nature of harmonisation in European insolvency 
law today. 
The papers contained herein are therefore truly innovative and will increase the 
awareness of the impact of insolvency law and its harmonisation throughout 
Europe and the potential impact this may have in domestic, regional, and even 
global contexts. Submissions for this collection have come from prominent 
academics, doctoral students and other researchers, practitioners, and policy 
makers in the field, representing numerous jurisdictions including common 
law, civil law, and mixed systems within Europe and even beyond. As such, 
the contents of the research and analyses are of extremely high quality and 
offer thought-provoking and at times innovative insights into the subject matter 
at hand. It is hoped that this will render the contributions here, as well as the 
further references that they contain, of great value for researchers in the field of 
insolvency law. 
In summary, I would like to express my appreciation to every contributor who 
has given their time and intellectual skills to making this project a rich and 
diverse treatise on the issue of harmonisation of insolvency law in Europe. 
I must also give my profound thanks to the administrative staff members of 
INSOL Europe, particularly Caroline Taylor and Wendy Cooper, together with 
the technical officers Myriam Mailly and Emmanuelle Inacio, and Paul Newson 
for his brilliant design and publishing expertise. If not otherwise noted by the 
contributors, the law is as stated as at 10 July 2017. 
Dr Jennifer L. L. Gant 
Senior Lecturer in Law 
Deputy Director – Centre for Business and Insolvency Law 
Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University 
E-mail: jennifer.gant@ntu.ac.uk
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Introduction to INSOL Europe Academic Forum
The INSOL Europe Academic Forum, founded in 2004, is a constituent body 
of INSOL Europe, a Europe-wide association of practitioners in insolvency. 
The Academic Forum’s primary mission is to engage in the representation of 
members interested in insolvency law and research, to encourage and assist in 
the development of research initiatives in the insolvency field and to participate 
in the activities organised by INSOL Europe. The membership of the Academic 
Forum includes insolvency academics, insolvency practitioners with recognised 
academic credentials as well as those engaged in the research and study of 
insolvency. The Academic Forum meets annually in conjunction with the main 
conference of INSOL Europe and also arranges half-yearly conferences around 
suitable themes of interest to the practice and academic communities. Previous 
meetings have taken place in Prague (2004), Amsterdam (2005), Monaco 
(2007), Leiden and Barcelona (2008), Brighton and Stockholm (2009), Leiden 
and Vienna (2010), Milan, Venice and Jersey (2011), Nottingham and Brussels 
(2012), Trier and Paris (2013), Leiden and Istanbul (2014), Trier, Nottingham and 
Berlin (2015), Berlin and Lisbon (2016) as well as Trier and Warsaw (2017). A 
number of smaller events, including University seminars and colloquia, are also 
co-hosted by the Academic Forum with institutions across Europe.
At Lisbon, Professor Michael Veder (Radboud University, the Netherlands) was 
elected Chair of the Academic Forum for a three-year term. Anthon Verweij 
(Sdu Publishers, the Netherlands) serves as Secretary to the Board, while 
Florian Bruder (DLA Piper Munich, Germany), Jessica Schmidt (University of 
Bayreuth, Germany), Jennifer Gant (Chair of the Young Academics’ Network 
in Insolvency Law), Emmanuelle Inacio and Myriam Mailly (INSOL Europe 
Technical Officers) and Rolef de Weijs (Amsterdam University, the Netherlands) 
are ordinary members of the Board. Jennifer Gant (Nottingham Trent University, 
the United Kingdom) is the Editor of the Conference Proceedings series. A 
Supervisory Committee has also been established as a consultative board for 
Academic Forum projects whose membership includes senior insolvency 
academics and practitioners.
With sponsorship made available by Edwin Coe LLP over a seven-year 
period from 2007-2014 and Shakespeare Martineau from 2015 onwards, the 
Academic Forum has been able to offer young scholars travel grants to attend 
its conferences. The sponsorship has also permitted for an annual lecture to be 
given by a scholar of international repute. These have included Professor Jay 
Westbrook (University of Texas, the United States), Gabriel Moss QC (3/4 South 
Square, Gray’s Inn, the United Kingdom), The Hon Mr Justice Ian Kawaley 
(Supreme Court of Bermuda), Professor Karsten Schmidt (President of the 
Bucerius Law School, Germany), Professor Bob Wessels (Leiden Law School, 
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the Netherlands), Professor Ian Fletcher QC (University College London, United 
Kingdom), Professor Rosalind Mason (Queensland University of Technology, 
Australia), Professor Axel Flessner (Humboldt University Berlin, Germany) and 
His Honour Judge Ignacio Sancho (Spanish Supreme Court).
These lectures and many of the presentations at the Academic Forum conferences 
have been collected in the conference proceedings booklets that have been 
regularly published since the publications series arising from conferences was 
inaugurated in 2009 by reports from the 2008 Leiden and Barcelona events. 
The intention is that conference proceedings booklets will be published from 
all of the conferences listed above and will accompany other publications in the 
Technical Series produced by INSOL Europe and the Judicial Wing. Overall, the 
publications are intended to form a comprehensive report of the conferences and 
contain accounts of recent research in the insolvency field useful for academics, 
judges, policy-makers and practitioners alike.
The Academic Forum’s next meeting is scheduled to take place in conjunction 
with the INSOL Europe conference in Warsaw, Poland on 4-5 October 2017, 
with future conferences likely to see Academic Forum members visit Athens 
(2018), Copenhagen (2019) and Sorrento (2020). Details of academic conferences 
will be posted on this website (www.insol-europe.org/academic/) as and when 
available. An on-line registration facility for academic conferences as well as 
further information about the work of the Academic Forum can also be obtained 
via the website as well as a dedicated Facebook page.
1PART I
SUBSTANTIVE HARMONISATION
2 Harmonisation of European Insolvency Law
3Chapter 1
Stakeholders and their Influence on 
Harmonisation of Insolvency Laws in Europe
Gert-Jan Boon*
1 Introduction
Since the 2011 call of the European Parliament for legislative measures with 
regard to insolvency proceedings in the context of EU company law,1 reform of 
insolvency regimes has been prominent on academic and legislative agendas.2 
Undoubtedly, the interest in insolvency, and more specifically rescue of distressed 
businesses, has been driven by the economic downturn that the EU (and its Member 
States) experienced since 2008.3 These developments have proven pivotal in the 
Commission’s legislative efforts that followed.4 In these efforts, the Commission 
acts in a largely untapped area of European law, namely the harmonisation of 
substantive insolvency law. A field of law characterised by diverse stakeholders 
with strongly opposing interests, including, among others, the debtor, the debtor’s 
management, shareholders, employees, financiers, secured and unsecured 
creditors, and tax authorities. The Commission has not ignored the great challenges 
its legislative initiatives have brought as its approach is characterised by the active 
involvement of all these stakeholders.
In this paper I will discuss the – what I call – integrated stakeholder approach that 
the Commission pursues in harmonising European insolvency regimes. Both in 
1 European Parliament resolution of 15 November 2011 with recommendations to the Commission on insolvency 
proceedings in the context of EU company law (2011/2006(INI)). 
2 Ian F. Fletcher and Bob Wessels, Harmonisation of Insolvency Law in Europe, Reports presented to the 
Nederlandse Vereniging voor Burgerlijk Recht (Netherlands Association of Civil Law) (2012, Kluwer, Deventer).
3 See e.g. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee, A new European approach to business failure and insolvency of 12.12.2012, 
COM(2012) 742 final, at 1. Here, the Commission highlights the effects that the economic crisis has on people, 
jobs and businesses, including some 200.000 companies that were declared insolvent annually in the EU between 
2009 and 2011 and with the loss of 1.7 million jobs annually too.
4 Idem, see e.g. also Commission Recommendation of 12.3.2014 on a new approach to business failure and 
insolvency, C(2014) 1500 final, at (6).
Stakeholders and their Influence on Harmonisation of Insolvency Laws in Europe
* J.M.G.J. (Gert-Jan) Boon LL.M MSc is a researcher at the Leiden Law School, the Netherlands, he can be reached 
at: j.m.g.j.boon@law.leidenuniv.nl. For this chapter, the developments with regard to harmonisation of European 
insolvency law have been stated, based on the available information, as per 30 November 2016. At the same date all 
internet sources have been checked. The author thanks Professor Bob Wessels for his comments on an earlier draft.
4 Harmonisation of European Insolvency Law
its revision of the European Insolvency Regulation5 (EIR) and the proposal for a 
directive on preventive restructuring frameworks; second chance and measures to 
increase the efficiency of restructuring; and insolvency and discharge procedures 
(‘Restructuring Directive’),6 the role and direct influence of stakeholders 
is noteworthy. 
This interesting development may have several outcomes. Concerns are raised 
regularly regarding undesired involvement of stakeholders, in particular 
commercial market players, in legislative processes. But at the same time, 
stakeholders may contribute to prioritising potential themes for harmonisation 
based on perceived needs in practice, a focused treatment of the scope and details 
of those needs, and a higher level of involvement in law making and its execution. 
As a result, involvement of stakeholders may lead to better founded legislation. 
The question is, however, what a relevant ‘stakeholder’ is, why the Commission 
is involving them, and whether – and under which conditions – it is justified to 
involve stakeholders in designing and execution of EU insolvency legislation.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 will elaborate on some theories 
regarding stakeholders and will propose a technique to distinguish and rank 
different types of stakeholders based on their salience. Subsequently, in section 
3, this will be applied to define what stakeholders are in the field of insolvency 
legislation. Then, in section 4, the approach of the European Commission towards 
harmonising substantive insolvency and stakeholders will be discussed. Section 
5 will turn to the sentiments of different stakeholders on harmonisation. This 
will be followed by some recommendations to pursue, with the involvement of 
stakeholders, the Commissions’ aim of harmonising certain aspects of national 
insolvency regimes (section 6). Finally, section 7 draws some conclusions.
2 Theorising the Stakeholder
The relevance of stakeholder involvement in the field of insolvency was 
advocated by EU Commissioner Věra Jourová. The EU Commissioner for Justice, 
Consumers and Gender Equality touched upon this in her speech of 16 June 2016 
held at the occasion of the 5th European insolvency and restructuring congress 
where she spoke on the harmonisation process of European insolvency law. She 
5 Council Regulation (EC) no 1346/2000 of 29 may 2000 on insolvency proceedings, which will be revised in 
June 2017 when Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
insolvency proceedings (recast) comes into force.
6 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Union and the Council on preventive 
restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU of 22 November 2016, COM(2016) 723 final.
5emphasised the important role of practitioners and judges to bring legislation alive 
and bring forward the benefits of legislation to the whole of the internal market. 
But their involvement is also required in designing new legislation. In particular, 
in drafting the new legislative instrument on substantive insolvency law, the EU 
Commissioner stated:
“It will build on the 2014 Recommendation and designed based 
on the input receive[d] from all concerned stakeholders, including 
you the practitioners, and from other Member States experts. We’ll 
duly consider such input also in order to assess the state of play on 
consumer insolvency and whether action is needed in this regard.” 7
More recently the EU Commissioner said:
“In our preparatory work, we paid attention to the opinions of all 
stakeholders, including national parliaments.”8
These quotes show the great importance the Commission has attached to involve 
all stakeholders. At the same time, it is left open what these ‘stakeholders’ are. 
Though the Commissioner refers to, among others, insolvency practitioners, 
national parliaments and Member State experts, this seems a non-exhaustive list 
of stakeholders and leaves much room for interpretation. But also, what role do 
these stakeholders fulfil; are they a sounding board for the Commission’s policies 
or even a strategic partner in developing and executing new legislation? 
2.1 EU Perspectives on the Role of Stakeholders
In the field of business administration and corporate governance, research has 
been conducted on what stakeholders are, how different stakeholders can be 
distinguished, and how the interests of different stakeholder should be prioritised. 
My line of approach is built, in particular, around the well-known divide between 
7 Speech by Commissioner Jourová at 5th European insolvency and restructuring Congress, Brussels (16 June 
2016). The full text is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/jourova/announcements/speech-
commissioner-jourova-5th-european-insolvency-and-restructuring-congress_en. 
8 Speech by Commissioner Jourová to the Legal Affairs Committee and EU Affairs Committee in the Bundestag: 
Anti-Money Laundering, European Public Prosecutor’s Office, Digital Contracts, and Insolvency (26 
September 2016), SPEECH/16/3189. The full text is available at: http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
SPEECH-16-3189_en.htm. 
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the shareholder primacy (corresponding to the agency theory9) and the non-
shareholder stakeholder perspective.10 
In 2014 the Commission published a proposal to revise two directives on 
encouraging long-term shareholder engagement and corporate governance.11 
Here, the Commission promotes the involvement of shareholders and other 
stakeholders in a company. The European Parliament, in response, took this a step 
further and suggested to include the position of all stakeholders of the company 
(‘EP Amendment’).12 Regarding shareholders, the text should explicitly state 
(underlining added):
“(2) Although they do not own corporations, which are separate legal 
entities beyond their full control, shareholders play a relevant role in 
the governance of those corporations.
[…] (2a) Greater involvement of shareholders in companies’ corporate 
governance is one of the levers that can help improve the financial 
and non-financial performance of those companies. Nevertheless, 
since shareholder rights are not the only long-term factor which needs 
to be taken into consideration in corporate governance, they should be 
accompanied by additional measures to ensure a greater involvement 
of all stakeholders, in particular employees, local authorities and 
civil society.”13 
9 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and 
ownership structure”, (1976) 3(4) Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 305-360. 
10 See David Millon, “Radical Shareholder Primacy”, (2013) 12(4) University of St. Thomas Law Journal, pp. 
1013-1044, also published in Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2014-17. Available at SSRN: http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2473189. Millon describes two types of shareholder primacy, (i) the radical shareholder 
primacy where directors are fully focused on serving the shareholders’ interests and (ii) the traditional shareholder 
primacy, where directors consider interests of shareholders and (where appropriate) that of non-shareholders. 
Vasudev and Watson refer to this divide as the ‘Great Debate’, see P.M. Vasudev and S. Watson (eds.), Corporate 
Governance after the Financial Crisis (2012, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham), p. 6. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2009076. See also Jonathon Strom, “The Rebirth of Heroic Managerialism”, (2015-2016) 3 Bus. 
& Bankr. L.J. 67, p. 69 et seq.
11 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/
EU as regards certain elements of the corporate governance statement, 9 April 2014, 2014/0121 (COD). Both the 
directives themselves and this proposal hardly touch upon the position of stakeholders other than shareholders.
12 European Parliament, Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 8 July 2015 on the proposal for 
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the 
encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of 
the corporate governance statement (COM(2014)0213 – C7-0147/2014 –2014/0121(COD)) (Ordinary legislative 
procedure: first reading), P8_TA (2015)0257.
13 Idem, at (2), subsequent to adopting these proposed amendments, it was decided to proceed with informal 
discussions by the Commission, Council and the Parliament. See also Jean Jacques Du Plessis, “Corporate 
Governance, Corporate Responsibility and Law: Shareholder Primacy and Other Stakeholder Interests” (2016) 
34(8) Company and Securities Law Journal, pp. 238-242, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2777832.
7With this proposal the European Parliament declines, more explicitly than the 
Commission did, the shareholder primacy perspective, as shareholders are not 
regarded as owners of companies. Shareholders are recognised for their important 
contribution to the company, but, with regard to the corporate governance of the 
company, involvement of all stakeholders is required. 
2.2 Defining Stakeholders
The European Parliament’s Amendment provides a useful definition of 
stakeholders. Interestingly, the European Parliament proposes a definition of a 
company’s stakeholders (in particular those of employees, local authorities, and 
civil society),14 which reads as follows:
“any individual, group, organisation or local community that 
is affected by or otherwise has an interest in the operation and 
performance of a company.”15
Various other definitions of stakeholder can be found in academic literature.16 
Parliament’s definition seems in line with Freeman’s perspective of stakeholders 
of 1984, although he takes a stronger emphasis on the companies’ strategy 
and purpose:
“A stakeholder in an organization is (by definition) all of those groups 
and individuals, that can affect, or are affected by, the accomplishment 
of organizational purpose.”17
A more invasive perspective on stakeholders is proposed by Savage, Nix, 
Whitehead and Blair (1991), as they define stakeholders as follows:
14 For civil society no definition is provided by the European Parliament in this proposal, nor who will represent these 
interests (to the company). The United Nations regards ‘civil society’ as the third sector, besides the government 
and business, comprising the whole of non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations, see United Nations, 
Civil Society (2016), available at: www.un.org/en/sections/resources/civil-society. The World Bank defines civil 
society as follows: “the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in 
public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, 
scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide 
of array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous 
groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations” (World 
Bank, Defining Civil Society (2016), available at: http://go.worldbank.org/4CE7W046K0).
15 Idem, Article 1(2)(jb).
16 Some prime definitions of stakeholder have been provided in this chapter, however, as has been rightly 
observed by Samantha Miles, there are numerous definitions and consensus on the concept of ‘Stakeholder’. 
She even concludes that we could speak of stakeholder as an essentially contested concept, see Samantha Miles, 
“Stakeholder: Essentially Contested or Just Confused?”, (2012) 108(3) Journal of Business Ethics, pp. 285-298. 
For an overview of some 27 definitions of ‘stakeholder’, see Ronald K. Mitchell, Bradley R. Agle, & Donna J. 
Wood, “Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really 
counts”, (1997) 22(4) Academy of Management Review, p. 858.
17 R. Edward Freeman, “Strategic Management: A stakeholder Approach” (1984, Pitman, Boston), p. 25.
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“Stakeholders include those individuals, groups, and other 
organizations who have an interest in the actions of an organization 
and who have the ability to influence it.”18
According to Savage et al., stakeholders need to have both (i) an interest in the 
actions of an organisation, which I argue is present when an organisation’s actions 
affect these interests, and (ii) be able to influence the organisation. This is a more 
stringent definition compared to the definitions of the European Parliament and 
Freeman, where either (i) or (ii) would suffice to qualify as stakeholder.
In light of the above, there would in general be two (not mutually exclusive) types 
of stakeholders from the perspective of the legislative ‘business’ of the European 
Commission: (i) all those individuals and groups that can affect the drafting 
process of a legislative measure on insolvency law, in particular the Council, the 
Parliament and the Member States, and (ii) all those individuals and groups that are 
affected by a legislative measure on insolvency. This could include, among others, 
companies, employees, insolvency practitioners, judges, etc. From a strict legal 
perspective, only the first group would qualify as stakeholders, as the latter group 
has no formal foundation upon which they can affect legislation. In its current 
insolvency endeavour, the Commission provides these latter stakeholders with an 
informal influence on the legislative process, that therefore fall within the scope of 
stakeholders as defined by Savage et al. (1991).
2.3 Distinguishing and Ranking of Stakeholders
With a broad perspective on stakeholders, the inequality of interests makes it 
hard to compare the various stakeholders involved in insolvency. To distinguish 
‘who and what really counts’, Mitchell, Agle & Wood (1997) have developed an 
approach based on salience. They propose that those interests that have the highest 
salience are the interests that should be given most priority. Salience should be 
evaluated on three attributes, namely (i) power, (ii) legitimacy, and (iii) urgency:19 
i. Power relates to the possibility that someone can impose his will in a 
relationship upon (an) other(s). There can be a legal foundation to this power.20
18 Grant T. Savage, Timothy W. Nix, Carlton J. Whitehead, and John. D. Blair, “Strategies for assessing and 
managing organizational stakeholders”, (1991) 5(2) Academy of Management Executive, p. 61. They further 
distinguish between (i) primary stakeholders as the ones that have a direct and necessary economic impact on the 
organization, and (ii) secondary stakeholders as the ones that are only indirectly part of the companies’ business, 
but that can influence the company. To review the different stakeholders two dimensions are proposed: (i) the 
potential threat they represent and (ii) the potential to cooperate with these stakeholders.
19 Mitchell et al., above note 16, pp. 853-854.
20 Idem, pp. 1 and 865-866.
9ii. Legitimacy relates to the (social) desirability of the interest (and accompanying 
behaviour) of a stakeholder as shared by others.21
iii. Urgency relates to whether or not ‘time is of the essence’ for the interests at 
hand and whether compelling action is required.22
The combination of these three attributes results in eight different types of 
stakeholders (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Qualitative Classes of Stakeholders23 
Mitchell, Agle and Wood propose the following typology of stakeholders:
1. Dormant stakeholder
2. Discretionary stakeholder
3. Demanding stakeholder
4. Dominant stakeholder
5. Dangerous stakeholder
6. Dependent stakeholder
7. Definitive stakeholder
8. The non-stakeholder
21 Idem, p. 866-867.
22 Idem, p. 867-868.
23 Idem, p. 872.
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The more attributes a stakeholder possesses, the more priority should be given 
to a stakeholder. Besides 8 (the non-stakeholder), 1-3 (dormant, discretionary 
and demanding stakeholders) would receive the least attention, 4-6 (dominant, 
dangerous and dependent stakeholders) much more and 7 (definitive stakeholders) 
most attention. Applying this framework will be useful in distinguishing between 
various interests.24
2.4 Conclusion
The above has shown the interrelatedness between a governance model and 
the involvement of stakeholders. Where it concerns corporate governance, the 
Commission and in particular the European Parliament have expressed support 
for the stakeholder approach (in contrast to shareholder primacy). This requires 
the involvement of all concerned stakeholders in the governance of companies.
Various definitions of stakeholders have been developed, in this section the 
definition of Savage et al. (1991) was adopted, which requires stakeholders to 
have an interest in the organisations’ action and be able to influence its actions: 
“Stakeholders include those individuals, groups, and other 
organizations who have an interest in the actions of an organization 
and who have the ability to influence it.”25
These perspectives on corporate governance can also be used to analyse the 
governance of a legislative process. The EU Commissioner pointed out the 
importance of involving all stakeholders in its current endeavour on insolvency, 
thereby advocating a stakeholder perspective on legislative governance. It remains, 
however, undecided who these stakeholders are and what their role should be in 
this legislative process. The above framework provides a qualitative tool for the 
evaluation of who possible stakeholders are and what their position is compared 
to other stakeholders. Where, following the Commission’s approach, besides 
legislative parties (such as the European Parliament, Council, and Member States) 
other parties are also recognised as stakeholders (for example employees and civil 
society), an approach based on salience of interests may be effective in prioritising 
the different stakeholders. This differentiation can be based on three attributes: (i) 
24 Idem, p. 856. This framework also leaves some room for subjectivity, for example, on whether or not a broad or 
narrow view is applied in recognising power, legitimacy, and/or urgency of specific interests of stakeholders.
25 Savage et al., above note 18, p. 61. They further distinguish between (i) primary stakeholders as the ones that 
have a direct and necessary economic impact on the organisation, and (ii) secondary stakeholders as the ones that 
are only indirectly part of the companies’ business, but hat can influence the company. To review the different 
stakeholders two dimensions are proposed: (i) the potential threat they represent and (ii) the potential to cooperate 
with these stakeholders.
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power, (ii) legitimacy, and (iii) urgency. The more attributes a stakeholder possesses, 
the more important its interests are. This forms a starting point in distinguishing 
between the many conflicting interests involved in legislative processes. 
3 Stakeholders in Insolvency and Restructuring
As mentioned before, governance plays a key role where it concerns the extent to 
which internal and external stakeholders are involved in a legislative process, to 
which I refer as ‘legislative governance’. Where it concerns the legislative efforts 
of the Commission on harmonising insolvency and restructuring laws, stakeholders 
can be defined, based on the definitions of, in particular, Savage et al., as follows: 
“Stakeholders are all those individuals, groups and other organisations 
that have an interest in the EU legislative process of harmonising 
insolvency and restructuring law and which have the ability to 
influence the choices and decisions the Commission has to make.”
The ability to influence the legislative process will be presumed present for all 
individuals, groups and other organisations that have taken (actively) part in 
any of the activities that the Commission has employed, as will be elaborated in 
section 5, and represent interests that are affected by insolvency and restructuring 
proceedings. For legislative governance, in particular ‘power’ and ‘legitimacy’ 
are important attributes for stakeholders to affect legislation. For ‘urgency’ this is 
different, as urgency will in the course of a legislative process not be an attribute 
likely present with stakeholders in general. Taking the Commission’s perspective 
with a focus on insolvency and restructuring proceedings, a distinction can be 
made between three types of stakeholders which provides the following non-
exhaustive overview of stakeholders:
3.1 Dominant Stakeholders (Attributes: Power and Legitimacy)
Stakeholders for whom power is based on a statutory provision includes:
• European Parliament
• European Council
• Member States
Power can also be based on the direct involvement and central role played by 
certain stakeholders in realising a successful restructuring:
• Banks and other institutional investors
• Non-institutional investors 
• Secured creditors
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3.2 Discretionary Stakeholder (Attribute: Legitimacy)
Legitimacy for various stakeholders is based on their direct involvement in 
insolvency and restructuring proceedings, as is the case for:
• Debtors*
• Shareholders*
• Trade creditors
• Employees
• Tax authorities*
• Judiciary*
• Practitioners (insolvency practitioners,* mediators, supervisors, CROs, 
turnaround professionals)
* While these stakeholders have no statutory power to draft legislation, they 
can, based on different grounds, have some informal power due to their direct 
involvement on insolvency and restructuring proceedings.
For other stakeholders, legitimacy is based on the indirect involvement in 
insolvency and restructuring proceedings, as their involvement is professional or 
based on representation of interests:
• Accountants
• Lawyers (including barristers, solicitors, attorneys-at-law, etc.)
• Labour Unions
• Business Associations
• Trade Unions
3.3 Dormant Stakeholders (Attribute: Power)
Informal power based on independent expertise applies to these stakeholders:
• The Commission’s Group of experts on restructuring and insolvency law26
• Academics
• International Monetary Fund (IMF)
• United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
• World Bank
The above overview shows in part a divide between the formal legislative 
stakeholders versus the ‘other stakeholders’. Though some of these other 
26 This group has been initiated by the European Commission, with the aim of assisting the Commission in its work 
on a legislative proposal on substantive insolvency law. See http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.
cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3362.
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stakeholders may have a powerful informal position, from a strict legal perspective 
this is of secondary importance to that of the legislator. However, as Věra Jourová 
stated, these other stakeholders are the ones “to apply the new rules as well as help 
deliver the benefits to the Single Market”27 
3.4 Conclusion
With regard to the legislative governance of the European Commission concerning 
the involvement of stakeholders in its legislative endeavour on substantive 
insolvency law, stakeholders can be defined as: 
“Stakeholders are all those individuals, groups and other organisations 
that have an interest in the EU legislative process of harmonising 
insolvency and restructuring law and which have the ability to 
influence the choices and decisions the Commission has to make.”
In the field of legislation, ranking of diverse interests of stakeholders can be 
based on two out of the three attributes defined by Mitchell et al. Stakeholders 
can be characterised by their ‘power’ and/or ‘legitimacy’, but in general not with 
‘urgency’. Different groups of stakeholders can be distinguished. The formal 
legislative stakeholders (e.g. the Parliament, Council or Member States) are 
referred to as dominant stakeholders with power and legitimacy of their interests. 
Other stakeholders can have direct (e.g. debtor, shareholders or employees) or 
indirect (e.g. insolvency practitioners or accountants) legitimacy of their interests 
(the so-called discretionary stakeholders). Dormant stakeholders are characterised 
by the power of their interests (e.g. academia). Whereas this approach shows the 
strength of certain interests, it gives no substantive judgement on the value of 
specific interests.
4 Towards Harmonisation of EU Insolvency and Restructuring Laws
Where various developments argue in favour of stakeholder involvement, this was 
not yet the approach when, in 2011, the European Parliament adopted a resolution 
by which it requested the Commission to submit proposals for legislative 
measures with regard to insolvency proceedings in the context of EU company 
law (Resolution).28 This Resolution was the so-called ‘kick-off’ for a series of new 
initiatives in which active stakeholder involvement developed over time.
27 Speech by Commissioner Jourová at 5th European insolvency and restructuring Congress, Brussels, 16 June 2016. 
For the full text see http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/jourova/announcements/speech-commissioner-
jourova-5th-european-insolvency-and-restructuring-congress_en.
28 European Parliament resolution of 15 November 2011 with recommendations to the Commission on insolvency 
proceedings in the context of EU company law (2011/2006(INI)). 
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4.1 The Road towards Harmonisation
The 2011 Resolution of the European Parliament clearly expressed its aim with 
regard to insolvency law:
“insolvency law should be a tool for the rescue of companies at Union 
level”, and also, that “a legal framework should be established that 
better suits cases of companies which are temporarily insolvent.”29
The Commission subsequently employed many activities, this included the 
Resolution at the end of 2012 with a ‘Communication on a new European approach 
to business failure and insolvency’ (Communication),30 but also the Commission’s 
proposal to revise the EIR.31 With regard to the latter, two extensive studies were 
conducted to review the working of the EIR.32An expert group was formed to assist 
the Commission in the drafting process,33 a public consultation was held and two 
meetings took place with national experts. This contributed to the adoption of the 
European Insolvency Regulation (recast) (‘EIR (recast)’) on 20 May 2015.34 
Another landmark was the publication of the Commission’s Recommendation on 
a New approach to business failure and insolvency (Recommendation) in 2014.35 
In the preparation of the Recommendation, the Commission commissioned a study 
to INSOL Europe on national insolvency regimes.36 The Recommendation lays 
down six key topics for Member States to reform national preventive restructuring 
29 Idem, page 3.
30 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and 
Social Committee, A new European approach to business failure and insolvency, 12.12.2012, COM(2012) 742 
final, p. 3, 5-8.
31 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, COM(2012) 744 final, Explanatory 
Memorandum, p. 4 and 5.
32 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the application of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency 
proceedings, COM(2012) 743 final, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/insolvency-report_en.pdf. 
For the comparative legal study see Burkhard Hess, Paul Oberhammer, and Thomas Pfeiffer, “European 
Insolvency Law, The Heidelberg-Luxemburg-Vienna Report on the Application of Regulation (EC) No. 
1346/2000/EC on Insolvency Proceedings (External Evaluation JUST/2011/JCIV/PR/0049/A4)” (2013), available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/evaluation_insolvency_en.pdf. Separately published as: Burkhard Hess, 
Paul Oberhammer and Thomas Pfeiffer, “European Insolvency Law, The Heidelberg-Luxembourg-Vienna 
Report”(2014, C.H. Beck – Hart – Nomos, Baden-Baden).
33 European Commission, Expert group on cross-border insolvency (E02772), 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/
transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2772.
34 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings (recast).
35 Commission Recommendation on a new approach to business failure and insolvency, 12 March 2014, C(2014) 
1500 final.
36 European Commission, Study on a new approach to business failure and insolvency – Comparative legal analysis 
of the Member States’ relevant provisions and practices (submitted by INSOL Europe), 2014.
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frameworks, in order to provide for: (1) restructuring at an early stage, when there 
is a likelihood of insolvency; (2) keeping control over the day-to-day activities of 
the distressed business (debtor-in-possession); (3) requesting a temporary stay of 
individual enforcement actions; (4) adopting a restructuring plan that is binding 
also on dissenting creditors; (5) accepting new finance for the implementation 
of a restructuring plan; and (6) resolving financial distress by employing out-of-
court procedures.37 
Eighteen months after the issuance of the March 2014 Recommendation,38 
the Commission presented an evaluation of the implementation of the 
Recommendation. The Commission concluded that “a few Member States have 
undertaken reforms which, in some cases, resulted in legislation implementing 
the Commission’s Recommendation,” though in some Member States legislative 
proposals are still pending. This has lead the Commission to conclude that the 
Recommendation did not have the desired impact.39
In September 2015 a new initiative was announced with a public consultation on a 
European Capital Markets Union (CMU), with the aim to promote diversification 
of and access to the funding needs of businesses.40 In the subsequent Action Plan 
the Commission considered, out of twenty key actions, ‘insolvency’ as one of the 
key actions for a CMU. It was stated that the Commission: 
“will propose a legislative initiative on business insolvency, including 
early restructuring and second chance, drawing on the experience of 
the Recommendation. The initiative will seek to address the most 
important barriers to the free flow of capital, building on national 
regimes that work well.”41 
In preparation of this proposal for a Restructuring Directive the Commission 
undertook various activities, directed in particular at involving a wide variety 
37 Kristin van Zwieten, “Restructuring law: recommendations from the European Commission”, (2014) Law in 
Transition, pp. 1-9.
38 Articles 35 and 36 of the Recommendation.
39 European Commission, Directorate-General Justice & Consumers of the European Commission, ‘Evaluation of 
the implementation of the Commission Recommendation of 12.3.2014 on a new approach to business failure and 
insolvency’, 30 September 2015, at 2 and 5. See also: European Commission, Directorate-General Justice (A1), 
2016/JUST/025 – Insolvency II, Inception Impact Assessment, 2 March 2016, p. 7.
40 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, 
30.09.2015, COM(2015) 468 final, p. 3.
41 Idem, at p. 26 and 30. This was reiterated in: European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions, “Towards the completion of the Banking Union”, 24 November 2015, COM(2015) 
587 final, p. 10.
Stakeholders and their Influence on Harmonisation of Insolvency Laws in Europe
16 Harmonisation of European Insolvency Law
of stakeholders. Besides some ad-hoc substantive harmonisation of insolvency 
law, on a European level this is the first structural initiative in this regard. Often 
for good reasons, substantive harmonisation of insolvency laws was considered 
impractical and unfeasible.42 Still, since 2012 the Commission has shown its 
dedication to promote the rescue of distressed businesses, although in particular the 
widely diverging national insolvency regimes and the embeddedness of insolvency 
law have been mentioned as a hindrance to harmonisation.43
4.2 The Commission’s Involvement of Stakeholders
With the foregoing in mind, any legislative proposal to substantively harmonise 
insolvency law will have a significant impact on national insolvency regimes. 
Involvement and support for any legislative proposal from such a broad group 
of stakeholders may be compelling for EU Member States too to fine-tune its 
efforts on the Proposal for a Restructuring Directive. It is what could be called 
a horizontal approach where extensive consultation takes place to involve 
stakeholders (already) in preparation of a legislative proposal, contrary to the 
traditional vertical approach where stakeholder involvement relates mostly to 
consultation on a published legislative proposal. 
So far, the Commission has employed various activities in which stakeholders are 
involved, this includes among others:44
• Discussions with a group of experts on restructuring and insolvency law.45 
This group, established in 2015 and expected to continue until 2018, consists 
of some 22 individual experts and 4 institutional observers. The individual 
experts are practitioners, academics, and judges from mostly western European 
countries and are appointed based on their personal capacity. The observers 
42 See e.g. ‘The H-word is out!’ observed by Bob Wessels, “Harmonization of Insolvency Law in Europe” (2011) 
8(1) European Company Law, at 27 et seq. See also Björn Laukemann, “Structural Aspects of Harmonization in 
European Insolvency Law”, in: Jean François Vandrooghenbroeck, “Hommage au Professeur Gilberte Closset-
Marchal” (2013, Louvain-la-Neuve), at 347 et seq, and Christoph Paulus, “Europeanisation of the Member States’ 
Insolvency Laws”, (2015) 3 Nottingham Insolvency and Business Law e-Journal, at 301 et seq.
43 Gert-Jan Boon & Stephan Madaus, “Toward a European Business Rescue Culture”, in: Jan Adriaanse en Jean-
Pierre van der Rest (eds), ‘Turnaround Management and Bankruptcy” (2017, New York: Routledge).
44 See the Commission’s webpage on insolvency: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/commercial/insolvency/
index_en.htm.
45 European Commission, Group of experts on restructuring and insolvency law (E03362), 2015, http://ec.europa.
eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3362. Reports of the expert group’s 
meetings are published at this website. The group consists of 22 experts (comprising academics, judges and 
practitioners) and two international organisations. With regard to the functioning of expert groups they are 
guided, since 2010 by a Communication from the President to the Commission, Framework for Commission 
Expert Groups: Horizontal Rules and Public Register, C(2010) 7649 final which was revised in 2016 with the 
Commission Decision of 30.05.2010 establishing horizontal rules on the creation and operation of Commission 
expert groups, C(2016) 3301 final.
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are public entities, mostly international organisations. The experts assist the 
Commission directly in drafting a legislative proposal.46 These groups in the 
field of insolvency (a previous group on cross-border insolvency was initiated 
to assist on the revision of the EIR)47 are established only for specific matters 
and usually operate on a temporary basis. With the increasing involvement 
of the Commission in insolvency law, they may consider establishing a 
permanent expert group on insolvency law.48
• Stakeholder meetings. In the course of 2016 the Commission organised 
several meetings with diverse stakeholders to discuss the possibilities for a 
legislative proposal. Three informal stakeholder meetings took place in April, 
May, and July, which functioned as a sounding board for the Commission.49 In 
addition, on 12 July 2016 a conference, hosted by the Commission and under 
the auspices of the Slovak Presidency of the Council, was held on convergence 
of insolvency frameworks within the European Union. This conference was 
attended by some 250 representatives of national governments, national 
parliaments, European Commission, European Parliament, courts, insolvency 
practitioners, business associations, consumer associations, academia, lawyers, 
banks, trade unions and labour unions.50 
• Public consultations on an effective insolvency law within the EU. The 
Commission conducted two public consultations where harmonisation of 
insolvency laws was considered. Firstly, in 2015, with regard to the Capital 
Markets Union, a public consultation was conducted in which one question 
touched upon harmonisation of insolvency. Secondly, in 2016, after it 
was announced that a legislative proposal would be prepared, an in-depth 
consultation on harmonisation of insolvency law was conducted. These public 
consultations will be discussed more extensively in section 5.
The above examples of stakeholder involvement took place in 2015 and 2016, in 
the phase where the Commission was preparing its proposal for a Restructuring 
46 Commission Decision of 30.05.2010 establishing horizontal rules on the creation and operation of Commission 
expert groups, C(2016) 3301 final, Article 3(1)(c).
47 European Commission, Expert group on cross-border insolvency (E02772), 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/
transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2772.
48 In contrast to, for example, company law (Group E01456), there is no permanent expert group on insolvency law.
49 These meetings took place on 7 April 2016, 27 May 2016 and 18 July 2016. The minutes of the meeting of 
the informal stakeholder group are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/commercial/insolvency/
index_en.htm. Participants of these meetings included: BusinessEurope, AFME, EBF, ACCA, UEAPME, ESBA, 
Independent Retail Europe, EuroChambers, ETUC, EFIN, FEE, INSOL Europe, FDC, The Council of Bars and 
Law Societies of Europe, and the European Law Institute.
50 For more information on this event see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/events/160712_en.htm. A video-
recording of the conference is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/events/160712_en.htm.
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Directive, and where no draft texts were publicly available. It is not certain whether 
stakeholders will be involved now that the proposal has been published. In October 
2016, the Commissioner stated in this regard: “[i]n our preparatory work, we paid 
attention to the opinions of all stakeholders, including national parliaments.”51 
Besides the group of experts, which is expected to continue until 2018,52 no further 
details have been announced whether and to what extent the Commission will 
continue to involve stakeholders in the legislative process.
4.3 Conclusion
Since the 2011 Resolution of the European Parliament, the Commission has 
been dedicated to promote the rescue of financially distressed but economically 
viable businesses. This has resulted, in particular, in a Communication (2012), 
a Recommendation (2014) and a legislative proposal in (2016). Also the EIR 
(recast), adopted on 20 May 2015, extends its scope with regard to specific 
restructuring proceedings. Until 2015, the involvement of stakeholders has been 
limited. Besides some studies and an expert group, stakeholders in general were 
hardly involved. At the same time, studies on national regimes, but also analyses 
of the Commission and the European Parliament pointed out that any legislative 
effort in this regard would be complex. This is, in particular, due to (i) the widely 
differing national insolvency regimes, and (ii) the great extent to which insolvency 
law is embedded in other fields of law. Harmonisation efforts will therefore 
touch upon the interests of the many affected stakeholders. This is also why the 
involvement of stakeholders by means of expert groups, stakeholder meetings and 
public consultations, comes as no surprise. This involvement took off especially 
after the preparation of a legislative proposal was announced. Interestingly, the 
Commission has not made comments yet on how stakeholders will be involved 
now the proposal for a Restructuring Directive has been published, except for the 
group of experts that will continue to assist the Commission until 2018.
5 Stakeholder Sentiments: the Public Consultations on CMU and on an 
Effective European Insolvency Framework
The involvement of stakeholders has already shed light on their sentiments 
towards harmonising insolvency law. To gain an overview, the Commission’s 
51 Speech by Commissioner Jourová to the Legal Affairs Committee and EU Affairs Committee in the Bundestag: 
Anti-money Laundering, European Public Prosecutor’s Office, Digital Contracts, and Insolvency (26 September 
2016), SPEECH/16/3189. For the full text see http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3189_
en.htm.
52 See the Call for a Group of Experts on insolvency and restructuring, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/
regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3362.
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public consultations that touched upon matters of insolvency are useful. They 
show what the targeted audience is, what topics they are requested to respond 
too, what types of respondents are involved, and what their positions are. First 
of all, in 2015 a consultation was held with regard to the initiative on a Capital 
Markets Union (CMU),53 in which the Commission also surveyed on the need and 
possible topics for harmonisation of insolvency laws.54 Subsequently, in 2016 a 
public consultation was conducted more specifically on the feasibility and scope of 
possible EU legislative measures regarding insolvency frameworks.55 I will briefly 
describe both consultations.
5.1 Public Consultation on Building a Capital Markets Union
In 2015 the Commission surveyed on harmonising insolvency laws in Europe 
with the public consultation on the CMU, and asked respondents: “What specific 
aspects of insolvency laws would need to be harmonised in order to support 
the emergence of a pan-European capital market?”56 From the responses the 
Commission concluded that a lack of harmonised insolvency law is regarded as 
one of the main barriers to bank and non-bank direct lending to companies, and 
that indeed harmonisation of certain aspects of insolvency law is recommended.57 
The stakeholders that took part in this public consultation, however, took varying 
positions on harmonisation. The Commission summarised their positions 
as follows:58
• Banks favour reform of certain aspects of national insolvency regimes at the 
EU level.
53 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, 
30.09.2015, COM(2015) 468 final.
54 Public Consultation: Building a Capital Markets Union, from 18 February 2015-13 May 2015, see http://
ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/capital-markets-union/index_en.htm. 
55 Consultation on an effective insolvency framework within the EU, from 23 March 2016-14 June 2016, see http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/160321_en.htm. 
56 This public consultation ran from 18 February 2015 to 13 May 2015 and was based on the Commission’s Green 
Paper ‘Building a Capital Markets Union, 19.02.2015’. The responses to the questionnaire were made available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/publication/capital-markets-union-2015?surveylanguage=en. A summary of 
the responses is provided in Commission Staff Working Document, Feedback Statement on the Green Paper 
“Building a Capital Markets Union” Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union of 30.9.2015, SWD(2015) 184 final, see http://
ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/capital-markets-union/docs/summary-of-responses_en.pdf.
57 Commission Staff Working Document, Feedback Statement on the Green Paper “Building a Capital Markets 
Union” Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan on 
Building a Capital Markets Union of 30.9.2015, SWD(2015) 184 final, at 2.6 and in the accompanying Annex at 
Q 5.6, Q15.1, Q16.1, Q19.1, Q24, Q27.1, Q27.2, and Q29.
58 Idem, at Q29.3.
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• Pension funds and other financial intermediaries noted that the diverging 
national insolvency laws should be reformed, but this is a long-term project.
• Member States and Ministries of Finance were hesitant about harmonisation. 
They might consider a step-by-step approach in increasing approximation of 
national insolvency laws, possibly accompanied by measures to strengthen 
national insolvency frameworks.
• Central Banks showed support for a more comprehensive reform of the 
diverging national insolvency regimes
• Capital Market Regulators similarly expressed support for a reform of 
insolvency regimes, as the current differences create barriers to cross-border 
investments.
• Business Associations showed diverse responses on the harmonisation of 
insolvency laws. 
• SME Representatives expressed that efficiency and effectiveness of insolvency 
practitioners and courts could be improved with harmonisation.
• Labour Unions support a wide ranging harmonisation of insolvency 
frameworks.
• Research Institutes favour harmonisation to realise better re-allocation of 
capital and bring more economic growth.
Most respondents emphasised the differences between national insolvency 
regimes as a prime reason for reform or harmonisation of national insolvency 
laws. However, the Commission noticed that, in particular, Member States and 
Ministries of Finance seemed more cautious (see figure 2). Out of the twelve 
substantive responses from Governments and Ministries,59 five showed some 
interest to further study possibilities for partial harmonisation, including Austria, 
the Czech Republic, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.60 
59 Responses to the public consultation were received from several Governments/Ministries, those from Austria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, States of Guernsey, Hungary, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, 
Jersey, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom were published. Only twelve 
of these responses touched upon the issue of harmonisation of insolvency law, six responses provided no answer.
60 Commission Staff Working Document, Feedback Statement on the Green Paper “Building a Capital Markets 
Union” Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan on 
Building a Capital Markets Union of 30.9.2015, SWD(2015) 184 final, see the Annex at Q29, see http://ec.europa.
eu/finance/consultations/2015/capital-markets-union/docs/summary-of-responses_en.pdf. 
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Figure 2: Sentiments of Member States and Ministries of Finance towards 
harmonisation
Other responses stated that harmonisation would not be desirable or that current 
measures would suffice. However, out of all responses to the consultation, there 
appears to be significantly more support for substantive harmonisation (to some 
extent), compared to those favouring no substantive harmonisation.61
The respondents to the public consultation made various suggestions for specific 
topics which would be ready for harmonisation: 
• Common definitions of e.g. default, avoidance actions, restructuring of 
companies, stay on individual creditor claims, discharge period, and close-
out-netting;
• Preventive restructuring proceedings, out-of-court, and hybrid restructuring 
proceedings;
• Communications on the opening of insolvency proceedings and measures to 
be taken upon commencement;
• Requirements for opening insolvency proceedings;
• Ring-fencing of a client’s securities (for insolvent financial intermediaries);
• Ranking of creditor’s claims;
61 From the 346 public responses, about 25% of the responses showed support (to some degree) for substantive 
harmonisation, against less than 10% of the respondents stating substantive harmonisation would not be desirable 
or possible (considering the great divergences among countries). Most of the remaining respondents did not 
answer Q29 on harmonisation of insolvency law.
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• Qualifications, tasks and rights of insolvency practitioners;
• Liability of directors and shadow directors;
• Time cap on insolvency proceedings;
• Establishment of EU register with information on insolvencies;
• Single form for petition of claims;
• Second chance for entrepreneurs; and
• Personal insolvency.
The consultation, which was open to all citizens and organisations, resulted in 
some 422 responses from a wide variety of stakeholders.62 
From the responses the Commission derived that insolvency proceedings are 
considered a key barrier to a Capital Markets Union, especially as inefficiency and 
the great diversity of national insolvency regimes inhibit the possibility to assess 
the risks associated with making cross-border investments. It was often commented 
that harmonisation is not only complex, in particular due to its embeddedness in 
other fields of law, but also a long-term rather than short-term endeavour. 
5.2 Public Consultation on Effective Insolvency Frameworks
For a period of twelve weeks (23 March 2016 to 14 June 2016), the Commission 
also held a public consultation directed at distinguishing the barriers to effective 
insolvency frameworks within the EU.63 It relates especially to the:
“efficient organisation of debt restructuring procedures” and “the 
rationale and the process for debt discharge for entrepreneurs (and its 
possible extension to consumers).”64
62 In total some 422 respondents from across the 27 Member States and beyond submitted a response on the 32 
questions of this consultation (346 responses were made public). This includes (representatives of) Member States 
and Ministries (of Finance), non-governmental organisations, international or European organisations, industry/
business associations, trade unions, companies, SME’s, micro-enterprises, sole traders, private individuals, banks, 
pension funds, central banks, capital market regulators and supervisors, consumer organisations, think tanks and 
research institutes.
63 The Commission reported on this public consultation in its proposal for a Restructuring Directive. There were 
over 260 respondents, from the 27 Member States. At the time of finalizing this chapter, the responses to the 
public consultation itself were not yet published.
64 European Commission, Webpage on the Consultation on an effective insolvency framework within the EU, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/160321_en.htm. See also the introduction to the questionnaire 
of the public consultation itself.
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Against the backdrop that the absence of a harmonised approach to insolvency 
is preventing the proper functioning and development of capital markets, the 
Commission stated as its aim: 
“[i]it seeks views with regard to common principles and standards 
which could ensure that national insolvency frameworks work well, 
especially in a cross-border context.”65
The consultation has predominantly an explorative character, as the results would 
be used to devise relevant topics for the Commission’s legislative proposal. As a 
consequence, the scope of this survey is broad, it includes basically all key aspects 
of insolvency.66
The consultation is based, in particular, on the 2014 Commission Recommendation 
which is also reflected in the above mentioned topics. In this consultation the 
Commission was open to the “views and input from the broadest public possible.” 
This envisaged audience reflects diverse groups of possible stakeholders, including:
“citizens, companies (including SMEs and entrepreneurs), business 
associations, public authorities, consumer organisations, as well as 
insolvency practitioners, researchers and think tanks, courts and 
public administrative bodies at international, EU-wide, national, 
regional and/or local levels”.67
The results of this public consultation shows that Member States take different 
positions to the other stakeholders. This is in line with the public consultation on 
the CMU. The Member States, in general, preferred a principle based approach, as 
the embeddedness of insolvency laws prevents more substantive harmonisation at 
this point. The other stakeholders, however, were in favour of a framework with 
65 Idem.
66 The topics include among others: effect of differences between the laws of the Member States, in particularly at 
newly established companies and saving distressed but viable companies; involvement of courts in restructuring 
procedures; publicity for restructuring procedures; assessment of the viability of a distressed debtor; debtor-in-
possession; stay; adoption of restructuring plan and cram-down; protection of rescue finance; directors’ liability; 
second chance for over-indebted honest debtors (entrepreneurs and consumers); recovery of debts, including 
ranking of claims and avoidance actions; professional standards for insolvency practitioners; and disqualification 
of debtors. See also: Questionnaire for the public consultation on an effective insolvency framework within the EU. 
Responses to the consultation could also be submitted by (e-)mail to the DG Justice, Unit A1 – Civil Justice Policy. 
67 European Commission, Webpage on the Consultation on an effective insolvency framework within the EU, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/160321_en.htm.
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minimum rules on early recourse for distressed businesses and a second chance for 
honest bankrupt entrepreneurs.68
5.3 Conclusion
From the public consultations in 2015 and 2016 on insolvency I observe that, 
in general, there is support for furthering the adoption of a European insolvency 
framework. The major divergences between the regimes of Member States create 
a barrier for harmonisation, as well as the embeddedness of insolvency law. At 
the same time, it necessitates action from the Commission in order to promote 
the free flow of capital across the EU as well as the assessment of investment 
risks. This support is given by a variety of stakeholders, including banks, central 
banks, capital market regulators, business associations, labour unions and research 
institutes, which are mostly the so-called dormant and discretionary stakeholders.
Most notably, the Member States and the Ministries of Finance (they can be 
classified as dominant stakeholders), seem to lack ambition and support for 
substantive harmonisation. They appeared reluctant or sometimes even dismissive 
in considering any further substantive harmonisation. Perhaps, this could have been 
derived already from the mild adoption of the Commission’s Recommendation 
but also national political considerations can play a role here. The results of 
the Commission’s public consultations provide further insight in the position 
of Member States, and show that Member States are more reluctant than other 
stakeholders to pursue a significant attempt toward substantive harmonisation.
6 The Way Forward with Stakeholders
The previous conclusion leads to the (for some not so surprising) observation 
that expectations for a legislative instrument on harmonising EU insolvency and 
restructuring law should not be too farfetched. In principle, one could regard this 
as a situation where most of the dormant and discretionary stakeholders take 
a different position to that of the dominant stakeholders. The support of other 
stakeholders, especially from practice, may promote the Commission’s initiative 
with, for example, Member States. Where a standstill in the legislation might be 
risked, the Commission could draw on experiences from other fields by introducing 
‘semi-legislation’, based on self-regulation. This would be in line with the ‘open 
method of coordination’, as suggested by Ian Fletcher and Bob Wessels, where 
68 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Union and the Council on preventive 
restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency 
and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU of 22 November 2016, COM(2016) 723 final, 
Explanatory Memorandum, p. 17.
25
traditional hierarchical legislation is supported by soft-law instruments.69 With 
Recital 48 EIR (Recast) I will try to illustrate how semi-legislation can assist in 
the insolvency endeavour.
6.1 Inspiration from Recital 48 EIR (Recast) 
In the EIR (recast) the obligations for cooperation and communication have been 
extended significantly. Not only insolvency practitioners, but also courts must 
cooperate and communicate closely with each other in cross-border insolvency 
cases.70 The EIR (recast) has left room to further specify how this cooperation and 
communication should actually take place, as is stated in Recital 48 EIR (recast):
“[…] When cooperating, insolvency practitioners and courts 
should take into account best practices for cooperation in cross-
border insolvency cases, as set out in principles and guidelines 
on communication and cooperation adopted by European and 
international organisations active in the area of insolvency law, and 
in particular the relevant guidelines prepared by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).”
The EU legislator has given explicit room to groups of European or international 
stakeholders to develop further guidance on communication and cooperation 
by insolvency practitioners and courts. This novelty (in the field of European 
insolvency law) can be an effective approach to allow for a sort of harmonisation 
based on self-regulation by means of principles and guidelines, but within the 
scope of an EU legislative instrument.71 
Formulating such provisions should receive considerable attention. Recital 48 of 
the EIR (recast), for example, states that in particular the guidelines prepared by 
UNICTRAL are relevant. Remarkably, UNCITRAL has provided no ‘guidelines’ 
with regard to communication and cooperation. It is therefore not clear what the EU 
legislator is referring to. Perhaps it is the UNICTRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency (1997) with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation (revised in 2013) 
where Articles 25-27 relate to cooperation and communication in cross-border 
69 Fletcher and Wessels, above note 2, paragraphs 146 and 216. See also http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/
open_method_coordination.html.
70 Articles 41-44 EIR (recast), for group-proceedings comparable obligations have been provided for insolvency 
practitioners and courts, see Articles 56-59 EIR (recast).
71 Another example where the importance of self-regulation and soft law was emphasized concerns the review of 
the EU Mediation Directive in 2016, see: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council 
and the European Economic and Social Committee on the application of Directive 2008/52/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters, 26 August 2016, 
COM(2016) 542 final.
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insolvency cases.72 At the same time, the EIR (recast) may refer to the UNCITRAL 
Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation (2009) which provides, 
for example, insights on cooperation and sample clauses for insolvency agreements 
(also known as protocols).73 Alternatively it could refer to the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: The Judicial Perspective (2013) which provides 
also some guidance to courts on cooperation and communication. Therefore, the 
EU legislator should provide stakeholders with clear directions on the scope, status 
and adoption of principles and guidelines.74
6.2 Conclusion
Where support from the Member States (dominant stakeholders) may be lacking 
for substantive harmonisation of insolvency law, despite the support from dormant 
and discretionary stakeholders, we could draw from experiences in other fields. 
Here, examples with regard to ‘semi-legislation’, based on self-regulation, show 
how the EU legislator can involve stakeholders also in executing EU law by 
creating room for non-binding principles and guidelines on matters where EU 
legislation is absent. 
The EIR (recast), leaves room for self-regulation in Recital 18. It states – in brief 
– that insolvency practitioners and courts should take into account principles and 
guidelines on communication and cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases 
adopted by European and international organisations. Within the scope of an EU 
instrument, and within certain conditions, stakeholders are permitted to develop 
principle and best practices.
It illustrates an alternative for the EU legislator when support for (specific parts of) 
harmonisation is lacking. Stakeholders, in particular from practice and academia, 
could function as the place where such principles and best practices could be jointly 
developed to further specific elements of an effective restructuring framework for 
distressed businesses in Europe.
72 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency Law, 1997, with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation, 
2013, available at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency.html. See also Bob Wessels and 
Gert-Jan Boon, “Cross-Border Insolvency Law: International Instruments and Commentary, second edition” 
(2015, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn), paragraph 8. 
73 UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation, 2009, available at: http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency.html. See also Bob Wessels and Gert-Jan Boon, “Cross-Border Insolvency 
Law: International Instruments and Commentary, second edition” (2015, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan 
den Rijn), paragraph 11.
74 UNCITRAL Model Law: the Judicial Perspective, 2011, available at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/insolvency.html. See also Bob Wessels and Gert-Jan Boon, “Cross-Border Insolvency Law: 
International Instruments and Commentary, second edition” (2015, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den 
Rijn), paragraph 14.
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7 Conclusion
In this section I will summarise the findings and present conclusions.
In its preparatory work for a legislative proposal on substantive harmonisation 
of insolvency laws in Europe, the European Commission has given stakeholders 
a prominent role. However, it remains undecided who these stakeholders are, 
why the Commission is involving them, but also whether and to what extent it is 
justifiable to involve them in a legislative process. 
In sections 2 and 3 I elaborated on what stakeholders are, in particular regarding 
the Commission’s legislative governance, and how different stakeholders can 
be distinguished. Following the definition of Savage et al., stakeholders need 
(i) to have an interest in the actions of an organisation, which I argue is present 
when an organisation’s actions affect these interests, and (ii) be able to influence 
the organisation. The Commission does not apply a formal approach to these 
dimensions of stakeholders, as also non-legislative parties are involved in its 
activities and considered a stakeholder. Concerning the legislative governance of 
the Commission, stakeholders can be defined as: 
“all those individuals, groups and other organisations that have an 
interest in the EU legislative process of harmonising insolvency and 
restructuring law and which have the ability to influence the choices 
and decisions the Commission has to make.”
With the Commission’s broad perspective on stakeholders, differentiation of 
stakeholders is even more complex. Interests can be distinguished on the basis of 
the salience of interests. Salience consists of the attributes (i) power, (ii) legitimacy 
and (iii) urgency. Urgency will, in general, not be an attribute likely present for 
stakeholders in a legislative process. Prioritising of interests, without prejudice to 
specific interests, can be based on the number of attributes they possess. This leads 
to three types of stakeholders in the legislative governance of the Commission:
(1) Dominant stakeholders: they possess both power and legitimacy. This includes 
foremost the formal legislative bodies, such as the Council and the European 
Parliament.
(2) Discretionary stakeholders: they possess legitimacy. It relates to direct and 
indirect parties involved in insolvency proceedings, such as debtors, creditors 
and employees, but also insolvency practitioners and trade unions.
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(3) Dormant stakeholders: they possess power. This group includes for example 
academics, the Commission’s expert group, but also international organisations 
such as the IMF, UNCITRAL and the World Bank.
In section 4, it is argued that stakeholder involvement developed only over time. 
The debates on harmonising substantive insolvency law started with a resolution 
of the European Parliament in 2011. A subsequent milestone was the publication 
of the 2014 Commission’s Recommendation on a new approach to business failure 
and insolvency. Input for this Recommendation was, in particular, the study on 
national insolvency regimes that was conducted by INSOL Europe. The evaluation 
in 2015 on the adoption of the Recommendation showed, however, that it had 
limited effect on national regimes. The Commission, at the time, also worked 
on the EIR (recast), which was adopted on 20 May 2015. In these efforts, the 
Commission was supported not only by extensive studies on the EIR, but also a 
temporary group of experts and meetings with national experts.
In 2015, subsequent to the evaluation of the Recommendation, the Commission 
published the Action Plan on a Capital Markets Union and announced a legislative 
proposal on harmonising insolvency law. From here on stakeholders were more 
actively involved by the Commission. The Commission initiated a new (temporary) 
group of experts to assist in the preparations for the legislative proposal. From 
April till July 2016, multiple meetings were organised for extensive debate with a 
broad variety of stakeholders on the possibilities for harmonisation. Also, public 
consultations were conducted to gather insights from the wider public. These 
efforts have led to ample response from stakeholders.
It was shown in section 5 that Member States showed some reluctance to 
substantively harmonise insolvency laws, but that general principles are welcomed. 
At the same time other stakeholders, including central banks, pension funds, 
Member States, business associations, SME representatives, labour unions, and 
research institutes, are supportive of a minimum framework to rescue distressed 
businesses and provide a second chance to honest bankrupt entrepreneurs.
Finally, in section 6, I propose that the current sentiment of all stakeholders 
does not prevent the Commission from furthering approximation of insolvency 
frameworks. Before, the Commission experienced similar situations with differing 
perspectives of stakeholders, and where different approaches based on semi-
legislation were adopted. Inspiration could be drawn from the EIR (recast). In this 
regulation, Recital 48 allows explicitly for European or international organisations 
to adopt principles and guidelines to further cross-border insolvency cooperation 
and communication. These examples illustrate how promoting effective European 
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restructuring frameworks for distressed business may be given shape by means 
of semi-legislation, even where stakeholder perspectives are diverging. With 
guidance from the EU legislator, there could be room in legislative measures for 
contributions from stakeholders.
From all this it can be concluded that stakeholders are becoming increasingly 
important for the EU legislator in designing and executing EU legislation. 
Traditionally, stakeholders have been involved, for example, in providing 
comments on a legislative proposal (this could be called a vertical approach). 
This provides the legislator with the information on how stakeholders perceive 
the proposal. The Commission has, in developing a proposal for a Restructuring 
Directive, decided to involve stakeholders right from the start and in multiple 
ways. They have been given a prominent role in discussing what a feasible 
and desirable direction is for a draft legislative proposal (this could be called a 
horizontal approach). This would not only help the Commission to better adapt 
its proposal to the insights derived from these stakeholders, but has provided the 
Commission also with a new partner in its efforts so far.
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Chapter 2
The Role of Judiciary for a Greater 
Convergence of European Insolvency Law
Nicoleta Mirela Nastasie
1 Introduction
In the new environment of globalization, national laws develop an increasingly 
internationalized orientation. Differences in insolvency regimes and their 
impact on EU investments in the Internal Market, unification, approximation or 
harmonization of Insolvency EU Law and structures are burning issues within the 
European Union not only for law-makers, but also for the judiciary.
In the doctrine some terms have been used to define the process of obtaining 
a “higher degree of similarity”: unification, convergence, harmonisation, 
approximation. Harmonisation has been characterised as a process “in which 
diverse elements of legal system are combined or adapted to each other in aim to 
create a coherent body of rules or principles”. It is a legislative activity, different 
from convergence, seen as a “global phenomenon that transcends different 
legal orders.”1
It is interesting the use of terms as “interaction, synchronisation, adjustment, unity, 
coherence” to describe this complex and coordinated process, able to create and 
improve “a world-class European insolvency law and regulatory framework.”2 
Harmonisation was also considered as a “standardization regarding issues 
implicating core insolvency concern.”3 In the academic world of insolvency 
law, it is not questionable anymore that modern reality necessitates a modified 
universalism. In addition, if harmonisation is an essential tool for modified 
1 I. Fletcher and B. Wessels, “Perspectives on Harmonisation of Insolvency Law in Europe”, in Harmonization of 
Insolvency Law in Europe, Report (2012, Kluwer, Deventer) pp. 107-135. 
2 B. Wessels, “Amending the EU Insolvency Regulation: Shaken or Stirred?”, in R. Parry (ed), The Reform of 
International Insolvency Rules at European and National Leve (2011, INSOL Europe, Nottingham, Paris) pp. 
125 – 135.
3 I. Mevorach, “The Prospect of Standardization of Insolvency Laws in Europe- Learning from UNCITRAL’s 
Work on Enterprise Groups and Directors’ Duties” in Substantive Harmonisation and Convergence of Laws in 
Europe (2012, INSOL Europe, Nottingham) at 18.
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universalism, it is important to find out the proper methods and mechanisms for 
its most efficient form.
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) does not provide 
explicit legal basis “to the approximation of insolvency law”, but Article 114 
TFEU (measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by the law ) 
and Article 81 TFEU (cross-border judicial cooperation) “may serve as legal basis 
for harmonization.” 4
However, is legislative intervention sufficient and strong enough to reach this 
scope in a short time, or is concentrated action of the judiciary, professionals, 
and other actors involved in international insolvency necessary to develop an 
efficient process?
The judiciary is the key institution in the insolvency system. Consequently one 
fundamental question is to establish how the judiciary could participate to the 
European process of harmonization of insolvency law.
2 Methods for the Judiciary to Metamorphose into a more Coherent System
The progress of institutional capacity could increase the role of judges in 
supervision of insolvency procedures. But we should not forget that promoting 
the fundamental values of a judicial system, such as procedural fairness, efficiency, 
accessibility, and confidence, the insolvency domain is able to transform the 
system itself.
2.1 Judicial Institutional Capacity in the EU – a Comparative Perspective 
2.1.1 A Common Definition of “Court”
There is no common definition of “court” or a harmonised professional status 
of judges involved in insolvency cases. The term needs some clarification to 
make it less confused and more comprehensible. From the Insolvency Regulation 
perspective, the concept of a “court” includes a broad meaning of the judicial body 
or any other competent body of a Member State, empowered to open insolvency 
proceedings or to take decisions in the course of such proceedings.5 According 
to the European Court of Justice’s jurisprudence, a functional criterion, not the 
4 I. Fletcher and B. Wessels, above note 1.
5 Article 2(d) and Recital (10), Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings of 29 May 2000 
( OJ 2000, L 160/1).
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national definition, has relevance to establish whether an authority represents 
a “court”.6
The nature, history, influence, and authority of a court are factors in determining 
significant variations of judicial identity. In the doctrine were described four 
major problems affecting the judiciary system: judicial selection and discipline, 
additional duties and non-judicial functions, the freedom of speech and the need 
for an environment of trust and confidence.7
2.1.2 Institutional Differences 
The Report on the judicial system 2014, CEPEJ8 emphasizes the diversity of the 
persons defined as “judges” by the status and functions, through the categories 
identified across Europe: professional judges; those who have been trained and 
who are paid as such; professional judges practicing on an occasional basis; non-
professional judges; and volunteers who give decisions in courts.9 It was observed 
that the number of professional judges sitting in courts varies considerably 
between countries and judicial systems, higher in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Some systems, such as Portugal and Romania, rely completely on professional 
judges. In other systems, such as in Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Germany or the 
UK-England and Wales, lay judges have a significant role. The UK has a low 
number of professional judges (less than 4 per 100.000 inhabitants). The justice 
system uses lay judges in more than 90 % of cases. According to conclusions 
of the reports,10 from the analysis of the judicial data between 2004 and 2014, 
the European judicial landscape has evolved in key areas. Among others, this 
includes “the protection of the independence of judges and of the principles of 
a fair trial within a reasonable time, the promotion and protection of access to 
justice, efficient and effective court organisation, adequate judicial proceedings 
and public service”.11
6 HSB Wohnbau, Case C-86/00, ECJ 10 July 2001. 
7 For details and explanations see H P Lee (ed) “Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective” (2011, CUP, Cambridge).
8 The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) is an unique body for all European States, made 
up of qualified experts from the 47 Council of Europe member states, to assess the efficiency of judicial systems 
and propose practical tools and measures for working towards an increasingly efficient service for the public, for 
details see http://www.coe.int/T/dghl/cooperation/cepej/default_en.asp (last viewed 14 October 2016).
9 “Report on “European Judicial Systems – Edition 2014 (2012 data): Efficiency and Quality of Justice, The 
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) available from: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/
cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2014/Rapport_2014_en.pdf (last viewed 14 October 2016) pp. 155- 159 and 
Report on “European judicial systems – Edition 2016 (2014 data): efficiency and quality of justice, The European 
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), available from http://www.coe.int/T/dghl/cooperation/cepej/
evaluation/2016/publication/CEPEJ%20Study%2023%20report%20EN%20web.pdf (last viewed 14 October 
2016) p. 81. 
10 Ibid, pp.264, pp. 199.
11 Ibid, p.264.
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After an analysis of the courts’ role in 12 Member States, provided by the Judicial 
Wing of INSOL Europe in 2013, it was observed that in some states courts are 
not involved in grounding solutions in insolvency cases, they have a passive and 
supervisory role, in contrast to insolvency administrators.12 But even in these 
systems, based on the traditional role of the courts, a judge’s competence in 
insolvency problems, such as debtors’ reorganisations or rescues, is paramount.
As Professor Westbrook observed in 2015, an important issue to determine is 
whether insolvency proceedings will be private (contractual bankruptcy) or public. 
The protection of the public interest indicates the importance of public control 
in proceedings, an actual issue and a problem for the future of the international 
insolvency domain. There are two options described in EU legal systems. The 
first is the United Kingdom and many common law countries’ orientation to a 
private insolvency system. The second model in most civil systems is orientated 
to the public and third parties’ interest. They are different from the United States’ 
system, where “the bankruptcy law has exerted strong control over the exercise 
of the secured party’s rights.”13 It is interesting to surmise whether there will be 
some harmonisation in this matter and the effects it may have on the judicial 
institutional system.
An important problem is the courts’ specialisation. It is recognised that in some 
civil law countries, such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Germany, there 
are not specialised judges for insolvency cases. Other issues, such as differences 
between financial institutional budgets, discrepancies between the professional 
judges status, are seen as major obstacles towards harmonization.14
The court’s infrastructure, poor available means, and the career judicial system in 
which judges are moved from one court to another, or to one specialized domain 
to another on a regular basis, make it difficult for judges to specialise in the field 
of insolvency. The principle of specialisation has to find an equitable balance with 
the coherence of the national legal systems. Harmonisation of EU insolvency law 
through judges’ activity dealing with insolvency cases may be easier than for those 
judges faced with public enforcement or civil cases. 
12 H. Vallender “The Role of the Judge in the Restructuring of Companies Within Insolvency” in The Role of the 
Judge in Nomination, Supervision and Removal of the Insolvency Representative: Judicial Wing INSOL Europe 
(2013, INSOL Europe, Nottingham). 
13 J. L. Westbrook, “The Present and Future of Multinational Insolvency, in P Omar and Rebecca Parry (eds) 
International Insolvency Law: Future Perspectives (2015, INSOL Europe, Nottingham) p. 9. 
14 Bob Wessels, “On the Future of European Insolvency Law, in INSOL Europe Academic Forum’s 5th Edwin 
Coe lecture, Leiden Law School Brussels, 2012 available from: https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/
futureofeuropeaninsolvencylaw.pdf, (last viewed 14 October 2016).
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The institutional organisation has been studied by CEPEJ. According to the CEPEJ 
2014 Report, European states experience the greatest difficulties in managing 
insolvency cases. In most of the EU states, courts cannot cope with the larger 
volume of cases, which leads to delays and increasing durations, with more 
than 2,500 days in Italy and more than 1,000 days in Spain, partially because of 
the economic crisis, together with “the specificity of the procedures that varies 
according to the national systems”.15 The data for 2014 confirms the results. 60% 
of the states were able to solve fewer cases than those received and these cases 
would require more than two and a half years to be solved. The reported duration 
of case proceedings in 2014 was particularly long in France, Italy, and Turkey.16
In some systems, such as Romania, judges have to participate in an excessive 
number of cases and in procedures based on hearings for almost all petitions and 
stages, which encumber the courts. 
2.1.3 Education and Training
There are many issues affecting the judicial efficiency in dealing with insolvency 
cases in civil courts and common law courts: insufficient commercial expertise, 
differences in continuing education, and insufficient experience in complex cases.
It was observed that in some Member States, the knowledge of the Insolvency 
Regulation is insufficiently developed. Judges have no proper experience in 
international insolvency cases and most do not know a second language.17 A large 
number of judges do not speak another language than the national one. Especially 
in cross-border insolvency cases in Europe many courts agree “that it is for the 
administrators to smoothly and effectively run their proceedings”, but local 
language in proceedings is mandatory and translations are constantly requested 
for all documents transmitted to the court.18 That is usually a matter of domestic 
law, but maybe an expression of the passive attitude of the judiciary.
It is a fact that in some jurisdictions judges are more active in the process, being 
involved as a supervisory, directing, giving instructions, and controlling most of 
proceedings, not just the opening and adjudication of litigation. When judicial 
power in economic and business resolutions or the viability of a reorganisation plan 
15 Above note 9, CEPEJ, p.264.
16 Ibid, pp. 199 & 264.
17 A. Sadler, “Practice Obstacles in Cross-border Litigation and Communication between (EU) Courts” (2012) 5(3) 
Erasmus Law Review 151-168.
18 EU Cross-Border Insolvency, Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles, Final Public Draft (extended version) 
June 2014, pp. 58, available from http://www.tri-leiden.eu/uploads/files/Final_Public_Draft_-_EU_JudgeCo_
Principles.pdf, (last viewed 14 October 2016).
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is increased, this situation necessitates superior economic expertise and abilities. 
Of course, not all judicial systems offer the opportunity to attain such expertise 
for all judges involved in insolvency procedures. What is the proper solution for 
a predictable and efficient institutional insolvency system; to reduce the powers 
and judicial involvement to the minimum possible,19 or to search financial and 
structural resources to increase judicial skills and knowledge, aptitudes to operate 
as an active player in the process? The question is still in need of an answer. 
The efforts of EU training institutes or national judicial formation providers for 
education on economic aspects related to insolvency law are not great. When 
the number of judges who could potentially be involved in insolvency cases is 
relatively large, it means that in reality a small number of them actually deal with 
such cases or with cross-border insolvency. 
There are few opportunities for judges to meet their colleagues from other States 
who are involved in international insolvency law, or to participate in distance-
learning courses or programs. Regarding judicial training, the CEPEJ’s last Report 
established that the financial effort is limited to less than 1% of the budget of the 
courts on average, less than 0,1 % in Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Italy, 
Malta, Republic of Moldova, Romania, and the UK-England and Wales, although 
judicial training should be a higher priority for the European states.20
2.2 Relation to Other State Powers and Legal Orders
The relation to other state powers and legal orders is another subject for reflection 
in the process of searching the best solutions for a more coherent EU insolvency 
system, keeping in mind the connections with other states authorities and also the 
relationships between legal systems.
]Scholars exploring the field are talking about internationalisation of the judiciary 
or the development of a transnational law. The theory of judicial interests 
expresses the idea that the judiciary is not “an epistemic community” but rather a 
bureaucracy, with significant differences, and that European law could also support 
or threaten judges “independence, influence and authority vis-à-vis other courts 
and political bodies”. The process depends on how a judge understands his or her 
role in the political process.21
19 Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform, “Insolvency Reforms in Asia: An Assessment of the Implementation 
Process and the Role of Judiciary” Bali, Indonesia, 7-8 February 2001, Synthesis Note 1.
20 Above note 9, pp. 43 & 479.
21 K. J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe 
(2001, OUP, Oxford) pp. 39.
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From another perspective, it is important to search for coherence in the definition 
of concept of judicial independence and to find the right balance between judicial 
independence and public responsibility of judges. Fairness is particularly important 
in a collective process. It therefore requires supervision by a credible and impartial 
institution, which has independence as key word.
When examining judicial developments, we have to analyse the relationship to 
other systems, such as the legislature, government, and international legal orders, 
but also internal factors affecting connections between courts and judges. Recent 
legal and social transformations of insolvency domain, especially cross-border 
insolvency, have influenced not only the size of judicial systems as institutions, 
and the structure of the legal field, but also the authority, power, jurisdiction, 
economic, and sociological role of the judiciary.
When describing the contrasting trends that can lead to the increase or limitation 
of the judicial area and influences, in doctrine the idea was emphasised that “long-
term developments are so complex that the effects cannot be individualized and 
are, in a number of ways, dependent on the judge’s role in society and in the legal 
order”.22 In this context, it has to be determined if the harmonisation of insolvency 
law will push back the judiciary in relation to the administration authorities and 
international courts, or, by the contrary, will increase its powers and control.
It is not clear if the actual EU tendencies lead to a growing demand for the judiciary, 
or to the promotion of out-of-court settlements, as an expected alternative. 
It is obvious that international and EU legal orders have exerted an increasing 
pressure of supranational legal power on national legislation and the judiciary, a 
superposition of jurisdictions between the national and European courts, territorial 
and functional, and the formation of a global law through the harmonization or 
unification of law between different countries.
The transformations in the EU legal order could determine in time also a judicial 
restraint, with national judges giving away part of their jurisdiction to European 
judges, but also judicial progress, through the functions and application of EU 
insolvency law and principles.
2.3 Solutions to Bring into Harmony Different Judicial Systems in Europe.
A method to a more convergent EU system could be the judicial structure with 
specialized courts or specialized chambers for insolvency proceedings, with a 
22 M. Loth & E. Mak, “The Judicial Domain in View, Figures, Trends and Perspectives (2007) 3(1) Utrecht Law 
Review pp. 82-85.
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number of judges with high level of expertise in the commercial field, able to 
deal with complex cross- border insolvency cases. This system would permit a 
rapid evaluation of organization, schemes, and judges’ education necessary at an 
EU level and could increase the possibilities for the development of frameworks 
or structures different from ordinary courts. Judges could meet and communicate 
easier, contributing to more coherent practices and predictable interpretation 
of concepts, to the creation of unified substantial EU insolvency law. Another 
direction is to modernise and simplify judicial insolvency proceedings in order to 
reduce the involvement of the courts in many administrative steps of the process. 
Developing simplified procedures could be a way toward harmonisation of the EU 
insolvency law. 
What is the role of judicial training to achieve a higher degree of similarity in 
insolvency proceedings in Europe? 
It is actually impossible to train all judges acting in general jurisdictions, potentially 
called to decide in an insolvency case, to the same extent as specialised judges 
from a court with exclusive jurisdiction. But for judges having regular contact with 
international insolvency law, or as part of specialized courts, continuous training 
programmes and language training are necessary.
What are the possibilities to increase technical assistance at EU level in order to 
develop judicial competence, expertise, and cooperation? What is the appropriate 
way to bring the judiciary “up to standards”? 
I imagine a complex European program beginning with an assessment report 
in order to conduct a general analysis of actual judicial procedures, powers and 
practice, the role of judiciary, and difficulties and issues in the existing national 
insolvency legal systems. The next step is to develop a teaching methodology 
applicable in Member States by national authorities or institutions, such as the 
National Institute of Magistracy in Romania. It could be useful as an e-learning 
system of teaching created by an European institution/organisation for judges 
or a permanent EU judicial training program, a common internship training at 
European level with judges from each European country. 
The combination of regional, social, and cultural characteristics can certainly affect 
the point of view and activity of judges involved in insolvency cases. It would be 
helpful to consider the creation of an EU organisation or institution (European 
Insolvency Institute), including scholars, judges, lawyers, and other insolvency 
specialists as an important step to increase judicial cooperation and “structured 
education on European basis” in the field. A very interesting expectation was also 
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expressed in 2012: the creation of an organisation comparable to the National 
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges existing since 1926 in the USA.23
3 How can the Judiciary Participate in the European Process of 
Harmonisation of Insolvency Law through its Main Prerogatives? 
3.1 Judicial Attributions
Dealing with concrete cases as a main competence, the judiciary has to offer a 
sufficient degree of legal certainty and keep the balance between the interests of all 
parties. When judges decide what law is applicable to a particular situation, they 
become interpreters and enforcers of the law. 
One way to achieve EU insolvency law harmonization can be a judicial 
metamorphosis in the process of interpretation. National courts dealing with 
non-harmonized rules of domestic insolvency law may and should reduce the 
inflexibility or incoherency between such rules, through the interpretation by 
analogy to general principles or regulations of EU insolvency law.
However, insolvency is a complex domain that challenges different problems 
both in national circumstances and international cases. More important than any 
of the other objectives that judges have to keep in mind are the main purposes of 
maximising the value of the debtor’s assets, providing chances for reorganisation 
of a debtor’s business, and ensuring that all creditors are to be treated equally.
One debatable issue is the concept of equal treatment of creditors in an 
international context. In national systems, creditors have procedural rights, such 
as the right to be informed, to claim, and to be heard, but what are the limits of 
non-discrimination among the same class of creditors in the absence of harmonised 
concepts at EU level? Which are the proper methods for a local judge to ensure that 
the demand for good faith and integrity are respected by the creditors, the debtor, 
their representatives, and other parties interested in the insolvency procedures? It 
is not yet established. 
In another regard, the concrete judicial activity in the field of insolvency law is 
influenced by different factors, such as the knowledge of the applicable law, how 
often the judge has to apply the law in insolvency cases, and other domains of law 
in which the judge is involved in his daily activity. It is difficult to evaluate if a 
judge assigned to solve a case has the knowledge and skills to interpret and apply 
the insolvency law in accordance with international general principles, complex 
23 Above note 2, p.133; B. Wessels, above note 14.
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socio-economic conditions, and processes existing in the contemporary world. In 
addition, the details of European Insolvency law and the role and responsibility of 
national judges as specified by Regulation No.1346/2000 and No.848/2015 are not 
easily grounded in the absence of concrete jurisprudence, practice, or coordination 
in the national courts.
It is not yet determined if standardizing legal judgments it could bring about 
convergence in the EU and how to realise this process. International enforcement 
of insolvency judgements and automatic enforcement generate numerous issues, 
given the fact that national courts and legislation have different approaches. 
Consequently, the need for harmonisation is real in some matters, such as how to 
equilibrate the “wide judgment” in common simple cases with “deep” complex 
judgments; and how to find proper instruments for a coherent enforcement of 
judicial decisions, for a standardization of legal judgments, and for the development 
of fundamental principles in substantial insolvency law.
3.2 Law-Making Attributes 
The need for approximation in the field of international insolvency is expressed 
through a modern orientation of approach between the major systems of law, 
the Romano-Germanic system and common-law system, but also through an 
increasing role of jurisprudence as a source of law.
The European legal system is very powerful and the European Court of Justice 
helps the continuous changing and improvement of its framework. The relationship 
between judges dealing with insolvency cases and the ECJ on law-making 
influence is already a reality. Local judges apply the law in domestic cases and 
European litigation according to their competences and to principles of procedural 
autonomy, using the framework of the national procedural and remedial laws. 
When national procedural rules make it impossible or unreasonably difficult to 
protect rights derived from EU law, the principles of equivalence and effectiveness 
require national judges to remove those rules. Moreover, national judges analyse 
and apply the rights, obligations, and principle related to the insolvency domain, 
provided by a plurality of legal regimes, with an increased possibility of conflicts 
between legal systems. 
In their search for solutions, scholars have identified as EU tools:
“consistent interpretation of national law with EU law; the power/duty 
to make a reference for a preliminary ruling; proportionality within 
the margin of deference afforded by the CJEU; mutual recognition of 
foreign judgments; comparative reasoning with national legislation 
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and jurisprudence from another Member State; disapplication of 
national law for violation of EU norms.”
The use of consistent interpretation as a “judicial interaction technique,”24 would 
lead to changes of the domestic judges and legislative interference.
Judges can use the preliminary ruling mechanism to the European Court of Justice, 
which has the authority not only to explain the EU law, but also to ensure its 
uniform application in all Member States. In this matter, national courts and the 
ECJ act together to enforce the rule of law in Europe and to increase the influence 
of courts in the political process of European integration.25
In order to gain a further insight, it would be interesting to follow the experience 
of this process for private law in Europe. It is analysed in a recent study, made 
under the umbrella of European Parliamentary Research Service,26 the proposal 
for a European Civil Code, providing general principles on the basis of a Code as 
a directive. Compared to the European Convention on Human Rights, the directive 
is described as an important measure for the internal market process, but also for 
the creation of a “transnational civil society in Europe,” for the positive integration 
in the “pan-European civil society.”27 Is it desirable and attainable for a directive 
aimed at the substantive harmonization of some important issues in insolvency 
domain, as an effect of EU legislative activity but also as a result of judicial 
dialogue between national courts and the CJEU?
Participating in the process of European integration, each member of judiciary can 
and may have some influence. When laws are equivocal, doubtful, or in conflict, 
the role of the judiciary is essential because of its ability to act as a law-maker. The 
judicial system in this sense should align to the process of continuous reassessment 
and renovation of the insolvency law, and through that to the “normative structure 
of society,” more than any other institution.28
24 Final Handbook, Judicial Interaction Techniques- Their Potential and Use in European Fundamental Rights 
Adjudication, project funded by the European Commission Fundamental Rights & Citizenship Programme 
(JUST/2012/FRAC/AG/2755) Project Coordinator: European University Institute, pp.39 available 
from http://www.eui.eu/Projects/CentreForJudicialCooperation/Documents/JUDCOOPdeliverables/
FinalHandbookUseofJudicialInteractionTechniquesinthefieldofEFRs.pdf, ( last viewed 14 October 2016).
25 K. J. Alter, “An Analysis of the European Legal System Transformation,” in The Making of an International 
Rule of Law in Europe, (2010, Oxford Scholarship Online) available from http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/
view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260997.001.0001/acprof-9780199260997, ( last viewed 14 October 2016).
26 R. Mańko, “EU Competence in Private Law - The Treaty Framework for a European Private Law and Challenges 
for Coherence,” European Parliamentary Research Service, January 2015 — PE 545.711, available from http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/545711/EPRS_IDA(2015)545711_REV1_EN.pdf.
27 H. Collins, “Why Europe Needs a Civil Code” (2013) 21(4) European Review of Private Law 907-922.
28 Loth & Mak, above note 22, pp. 98-100.
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Although harmonisation refers to a legislative activity, the judiciary could express 
a more flexible way to deal with cross-border insolvency cases, helping significant 
changes in the existing legal framework and ensuring the equitable treatment of 
different proceedings and creditors. Therefore, the justice system in each Member 
State must be adjusted to the EU standard. The judicial body could contribute to 
the establishment of minimum standards for different legal traditions or methods.
3.3 Social Role of the Judiciary 
Solutions to find and keep the balance in the relationship between the judicial 
system and the parties in the insolvency proceedings are necessary. Referring to 
the judicial system trends and perspectives, a distinction is made between two 
visions. First, the judicial system is seen as having a subsidiary role, rather than 
instrumental, to solve conflicts between disputing parties, “in the service of the 
citizen’s freedom.” 29 In the second opinion, called the public life conception, the 
judicial system has a resolving function but also an important forming function, 
promoting the public values through its main purpose: to be the strong arm of 
the law. There is also recognised the mediating function “not only between the 
disputing parties, but also between the parties and the community, and also 
between a diversity of interests, roles, and values that typifies a plural society.”30 I 
believe that this second viewpoint is approaching closely to the real meaning of a 
judicial system for the insolvency domain and its development.
The social role of the judiciary is directly connected to citizens, not just as 
recipients of judicial activity. The central idea in this matter is the confidence in 
the judicial system as a fundament of the relationship between the judicial system 
and participants in insolvency procedures. The decreasing confidence could reduce 
the demand addressed to the judicial system and its procedures, with an effect on 
the size of the judiciary as an institution. But the development of the insolvency 
domain in society and the global economy leads rather to an increase in the judges’ 
activity, and to the strengthening of the judicial structure, in order to realize its 
social role.
In the doctrine the connection between the influence of the judge and the impact 
of his decisions was analysed, especially under the criteria of judicial activism. It 
was observed that an activist judge makes “wide judgements”, being attentive to 
the social context of his work, as a: 
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
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“social engineer or case load manager, with an increasing 
responsiveness on his work. Instead, minimalist judges avoid 
precedent on principle grounds and for pragmatic reasons.”31 
However, in the context of international developments of insolvency law, what can 
be the proper approach of judicial activity in the connection to the democratization 
of judicial structures and consequences for the social role of the judiciary?
3.4 Judicial Cooperation
3.4.1 Consultation Power 
The judiciary may and should develop research to encourage remedies for problems 
of inconsistency with the Insolvency Regulation, and a comparative analysis on the 
functioning of courts managing international insolvency cases.
3.4.2 Legal Cooperation
As part of general trends in the judicial domain, the evolution to a functional 
jurisdiction can be observed even in insolvency field. The main criterion is not 
based on territoriality anymore. The important aspects at institutional level are the 
specialisation of judges, the rapidity and correctness of judgements, and how a fair 
and predictable application of both substantive and procedural law can be obtained.
In this actual system the role and impact of national Supreme Courts on the 
lower courts is also significant. Academics use different terms to describe the 
phenomenon of judicial interaction, such as “conversation” or “transnational 
dialogue of judges” in the sense that the highest national courts often consult the 
case law of the highest courts in other countries to see how a solution was found 
to a certain case, especially for a comparative objective.32
In the increasing interest for a set of rules and practices in the process of efficient 
judicial communication and cooperation, some issues need answers. Firstly, how 
to determine concretely when the direct judicial cross-border communication is 
absolutely necessary and what are the best solutions in insolvency procedures? 
How to establish if this kind of cooperation offers sufficient procedural safeguards 
for all parties, when national procedural laws do not regulate such matters? Beyond 
general principles and guidelines emphasized recently in the doctrine, we have to 
31 Ibid. 
32 M. Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, (2013, OUP, Oxford); A. Slaughter, A New 
World Order, (2009, Princeton University Press, Princeton); M. Claes, M de Visser, P. Popelier and C van 
de Heyning, “Introduction: On Constitutional Conversations,” in Koen Lemmens, Maartje De Visser (eds), 
Constitutional Conversations in Europe, Actors, Topics and Procedures,(2012, Intersentia, Cambridge) pp. 1-8. 
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find the fastest, most practical and least costly methods to be used currently and 
without losing time. 
In recent years it was emphasized that appointing one or more intermediaries in 
procedures, viewed as impartial specialists, with proper skills and experience, 
able to identify possible conflicts or problems and to find practical solutions to 
them enhances efficiency.33 However, if the judge needs a general opinion or 
advice on cross-border problems related to a problem or practice, would it be 
possible that this intermediary could be a judge from other national system? 
Could judges specialized in insolvency be integrated in a group of possible EU 
“advisors” in cross-border insolvency issues for their colleagues? Is this form 
of communication and cooperation prohibited by general principles of a judicial 
system? Would it be possible to create a powerful group of EU judges dealing 
with international insolvency cases through a combination of statute, conventions, 
judicial restrictions, while also ensuring their independence? 
Because the training priorities of judges and resources available are different from 
court to court and state to state, and that this is difficult to harmonize, maybe a 
coordinator designated from judges in each court or at a regional level, advanced 
and academically trained, whom his colleague judges can consult, especially in 
complex issues involving cross-border insolvency law, would be easier to attain. 
3.4.3 Judicial Cooperation with Professional Associations, Practitioners, and 
Non-Insolvency Specialists.
The International Bar Association, with a membership of more than 80,000 
individual lawyers and 190 bar society members from 160 countries, has conducted 
an informal survey as to the desirability and feasibility of an international 
insolvency convention. This was presented to the UNCITRAL Working Group V 
in May 2016. Very interesting resolutions related to judicial cooperation appear in 
this survey. Between 74% and 84% of respondents indicate that an international 
insolvency convention should deal with issues of cross-border judicial cooperation 
and communication based on harmonious principles of insolvency law developed 
at the national level. The convention would promote harmonization in cooperation, 
coordination, and recognition in insolvency law, taking into consideration that 
“judicial cross-border cooperation and communication can co-exist effectively 
33 B. Wessels “The Role of Courts in Solving Cross-Border Insolvency Cases,” (2011) 24(5) Insolv. Int 65-73.
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with national sovereignty and public policy priorities in a treaty regime.”34 The 
idea of an international bankruptcy court created by a convention or treaty, whose 
judgments are enforced by domestic courts of individual countries, is described as 
a model for cross-border insolvency law.35
This study and the UNCITRAL recent activity develop the real interest in fair and 
effective regulation of international insolvency law and judicial cooperation at 
global level, not just within EU. Direct and indirect communication is developed 
as form of judicial globalisation. In reality, EU Member States have adopted (e.g. 
Greece, Croatia, Poland, Rumania, Slovenia, and the UK) (or are considering 
adopting) the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 1997, with 
regard to, among other principles, the idea expressed by Article 27, cooperation 
through communication between courts and office-holders.
It should also be noted that a significant role that the judiciary may accomplish is in 
removing or reducing obstacles to communication and cooperation in cross-border 
insolvency proceedings. Regarding such communication, it is at judicial discretion 
to establish which method of communication to use in the process. Is it feasible 
that a modern method, such as telephone, teleconference, or electronic mail could 
be used instead of traditional ways of transmitting written documents? What is the 
real freedom of judge to decide the method and the language of communication? 
How might it be possible to solve the problem of differences between national 
procedural rules in these matters?
At the same time it is important to support judicial activity for the identification 
and development of soft law techniques, best practices, or guidelines in the 
international insolvency field. Determining best practices for the cooperation 
in international insolvency is a continuous activity of specialists. One project 
was developed between 2005 and 2012 for the American Law Institute and the 
International Insolvency Institute to determine Principles and Guidelines for 
34 For more details, see UNCITRAL Working Group V, “Note by the International Bar Association Observer 
Delegation: International Insolvency Convention, Issues, Options and Feasibility Considerations”, 49th Session, 
May 2016, “Report to the IBA RE May 2016 UNCITRAL Working Group V 49th Session and Meeting of 
the HOC Convention Study Group, available from http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Insolvency_Section/Insolvency_
Section/Projects.aspx (last viewed 14 October 2016).
35 UNCITRAL Working Group V “Note by the International Bar Association Observer Delegation: International 
Insolvency Convention, Issues, Options and Feasibility Considerations,” 49th Session,May 2016, available 
from file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/IBA%20Submission%20UNCITRAL%20re%20Insolvency%20
Convention%20May%202016%20(1).pdf and “Report to the IBA RE May 2016, UNCITRAL Working Group V 
49th Session and Meeting of the HOC Convention Study Group, available from file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/
Report%20IBA%20re%20UNCITRAL%20May%202016%20(3).pdf, ( last viewed 14 October 2016).
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Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases, a form of soft law aimed at helping 
judges, legislators, and practitioners in their work.36
Judges have to keep in mind that in cross-border litigation the principle of 
cooperation represents a central problem and perhaps solution for many issues 
related to the procedures. The application of this principle and the search for 
practical solutions could conduct the practitioners and courts to develop Guidelines 
to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of procedural rules in international 
insolvency cases and maybe a uniform interpretation the law in its substance.37
In early 2011, Romania adopted rules concerning communication and cooperation 
in cross-border cases. At present, regulation of private international law in 
insolvency is made in Romania by the EU Insolvency Regulation and the 
Insolvency Code, Title III “Cross-Border Insolvency,” which contains provisions 
on the coordination of insolvency proceedings. It recognizes the principle of 
cooperation, and establishes forms and means of cooperation and their limits. In 
addition to such a new and revolutionary legislation, several manifestations lead to 
a changing role of Romanian insolvency judges as a professional body interested 
in developing ways for international communication. 
4 New Trends and Practices for an Increasing EU Insolvency Law Coherence
4.1 The Need for an EU Database of Court Orders and Judgments
The need for an EU database of court orders and judgments and a central source 
of information relating to national insolvency law frameworks, an open-book 
improved and updated with the help of the national authorities and courts, including 
a description of some key-aspects and changes of national legislation in Member 
States is evident. The lack of EU database of court judgements is an significant 
obstacle to obtaining common rules on insolvency matters. 
The 2010 INSOL Europe Study38 emphasised the necessity of a centralised 
e-database containing significant court orders and decisions, to help individuals and 
practitioners to have direct access to information in their language about national 
36 I. Fletcher and B. Wessels (reporters), “Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles for Cooperation in 
International Insolvency Cases” (2012, The American Law Institute and the International Insolvency Institute, 
Philadelphia) available from https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/alireportmarch_0.pdf, (last viewed 14 
October 2016).
37 Above note 1, pp. 166
38 European Parliament, Directorate –General for Internal Policies, G. Cherubini, et al, (eds) “Harmonisation 
of insolvency law at EU level”(2010, INSOL EUROPE), pp.24, available from http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/empl/dv/empl_study_insolvencyproceedings_/empl_study_
insolvencyproceedings_en.pdf (last viewed 14 October 2016).
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insolvency procedures.39 The European Judicial Network in civil and commercial 
matters is by purpose and organization such a tool. Building best practices in a 
number of Member States, the purpose of the Network is to ensure interaction and 
the availability of knowledge and information, to provide substantial support for 
efficient judicial cooperation between Member States, and stronger integration 
of judges and other judicial authorities, as well as legal professionals. To 
facilitate the access to justice, the Network’s core function is to set up an online 
information system for the public on EU instruments, national measures for their 
implementation in national law, international instruments, and on relevant case-
law by the Court of Justice.40
The European Commission launched in 2014 an EU interconnection of national 
insolvency registers, with a database of seven Member States: the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Estonia, Netherlands, Austria, Romania, and Slovenia, including real 
time access to insolvency information, in the languages of EU, clear explanations 
on the insolvency terminology and national systems.41 In July 2014 the European 
e-Justice Portal was made available which interconnected insolvency registers as 
an important source of insolvency-related information.42
An important element is the adopted revision of the EU Insolvency Regulation 
(Regulation EU 2015/848) which rules the establishment of the EU-wide 
interconnection of national electronic insolvency registers.43 In this international 
context, would it be possible, through the efforts of judges and local judicial 
authorities as Network members, to provide information on national decisions on 
insolvency related cases to improve and enlarge the EU e-databases in the future? 
It is a question not just for European Commission but also for national judiciaries.
39 Directorate General for Internal Policies, “Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at EU Level” (2010, European 
Parliament, Brussels) available from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/empl/dv/
empl_study_insolvencyproceedings_/empl_study_insolvencyproceedings_en.pdf (last viewed 14 October 2016) p 84.
40 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and The European Economic and Social 
Committee on the Activities of the European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters, Brussels, 
10.3.2016, COM(2016) 129 final; The Multiannual European e-Justice Action Plan 2014-2018 of the Council, 
OJ C 182, 14.6.2014, p. 2.
41 European Commission Press Release, “Modern Insolvency Rules: European Commission kicks off EU-wide 
interconnection of insolvency registers,” (Brussels, 7 July 2014) available from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-14-774_en.htm. 
42 For details, see European e-Justice Portal – Insolvency registers, e-justice.europa.eu.
43 EU-wide interconnection of insolvency registers, Pál Szirányi, P. ERA Forum (2015); Regulation (Regulation 
(EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings 
(recast)—hereinafter as “the Recast Insolvency Regulation”, OJ L 141 of 5 June 2015, p. 19.
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4.2 Increasing Consistency of Insolvency Law Across the European Union 
through Recent Soft-Law Instruments.
There have been efforts to develop soft law mechanisms, principles and 
recommendations, possible to be used both in civil-law as well as common law 
jurisdictions, to increase convergence of insolvency law across the European 
Union. In this context, EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation 
Principles and Guidelines produced by a team of scholars of Leiden Law School 
and Nottingham Law School (2013-2014) in collaboration with some fifty experts, 
including 25 judges representing several EU countries, finalised in February 
2015, with a set of 26 EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation 
Principles (EU JudgeCo Principles) and 18 EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-
to-Court Communications Guidelines (EU JudgeCo Guidelines), represents an 
important step to making national legal systems “work together” without unifying 
or approximating them, nevertheless obtaining a “limited harmonisation” of 
insolvency law.44
The JudgeCo Project, promoted as a comparative research activity followed by 
a training programme for insolvency judges from all EU states, is a valuable 
experience. The JudgeCo Project is a result of complex analysis of practice and 
theoretical expertise about the process in which judges and other practitioners can 
be directly involved. The project is innovative for the development of certain rules, 
encouraging them to achieve greater convergence to the main EU goals.45
The project’s results may be a well prepared step for certain measures to be taken 
by the European Commission as recommendations or they may be used for the 
approximation of civil, procedural or insolvency laws, within the meaning of art 
288 TFEU.
As an individual practitioner involved in this training program, I can say that its aim 
was at least partially accomplished, considering the fact that it was an important 
reason in my decision to specialize in the field of international insolvency law and 
cross-border judicial cooperation.
44 EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles, Final Public Draft, 2014, at 27, for details 
of project see http://www.tri-leiden.eu/project/categories/eu-judgeco (last viewed 14 October 2016).
45 The project is initiated and co-funded funded by the European Union and the International Insolvency Institute 
(III). It is a part of a larger EU initiative called “European Cross-border Insolvency: Promoting Judicial 
Cooperation”. The Project Team consisted of Bob Wessels, Professor International Insolvency Law, Leiden 
University (principle drafter); Jan Adriaanse, Professor of Turnaround Management, Leiden University; Paul 
Omar, Professor of International and Comparative Insolvency Law, Nottingham Law School; Dr. Jean-Pierre van 
der Rest; Dr. Bernard Santen; Gert-Jan Boon LL.M MSc; Frédérique Vos LL.M; Rumana Abdur; and Leiden Law 
School master students. For more details, see http://www.tri-leiden.eu/projects.
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In should be also noted the important role played by international organisations 
such as a forum for judges in this field. It is uncontestably the significant place of 
INSOL Europe and also INSOL International for increasing connections between 
IP’s, judges, regulators, and academics in the process of judicial communication 
and cooperation, for development of “mutual trust,” common ideals, and scopes 
in insolvency domain.
5 Conclusion 
Full harmonisation of insolvency law, presented as an option for the reform of EU 
legislation, does not look like a real possibility for the time being. Such unity of 
vision is yet to be achieved across the 28 Member States, and it may take some 
time, much patience and effort before a consensus can emerge. Consequently, it 
is essential to establish which areas demand harmonisation and what levels of 
approximation are required.
The sustained effort made for removing or reducing the existing disparities in the 
European Union is appreciable, as is the respect for insolvency legislation and 
cross-border proceedings. 
I strongly believe that the contribution and involvement of the judiciary in the 
process of harmonization of international insolvency law and procedures is a 
problem and a necessity for the present and the near future, which requires concrete 
and viable measures to be taken both at national and European level.
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Chapter 3
Constitutions and Crises: Balancing 
Insolvency and Social Policy through the Lens 
of Comparative Legal History
Jennifer L. L. Gant*
1 Introduction
The economic and financial crises of the last decade have led to massive changes 
in economic, social, banking, and employment policies throughout the world. 
However, both the United States and the United Kingdom have generally 
maintained more static in relation to their overall status quo regarding insolvency 
and social policy, in stark contrast to the reactions of most continental European 
nations. Taken together with the sovereign debt crisis that plagued many 
continental European nations beginning in 2010, it may be somewhat surprising 
that the United Kingdom has not adjusted its policies to any greater degree than it 
has. Rather, it is continental Europe that has moved more or less en masse toward 
the lower common denominator of the United Kingdom, at least in terms of social 
and employment protection. In addition, many peripheral or less economically 
developed European nations have achieved some inadvertent legal benefits from 
the crises of the last decade in the reform or creation of more robust insolvency 
and corporate rescue systems. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the historical and constitutional underpinnings 
of the US and the UK, within the context of the European Union when required, 
in order to identify important differences in legal development and divergence 
from a common legal ancestry in approaches to insolvency, in particular corporate 
rescue procedures such as Chapter 11 and administration under the Insolvency Act 
1986, and the social policy issues related to it. By identifying points of divergence 
situated within the historical context in which it arose, a more detailed, path 
dependent observation may reveal deeply seated differences that can explain why 
the US and the UK have often relied upon different foundational philosophies in 
the development of legal systems in insolvency and social policy. While the UK 
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and the US are often compared in a positive light, as being more closely aligned 
than other European nations and the UK, their differesnces continue to persist, 
despite EU influence, and indeed, at times, in spite of it.
2 Comparative History of Insolvency and Corporate Rescue in UK and USA
Insolvency law draws together a number of different legal areas that interact in a 
complex balancing act, one that has sometimes been skewed due to constitutional 
restrictions and other legal and policy related roadblocks. The complex 
intermingling of insolvency law with, in particular, the law of contract, with what 
one might normally view as the defining parameters of the American Constitution, 
contrasted with the decisions of individual state courts, illustrates how this area 
has been problematic. The United Kingdom has not faced similar obstacles for 
a number of centuries, which, while reducing the competing factors that might 
be encountered by legislators in this area, has not prevented a slow evolution of 
insolvency systems, as opposed to the more rapid and holistic changes that has 
historically characterised insolvency in the US. 
2.1 Divergence from a Common Past
The Statute of Anne that was in place in the American colonies at the time of the 
American Revolution, exporting the stigma that remains attached to indebtedness 
today in the UK given the fact that one was “liable” to bankruptcy, rather than 
benefitting from it.1 This law is often portrayed as the beginning of a modern, 
enlightened bankruptcy practice because it introduced the possibility of being 
discharged from debt, though exceedingly difficult and restricted only to traders.2 
Even prior to the passing of the Statute of Anne various states of America had 
created their own ways of dealing with bankruptcy, with Maryland formulating 
the first true bankruptcy law on the American continent in 1638, though it tracked 
existing English law at the time. Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts 
followed suit with their own versions, all of which varied in description, scope, and 
purpose. Between 1755 and 1770 New York expanded a system for the release of 
impoverished debtors from prison to include the ability to bind holdout creditors 
to a workout agreed by a majority of creditors. Thus, the US began to diverge from 
the norms of British bankruptcy law even prior to the Revolution, developing a 
number of procedures that were often labelled as something else and private bills 
that eventually came together to provide an early system of bankruptcy relief. 
1 S.J. Lubben, “A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause”, (2013) 64(2) Case Western Reserve Law Review 
319, pp. 337.
2 Ibid., pp. 336-337.
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While it relied heavily on English practice in the earliest days, the tendency of the 
colonial law makers were to concentrate on the plight of imprisoned debtors rather 
than the punishment of them.3
In the early 1770s, the US continued to attempt to provide better and greater 
relief via bankruptcy provisions. One of the major issues encountered by colonial 
legislators was the requirement that any commercial legislation must obtain 
approval of Britain’s Privy Council. In 1771, New York attempted to further 
expand their system relating to the release of imprisoned debtors to also protect 
the debtor’s property acquired following release from prison, but Britain refused to 
approve it.4 Thus not only did the Revolution successfully separate the American 
nation from the patriarchy of English rule, it freed their ability to legislate to 
create systems suited to the social, cultural, and economic circumstances that 
characterised the pioneering spirit of the new American nation. Following 
the American Revolution, the first constitutional document, the Articles of 
Confederation, failed to provide for a national bankruptcy law, thus the states had 
to continue to legislate in this area without any continuity that might have been 
possible with some federal coordination.5 
The US Constitution provided the framework for the power relationship between 
the States and the Federal Government. Due to competing views on what level 
of power the federal government should wield over the states, the Federal 
Government was given enumerated powers that limited its competences to govern 
the states.6 These enumerated powers included a Bankruptcy Clause, which gave 
the federal government the apparent power to enact “uniform laws on the subject 
of bankruptcies throughout the United States.”7 This should have heralded the 
commencement of a senatorial drafting of a unifying bankruptcy act that would 
have consolidated and simplified bankruptcy throughout the entire nation. However, 
such was not to be for nearly two centuries due to fundamental differences in 
governance philosophies between Federalists and Republicans, the competing 
political parties of the day.8 Thus, the states remained free to enact the insolvency 
laws they deemed appropriate and the Federal Government was acquiescent, 
leaving individual states responsible for providing the means to resolve financial 
3 Ibid., pp. 338-339.
4 Ibid., p. 339.
5 Ibid., p. 340.
6 M.H. Redish, “Doing it with Mirror: New York v United States and Constitutional Limitations of Federal Power 
to Require State Legislation”, (1993-1994) 21 Hastings Const LQ 593, pp. 594-596.
7 US Constitution, article I paragraph 8 clause 4.
8 R. Sylla, R.E. Wright and D.J. Cowen, “Alexander Hamilton, Central Banker: Crisis Management during the US 
Financial Panic of 1792”, (2009) 83 Business History Review, pp. 62-63. 
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distress despite the apparent constitutional power of the Bankruptcy Clause,9 with 
only a few largely failed interventions by the Federal Government.10
In 1874, a predecessor of the debtor in possession provision of Chapter 11 was 
introduced in a composition procedure that formed a part of massive reforms 
made to the Bankruptcy Act of 1867.11 The composition provision allowed a 
debtor to remain in possession of his property if a sufficient number of creditors 
accepted the composition proposal, which would then be binding on all unsecured 
creditors, while those creditors who dissented were paid according to a “best 
interests” test based on liquidation outcomes. While this law lasted longer than 
those attempts made previously by the federal government, the economic problems 
encountered by the South following the Civil War led to the repeal of the federal 
bankruptcy legislation.12
2.2 British Insolvency: Slow Escape from the Debt Stigmata 
During period between the passing of the Statute of Anne and the commencement 
of hostilities with the American colonies, Britain also had developments in its 
bankruptcy system, but in a fashion that focussed on maximising the returns to 
creditors rather than alleviating the burden of debtors to any significant degree. 
In 1732, a consolidating act13 was passed that became the statutory basis for 
bankruptcy law for the rest of the eighteenth century. As the eighteenth century 
progressed, the number of insolvencies increased, revealing weaknesses in the 
system illuminated by the burden placed upon it.14
Throughout the nineteenth century, insolvency law in the UK evolved in order 
to avoid fraudulent activities common in the earlier regimes. While laissez-faire 
economics was the preferred approach during this period, government intervention15 
was justified due to the growing influence of the business community,16 
particularly following the introduction of the joint-stock companies.17 While an 
9 Lubben, above note 1, 341-342.
10 The Bankruptcy Act of 1800, Act of Apr 4, 1800, ch 19, 2 Stat 19 (repealed 1803); The Bankruptcy Act of 1841, 
Act of Aug 19, 1841, ch 5 Stat 440 (repealed 1843); The Bankruptcy Act of 1867, Act of Mar 2, 1867, ch 176, 
14 Stat 517 (repealed 1878).
11 Act of Jun 22, 1874, ch 390, 18 Stat 178 (amending and supplementing an act entitled “an act to establish a 
uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States).
12 Lubben, above note 1, 377.
13 An Act Preventing the Committing of Frauds by Bankrupts 1732 (5 Geo 2 c 30). 
14 V.M. Lester, Victorian Insolvency (1995, Oxford University Press, Oxford), pp. 18-21.
15 Bankruptcy Court (England) Act 1831 (1 & 2 Will 4 c 56).
16 Lester, above note 14, pp. 40-48.
17 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 (7&8 Vict c 110); a winding-up was introduced at the same time in the Act 
Facilitating the Winding Up of Affairs of Joint Stock Companies Unable to Meet Their Pecuniary Engagements 
1844 (7&8 Vict c111).
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early composition procedure was also available,18 the stigma associated with debt 
and bankruptcy remained resilient, as well as the focus on creditors.19 The focus on 
fault and creditor satisfaction indicates a close tie to the prevailing moral perception 
of bankrupts and the Victorian values of thrift, self-help, and individual effort.20
A number of Acts21 introduced and reinforced modern concepts of insolvency, such 
as the statutory regime for preferential debts; the pari passu principle; separate 
judicial and administrative functions; and the public examination of those at fault 
for creditor losses.22 Some of these were influenced by the recognition that some 
species of public good was both desirable and could be achieved by providing a 
means of collective action in the liquidation and distribution of bankrupt estates.23 
However, the quantity of bankruptcy reforms during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century resulted in layers of law that were difficult to operate and prone to 
manipulation and would attract the attention of reformers in the 1970s,24 but it would 
not be until the Insolvency Act of 1986 that a true species of corporate rescue would 
be legislated,25 partly due to the desire of the UK to join the European Community.26 
The Cork Report preceded the passage of the Insolvency Act 1986.27 An entirely 
new approach and perception of the aims of insolvency law in the UK was adopted, 
including a truly social message that was recommended to be incorporated in the 
imminent reforms.28 The Cork Report recognised and formulated the concept 
of a rescue culture, stating that given that the failure of commercial enterprises 
has wide repercussions for a variety of stakeholders, including but not limited to 
creditors, shareholders, employees, suppliers, and others who would be adversely 
affected by business failure. A legitimate aim of insolvency laws should be 
to have concern for the livelihood and well-being of those dependent upon an 
18 Bankrupts (England) Act 1825 (6 Geo 4 c16).
19 Lester, above note 14, 21-37 & 53-64.
20 R. Bellamy, Victorian Liberalism: Nineteenth Century Political Thought and Practice (1988, Routledge, 
London), p. 7.
21 The Joint Stock Companies Winding-Up Act 1844 (7&8 Vict c111); Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46&47 Vict c52); 
Bankruptcy Act 1914 (4&5 Geo 5 c59); and The Companies Act (25 & 26 Vict c89). 
22 R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, Student edn, (2005, Sweet and Maxwell, London) 6-9 and 
Lester, above note 14, p. 227.
23 Lester, above note 14, pp. 293-294.
24 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, 2nd edn (2009, CUP, Cambridge), pp. 12-13.
25 1986 c 45 (hereafter referred to as the IA1986); M. Hunter, “The Nature and Functions of the Rescue Culture” 
(1999) November JBL 426, p. 455.
26 Hereafter referred to as the “EC”.
27 Hunter, above note 25.
28 K. Cork, Sir (Chairman), Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee (Cmnd 8558 1982) ch 
4 para 203-204.
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enterprise.29 In the view of Cork Committee, the rescue culture would manifest 
itself in policies directed at the more benevolent treatment of insolvent legal 
entities as well as the more draconian treatment of the unscrupulous abusers of 
the system. It would also mean the steady removal of the stigmatising effect of 
bankruptcy.30 Though beneficent in their view of what the future should hold for 
insolvency, the Cork Committee’s more socially oriented recommendations would 
not find immediate implementation, however, more recent reforms31 as well as 
the influence of the EU have seen many of the social objectives of insolvency law 
incorporated into the British insolvency system, including a preference for rescue 
over simple liquidation.32
The changes made to insolvency law in the last fifteen years demonstrate that the 
policy of corporate rescue is now being given precedence over traditional creditor 
wealth maximisation and debt recovery.33 Rescue strategies supported by the 
current legislation are based upon a utilitarian approach, predicated on the premise 
that the interests of the few are outweighed by the needs of the many. The interests 
represented now also include the wider community, as well as social and political 
objectives of full employment. These interests can often be better served though 
the rescue of a business than asset realisations followed by pari passu distributions 
of what remains after secured creditors and liquidators are paid their share.34
2.3 The American Way: A Constitutional Conundrum
The presence of the Bankruptcy Clause in the American Constitution crossed with 
the existence of a myriad of State authored bankruptcy laws caused a number of 
problems for state courts. Some held insolvency codes to be unconstitutional, on the 
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Clause as having left Congress with the sole power 
to legislate in this area. Focused on the existence of the discharge, it was held that 
“a law discharging a debtor from his debts, without payment, if not 
a bankrupt law, is a law impairing the law of contracts, the power 
of making which is, by the said Constitution, expressly forbidden to 
individual states.”35 
29 Ibid.
30 Hunter, above note 25, p. 26.
31 The Enterprise Act 2002 c 40 (hereafter referred to as the “EA”).
32 See the Insolvency Act 1986 sch B1 para 3.
33 D. Milman, “Moratoria on Enforcement Rights: Revisiting Corporate Rescue” (2004) March/April Conveyancer 
and Property Law Journal 89, p. 104.
34 Ibid. 
35 Olden v Hallet 4 NLJ 466, 469 (NJ 1819).
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Thus it was not only the Bankruptcy Clause, the ignoring of which was beginning 
to create uncertainty, but also implicated the Contracts Clause, given the effect on 
contracts that a discharge post-bankruptcy would have. By allowing a discharge, 
bankruptcy law was viewed as interfering with the integrity of contracts by 
facilitating a breach in discharging the obligation to pay the full consideration 
agreed by the contracting parties.36
The constitutionality of state authored bankruptcy law was assessed in Sturges 
v Crownshield 37 in 1819. Crownshield sought relief by way of bankruptcy and 
discharge under the New York statute. It was argued by his creditor that the 
Bankruptcy Clause prevented states from legislating in this area and that, therefore, 
the New York statue and the discharge it afforded was unconstitutional. The 
Supreme Court failed to state definitively the position of state insolvency law with 
regard to the Bankruptcy Clause; rather, the Court inferred a broader reading of 
the Clause, ruling that the states had the power to legislate in this area in the 
absence of Congressional action, and that such laws would be constitutional as 
long as they were not applied to contracts arising prior to the promulgation of the 
law.38 By not weighing in definitively on what likely should have been the federal 
nature of bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Clause of the US Constitution, the 
Supreme Court allowed the States to take the ambiguous judgment in Crownshield 
and apply it to their own bankruptcy cases with an extraordinarily diverse effect, 
creating a great deal of uncertainty in relation to the applicability and effectiveness 
of bankruptcy laws among the states, as well as the validity of any discharges that 
were given.39
State insolvency laws met their end in the final years of the nineteenth century 
with the passing of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.40 The Act was a clear break 
from the English inspired, creditor controlled systems that were tried earlier in the 
century, providing discharge post liquidation and the option of compositions with 
creditors. When challenged in the Supreme Court, the Bankruptcy Clause finally 
left dormancy as bankruptcy became the province of the federal government.41 Its 
boundaries were tested in the 1930s and corporate reorganisations were federalised 
in the Chandler Act. Following the Act, a group of specialised bankruptcy 
36 Lubben, above note 1, 349-350.
37 Sturges v Crownshield 17 US (4 Wheat) 122 (1819).
38 Lubben, above note 1, 352-353.
39 Joshua M. Van Cott, “A General Bankrupt Law” (1841) 4 Merchant’s Magazine and Commercial Review 22. 
40 Act of July 1, 1898, Ch 541 30 Stat 544 (repealed 1978); SJ Lubben, “A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy 
Clause” (2013) 64(2) Case Western Reserve Law Review 319, 383-384.
41 Lubben, above note 1, 388-389.
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professionals developed, who would be important characters for the procedures 
introduced in the 1978 Act when the referees under the previous act became 
bankruptcy judges.42
3 Aims of Insolvency: An Anglo-American Rift
American Bankruptcy Law evolved following the Revolution in a piecemeal 
fashion among individual states with a focus on how to provide relief for debtors 
while also treating creditors as fairly as possible under the circumstances. A 
Maryland bankruptcy statue encapsulates the concept of discharge: 
“The great principle upon which it is founded, is, that the debtor shall 
surrender all his property for the common benefit of all his creditors. 
He can only obtain his discharge on complying with this requisite, 
and some others of an inferior nature. When he has complied, then 
he is entitled to his discharge.”43
The idea of a “fresh start” attracted dozens of bankrupts to apply to the court in 
Baltimore. Further, the concept of a fresh start is a fundamental characteristic of 
the modern American bankruptcy system. It was recognised that it was important 
for the entrepreneurial spirit of the country that relief should be made available to 
honest but unfortunate debtors.44 Thus the purpose of bankruptcy in the American 
system has evolved with the foundational principle of aiding the unfortunate but 
honest debtor.45 
English bankruptcy was quite different due to the historic relationship with debt 
which characterised debtors as anti-social and immoral by causing difficulty for 
one’s creditors and failing to adhere to bargains struck. While the unforgiving 
nature of English bankruptcy law has changed over time to a degree, financial 
failure is still considered a character weakness and business failure is generally 
an embarrassment.46 The opposing character of American bankruptcy law could 
be attributed to the draconian treatment of debtors in the English legal system. 
A large proportion of settlers in the eighteenth century were convicts who had 
been imprisoned for debt, so it is not surprising that the American approach to 
bankruptcy would be potentially quite different from the old country. In addition, 
42 Cent Va Cmty Coll v Katz, 546 US 356, 373 (2006).
43 In Re Stewart, 2 Am LJ 184, 186 (Md Ch 1809).
44 In Re Brown, 1 Mart (os) 158, 159 (Orleans 1810).
45 Stellwagen v Clum, 245 US 605, 617 (1918).
46 N. Martin, “Common-Law Bankruptcy Systems: Similarities and Differences” (2003) 11 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 
367, pp. 371-374.
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the nature of economic growth in America had to be rapid in order to cope with 
competing industrialising nations in Europe; as such, early bankruptcy laws had 
the flavour of promoting commerce, which meant encouraging entrepreneurialism 
and the risk taking that was inherently associated with it.47 Debt forgiveness was 
therefore critical to a strong American economy.48
There is also a cultural aspect of the American people that helps to explain the 
focus on debt forgiveness and reorganisation over liquidation and punishment. 
Money and consumerism are particularly strong forces in American society. 
Losing money equates to losing independence and independence is a fundamental 
facet of the American psyche.49 In addition, business failure is often viewed as a 
product of misfortune rather than wrong doing. Given the pioneering character of 
the US historically, risk-taking is expected and respected, while creditors are at 
times perceived as being greedy.50
The Chapter 11 procedure today continues to adhere to aims of rescue and 
reorganisation over liquidation with the debtor-friendly aspect of early bankruptcy 
laws evident in the “debtor in possession” nature of the procedure. Reorganisation 
has been prioritised because it was viewed that allowing assets to be utilised as 
intended with the benefit of preserving jobs was preferred over the destruction 
of valuable firm specific assets.51 Thus not only is the old focus on discharge 
still present, which places the plight of the honest debtor ideologically above 
the position of creditors, but the focus on rescue over liquidation is clear in the 
preference that managers often have for the former given the presumption favouring 
the continued control of management. The structure of the procedure provides an 
incentive for managers given the latitude corporate debtors have regarding the 
treatment of creditors and the fact that the managers can control what is done with 
that freedom.52 The underpinning philosophy is to balance the desires of creditor 
and debtor groups while promoting commerce, which was not aligned with the 
English system’s unforgiving and highly administrative bankruptcy process.53 It 
did not take long to shed the stigma of the more punitive English system. 
47 Ibid, p 370.
48 Ibid., p. 403.
49 G. McCormack, “Control and Corporate Rescue – an Anglo-American Evaluation” (2007) 56(3) International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 515, p. 525.
50 G. Moss, “Comparative Bankruptcy Cultures: Rescue or Liquidations? Comparisons of Trends in National 
Law—England” (1997) 23 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 115.
51 M. Bradley and M. Rosenwig, “The Untenable Case for Chapter 11” (1992) 101(5) The Yale Law Journal 1043, 
pp. 1043-1044.
52 Ibid., 1045
53 Martin, above note 46, pp. 367-368.
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Prior to the introduction of the concept of corporate rescue in the United Kingdom, 
the purpose of insolvency was based primarily on a collective regime aimed at 
achieving the best possible outcome for creditors.54 The purpose of insolvency law 
was predicated on the assumption that if a company encounters financial difficulty, 
it is probably due to the failure of management. Thus, unlike the American system, 
it is viewed as contrary to the aims of insolvency to allow the management to 
retain control.55 Further, the British system tends to favour financiers as bankers 
seem to have acquired respectability while entrepreneurs who take business risks 
have not.56 The English judiciary also tend to be inclined to be sympathetic to 
insolvency practitioners rather than debtors as practitioners are professionals 
known to the court, whereas the debtor’s fall into insolvency tends to be treated as 
a basis for suspicion.57
Although insolvency law has traditionally aimed to satisfy more economic interests 
in the UK, issues of fairness have now been accepted as necessary considerations 
in the UK insolvency system. Among these considerations are the ranking of 
wages as preferential debts, access to social security for repayment of arrears, 
rules dealing with continuity of employment, and laws stipulating the mandatory 
transfer of contracts on the transfer of a business as a going concern.58 In this 
area, the UK has expanded beyond the social considerations taken in relation to 
corporate rescue than has the US, which is again influenced by the constitutional 
and legal history of both jurisdictions, as well as the approach to social policy that 
each country takes. It is to the concept of social policy as it relates to insolvency 
that this paper now turns. 
4 Employees in Insolvency: Issues of Job Security and Social Policy
From its peak following the New Deal era,59 much of the welfare state programmes 
have been retrenched in the US with policy changes that either cut social 
expenditure, restructure welfare state programs to conform more closely to the 
residual welfare state model, or alter the political environment in ways that 
enhance the probability of such outcomes in the future.60 In addition, social policy 
retrenchment is highly path dependent, thus social policy choices tend to create 
54 Goode, above note 22, p. 5.
55 McCormack, above note 49, p. 522.
56 Moss, above note 50.
57 McCormack, above note 49, p. 525.
58 Finch, above note 24, p.15.
59 The New Deal was a series of federal programs, public works projects, and financial reforms and regulations 
enacted in the United States during the 1930s in response to the Great Depression.
60 P. Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State (1995,CUP, Cambridge), p. 17.
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strong vested interests and expectations, which are difficult to dislodge. As the 
risks have risen due to increased income inequality, growing instability of income 
over time, increased employment in less structured services and part time roles, 
and increased structural unemployment, social protections have been eroded rather 
than enhanced.61 The US has an uneasy partnership with welfare state ideals. The 
purpose of welfare considerations undermines that central theme of independence 
and the individual responsibility that is connected to it. This approach to matching 
reforms to social changes is also evident in the American approach to employment 
issues arising out of corporate rescue.
While the UK tends toward a modest liberal market ideology, its welfare state model 
tends to be far more progressive than the US model. Among most welfare states 
apart from the US, core programmes are broadly cherished, rather than regarded 
with suspicion.62 However, the financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis precipitated 
a review of such programmes throughout the world’s welfare states, including the 
UK. A number of social protections have been undermined, including employment 
protection and job security, despite public outcry and resistance. In fact, public 
support for the welfare state has increased following the crises, despite mounting 
financial constraints that have limited the extent to which governments can meet 
such demands. The UK, however, has scaled back far more welfare support than 
has its European counterparts,63 though the nature of social policy remains far more 
central and important in the UK than the position it occupies in the US. 
4.1 Social Policy and Insolvency in the United States: A Dire WARNing
Until World War I, State law was the primary source of employment law, but 
these regulatory frameworks were heavily tempered by the concept of individual 
liberty. State laws generally tended to uphold rights to freely enter contracts for the 
hiring of services.64 The American employment system is thus characterised by the 
concept of “at-will” employment in which employers possessed the legal authority 
to determine unilaterally the terms and conditions of an employment relationship.65 
This rule gained the ultimate authority in 1908 when the Supreme Court provided a 
61 J.S. Hacker, “Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy 
Retrenchment in the United States” (2004) 98(2) The American Political Science Review 243, pp. 245-249.
62 B. Vis, K. van Kersbergen and T. Hylands, “To What Extent Did the Financial Crisis Intensify the Pressure to 
Reform the Welfare State” (2011) 45(4) Social Policy & Administration 338, p. 341.
63 Ibid., 342.
64 C.A. Scott, “Money Talks: The Influence of Economic Power on the Employment Laws and Policies in the United 
States and France” (2006) 7 San Diego Int’l LJ 341, pp. 350-351.
65 S.F. Befort, “Labour and Employment Law at the Millennium: a Historical Review and Critical Assessment” 
(2001) 43 B C L Rev 460, pp. 355-375.
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constitutional basis for the doctrine.66 Essentially the doctrine means that both the 
employer and employee are engaged in a relationship that is at the will of either 
of them, thus the employee can leave at any time and the employer can dismiss 
him, unless there is a contractual provision in place to the contrary.67 The at will 
doctrine is universally accepted in the US, having been described as the “very 
foundation of the free enterprise system.”68 Some states have enacted legislation 
placing limitations on the at-will doctrine; however, broadly speaking it is still in 
place.69 The lack of employment protection for American workers is not helped by 
the lack of federal power to control social policy in this area in any fundamental 
way due to the fact that contract law, of which employment law is a subset, is 
governed by individual state legal systems. 
While the Bankruptcy Clause provides the US Federal Government with the 
power to legislate in relation to insolvency and corporate rescue,70 the same does 
not apply to contract law and other domestic state concerns. Certain rights are 
now guaranteed for employees in the US, but these rights do not derive from any 
specific constitutional article or amendment implementing social policy objectives 
on a federal level. Rather, they derive from various articles and amendments to 
the Constitution that have been used to justify their existence. Notably, employee 
rights such as minimum wage, working hours, health and safety, equal pay, and 
even civil rights issues such as affirmative action71 have been justified as being 
covered by the Commerce Clause,72 which allows the federal government to 
regulate business conducted across state lines. There is also a “necessary and 
proper” clause providing Congress with a significant degree of flexibility in the 
invocation of its enumerated powers, though this flexibility has been continuously 
mitigated by a focus on the limitations on the federal government set out with 
some specificity in the Constitution.73 The context of US social policy thus differs 
significantly from EU social policy, which figures quite prominently in most 
66 Adair v United States, 208 US 161 (1908). 
67 Scott, above note 64, 351.
68 D.B. Shine, “An Analysis of the Terms and Level of Implementation of the European Union’s Collective 
Dismissal Directive and the United States WARN ACT. Another Example for the European Union on the Relative 
Merits of Political Federation over Confederation” (1998) 12 Fla J Int’l L 183, p. 185.
69 Known as “whistle-blowing” in the UK which as a reason for discharge is now prohibited in a number of 
American states; see Befort, above note 65, 385-393.
70 Article 1 Section 8 Clause 4 states that Congresses enumerated powers include the power to establish a uniform 
rule of naturalisation and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the US.
71 Although the groundwork for these were laid by the 13th amendment abolishing slavery, the 14th amendment 
prohibiting discrimination in the right to vote based on race and the 15th amendment giving women the right to 
vote laid the groundwork for these laws.
72 Article 1 Section 8 of the Preamble to the US Constitution
73 Redish, above note 6, p. 604.
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Member States through the implementation of social policy directives having legal 
basis set out in the Social Chapter of the EU Treaty.
Although there are certain employee rights available under Chapter 11, these 
do not always adequately protect employees who might be subject to drastic 
reductions in the workforce, pensions and other employee benefits. As these are 
not protected in any way by statute, and in the absence of any protection from 
collective agreements, employees may get notification of redundancies but will 
essentially just have to suffer the loss of their jobs and associated benefits. These 
drastic reductions often occur at the beginning of a reorganisation process, which 
is then sometimes followed by the payment of massive retention bonuses to upper 
management in order to keep them “on the job.”74 Thus, there is often a great 
divide between the treatment of managers as opposed to workers and employees 
in the context of Chapter 11 restructurings.75 In addition, collective agreements and 
employment contracts can be summarily terminated under the Bankruptcy Code.76 
The persistence of the “at will” doctrine means that employees in these situations 
will have recourse to legal protection in only limited circumstances.
Employee claims occurring prior to the petition for Chapter 11 rank fourth in 
priority under the US Bankruptcy Code and are limited in time and amount.77 
While such claims carry priority, this is only after administrative expenses and 
secured claims have been paid.78 Following the petition for bankruptcy, those 
employees that have been assumed by the debtor are assured of being paid for 
services rendered during the reorganisation. These rank as an administrative 
expense and are given first priority, though it is rare that such a claim will arise 
as a debtor will be sure to continue to pay such administrative debts as they fall 
due or risk not completing reorganisation.79 In any event, while priority exists, it 
falls short of the priority given to employees in similar situations in EU countries 
74 See for example Re Eastman Kodak Co. et al, Voluntary Petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, Case No 12-10202, So, 
Dist. NY (2012) available from http://bankrupt.com/misc/Kodak_StipSpectra073013.pdf accessed 30 October 2014.
75 J. Berry, “Different Playing Fields: What Affect Does Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Have on Employees of the Debtor 
and Why do, These Affects Drive Companies to Bankruptcy?” (2012) Social Sciences Research Network http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2139062 accessed 30 October 2014.
76 P.A. Susser, A.M. Weber and S.J. Friedman, “Employment and Employee Benefits in the US: Overview” (2014) 
Practical Law Multi-Jurisdictional Guide on Employment and Employee Benefits http://global.practicallaw.
com/1-503-3486 accessed 28 October 2014.
77 Pensions refers only to retirement income while welfare benefits refer to medical, health, accident, disability or 
death benefits, severance pay, training, apprenticeship programmes, day care and prepaid legal services.
78 P.M. Secunda, “An Analysis of the Treatment of Employee Pension and Wage Claims in Insolvency and Under 
Guarantee Schemes in OECD Countries: Comparative Law Lessons for Detroit and the US” (2014) XLI Fordham 
Urban Law Journal 867, 898 and D R Korobkin, “Employee Interests in Bankruptcy” (1996) 4 Am Bankr Inst L 
Rev 5, pp. 8-9.
79 Korobkin, above note 78, pp. 14-15.
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as employees with pre-petition claims essentially rank equally with unsecured 
creditors and are limited in time and amount claimable.
In terms of the employment protection regulation available to employees during 
the insolvency of their employer, the “at-will” doctrine continues to apply in the 
United States. An employee does not have the right to be transferred with a business 
to which he is associated and if he is, there is no continuity of employment between 
the previous employer and the new one. Essentially, this relies on basic laws of 
contract that once governed the whole of employment law in the UK, though this is 
now mitigated by employment protection regulation aimed at correcting the power 
imbalance in the employment relationship. There are no statutory notice periods, 
requirements for severance, or redundancy pay, or procedural requirements for 
dismissal. For any of these to apply, they would have to be included in a collective 
agreement or perhaps an employee handbook. Employers can lay-off employees 
for any reason that does not violate anti-discrimination statutes or that constitute 
an act of bad faith.80
There are some limited protections available to employees affected by an 
employer’s insolvency. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification 
Act,81 a statute requiring advance notice if collective redundancies were 
envisaged, was passed to mitigate some of the issues surrounding large scale 
bankruptcies.82 If the WARN Act is engaged, the employer must provide written 
notice to representatives and employees affected by the action. The WARN Act 
applies to business enterprises of a certain size and composition in the event 
of a mass layoff,83 however, the threshold for a mass layoff is relatively high 
compared to the Collective Redundancies Directive. The WARN Act does not 
require consultation, merely 60 days advance notice in employers having over 
100 employees, though it excludes several categories of workers, including 
those engaging in collective action at the time of the notice.84 There is also no 
provision for transferring employment contracts. Employees will only transfer if 
the transferee formally offers them employment and continuity of employment is 
not guaranteed.85 Compared with the protections available to employees affected 
by the insolvency of their employer in the UK and other EU countries, the WARN 
80 Susser, Weber and Friedman, above note 76.
81 An Act to require advance notification of plant closings and mass layoffs, and for other purposes (the “WARN” 
Act) enacted by the 100th United States Congress, Pub. L. 100-379 102 Stat 890.
82 Susser, Weber and Friedman, above note 76.
83 Scott, above note 64, pp. 373-374.
84 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
collective redundancies.
85 Scott, above note 76, p. 377.
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Act merely recognises that employees are affected, but offers very little in terms 
of real security or protection. This is where the protections provided to American 
employees in the event of an insolvency ends. 
4.2 Social Policy and Insolvency in the United Kingdom: An EU Imperative
The British employment relationship is based on a ‘master and servant’ model 
connected to the early legal form of social relations, which was a statutory and 
hierarchical paradigm rather than contractual and common law. The master and 
servant form of employment relationship relied upon a command relation with 
an open ended duty of obedience imposed on the worker, reserving far-reaching 
disciplinary powers to the employer.86 Even once the employment relationship had 
been given contractual status, imposing certain civil obligations, the hierarchical 
characteristic of the traditional master and servant model has been carried over 
into the modern contractual employment relationship to some extent.87 Legal 
terminology and the old assumptions of unmediated control continued to be applied 
by the courts as they developed the common law of employment. The advent of 
the welfare state and the extension of collective bargaining caused employment 
law to change direction, but the traditional hierarchy of employer and employee 
remained difficult to dislodge from the British legal psyche.88 While this has been 
tempered since the 1940s and given legal status following the introduction of the 
Employment Rights Act of 1996, as well as other more progressive employment 
oriented legislation, the master and servant approach is still evident in Britain’s 
regulatory approach to employment law.89 This has been displaced to some extent 
by the application of EU law through a number of social policy directives.
After decades of slow but progressive changes to employment rights and 
protections within the EU, all Member States are now bound by the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights90 and the Social Chapter of the EU Treaty,91 with some 
narrow derogative options.92 However, EU social policy remains within the 
domain of Member States to determine, requiring unanimous decision making in 
86 S. Deakin and W. Njoya, “The Legal Framework of Employment Relations” (2007) Centre for Business Research, 
University of Cambridge, Working Paper no. 349, p 7.
87 Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, “The Social Charter in Britain: Labour Law and Labour Courts?” (1991) 54(1) 
MLR 35, p. 6.
88 Deakin and Njoya, above note 86, p. 7.
89 Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, above note 87, p. 6.
90 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union OJ 2000/C 364/1 of 18 December 2000.
91 The Treaty on European Union OJ C/191/01of 29 July 1992 (the Maastricht Treaty).
92 The Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the provisions of the Social Chapter directly in 1997.
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legislative proposals falling under its definition.93 As social institutions are deeply 
embedded in each country’s larger societal framework and history, they cannot be 
easily aligned94 as can be seen by the diverse ways in which social policy related 
directives are implemented in Member States. 
The approach to social policy differs significantly from the more closely coordinated 
action taken by the EU in matters of insolvency. The cooperation of European 
countries in matters of insolvency has a long history. The project has been in 
progress for over 40 years within the EU, evolving in complexity and increasing 
in cooperation as the EU has expanded and changed.95 The culmination of this 
cooperation was the EU Insolvency Regulation.96 While this does not implement 
an EU wide insolvency system, the aims and outcomes of corporate rescue 
mechanisms throughout the EU do not have the same variance that social policy 
regulation does. This could be explained by the fact that insolvency, as a corporate 
law matter, has a more international influence given the globalised marketplace in 
which most businesses now exist. A closer alignment of insolvency mechanisms 
is logical, therefore, as it makes cross-border business less complicated. This may 
also explain the EU approach to a cross-border insolvency regulation, rather than 
trying to implement an EU wide insolvency system. There is perhaps a more natural 
tendency to align systems that are forced to interact regularly in the common and 
international markets.97
This same idea can explain to a certain extent why it is that Member State 
employment regulations have not seen the same kind of convergence or direct 
regulation by the EU. Workers are generally less mobile with the consequence that 
differences in preferences can lead to differences in employment law systems. Also, 
the political context of business versus labour is specifically a domestic concern; as 
such, the conflicting pressure may steer different countries in different directions.98 
This also offers justification for legislating in this area with directives, which are 
binding only as to the result to be achieved. There are a number of EU directives 
93 N. Esenturk, “EU Social Policy: Progressive Development in Legal and Governance Aspects” (2010) UK Social 
Policy Association http://www.social-policy.org.uk/lincoln/Esenturk.pdf accessed 17 November 2012, 2-3.
94 P. Kettunen and C. Wolff, “Europeanisation through the Back Door: EU Social Policy and the Member States” 
(2010) 47(5) Politicka misao 146, p.148.
95 P. Omar, European Insolvency Law (Ashgate 2004), p. 49.
96 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings (OJ 2000/L160/1) (hereafter 
referred to as the “EIR”).
97 See M. Siems, “Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection: Time Series Evidence about the Differences 
between French, German, Indian, UK and US Law” (2012) Centre for Business Research, University of 
Cambridge, Working Paper No 381 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1329997 accessed 
September 2013.
98 Ibid., 20-21.
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that serve to further preserve employment and workers’ rights in insolvency 
situations in relation to collective redundancies,99 transfers of undertakings100 and 
state guarantee funds for employee wages and other compensation.101 Member 
States have taken varied approaches to the implementation of these directives102 
as derogations are available that have been implemented differently among the 
Member States owing to the endogenous factors of culture, legal tradition and 
domestic social policy.103 While social policy directives and their implementation 
among Member States provide a minimum level of protection for employees 
affected by their employer’s insolvency, the position following the financial crisis 
has seen a retrenchment of social policy issues throughout the EU.
In the UK there are a number of protections in place for employees affected by 
the insolvency of their employer. While employees are still generally considered 
unsecured creditors of the employer with the usual rights of a normal contracting 
party,104 their position is protected in relation to up to four months wages occurring 
prior to the insolvency, ranking as a preferential debt subject to a maximum amount 
of £800, an amount set in 1986105 and, to date, unchanged. Employee claims 
beyond the preferred portion rank equally to that of other unsecured creditors. 
An employee also has the right to claim some amounts due from the Secretary of 
State, which is paid out of the National Insurance Fund.106 In the event the business 
continues, an insolvency practitioner steps into the role of the employer and must 
deal with the adopted employment contracts appropriately. Where the business is 
sold, provisions apply that will transfer employment contracts to the purchaser.107 
This was a huge change for the UK system, which relied on a fundamental value of 
99 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
collective redundancies, OJ L 255 provides standards to be used when an employer is contemplating collective 
dismissals which must be applied in a situation that involves dismissing 20 employees over a period of 90 days 
or the lesser of 10% or 30 employees over 30 days.
100 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of 
undertakings or businesses, OJ L 82 - provides for specific protections for employees subject to business transfers 
requiring the transfer of their employment contracts with continuity of employment, but allows for specific 
derogations in insolvency situations.
101 Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 Octover 1980 on the approximation of the laws of hte Member States relating 
to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer, OJ L 283.
102 Ius Laboris, Collective Redundancy Guide (2009). http://www.iuslaboris.com/files/documents/Public%20Files/
Publications/2009_Publications/collective-redundancies-guide.pdf first accessed 2013.
103 Ius Laboris, Guide on Transfer of Undertakings, available from http://www.iuslaboris.com/files/documents/
Public%20Files/Publications/2008_Publications/transfers-of-undertaking.pdf first accessed 2012.
104 D. Pollard, Corporate Insolvency: Employment and Pension Rights, 4th edn, (2009, Bloomsbury Professional 
Limited, Haywards Heath), p. 1.
105 SI 1986 No. 1996 The Insolvency Proceedings (Monetary Limits) Order 1986 para 4.
106 D. Baker and I. Smith, Smith & Woods Employment Law, 10th edn, (2010, OUP, Oxford), pp. 202-203.
107 Pollard, above note 104, p. 1.
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freedom of contract. The first UK legislation conferring continuity of employment 
on a business transfer108 only applied if the employees were voluntarily retained 
by the purchasing firm. There was no concept of automatic transfer as this would 
conflict with the fundamental freedom of contract.109
In terms of dismissals associated with corporate rescue procedures, there are a 
number of protections in place. Unfair dismissal legislation110 generally will 
protect employees from dismissals that have not been justified if an employee has 
worked at an establishment for at least two years. Redundancy111 is also regulated, 
which is the most likely method of dismissal to occur in the event of an employer’s 
insolvency. Like unfair dismissal, an employee must also have two years of 
continuous employment. If eligible, then employees may also be due a statutory 
redundancy payment112 calculated according to the length of time an employee has 
worked for the employer. In the event of collective redundancies, the Collective 
Redundancies Directive113 may apply, which requires consultation and information 
obligations provided to employees by the employer. Thus there are a number of 
provisions available to employees affected by the insolvency of their employer, 
unlike the limited protections available under the US system. 
5 Constitutional Matters: Bankruptcy and Social Policy – a Question of 
Federalism?
The UK and US have developed insolvency and social policy regulation in a 
fairly opposing manner. Despite the fact that parallels are often drawn between 
the UK and the US due to their generally shared views of a neo-liberal economy, 
the underpinning philosophies that inform regulatory choices are diametrically 
opposing. This can be attributed to the staid and steady UK culture and history 
juxtaposed against the fast growing, risk taking, and pioneering spirit that 
formed the backbone of the US. The American spirit of entrepreneurialism and 
independence continues today and is evident in its approach to both insolvency and 
social policy. The independence factor tends to both impede progress in the area of 
social policy due to the suspicion with which any paternalistic activism is viewed, 
while the same independence has imbued itself in the US insolvency system by 
making it possible for debtors to be freed from the shackles of debt without the 
108 Contracts of Employment Act 1963.
109 Baker and Smith, above note 106, p. 541.
110 S98 Employment Rights Act 1996 c 18 (hereafter referred to as the “ERA”).
111 S139 ERA.
112 S162 ERA.
113 S188 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 c 52.
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same stigma that often accompanies debt discharge in the UK. Seeking to balance 
the earnest businessman’s need to take risks to capture economic progress with 
the need to satisfy the obligations owed to creditors under contract law, the US 
created a system that allowed for bankruptcy discharge and an emphasis on rescue 
and restructuring. These aspects of the American culture are deeply imbedded in 
its history, colouring much of the policies still held today. 
Applying in a shallow manner the theory of path dependence to the social policy 
of the US, it is clear that given the American emphasis on individuality and 
independence, and the restrictions that it has created in relation to offering more 
robust protections to individuals who find themselves in difficulty due to their 
employers’ insolvency or other aspect of the lack of job security that is generally 
characteristic of the American employment market, it is clear that without some 
kind of “revolutionary” change, incremental changes are unlikely to achieve any 
significant shifts in relation to the protections available in such circumstances. 
While progressive ideas have recently found their way into common discourse, 
particularly in light of the current political debate, it remains uncertain whether the 
current system of governance is equipped to deal with such fundamental changes. 
The path dependent obstacles standing in the way of change in this area may 
require a federal approach that is potentially unachievable given the lack of firm 
constitutional basis to make unilateral change in the area of social policy. A similar 
structure can be observed in the way that social policy matters tend to be left to 
the prevue of the Member States of the EU, however, despite this fact, it appears 
that the EU has been able to influence individual states in a far more significant 
manner than the US has for the States. However, it is questionable whether such 
intervention is something that is within the ideological capacity of the American 
system in any event. 
While the power of the US Federal Government to legislate with regard to 
bankruptcy law forms a part of the very first Article of the Constitution, any federal 
intervention in labour or employment have had to find their justification in clauses 
and amendments that may or may not provide enough muster to pass Supreme 
Court analysis. This seems directly opposed to the way in which insolvency and 
social policy are regulated within the EU. The European Insolvency Regulation 
only goes so far as to regulate in matters of cross-border insolvencies, leaving 
member state procedures autonomous, while the social chapter has given the EU 
wide powers to legislate in matters of employment and labour regulation. While 
true that there the EU Commission has issued a recommendation introducing 
a new approach to business failure and insolvency that shifts the focus from 
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liquidation to encouraging the early restructuring of viable businesses,114 this is 
merely exhortation and an invitation to reform, non-binding on the Member States. 
However, in areas of social policy, EU influence is far more heavily felt, despite 
the fact that legislation is only in the form of Directives, which are binding only to 
the achievement of the intended results. The constitutional framework of the EU 
also seems far more flexible than the US, having directly interfered with Member 
State sovereignty in the area of social policy through a number of directives 
requiring implementation. 
What, then, is the final analysis that provides a rationale for the foregoing 
investigation? Despite the fact that the US and the UK are in theory aligned in 
economic and social policy to a significantly high degree compared to the rest of 
the EU, their underpinning values vary due to historical influences that have created 
very different contexts of legal development. It has been said that the US and the 
UK are two countries divided by a common language, but it seems that in terms of 
the philosophical foundations of both insolvency and social policy, in spite of an 
apparent cohesiveness, the truth of the matter is that the underpinning values vary 
to such an extent that they may not be reconcilable. This helps to explain why a 
debtor in possession model has not been tried in any meaningful way in the UK as 
it is contrary to the fault-based ideology underpinning insolvency theory. It explains 
why the at-will doctrine continues to find favour in the US among individuals, 
companies, and governmental organisations alike due to the focus on independence 
and freedom to contract. While in reality such freedom does not exist due to the 
imbalance in bargaining power in the employment relationship, the belief in 
freedom and independence is such that applying paternalistic employment policies, 
such as those present in the UK and throughout the EU, which provide basic job 
security and employee protection, would be unacceptable to many Americans. 
Even the more progressive nature of the Democratic party today tends to be 
tempered by some adherence to American values of independence and freedom, 
although the current climate is introducing extraordinary innovation that tempers 
those values with some social democratic ideas. The 2016 presidential election had 
the potential to break new ground that has the potential to dislodge some of the 
path dependent ideals that continue to inform both social policy and bankruptcy 
policy decisions, and the first year of the current presidency has seen significant 
attempts to “buck the trend” of progress. In a similar vein, the upcoming spectre of 
Brexit is raising serious questions about the direction that the UK will take in the 
future. The direction taken will inevitably influence the path of the law.
114 See the Commission Recommendation of 12.03.2014 on a new approach to business failure and insolvency. 
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Chapter 4
Harmonization and Avoidance Disputes 
Against the Background of the European 
Insolvency Regulation1
Antonio Leandro
1 Introductory Remarks on the Treatment of Detrimental Acts within 
the European Insolvency Regulation: the Role of Lex Concursus and 
Vis Attractiva
Regulation 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings ‘EIR’ provides that the validity 
and efficacy of acts reducing the debtor’s assets are subject to the lex concursus, 
i.e. the law of the Member State in which the proceedings have been opened or 
before whose courts the request of opening has been submitted. In this regard, the 
EIR coincides with Regulation no. 1346/2000. Therefore, even though the EIR 
will be applicable from June 2017, references in this paper are to its provisions. 
Lex concursus applies according to Article 7(2)(m), which refers to the “rules 
relating to the voidness, voidability and unenforceability of legal acts detrimental 
to the general body of creditors”, irrespective of whether the detrimental act 
yields rights that are not affected by the opening of the insolvency proceedings, 
such as rights in rem, the right to set-off and the rights based on a reservation of 
title. Articles 8(4), 9(2) and 10(3) ensure the lex concursus applicability while 
safeguarding those rights and claims when being governed by a different law. 
The strong interconnection between proceedings’ purposes and avoidance actions/
rules explains why the latter are in principle governed by the lex concursus. Such 
interconnection also underpins the vis attractiva principle whereby the courts of the 
State in which the proceedings have been opened rule on cross-border avoidance 
actions as well. 
The vis attractiva principle has been codified in Article 6. However, while no 
provisions of the Regulation no. 1346/2000 expressly govern the jurisdiction over 
the so-called ‘ancillary actions’, it is well known that the CJEU has filled in this 
1 The content of this paper is up to date as at 3rd May 2017. 
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gap with the aim to avoid loopholes between the Regulation no. 1346/2000 and 
the Brussels I Regulation (and the Brussels I Regulation (recast)),2 which does 
not apply to “bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent 
companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and 
analogous proceedings”. 
Following a CJEU’s well-established case law, this exception covers only actions 
and decisions which derive directly from the bankruptcy or winding-up and are 
closely connected with the proceedings.3
In Deko Marty particularly, the CJEU stated that even though Regulation no. 
1346/2000 lacks grounds of jurisdiction for actions directly stemming from and 
closely linked to the insolvency proceedings, it should nevertheless govern cases 
excluded from the Brussels I Regulation whenever a jurisdictional issue in matters 
of insolvency arises. To this end, the Court acknowledged a vis attractiva in 
favour of the courts of the Member State where insolvency proceedings have been 
opened, thereby allowing them to rule on the ancillary actions as well. Indeed, vis 
attractiva strengthens the effet utile of the Regulation, as it centralizes all ancillary 
actions in the court of the insolvency proceedings in such a way as to enhance the 
proceedings’ effectiveness and efficiency. Moreover, vis attractiva appears to be 
consistent with the scheme of interconnection between jurisdiction, recognition 
and enforcement framed by Articles 3 and 25 of the Regulation no. 1346/2000. 
Thus, actions that qualify as ancillary to insolvency proceedings are excluded from 
the Brussels I Regulation and fall within the Insolvency Regulation.4 This means 
that actions lacking such characterization are covered by the first Regulation as it 
“is intended to apply to all civil and commercial matters apart from certain well-
defined matters”.5
2 Regulation (EC) no. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, replaced by the Brussels I Regulation (recast) (Regulation (EU) No 
1215/2012 of 12 December).
3 Henri Gourdain v Franz Nadler Case C-133/78 [1979] ECR I-733; Christopher Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium 
NV Case C-339/07 [2009] ECR I-767; SCT Industri AB (in liquidation) v AlpenblumeAB Case C-111/08 [2009] 
ECR I-5655; German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v Alice van der Schee Case C-292/08 [2009] ECR 
I-8421; F-Tex SIA v Lietuvos-Anglijos UAB ‘Jadecloud-Vilma’ Case C-213/10 [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2012:215; 
Nickel & Goeldner Spedition GmbH v «Kintra» UAB Case C-157/13 [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2145 and Comité 
d’entreprise de Nortel Networks SA and others v Cosme Rogeau Case C-649/13 [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:384. 
4 See H v HK Case C-295/13 [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2410, para 31 et seq, also for references to the 2007 Lugano 
Convention (Lugano Convention of 30 October 2007 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2007] OJ L 339/3).
5 F -Tex SIA, above note 2, para 29.
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Moreover, having regard to the scope of the Brussels I Regulation, that of the 
Regulation no. 1346/2000 “must not be interpreted broadly”.6 In this regard, 
the CJEU pays attention to the legal basis of the claim rather than to the 
procedural context of which the action is part. In other words, vis attractiva 
depends more on the action’s basis in insolvency law than on its connection with 
insolvencyproceedings.7 
In case H v HK, the CJEU seems to clarify that actions based on insolvency which, 
according to national law, “could theoretically be brought even if there were no 
insolvency proceedings”, may fall within the Brussels I Regulation when brought 
outside – and in the absence of – insolvency proceedings.8 
Finally, vis attractiva applies both to main and secondary proceedings9 and 
irrespective of whether the defendant’s seat (or habitual residence) lies inside or 
outside the EU: when dealing with an action to set aside brought in the COMI’s 
court against a person whose place of residence was located outside the EU, the 
CJEU decided that the universal effect of main proceedings and the need to ensure 
certainty and uniformity to the jurisdiction criteria imply that the vis attractiva 
principle is not limited to ancillary disputes involving defendants domiciled or 
resident in a Member State.10 The Court emphasised that the Regulation does not 
only address cross-border situations within the EU, and that the determination 
of jurisdiction cannot be postponed until the time when the location of various 
aspects of the proceedings in addition to the COMI, such as the residence of a 
potential defendant to an ancillary action, are known. The CJEU stated that “to 
wait for knowledge of these matters would frustrate the objectives of improving 
the efficiency and effectiveness” of cross-border insolvency proceedings.11
2 The Interplay between Lex Concursus and Law Governing the 
Detrimental Acts
In a nutshell, ‘avoidance rules’ (and related proceedings) amount to both 
substantive and procedural devices serving the insolvency proceedings objectives, 
6 Nickel & Goeldner Spedition, above note 1, paras 22-23; Comité d’entreprise de Nortel Networks SA, above note 
2, para 27.
7 See extensively F -Tex SIA, above note 2; Nickel & Goeldner Spedition, above note 2; H v HK, above note 3; 
Comité d’entreprise de Nortel Networks SA, above note 2.
8 Above note 3, paras 20-25.
9 Comité d’entreprise de Nortel Networks SA, above note 2, para 32.
10 Ralph Schmid (liquidator of the assets of Aletta Zimmermann) v Lilly Hertel Case C-328/12 [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:6; H v HK, above note 2.
11 Ralph Schmid, above note 9, para 28.
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particularly the creditor satisfaction and the pari passu principle, by means of 
measures preserving the debtor’s assets. 
National legal systems provide for the so-called suspect period with respect to 
pre-insolvency transactions and establish in different ways the substantive and 
procedural conditions under which a detrimental act can be avoided in order to 
return assets to the insolvent estate.12 
While remitting avoidance matters to the lex concursus, the EIR sets forth two 
exceptional provisions. The first subjects ‘avoidance actions’ concerning payments 
and financial markets transactions to the law governing the system or the market 
concerned (Article 12(2)). The second one, enshrined in Article 16, excludes the 
application of Article 7(2)(m) whenever the person who benefited from an act 
detrimental to all the creditors provides evidence that both the act is governed by 
the law of a Member State other than that of the proceedings, and that law “does 
not allow any means of challenging that act in the relevant case”.
The specific rule concerning payment and financial markets transactions is self-
evident owing to the specificity of the system in which the detrimental effect arises. 
Article 16 amounts instead to a general exception to the lex concursus applicability.13 
Article 16 aims, in fact, to preserve the legitimate expectations of third parties who 
had dealings with the debtor in Member States (and under laws) other than those in 
which the proceedings have subsequently been opened, to rely on the validity and 
efficacy of the act according to its applicable law (lex causae).14 
The EIR does not determine such law, as its scope is confined to insolvency 
issues. Instead, it provides third parties with a means to demonstrate that the act 
detrimental to collective creditors was, and still is valid and effective according to 
its lex causae, even though their counterparty has been declared insolvent under 
the lex concursus. Accordingly, Article 16 does not establish a special conflict-of-
law rule that replaces the general one of Article 7, but rather a rule providing an 
12 See the INSOL Europe Report, “Harmonization of Insolvency Law at EU Level”, April 2010, p. 10 ff., available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/empl/dv/empl_study_insolvencyproceedings_/
empl_study_insolvencyproceedings_en.pdf last viewed 8 December 2016; and G. McCormack, A. Keay, S. 
Brown, J. Dahlgreen, “Study on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency”, January 2016, p. 137 ff., 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/insolvency/insolvency_study_2016_final_en.pdf last viewed 8 
December 2016.
13 For a deeper analysis see A. Leandro, “Il ruolo della lex concursus nel regolamento comunitario sulle procedure 
di insolvenza” (2008, Cacucci, Bari). 
14 Recital 67.
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exception to the application of the lex concursus if that law were to adversely affect 
the acts protected by the lex causae.15 
3 The Assessments of the Court of Justice 
Since it goes without saying that third parties bear the burden of establishing the 
content of the lex causae ‘in the relevant case’, it has been disputed whether third 
parties may invoke only the provisions on insolvency of the lex causae to prevent 
the insolvency practitioner from challenging the act or have to provide evidence 
that the act is unchallengeable according to the entire lex causae. 
The CJEU uphold the latter view in Nike European Operations judgment, 
stating that 
“a person benefiting from a detrimental act must prove that the act 
at issue cannot be challenged either on the basis of the insolvency 
provisions of the lex causae or on the basis of the lex causae, taken 
as a whole.”16 
Moreover, the CJEU seems to enlarge the concept of ‘rules concerning the 
unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all creditors’ in order to include 
provisions such as § 64 (2) GmbHG, which compels managing directors to 
reimburse the payments they make after the company’s insolvency or after it 
has been established that the company is over-indebted.17 This view comes from 
the judgment on the Kornhaas v. Dithmar case, where the Court ruled in the 
perspective of Article 4 Regulation no. 1346/2000. 
Following a previous judgment,18 the Court considered § 64 GmbHG as a 
provision “covered by insolvency law” so as to be attracted into the lex concursus 
for the purposes of Article 4.19 In particular, § 64 (1) would serve the purposes 
of identifying the persons obliged to open the proceedings (and penalizing the 
managing director who fails to request the opening within three month from the 
insolvency),20 while § 64 (2) “appears at least similar to a rule laying down ‘the 
15 Hermann Lutz v Elke Bäuerle (Case C-557/13) [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:227, para. 31.
16 Nike European Operations Netherlands BV v. Sportland Oy (Case C-310/14) [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:690, 
para. 34.
17 Kornhaas v. Dithmar (Case C-594/14) [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:806, para. 20.
18 H v HK, above note 3.
19 Above note 16, para. 17.
20 Ibid, para. 19.
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unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all creditors’ which ... comes within 
the lex fori concursus” for the purposes of Article 4 (2) (m).21 
Finally, with the aim to safeguard the uniform application of the Regulation no. 
1346/2000, the Court holds that Article 13 (Article 16 EIR) also covers limitation 
periods or other time-bars as well as both substantive and procedural requirements 
for the exercise of an action to set a transaction aside.22 
In reality, the Court’s views are somewhat arguable. Generally speaking, the Court 
seems to underestimate that the EIR sets up the mechanism of Article 16 with 
respect to ‘the relevant case’, which leads to keeping the dispute on the existence 
of means to challenge the act confined into the grounds of avoidance invoked by 
the insolvency practitioner.23 
As for the Kornhaas judgment, the characterization of § 64 (2) GmbHG as a rule 
“at least similar to a rule laying down ‘the unenforceability of legal acts detrimental 
to all creditors’” is also arguable because § 64 (2) only compels the managing 
director to reimburse the payments they made after the company became insolvent 
or after it was established that the company was over-indebted. 
However, since the Court qualified the provision as an insolvency one with respect 
to an action brought within an insolvency proceeding and for the purposes thereof, 
it is debatable whether the Court would have reached the same result if the action 
had been brought in absence of proceedings. As a matter of fact, if the action were 
to be brought out of the proceedings, it would not be ‘covered’ by insolvency law, 
instead falling under company law.
4 Safeguarding the Alleged Detrimental Act at the Heart of the Choice of 
the Law Applicable to the Transaction 
Be that as it may, the Court makes it clear that the evidence on being the act 
valid and effective  – by proving in negative the existence of circumstances to 
challenge the act – as well as the success of the avoidance action itself, depend 
on the contents of the entire lex causae. The need to take into account the entire 
21 Ibid, para. 20.
22 Lutz, above note 14, paras 44-49.
23 On the other hand, the Court has been recently requested to rule on whether it would suffices for the third 
party, should the lex causae theoretically allow a detrimental act to be challenged, to show that the conditions 
for such challenge have not been fulfilled in the relevant case (see request for a preliminary ruling from the 
Tribunale ordinario di Venezia lodged on 29 January 2016, Vinyls Italia S.p.A., in liquidazione v. Mediterranea 
di Navigazione S.p.A. (Case C-54/16), still pending). Advocate General Szpunar delivered his conclusions on 2 
March 2017 answering in the affirmative (see paras 66, 73, 74).
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lex cause raises peculiar concerns because of the lack of a EU harmonization in 
matter of avoidance actions (apart from the uniform rule – stressed by the CJEU 
– whereby the defendant in disputes under Article 16 bears the burden of proof). 
Such concerns stem from the uncertain legal framework in which the interplay 
between lex concursus and lex causae shapes .24 
The remainder of this paper aims to demonstrate how the pattern of Article 16 – 
clearly tailored to cross-border transactions governed by a private international law 
mechanisms –, along with other private international law provisions applicable to 
detrimental transactions, such as the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations, allow parties to legitimately opt for a law even to avoid 
the avoidance effects and, therefore, to somewhat foster the aforementioned 
uncertainty that, in reality, only a process of harmonization may reduce.
Initially, it should be borne in mind that EIR does not provide for the harmonization 
of substantive and procedural rules in matters of avoidance actions. Moreover, 
the resulting differences between national legal systems do not, per se, engender 
problems, even in terms of public policy, that might prevent the judgments from 
being recognized or enforced out of the State whose courts have opened the 
proceedings (and ruled on the avoidance dispute). 
In other words, having regard to the Lutz case, it does not matter in terms of 
public policy that German law requires the insolvency practitioner to commence 
the avoidance action within three years from the opening of the proceedings, while 
Austrian law requires it within in one year. In the same vein, having regard this time 
to the Nike Operation case, it does not matter that Finnish law requires that for the 
avoidance to be granted, payments must be made by unusual means or prematurely 
or in a large amounts, while Dutch law ‘only’ requires that the payment be made in 
the recipient’s awareness that the application to open the insolvency proceedings 
have been already submitted or with an agreement entered into by the debtor and 
creditor to alter the pari passu principle within the proceedings.
As for other avoidance rules, such as the ‘preference’ test, it does not matter that 
German law requires to consider the creditor/third parties’ intention, while English 
law the debtor’s one. What might have importance is instead that parties, against 
24 See A. Leandro above note 12, and Id., “La legge applicabile alla revocatoria fallimentare nel regolamento” 
(CE) n° 1346/2000”, (2009) 1(1) Cuadernos de derecho transnacional, pp. 102-111; more recently, inter alia, G. 
McCormack, “Conflicts, avoidance and international insolvency 20 years on: a triple cocktail”, [2013] Journal of 
Business Law 141, 156-157; A. Keay, “Security rights, the European Insolvency Regulation and Concerns about 
the Non-application of Avoidance Rules”, (2016) 41 European Law Review, pp. 72-90; J. Briggs, G. Corno, 
“Cross-border Insolvency – the Treatment of Legal Acts Detrimental to Creditors in English and Italian Law and 
under the European Insolvency Regulation”, (2016) 29 Insolvency Intelligence, pp. 49-57.
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the background of different provisions with respect to the same matter, may prefer 
one rather another of the aforementioned laws to be applied as lex causae for the 
sake of the transaction.
Broadly speaking, the more national legal systems are different as to the rules 
governing the avoidance actions, the more they get competitive with one another 
when parties are about to choose the law applicable to the transaction (be it ‘lex 
causae or lex contractus’ referred to). As a result, the ‘proper’ law of the transaction 
ends up being chosen as the ‘best anti-avoidance law’, in the perspective of 
parties’ insolvency, rather than the ‘best contractual law’ in the perspective of the 
substantive contractual right and obligations. 
What is being described is a scenario not raising per se alarms because it corresponds 
to the usual competitive position that national legal systems keep with each other 
to be as attractive as possible to the contracting parties. Nor does it reveal abusive 
tactics aiming to escape from the lex concursus because parties generally prefer 
choosing a law under which the contract is enforceable without regard to the risk of 
insolvency of one of them. Nor, finally, should this strategy be deemed limited to 
debarring the effects of the opening of an insolvency proceeding on the contract’s 
enforcement, given that parties may prefer a law just for its contents concerning 
the ordinary actio pauliana. In other words, parties may legitimately choose a law 
also for seeking to protect under the lex causae their expectation concerning the 
stability of a contract.
 The same scenario, however, raises concerns whenever the choice of the law 
ignores considerations about the connection between the contract and lex 
contractus. As it is well known, according to Article 3 Rome I Regulation the law 
applicable to the contract may be selected irrespective of being connected with 
the contract. Here again, the freedom of the parties (i.e. the dogma of the parties’ 
autonomy) is undisputable. However, as parties may not evade the imperative 
provisions of the law that is entirely connected with the contract (Article 3 (3)), 
one may wonder if they are also debarred when the provisions at stake govern the 
avoidance actions. 
For instance, it may be that two companies with a seat in Member State X enter into 
a contract to be performed in the same State, but designate the law of Member State 
Y as the lex contractus. As a result, the avoidance rules of the State X may not be 
applicable neither in the ordinary course of the contractual relationship nor – under 
the conditions of Article 16 EIR – in case of insolvency proceedings subsequently 
opened therein. Recently the CJEU has been requested by the Tribunale ordinario 
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di Venezia to rule, among other things, on whether Article 13 Regulation no. 
1346/2000 should be applicable in cases such as that just described.25
In more detail, the point is whether the rules protecting the creditors against 
a detrimental act amount or not to mandatory rules to which derogation is not 
possible according to Rome I Regulation, whose Article 3 (3) states:
“[w]here all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of 
the choice are located in a country other than the country whose 
law has been chosen, the choice of the parties shall not prejudice 
the application of provisions of the law of that other country which 
cannot be derogated from by agreement.”
Accordingly, the Italian Tribunal referred a question to the CJEU as to whether 
Article 3 (3) Rome I Regulation prevails in such circumstance over Article 13 
Regulation no. 1346/2000 (i.e., Article 16 EIR).
Waiting for the Court’s answer, three premises may be considered to handle the 
issues at stake: 
(a) both Article 3 (3) Rome I Regulation and Article 16 EIR are exceptions to 
general rules (respectively that of the Rome I Regulation allowing parties to 
put the contract under the provisions of the designated law – even when all the 
other elements relevant to the situation are located in a different State – and the 
rule of EIR whereby the avoidance disputes are governed by the lex concursus 
in case of insolvency); 
(b) the derogation of Article 16 comes up only in case of insolvency, thereby 
being almost irrelevant as to the application of the avoidance rules outside of 
an insolvency proceeding; and
(c) following the CJEU’s reasoning, there are no differences between provisions 
pertaining and those not pertaining to the insolvency for the functioning of 
Article 16 EIR. 
The first premise leads to a restrictive interpretation of the exceptional rules.26 
The second premise leads to a recognition of an interplay between the Rome I 
Regulation and the EIR only in case of party’s insolvency and, particularly, 
25 See Vinyls Italia S.p.A., in liquidazione v. Mediterranea di Navigazione S.p.A., above note 22. Advocate General 
Szpunar questionably held in his conclusions that no lex cause clashes with the lex concursus – and, accordingly, 
no problem arises as to the coordination between the EIR and the Rome Regulation – due to the absence of a 
choice of law in cases falling under Article 3 (3) Rome Regulation (paras 160-170).
26 It was in Lutz, above note 14, para. 34, that CJEU remarked in general that Article 16 must be ‘interpreted strictly’.
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of insolvency avoidance disputes. However, the third one makes the need of a 
difference between insolvency provisions and not-insolvency provisions for the 
functioning of Article 3 (3) Rome I Regulation questionable. 
Even assuming, in fact, that the avoidance rules of a State amount to imperative 
rules for their purpose to protect the creditors, they hardly may be conceived of 
at the moment of the choice of law as mandatory rules of the contract absent 
an insolvency proceeding, or (overriding) mandatory rules in case of insolvency 
opened in that State if they may be derogated through Article 16 EIR all the same. 
In other words, the point is not whether Article 3 Rome I Regulation may derogate 
to Article 16 EIR, but whether, under Article 3 generally, parties may choose – to 
target the favourite avoidance rules – a law different to that would-be applicable 
on the basis of all the elements of the contract.
Actually, the applicability of the insolvency avoidance rules is unlikely to be 
affected by the freedom of choice governed by the Rome I Regulation (and vice 
versa) due to the substantive scope of the Rome I Regulation itself, which is 
devoted to contractual obligations. The fact that lex contractus and lex concursus 
may concur for the functioning of Article 16 EIR has no importance because – as 
earlier noted – Article 16 assumes that a different law from that of the State of the 
proceedings exists and neither establishes how that law is to be designated nor 
evidently may extend the scope of Rome I Regulation to insolvency matters. 
As a consequence, the scope of the Rome I Regulation restricts the reasoning 
to contractual/ordinary avoidance rules. But, lacking the harmonization, the 
mandatory nature thereof depends on the value such rules have according to each 
Member State. Article 3 (3) leaves the existence of mandatory rules and the margin 
of derogation thereof to the law of the State in which ‘all other elements relevant 
to the situation at the time of the choice are located’.
The mandatory nature of the ordinary avoidance rules (if ascertained under the 
national legal system at stake) comes further into evidence when parties, availing 
themselves of the so-called dépeçage27, choose for the avoidance disputes a law 
different from that applicable to the rest of the contract. The case differs from 
those concerning Article 3 (3) of the Rome I Regulation. In that case the relevant 
standpoint necessarily is that of the law governing the rest of the contract: whether 
parties are debarred from designating for the ordinary avoidance disputes a different 
law will depend on the mandatory nature of the same rules under the lex contractus. 
27 Generally speaking, dépeçage is a private international law technique which splits an issue into two or more parts 
and subjects them to different laws.
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From the foregoing description it follows that the Rome I Regulation does not 
debar parties from choosing a specific law, even when they seek the sole purpose 
to safeguard the contract from avoidance challenges. 
5 More Laws, More Avoidance Rules ... More Uncertainty
Should different laws govern the transaction, the lack of harmonization among 
avoidance rules may engender inconsistency in the whole treatment of the 
avoidance disputes, thereby infringing the legal certainty, i.e. just the objective 
Article 16 aims to. 
One can imagine a dépeçage provided by the parties under Rome I Regulation 
or a contract covered by a partial choice of law to be compensated with the law 
designated by the court under Article 4. Unlike the case described above in which 
the dépeçage aims to put the avoidance issue under a specific law, this would only 
divide the contract into multiple fractions under different laws.
The fragmentation either of the contract or of the rules governing the contract may 
lead to the fragmentation in the treatment of the related avoidance disputes. The case 
would be more interesting if one of such laws became lex concursus afterwards. 
As for the insolvency rules, it is apparent that if they were to be harmonized the 
fragmentation could not engender problems under Article 16 EIR in terms of 
incongruous treatment of the same contract before the court of the proceedings.
6 Concluding Remarks
After having emphasized how the CJEU encourages an accounting for the entire 
lex causae when applying Article 16 and the problems of uncertainty that the 
interplay between the Rome I Regulation and the EIR cause, the reasons why 
harmonization among national avoidance rules by way of EU legislation is pressing 
are further evident.28 
However, it should not be overlooked that the success of the harmonization 
(especially in case of a maximum one) would somewhat affect the rationale of 
Article 16 as a private international law device which assumes – in the light of 
the legitimate expectations of the parties – a difference between the avoidance 
rules managed by the court of the proceedings. But we have been talking about 
harmonization not unification...
28 See the European Parliament resolution of 15 November 2011 with recommendations to the Commission on 
insolvency proceedings in the context of EU company law (2011/2006(INI)) at recital C and point 1.3.
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Chapter 5
“Wrongful Trading” in England and Hungary: 
A Comparative Study
Zoltán Fabók1*
1 Introduction
At the time of writing, it is still unknown how, if at all, the EU Commission’s 
legislative proposal due to be published in the framework if the “insolvency 
initiative”2 in autumn 2016 addresses the harmonisation of the laws of Member 
States on some aspects of directors’ liability. Given the long history of 
harmonisation attempts in this area, raising the idea of harmonisation again would 
not really be surprising. 
In this paper, it is not intended to argue for or against a potential European 
legislation on the personal liability of directors. Its purposes are more limited. It 
aims to present a specific example of legal transfer3 that took place in 2006 when 
Hungary imported the English concept of the liability for “wrongful trading”.4 The 
result of this legal transplant, it is believed, may be instructive for future incentives 
for harmonisation in the field of directors’ liability. 
In the second part of this paper, the initiatives of harmonisation of the directors’ 
liability in the history of the European Communities is summarised. In the third 
part, the function of wrongful trading concept is shortly discussed. In the fourth 
part, a comparative analysis of the main features of the liability for wrongful 
trading both in England and Hungary is presented. Subsequently, the diverging 
1* Zoltán Fabók, Fellow of INSOL International, is a counsel in DLA Piper, Budapest and a PhD candidate at 
Nottingham Trent University. The Shakespeare Martineau travel grant is gratefully acknowledged.
2 European Commission, Insolvency Proceedings, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/commercial/
insolvency/index_en.htm (last viewed 25 April 2017). In the meantime, the Commission published its Proposal 
for a Directive on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency 
of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures, available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/
newsroom/image/document/2016-48/proposal_40046.pdf (last viewed 8 May 2017). Article 18 of the draft 
Directive limits itself to determining some duties of the directors in the vicinity of insolvency.
3 “Legal transfer” or “legal transplant” means unilateral adoption of legal norms from other jurisdictions. See N. 
Garoupa and A. Ogus, “A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants”, (2006) 35 Journal of Legal Studies, p. 341.
4 On the legal transfer of the English provisions on wrongful trading see T. Cseh, “Új hitelezővédelmi jogintézmény 
a magyar társasági törvényben (wrongful trading) [New Legal Institution of Creditor’s Protection in the Hungarian 
Companies Act (Wrongful Trading)]”, (2006) 14 Gazdaság és Jog, pp. 9 ff.
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tendencies in case law is discussed. In the sixth part, an indication of some possible 
reasons why wrongful trading provisions play a more prominent (and different) 
role in Hungary than they do in England is given. As a conclusion, it will be 
attempted to answer the following questions: (i) Do the Hungarian provisions on 
liability for wrongful trading qualify as a “legal transplant”? (ii) Has the adoption 
of the English concept of wrongful trading resulted in “harmonised” or “unified” 
rules5 on directors’ liability for wrongful trading in England and Hungary?
2 Harmonisation Initiatives
The concept of uniform rules in the field of director’s liability throughout the 
Member States emerged early in the history of the European Communities. The 
1970 Preliminary Draft Convention6 envisaged a number of territories where the 
contracting states would have been required to harmonize their substantive laws. 
The personal liability of directors was one of these areas. However, the idea did 
not survive the Preliminary Draft Convention: no similar provision can be found 
in the latter versions of what eventually became the 2000 Insolvency Regulation.7 
The thought emerged again in 2003. The Commission, reflecting to the initiative of 
the “High Level Group”8 proposed9 introducing a wrongful trading rule similar to 
that found in England. However, on the basis of the responses that the Commission 
received,10 the idea was abandoned.11 In 2010 the idea of harmonisation turned 
up again. This time, INSOL Europe, commissioned by the European Parliament, 
5 “Legal harmonization” is a cooperative approach of approximation of laws through setting of objectives and 
targets and let each nation amend their internal law to fulfil the chosen objectives. “Legal unification” is an 
extreme version of harmonization replacing national rules and adopting a unified set of rules chosen at the 
interstate level. See E. Carbonara and F. Parisi, “The Paradox of Legal Harmonization”, (2007) 132 Public 
Choice, p. 368; N. Garoupa and A. Ogus, ibid., p. 343. The dichotomy of harmonisation and unification is 
mirrored at the level of the legislative acts of the EU. „With the use of »directives« member states of the EU 
harmonize their national legal systems by setting common goals and standards. With »regulations« EU countries 
instead agree to replace their respective national laws with a common rule which becomes directly applicable in 
the national systems of all member states.”; see E. Carbonara and F. Parisi, ibid., p. 368.
6 Preliminary Draft of a Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-Up, Arrangements, Compositions and Similar 
Proceedings. Translation of Commission Document 3.327/1/XIV/70, 4 June 1973. [EU Commission - Working 
Document]’ (1973), Annex 1 Article 1.
7 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] OJ L160/1.
8 J. Winter et. al., “Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework 
for Company Law in Europe” (2002), available from http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/
report_en.pdf (last viewed 27 July 2016).
9 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Modernising Company Law 
and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward COM (2003) 284 Final.
10 Synthesis of the Responses to the Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
“Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move 
Forward” – COM (2003) 284 Final of 21 May 2003.
11 P. J. Wright, “Challenges to the Harmonization of Business Law: Domestic and Cross-Border Insolvency” (2015) 
SSRN Electronic Journal, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2658230 (last viewed 1 August 2016), pp. 
15 ff.
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conducted a report12 identifying some areas of insolvency law where harmonisation 
at EU level seemed to be worthwhile and achievable. The report of INSOL Europe 
concluded that, among other things, directors’ liability could have been subject of 
harmonisation. At a later stage of the legislative process, this aspect of the initiative 
seemed to have evaporated.13 Recently, however, following a communication14 
on a new European approach to business failure and insolvency, the Commission 
adopted a recommendation15 in March 2014. This 2014 Recommendation aims 
at establishing minimum standards for: (i) preventive restructuring procedures 
enabling debtors in financial difficulty to restructure at an early stage with the 
objective of averting insolvency, and (ii) debt discharge, within prescribed 
periods, for honest bankrupt entrepreneurs as one of the steps necessary to provide 
them with a second chance. Neither in these texts nor in the evaluation16 of the 
2014 Recommendation by the Directorate-General Justice & Consumers of the 
European Commission is any direct referral to the intended harmonization of the 
rules on the personal liability of the directors. Notwithstanding, the idea seems to 
keep entertaining the European legislator.17 By the time of the publication of this 
paper it will be known to what extent and how, if at all, the legislative proposals 
of the Commission addresses the issue of directors’ liability.
3 The Function of the Provisions on Wrongful Trading
The principle underlying the wrongful trading concept is the protection of creditors 
in the period of time when the debtor company still operates, but is in a state of 
imminent insolvency. Diverging incentives can be detected in this period of time.18 
The director, acting in the interest of the company, may want to trade the company 
out from the difficult situation, but to do so he needs time, and possibly more credit 
and new obligations. The unsecured creditors may be concerned that the assets of 
the debtor, which are the only coverage for their claims, are melting away and that 
12 INSOL Europe, Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at EU Level, (2010) https://www.insol-europe.org/technical-
content/european-insolvency-regulation (last viewed 1 September 2016).
13 See Report with Recommendations to the Commission on Insolvency Proceedings in the Context of EU Company 
Law (2011/2006(INI) (2011); European Parliament Resolution of 15 November 2011 with recommendations to 
the Commission on insolvency proceedings in the context of EU company law, P7_TA (2011) 0484 2011.
14 A New European Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency COM(2012) 742 Final.
15 Commission Recommendation of 12.3.2014 on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency C(2014) 
1500 final.
16 Evaluation of the Implementation of the Commission Recommendation of 12.3.2015 on a New Approach to 
Business Failure and Insolvency (2015), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/insolvency/02_
evaluation_insolvency_recommendation_en.pdf (last viewed 8 May 2017).
17 See e. g. the reports of the Group of experts on restructuring and insolvency law at http://ec.europa.eu/
transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3362 (last viewed 8 May 2017).
18 On the incentive structures see G. Spindler, “Trading in the Vicinity of Insolvency”, (2006) 7(1) EBOR, pp. 340. ff.
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they will end up in a position worse than it would have been if formal insolvency 
proceedings had started earlier in time. As Professor Keay put it, 
“[i]f the risk-taking [by the director] pays off, then the shareholders 
will see their wealth maximised, but if it does not, then they have lost 
nothing more; it is the creditors who will bear the cost.”19 
Beyond this, the interest of the employees and the wider public is, generally, to 
save the company or at least the business as going concern. The secured creditors 
normally want their security interests to retain their value, etc. 
Directors are among the key players in the situation when the company is on 
the verge of insolvency. They may just throw in the towel, stop trading and file 
an application for winding up (insolvent liquidation). They may file for formal 
insolvency proceedings designed for reorganisation of the company or rescuing the 
business. Alternatively, they may continue operations and try to trade the company 
out of its difficulties. Should the latter option be chosen, there is little to protect the 
interests of the creditors of the struggling company. 
Two main strategies appear to exist in Europe when dealing with the protection 
of creditors’ interests in the vicinity of insolvency: the “duty to file” strategy and 
the “wrongful trading” strategy. The reports drafted by the London School of 
Economics20 and more recently by the team of University of Leeds21 give a detailed 
account on these strategies. 
The duty to file strategy is more common in Europe. The majority of the member 
states22 of the EU expect the directors to file for insolvency within a certain period 
of time after the insolvency (on cash-flow or balance sheet basis) occurs. Should 
the director fail to comply with that rules then he may be liable for the damage 
caused to the creditors while delaying the insolvency. Apparently, this concept 
puts the emphasis on the formal insolvency proceedings and leaves less room for 
either a potential “trade out” by the debtor company or informal rescue strategies. 
19 A. Keay, “Wrongful Trading and the Liability of Company Directors: A Theoretical Perspective”, (2005) 25 
Legal Studies 434.
20 C. Gerner-Beuerle et. al., “Study on Directors’ Duties and Liability”, (the “London Report”), (2013, London), pp. 
xiv, 208 ff. 
21 Gerard McCormack et. al., “Study on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency – Comparative Legal 
Analysis of the Member States’ Relevant Provisions and Practices” (the “Leeds Report”), (2016), 48 ff.
22 E.g. Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Poland, Spain, Portugal etc. For more details, see the London and Leeds 
Reports, above notes 19 and 20.
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A minority group of the member states23 incentivise directors to respect the interest 
of the creditors by imposing special – and personal – liability for diminution of 
assets in the period of the approaching insolvency. Following the English example, 
this can be called the “wrongful trading” strategy. As we are going to see below, 
the basis of the liability in the English law is that the director continues operating 
the company whilst he knows or should know that there is no reasonable prospect 
of avoiding an insolvent winding-up. The wrongful trading strategy indicates a 
more flexible approach where there is much more room to try to trade out of the 
difficulties by continuing operations or attempting to rescue the company through 
informal agreements with (some of) the creditors. However, because the apparent 
victims of failed behind-the-door rescue attempts are creditors, their interests are 
protected by special rules making directors liable for losses suffered by the debtor 
in the vicinity of insolvency. 
4 Wrongful Trading in England and Hungary
4.1 The Legal Transplant to Hungary
In England the liability for wrongful trading was introduced24 in the 1986 
Insolvency Act (IA) in addition to other existing civil remedies, first of all the 
provisions on fraudulent trading and misfeasance.25 By contrast, virtually no civil 
law protection was available in Hungary for creditors vis-à-vis the directors of 
the insolvent company prior to 2006.26 As long as the company was not formally 
insolvent (no insolvency proceedings were opened) in most cases directors were 
free to operate the debtor company without any relevant restrictions. Even if the 
management activity of the director resulted in the increase of the net deficiency of 
23 E.g. the U.K., Ireland, Malta, Cyprus, Hungary. For more details, the London and Leeds Reports, above notes 19 
and 20. Of course, the two strategies may be combined: e.g. under certain circumstances Hungarian companies 
are required to file for insolvency, see § 3:189 and § 3:270, Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code (the “Civil Code”). 
24 On the background, aims, rationale of the liability for wrongful trading in comparative context see A. Keay, 
Company Directors’ Responsibilities to Creditors (2007, Routledge-Cavendish, London), pp. 73-80.
25 Fraudulent trading is a cause of action which arises if, in the course of winding-up a company, it appears that any 
business of the company has been carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any 
other person or has been carried on for any fraudulent purpose, see section 213, IA. Misfeasance is a cause of 
action which arises if, in the course of winding-up a company, it appears that a person has misapplied or retained, 
or become accountable for, any money or other property of the company, or has been guilty of any wrongdoing 
or breached their duties of trust (for example, duty to hold something in trust) in relation to the company, see 
section 212, IA. On the number of the cases in England and Wales classified according to the different types of 
actions see P. Walton, “Insolvency Litigation and the Jackson Reforms – An Update” (the “Walton Report”) 
(2016), available at https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/policy/research_reports/bus_distress_index/
Insolvency_Litigation_and_the_Jackson_Reforms_-_An_Update_April_2016_FINAL.pdf (last viewed 18 April 
2017), pp. 18-19.
26 See 2006. évi VI. törvény indokolása a csődeljárásról, a felszámolási eljárásról és a végelszámolásról szóló 1991. évi 
XLIX. törvény módosításáról [Explanatory note on the Act VI of 2006 amending of the Hungarian Insolvency Act].
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the debtor, that did not typically provoked the personal liability of the executives 
vis-à-vis creditors.27 
What is equally relevant is that even before the import of the wrongful trading 
provisions from England, no efficient “duty to file” rule existed in Hungary. This 
means that Hungary applied none of the main strategies designed for protection of 
the creditor’s interests in the vicinity of the insolvency. In other words, there were 
no efficient rules forcing the directors or shareholders to start formal insolvency 
proceedings within a certain period of time after the company became insolvent, 
virtually nothing prevented directors from continuing to operate long-insolvent 
companies and accumulate further losses to the creditors of the dying company. 
Quite often, legal transplants occur because a legal institution another nation has is 
deemed superior.28 If that is true, the transfer of the liability for wrongful trading 
from the English law to the Hungarian legal system was more than justified. The 
wrongful trading concept had at least two features which were new and superior 
as compared to the Hungarian law. First, the newly adopted provisions established 
the legal basis of the liability of corporate directors directly vis-à-vis the creditors 
of the debtor company. Second, the new concept created an obligation on the side 
of the company directors to take into consideration the interests of the creditors in 
the period of imminent insolvency, i.e. prior to the factual insolvency.29
4.2 The Key Ingredients of Wrongful Trading in English and Hungarian Law
The basic elements of the liability for wrongful trading pursuant to the IA30 and the 
Hungarian Insolvency Act (HIA)31 are, somewhat generalised, as follows: 
27 In fact, a kind of statutory derivative action for compensation and some judge-made remedies were available; see 
below under heading 6 Possible reasons for the diverging case law. 
28 M. Graziadei, “Comparative law as the study of transplants and receptions”, Chapter 13 in M. Reimann and R. 
Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006, OUP, Oxford), pp. 457 ff. 
29 In theory at least, wrongful trading rules impose duties on directors already prior to the onset of material 
insolvency. However, as Bachner demonstrated, this is not necessarily the case. In fact, English courts tend to 
establish the starting point of the critical period (thus the beginning of the special duties) at a later stage of the 
agony, when the company is already (cash-flow or balance sheet) insolvent. See Th. Bachner, “Wrongful Trading 
- a New European Model for Creditor Protection ?”, (2004) 5(2) European Business Organization Law Review, 
pp. 296 ff. Similarly, A. Campbell, “Wrongful Trading and Company Rescue Andrew”, (1994) 25 Cambrian L. 
Rev., p. 74.
30 Section 214, IA.
31 § 33/A, Act XLIX of 1991 on Reorganisation Proceedings and Liquidation Proceedings. Note that, to some 
extent, “culpable trading” as a sub-category of the criminal offence “fraudulent insolvency”, § 404(1), Act C of 
2012 on the Hungarian Criminal Code, can be interpreted as a criminal law counterpart of the wrongful trading; 
for an analysis of the interplay between the two remedies see M. Tihanyi, “A vezetői felelősséggel kapcsolatos 
megállapítási per (wrongful trading) lehetséges hatásai a vétkes gazdálkodással elkövetett csődbűncselekmény 
miatt indult büntetőeljárásokra [The possible effects of the declaratory action regarding the liability of the 
directors (wrongful trading) on the criminal proceedings due to fraudulent insolvency committed through culpable 
trading]”, working paper, http://www.mabie.hu/node/2491 last viewed 17 October 2016. 
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• Formal insolvency proceedings32 have been opened against the debtor 
company. If the debtor is able to avoid opening formal insolvency proceedings 
the director will not be liable for wrongful trading. 
• The director knew or should have concluded before the commencement of the 
formal insolvency proceedings that the company would be unable to avoid 
going into insolvent liquidation or administration (in England) or that the 
company is in the state of imminent insolvency (in Hungary). 
• The person affected was, in a wide sense, a director of the company during the 
critical period. 
• The director fails to prove that he took every step he ought to have taken to 
minimise the loss to creditors.
• The continued operation caused loss to the creditors.
Under the subsequent headings a comparative analysis of these ingredients will 
be provided. 
4.3 Similarities between English and Hungarian Wrongful Trading Provisions
4.3.1 The Debtor Goes into Insolvent Liquidation
Both in England and Hungary, precondition to the liability for wrongful trading 
is that insolvent liquidation proceedings33 have been opened against the debtor 
company. This form of liability is per definitionem retrospective. The liability is 
not an end in itself: should the continued trading or rescue turn out to be successful 
and, as a consequence, the company regains solvency, there is no point to penalise 
the director for the – eventually successful – decision to continue business activity 
even in a seemingly hopeless situation. 
4.3.2 The Addressees of the Norm are Directors in a Wide Sense
Section 214 of the IA requires the persons targeted to be directors. First of all, this 
category includes de jure directors, i.e. those who occupy the position of director, 
by whatever name called.34 Also de facto directors are included.35 A de facto 
director is a person who assumes to act as a director. He is held out as a director 
32 In England: winding up or insolvent administration where the insolvency is to be determined on the basis of 
the balance sheet test, see Section 214, IA; Section 246ZB, IA; in Hungary: felszámolási eljárás (liquidation 
proceedings), see § 33/A, HIA.
33 Ibid.
34 Section 251, IA.
35 See Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd (In Liquidation), Re [1994] BCC 161.
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by the company, and claims and purports to be a director, although never actually 
or validly appointed as such.36 Finally, the statute itself provides that the category 
of director includes also shadow directors, too.37 Shadow director, in relation to a 
company, means a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the 
directors of the company are accustomed to act.38 Millett J. characterised a shadow 
director as someone who: 
“[…] does not claim or purport to act as a director. On the contrary, he 
claims not to be a director. He lurks in the shadows, sheltering behind 
others who, he claims, are the only directors of the company to the 
exclusion of himself.”39
In Hungary, the concept of director refers first of all to de jure directors.40 Beyond 
that, the statute provides that any person who has in fact exercised dominant 
influence on the decision-making mechanisms of the debtor company shall also 
be considered an executive, i.e. subject to liability.41 This category is generally 
mentioned as “shadow directors” in judgements and the literature but the definition 
appears to cover both shadow and de facto directors. By contrast to the English 
statute, the HIA limits the application of the wrongful trading provisions to those 
directors who have been in this position in the period of three years prior to the 
opening of the insolvency proceedings.42 
4.3.3 Exculpation of Directors
The defence to wrongful trading actions is addressed by both the IA and the HIA 
in a rather similar way. Should the director as defendant in the wrongful trading 
litigation be able to prove that he took every step with a view to minimising 
the potential loss to creditors he ought to have taken (in Hungary: that is to be 
expected from persons in such position), then no liability is incurred.43 This is a 
defence to the wrongful trading action thus the burden of proof, principally, lies 
on the director.
36 R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (2011, Sweet & Maxwell, London), pp. 641-643.
37 Section 214(7), IA.
38 Section 251, IA.
39 Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd (In Liquidation), Re [1994] BCC 161, at 163.
40 § 3(1)(d), HIA.
41 § 33/A(1), HIA.
42 Ibid.
43 Section 214(3), IA; § 33/A(3), HIA. The HIA adds that the it is expected from the director to prompt the supreme 
body of the debtor company to take action. 
91
In Hungary, however, there appears to be some ambiguity regarding the burden 
of proof. On the one hand, the wording of the statute suggests that the claimant 
is expected to prove that the director, when continuing trading, disregarded the 
interests of the creditors.44 On the other hand, the HIA provides that the director 
as defendant who is able to prove to have taken all reasonable measures expected 
from persons in such positions, upon the occurrence of the imminent insolvency so 
as to prevent and mitigate the losses of creditors, and to prompt the supreme body 
of the debtor’s economic operator to take action, shall not be held responsible. 
Thus, it is not completely clear on the basis of the wording of the statute, which 
party is expected to establish that the director reasonably tried to protect the 
interests of the creditors. The position of the Curia (Highest Court of Hungary) is 
not completely straightforward, either. In one judgement, the judicial body ruled 
that the occurrence and the date of the imminent insolvency, the fact and the extent 
of the increase of the net deficiency and the causal relation between the behaviour 
of the director and the increase of the net deficiency were to be proved by the 
claimant. On the other hand, the defendant director needs to prove that he has 
taken all reasonable measures expected from persons in such positions to prevent 
and mitigate the losses of creditors.45 However, another decision suggests that the 
claimant is required to establish also that the director acted in a way contrary to the 
interests of the creditors during the critical period.46 
4.3.4 Losses during Continued Trading
Section 214 of the IA does not expressly require any loss suffered by the creditors, 
but it is well-established in case law that the continued trading should make the 
company’s position worse, so that it has less money available to pay creditors, 
rather than to leaving the company’s position at the same level.47 Importantly, 
44 Before 15 March 2014 the statute expected to establish that the director failed to act on the basis of the priority 
of the creditors’ interests. Since, the statute has expected directors to take into consideration the interests of the 
creditors, thus there is no clear priority order. However, the changing in the wording of the statute may have no 
effect on the case law, see A. Csőke, “A vezető tisztségviselő felelőssége fizetésképtelenség és felszámolás esetén 
[Liability of executives in the context of insolvency and liquidation]”, in Z. Csehi and M. Szabó (eds), A vezető 
tisztségviselő felelőssége [Liability of the executives] (2015, Wolters Kluwer, Budapest) p. 142.
45 Legfelsőbb Bíróság Gfv.X.30.047/2011/3. cf. A Kúria Polgári Kollégiuma Joggyakorlat-elemző Csoport [Civil 
Department of the Curia, Expert Group Analysing the Case Law], “A vezető tisztségviselők hitelezőkkel 
szembeni felelőssége« tárgykörben felállított joggyakorlat-elemző csoport összefoglaló véleménye (A Kúria 
Polgári Kollégiuma által 2017. február 6-án elfogadott összefoglaló vélemény) [Summary Opinion of the Expert 
Group on the Subject of »the Liability of the Executives vis-à-vis the Creditors” (Summary Opinion approved 
by the Civil Department of the Curia on 6 February 2017] [2016.El.II.JGY.G.2.] (the “Summary Opinion”), 
available at http://lb.hu/sites/default/files/joggyak/osszefoglalo_velemeny_6.pdf (last viewed 12 February 2017); 
the Summary Opinion appears to share this view, pp. 25-27, 31-32.
46 Kúria Gfv.VII.30.303/2013/6.
47 Re Continental Assurance plc [2001] BPIR 733 at paragraph 9 of Annex B; Ralls Builders [2016] EWHC 243 
(Ch) at paragraph 241.
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English provisions on wrongful trading seem to focus merely on the general body 
of the creditors: form the point of view of the wrongful trading prohibition, it is 
not relevant if some creditors are paid fully during the period of continued trading 
while others end up receiving nothing due to payments made to other creditors.48 
What matters is the overall debt position of the company: as long as the overall 
position does not worsen during the critical period, no loss of assets occurs for the 
purposes of wrongful trading. 
The HIA expressly provides49 that some kind of loss is required to activate 
wrongful trading liability: either the debtor’s assets have diminished, or the director 
obstructed full satisfaction for the creditors’ claims, or has neglected to carry out 
the cleaning up of environmental damages. However, in order to trigger this type 
of liability the director must disregard the creditors’ interests in consequence of 
which the losses occur. In other words, even if the asset pool diminishes during 
the critical period that does not automatically result in the liability of the director. 
Some additional element, typically a fraudulent or grossly negligent act of the 
director, is required.50
Note that case law appears to be rather divided as to whether payments to selected 
creditors diminishing the asset pool of the company and decreasing the shares to be 
paid to the remaining creditors is contrary to the prohibition of wrongful trading. 
This question will be analysed below.51 
4.3.5 The Quantitative Limit of the Compensation 
The IA simply provides that the court may declare that the director is to be liable 
to make such contribution (if any) to the company’s assets as the court thinks 
proper.52 These are very wide words of discretion and, as Knox J. stated, it would 
be undesirable to seek to spell out limits on that discretion.53 Still, the principle is 
that the contribution to the assets in which the company’s creditors will share in 
the liquidation should reflect (and compensate for) the loss which has been caused 
to those creditors by the carrying on of the business when the insolvent liquidation 
could not be avoided.54
48 Re Continental Assurance plc [2001] BPIR 733 at paragraph 8 of Annex B; Ralls Builders [2016] EWHC 243 
(Ch) at paragraphs 239-240.
49 § 33/A(1), HIA.
50 BDT2016 3499 (Debreceni Ítélőtábla Gf. IV. 30 369/2015/6).
51 See below under the heading 4.5.2 Which creditors can be lawfully paid off during the critical period?
52 Section 214(1), IA.
53 Produce Marketing Consortium (In Liquidation) Ltd, Re (No2) [1989] 5 BCC 569, at 597-598.
54 Morphitis v Bernasconi [2003] EWCA Civ 289, at paragraph 55 (in relation to fraudulent trading).
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In Hungary, the established principle is that the upper limit of the liability for 
wrongful trading is the amount by which the assets of the debtor have diminished 
during the critical period, as long as this is attributable to the director.55 
4.4 The Differences
4.4.1 What should the Director Foresee?
Pursuant to the English statute, what the director knew or ought to have concluded 
is that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation or 
insolvent administration.56 Once the director first gains this “deemed knowledge”57, 
the critical period begins. For the purposes of this provision, insolvent liquidation 
or administration means that the assets are insufficient for the payment of debts 
and other liabilities and the expenses of the winding up or those of administration 
(balance-sheet test).58 The statute provides for both objective and subjective tests 
regarding the directors. The focus of the objective test is what should be known 
or concluded by a reasonably diligent person having the general knowledge, skill, 
and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same 
functions as are carried out by that director in relation to the company. Then, 
the subjective test focuses on the what should be known or concluded by this 
reasonably diligent person with the general knowledge, skill, and experience that 
the director in question (i.e. the defendant of the wrongful trading litigation) has. 
It is crucial to emphasise that the focus is not on insolvent trading but on the 
question of whether there is a reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation. 
Insolvent trading in itself does not give rise to wrongful trading.59 As Snowden J. 
put it, 
“[i]t is important to note that the fact that a company is insolvent 
(on a balance sheet or cash-flow basis) and carries on trading does 
not mean that a director – even one with knowledge of that fact — 
will be liable for wrongful trading if the company fails to survive. 
Many companies show a balance-sheet deficit from time to time, but 
nevertheless have every real prospect of trading out of that position 
or otherwise recovering from the deficiency and thereby avoiding an 
insolvent liquidation […]. Likewise, trading companies often suffer 
55 Legfelsőbb Bíróság Gfv.X.30.047/2011/3.; Debreceni Ítélőtábla Gf.III.30.387/2012/5.; Summary Opinion, above 
note 44, p. 23.
56 Section 214(2)(b), IA and Section 246ZB(2)(b), IA.
57 Goode, above note 35, p. 670.
58 Section 214(6), IA and Section 246ZB(6), IA.
59 See Brooks v Armstrong [2015] EWHC 2289 (Ch).
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cashflow difficulties and fail to pay their creditors on time, but are 
able to overcome that cash-flow insolvency by (for example) selling 
an asset or raising external finance on the security of their assets.”60 
What triggers the liability is not the factual insolvency of the debtor but rather 
“the type of situation […] where the director has been held to have had no rational 
basis for believing that the event that they hoped would save the company would 
come about.”61 To sum up, the critical period does not begin just because the 
debtors is insolvent: as long as there is reasonable prospect to trade the company 
out of the difficulties, the threat of wrongful trading does not emerge, even if 
the director knows about the insolvency and even if the continued trading in the 
period of insolvency results in loss to the creditors. English courts tend not to place 
undue emphasis on hindsight and avoid the danger of assuming that what has in 
fact happened was always bound to happen and was apparent.62 As Lewison J 
expressed in so graphic terms,
“[o]f course, it is easy with hindsight to conclude that mistakes were 
made. An insolvent liquidation will almost always result from one 
or more mistakes. But picking over the bones of a dead company in 
a courtroom is not always fair to those who struggled to keep going 
in the reasonable (but ultimately misplaced) hope that things would 
get better.”63
In Hungary, the critical period begins with the occurrence of imminent insolvency. 
Pursuant to the legal definition, imminent insolvency starts when the directors 
were or should have been reasonably able to foresee that the debtor company 
would not be able to satisfy its liabilities when due64 (cash-flow test). In other 
words, as long as the director knows or should foresee that the debtor is cash-flow 
insolvent he is exposed to the liability for wrongful trading if further elements of 
the liability are present. The Curia found that 
“[r]egarding the occurrence of the imminent insolvency the relevant 
question is whether the debtor is able to settle its debts when due. If 
the debtor is unable to do so because it has neither liquid assets nor 
60 Ralls Builders [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch) at paragraph 168.
61 Ibid. at paragraph 174.
62 Sherborne Associates Ltd, Re [1995] BCC 40 at 54; Brian D Pierson (Contractors) Ltd, Re [1999] BCC 26 at 
50; Hawkes Hill Publishing Co Ltd (In Liquidation), Re [2007] BCC 937 at paragraph 47; Ralls Builders [2016] 
EWHC 243 (Ch) at paragraph 173.
63 Hawkes Hill Publishing Co Ltd (In Liquidation), Re [2007] BCC 937 at paragraph 47.
64 § 33/A(1), HIA. Further, see Summary Opinion, above note 44, pp. 20-21; A. Csőke, “A fizetésképtelenséggel 
fenyegető helyzet [The imminent insolvency]”, (2016) (Annex No 2 to the Summary Opinion), pp. 66-70. 
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credit to settle its debts and it is unable to agree with its creditors on a 
different kind of performance or adjustment of the due date then the 
imminent insolvency occurs even if the other assets of the debtor […] 
exceeds the amount of debts.”65 
When applying the rather rigid cash-flow test, it appears that the hope in realising 
some uncertain incomes in the future is insufficient to be shielded from imminent 
insolvency.66 László Juhász, a Hungarian senior judge noted, regarding the rather 
rigid notion of imminent insolvency, that: 
“[h]owever difficult it is to say, it is a fact that a significant number 
of enterprises operating in Hungary need to face with the fact on a 
daily basis that they will not be able to pay off their debts when due 
if they are unable to collect their receivables. The executives should 
realise that in such situations they are acting in the state of imminent 
insolvency even if [the debtor] has significant assets […].”67 
In several cases, Hungarian courts apply the current ratio test or even the quick 
ratio test to determine the cash-flow situation of the company.68 The current ratio 
is a basic indicator calculated by dividing total current assets by total current 
liabilities; the quick ratio, by contrast, takes into account the most liquid current 
assets: it is calculated by adding cash and equivalents, marketable investments, 
and accounts receivables, and dividing that sum by current liabilities. Although the 
wording of the HIA (“were or should have been reasonably able to foresee”) seems 
to suggest that, similar to the English provisions, both an objective and subjective 
test applies, the Curia ruled that
“[t]he occurrence of the imminent insolvency is to be examined 
from the point of view of the knowledge of the director, i.e. of those 
circumstances he has been able to recognise.”69 
To sum up, the difference between the English and Hungarian approach is of 
paramount importance: While an English director is safe from wrongful trading 
liability as long as there is reasonable prospect to avoid insolvent liquidation, his 
65 BH2014. 188. (Kúria Gfv. VII. 30.247/2013.); Kúria Gfv.VII.30.265/2015/4.
66 Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 15.Gf.40.043/2015/5/II.
67 L. Juhász, A Magyar fizetésképtelenségi jog kézikönyve [Textbook on the Hungarian insolvency law] (2014, 
Novotni Kiadó, Miskolc) [electronic edition] p. 484.
68 Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 12.Gf.40.469/2013/5.; Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 12.Gf.40.679/2015/5-II.; Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 
12.Gf.40.013/2015/6-II. See also Csőke, above note 63, pp. 67-69. For an analysis of the methods of examination 
of the imminent insolvency see S. Fónagy, “A Fizetésképtelenséggel fenyegető helyzet megítélése [Assessment 
of the imminent insolvency”, (2015) 23 Gazdaság és Jog, pp. 16 ff.
69 BH2014. 188. (Kúria Gfv. VII. 30.247/2013).
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Hungarian counterpart is exposed to personal liability once and as long as the 
debtor company is cash-flow insolvent. Most probably this provision radically 
increases the number of the potential defendants in Hungary.70 
4.4.2 Who initiates the wrongful trading litigation and benefits from it?
The IA reserves the power for liquidators and administrators to claim against 
directors for wrongful trading.71 Should the court approve the claim the director 
is declared to be liable to make a contribution to the company’s assets. The 
contribution serves the purpose of making a distribution to the unsecured creditors, 
and is therefore not available for a charge holder.72 
In Hungary, the legislator followed a different path. For some reasons, the legislator 
designed the rules so that the court cannot oblige the director to contribute to 
the asset pool of the debtor company. Instead, a peculiar two-level litigation has 
been introduced. In the first phase, after the opening but before the closing of 
the insolvency proceedings, a declaratory action should be brought against the 
former director. This claim is available for both the liquidator and any creditors. 
The litigation is declaratory in nature. It is aimed at establishing the liability and 
the amount of the diminution of assets caused by the continuation of the business 
activity during the critical period of imminent insolvency.73 No performance 
may be sought in this proceeding. Then, in a second step, after the closing of the 
insolvency proceedings, assuming that the assets of the debtor do not or only partly 
cover the creditors’ claims (so in virtually all cases), the creditors, but not the 
liquidator anymore, may bring an action for performance.74 In this second phase 
of the litigation the court, if approving the claim, orders the former director to 
compensate those creditors on pro rata basis who initiated this second litigation. 
The maximum of the compensation to be shared among those creditors amounts to 
the net deficiency accumulated during the critical period as established by the court 
in the first phase of the litigation. One of the inexplicable peculiarities of the rules 
is that the second litigation may be initiated by any creditors, i.e. also by those who 
did not even participate in the first litigation. The root of the problem is that – for an 
unknown reason – the statute does not require the defendant director to contribute 
70 See below under the heading 6 Possible reasons for the diverging case law.
71 Section 214(1), IA and 246ZB(1), IA.
72 Re Oasis Merchandising Services Limited [1998] Ch 170; Ralls Builders [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch) at paragraph 
235.
73 1/2013. (II. 28.) Polgári jogegységi határozat. See A. Csőke, “A vezető tisztségviselő felelőssége [Liability of the 
executive]”, in A. Csőke, E. Lettner and Cs. Juhász, Nagykommentár a csődeljárásról és a felszámolási eljárásról 
szóló 1991. évi XLIX. törvényhez [Comprehensive Commentary on the Insolvency Act] (2015, Wolters Kluwer, 
Budapest) [electronic edition], at § 33/A.
74 § 33/A(6), HIA. See also 1/2013. (II. 28.) Polgári jogegységi határozat [Civil uniformity decision].
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to the assets of the debtor company.75 Instead, the claimants are free to enforce 
their claims on a quasi-individual basis in the second stage of the litigation. This 
appears to be contradictory to the principle of collective insolvency proceedings. 
Note that the legislator has recently eased the strict separation of the two stages of 
litigation by enabling the claimants to request performance during the insolvency 
proceedings if, according to the interim financial statement, the debtor’s assets are 
insufficient to cover the creditors’ claims.76
4.4.3 Statutory Presumption
In Hungary, a statutory presumption assists the claimant in several cases.77 The 
violation of the interests of the creditors is presumed if the director, failing to 
comply with the law, did not deposit and publish the debtor’s annual accounts 
prior to the opening of liquidation proceedings and/or breached his obligation to 
cooperate with the liquidator by providing him with the relevant information and 
documentation. There are some questions regarding this provision. First, the rule 
apparently fails to determine the length of the period before the opening of the 
liquidation proceedings concerning which the failure to deposit and publish the 
annual accounts is taken into consideration. Secondly and more importantly, there 
is some uncertainty in the case law regarding the scope of the presumption. The 
position of the Curia is that, if the claimant proved the occurrence and beginning 
of the imminent insolvency and the increasing of the net deficiency in the critical 
period then, should the statutory presumption be applied, it is presumed that the 
director neglected the interests of the creditors and this is in causal relation with the 
losses to the creditors.78 Others suggest that the scope of the presumption is much 
wider and extends to the occurrence of the imminent insolvency and the increase 
of the net deficiency during the critical period.79
The statutory presumption does not operate regarding shadow directors.80
4.4.4 Majority Shareholder as ex lege Guarantor 
The concept of lifting the corporate veil, i.e. ignoring the separate legal personality 
of the company thereby imposing personal liability on shareholders, is recognised, 
75 Csőke, above note 72, at § 33/A.
76 § 33/A(7), HIA.
77 § 33/A(3), HIA. cf Summary Opinion, above note 44, pp 22-25; P. Lakatos, “A vezető tisztségviselő felelőssége 
vélelmének fennállásával kapcsolatos kérdések [Questions regarding the Statutory Presumption of the Liability 
of the Executives]” (undated) (Annex No 5 to the Summary Opinion), pp. 80-84.
78 Kúria Gfv.VII.30.024/2015/4; Kúria Gfv.VII.30.059/2015/5.
79 M. Dzsula, “A vezető tisztségviselő felelősségével kapcsolatos jogalkalmazási problémák II. [Issues regarding 
application of law relating to the liability of executives II.]” (2013) 23(7) Céghírnök, p. 9. 
80 ÍH 2012.91. (Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 14.Gf.40.493/2011/4)
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although it plays a minor role, in England.81 In Hungary, this concept enjoys a 
wider recognition and shareholders need to consider a number of statutory 
provisions making them personally liable vis-à-vis the creditors of the insolvent 
company.82 What is common in these actions is that they focus on the shareholders 
of the debtor company.
By contrast, the liability for wrongful trading is generally reserved for directors of 
the debtor company, even if the term “director” is to be construed in a wide sense: 
beyond de jure directors, it includes de facto and shadow directors. Actually, the 
term “shadow director” is so widely drafted both in the English and the Hungarian 
statutes that it may cover also controlling shareholders – assuming, of course, 
that they interfere in the management of the company in a way that verifies 
this qualification.83
One of the peculiar characteristic of the Hungarian legislation is that, in an indirect 
but unambiguous way, it puts the majority shareholder of the debtor company to 
the position of a “statutory surety” (guarantor) of the director regarding the liability 
for wrongful trading even if that majority shareholder does not fall within the 
category of shadow director. The essence of the provision84 is that the claimants 
of the declaratory action, i.e. the first litigation,85 may request the court to order 
the director as defendant to provide financial security for the case if – typically 
later, in the second litigation (action for performance)86 – the court finds the 
director liable for wrongful trading and obliges him to pay compensation to the 
creditors on pro rata basis. Should the judgement ordering the former director to 
pay compensation to the creditors turn out to be unenforceable, e.g. because the 
director is impecunious, then the creditors as claimants will be able to recover 
their claims approved by the court from the financial security. Up to this point the 
system is consistent, if not really efficient. However, the statute goes further. The 
majority shareholder of the debtor company shall be deemed, by force of law, as 
a guarantor regarding the financial security if the latter cannot be recovered from 
the director. Practically, by this provision the legislator expanded the liability for 
wrongful trading, originally targeting the managers of the company, to the majority 
shareholders. Thereby, beyond providing an apparent benefit to the creditors, the 
81 P. L. Davies, S. Worthington and E. Micheler, Principles of Modern Company Law (2016, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London) pp. 191-206.
82 See § 3:2(2) and § 3:324. § (3, Civil Code; § 63(2) and § 63/, HIA; § 118/A, Act V of 2006 on Public Company 
Information, Company Registration and Solvent Winding-up Proceedings.
83 Regarding the IA see Goode, above note 35, p. 668.
84 § 33/A(2), HIA.
85 See above under the heading 4.4.2 Who initiates the wrongful trading litigation and benefits from it?
86 Ibid.
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legislator virtually eliminated the, otherwise very real, conflict of interests between 
directors and the majority shareholders arising from the threat of liability for 
wrongful trading. 
4.4.5 Professional Advisers are not Statutorily Exempted from the Category of 
Shadow Director
The IA provides that a person is not deemed a shadow director by reason only that 
the directors act on advice given by that person in a professional capacity.87 Of 
course, if they cross the line and move from advising to instructing this exemption 
will not protect them.88 
No similar exemption exists in the Hungarian statute. The widely drafted 
definition89 of shadow director may, in theory, include those who advised the 
debtor company in a professional capacity (e.g. solicitor or accountant). However, 
there are no apparent cases in which Hungarian courts established the liability of 
a professional adviser as shadow director. 
Another aspect of the involvement of professional advisers is whether that has 
any effect on the liability of the director. In England, courts have been prepared 
to place weight upon the evidence as to whether the directors took professional 
advice, and if so, what that advice was.90 It appears that asking for and following 
the advice of an informed professional is a strong defence against wrongful trading 
claims.91 No similar case law appears to exist in Hungary. 
4.5 Some further Critical Questions
4.5.1 The Question of “New Creditors”
One of the crucial, partially ethical, question emerging when a company operates 
on the verge of insolvency is the treatment of “new creditors”. When a company 
continues operating after the critical date,92 normally new debts incur. This is 
because, in order to generate revenues and performing its obligations vis-à-vis 
87 Section 251, IA.
88 L. Doyle and A. Keay (eds.), Insolvency Legislation: Annotations and Commentary (2016, Jordan Publishing, 
Bristol) p. 380.
89 § 33/A(1), HIA.
90 Hawkes Hill Publishing Co Ltd (In Liquidation), Re [2007] BCC 937 az paragraph 43; Continental Assurance 
Company of London plc [2007] 2 BCLC 287 at paragraph 108; Ralls Builders [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch) at 
paragraph 176-177, 206.
91 F. Oditah, “Wrongful trading” (1990) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law, p. 208.
92 In England when they know or should conclude that there no reasonable prospect to avoid insolvent liquidation 
and in Hungary when the director foresees or should reasonably foresee that the debtor company will not be able 
to satisfy its liabilities when due. See above under the heading 4.4.1 What should the director foresee?
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their partners, the debtor company more often than not needs to purchase material, 
order services, involve sub-contractors, accept new orders, etc. In principle, this 
is not contrary to the obligation of the director to take every step with a view to 
minimising the potential loss to the company’s creditors in the critical period.93 
After all, if the trade out is successful and the company regains its solvency then 
no creditor’s claims remain unpaid. However, in the event of a failure of rescue 
the new creditors, i.e. those whose debts arose during the critical period, find 
themselves in the situation as if they were, typically involuntarily, used to finance 
the attempt to rescue the debtor company at their own risk. Moreover, in several 
cases they have to face the fact that some of the “old creditors” (i.e. those whose 
claim arose prior to the critical period) were simply paid off from the money 
coming from the new creditors. 
Some legal systems, e.g. the German, handles this question differently. When 
applying the German “counterpart” of wrongful trading provisions, the so-called 
“Insolvenzverschleppungshaftung” (liability for delaying insolvency), German 
courts distinguish between old and new creditors. While the former ones receive 
“Quotenschaden” (i.e. the diminution after comparing the hypothetical dividend 
that would have been payable to the creditors at the time when the company should 
have filed for insolvency and the actual dividend expressed as a percentage of the 
nominal claims), the new creditors generally retrieve their total losses which are 
not to be claimed by the liquidator.94 In other words, when considering the damage 
has been caused by the delay in the commencement of the insolvency, German law 
focuses on the position of the creditors rather than the position of the company.95
By contrast, section 214 of the IA apparently looks at the loss suffered by the 
company, and consequently, by the general body of creditors, rather than the 
individual creditors. As Snowden J explained: 
“Standing back, whatever other criticisms can be made of the manner 
in which the Directors conducted the business of the Company [in 
the critical period], I think it is entirely plausible that such continued 
activity did not cause loss to the Company overall or worsen the 
position of the creditors as a whole [emphasis added]. The real sin of 
the Directors, so far as the unsecured creditors left in the liquidation 
are concerned, is the manner in which the continued trading facilitated 
the repayment of the Bank and some existing creditors whilst leaving 
93 Section 214(3), IA; § 33/A(3), HIA.
94 Bachner, above note 28, 311 ff; Spindler, above note 17, p. 47.
95 Ibid, p. 311.
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new creditors unpaid. I have already indicated my view that this is 
not something that the Directors ought to have permitted to occur, 
but for the reasons I have explained, I cannot see that it justifies a 
contribution to be made to the assets of the Company under section 
214(1). That may be thought to be a shortcoming in the structure of 
section 214 [the provision on wrongful trading], but I do not think it 
is one that I can remedy: any such change would be for Parliament.”96
Having said that, this does not mean that the directors should irresponsibly use 
the new creditor’s means to help the company survive or pay off some other 
due debts. Namely, such behaviour may trigger liability for fraudulent trading 
pursuant to section 213 IA.97 In general, fraudulent trading is committed if the 
company obtains new credit, knowing it will be unable to repay it when due in 
order to pay off existing creditors.98 The threshold of proof, of course, is higher 
as compared to that of wrongful trading. Namely, in order that the liability for 
fraudulent trading be established it is necessary to prove that the business has 
been carried out with intent to defraud creditors, that the defendant participated in 
carrying on the business, and that the defendant did so with knowledge about the 
fraudulent intention. 
As with the English provisions, the Hungarian subspecies of wrongful trading 
also focuses on the interest of the general body of the creditors. The monetary 
limit of the compensation is the decrease of the asset pool of the debtor company 
in the period of the imminent insolvency.99 Consequently, if there is no loss, there 
is no liability. Apparently, the current provisions of the liability for wrongful 
trading, like the English statute, are not designed to differentiate between “old” 
and “new” creditors. 
But again, as with the English provisions, there is some protection for those 
creditors whose claims arose when there was virtually no chance that the debtor 
would be able to pay them off. Although there is no statutory rule in Hungary 
corresponding to English civil remedy of fraudulent trading, fraud as a general 
criminal offence appears to cover this kind of behaviour.100
96 Ralls Builders [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch) at paragraph 279.
97 Regarding the criminal liability for fraudulent trading see Section 993, Companies Act.
98 R v Grantham [1984] QB 675; Goode, above note 35, p. 661-662. 
99 See above under the heading 4.3.5 The quantitative limit of the compensation.
100 BH2011. 58. (Legf. Bír. Bfv. II. 1040/2009.)
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4.5.2 Which Creditors can be Lawfully Paid off During the Critical Period?
We have seen before that section 214 of the IA is basically neutral regarding 
payment to selected creditors. What matters is the overall position of the company 
rather than the position of singular creditors. Similarly, fraudulent trading pursuant 
to section 213 of the IA is generally not implicated by payment of preferences. The 
mere fact of preferring one creditor will not in itself qualify as fraudulent trading.101 
Of course, other legal grounds for liability like the provisions on preferences102 and 
misfeasance103 may come into play. 
In Hungary, there is a degree of uncertainty as to what constitutes the diminution of 
assets and which payments by the debtor, diminishing the asset pool, are deemed 
lawful. In several judgements, the question of the increase of the deficiency (i.e. 
the worsening of the position of the general body of creditors) on the one hand 
and that of the lawfulness of such increase on the other hand are not handled as 
separate questions. The following main directions can be distilled from case law.
The majority opinion, confirmed by the Curia suggests that wrongful trading 
provisions are designed to protect the assets of the debtor company.104 
Consequently, if the asset pool diminishes in the critical period, even if through 
paying off some legitimate debts to the creditors, this amounts to the diminution of 
assets for the purposes of the wrongful trading provisions. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that such diminution is unlawful, as we are going to see below. 
A minority of the decisions concluded that in the event both the assets and the 
liabilities decreases, e.g. by paying off one or more legitimate creditors with due 
claims, this is not a diminution of assets for the purposes of wrongful trading.105
As to the question asking which creditors may lawfully be paid off in the critical 
period, even if at the price of diminishing the asset pool, diverging answers can 
be found in the case law. At the one end of the scale there are a few judgements 
concluding that no payment is allowed which diminishes the assets of the debtor 
company.106 At the other end of the scale are those decisions ruling that payments 
101 Sarflax Ltd, Re [1979] Ch 592. 
102 Section 239, IA.
103 Section 212, IA; Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd [1988] 4 B.C.C. 30; Goode, above note 35, 
652 f.
104 Kúria Gfv.VII.30.024/2015/4., Kúria Gfv.VII.30.265/2015/4., BH2016. 179. (Kúria Gfv. VII. 30.254/2015.), ÍH 
2013.37. (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30.344/2011.), Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 12.Gf.40.343/2012/7., Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 
15.Gf.40.043/2015/5/II.
105 E.g. Debreceni Ítélőtábla Gf.III.30.387/2012/5; Pécsi Ítélőtábla Gf.IV.40.022/2015/4; Szegedi Ítélőtábla 
Gf.IV.30.105/2013/5.
106 Kúria Gfv.VII.30.265/2015/4; Legfelsőbb Bíróság Gfv.IX.30.432/2010/4.
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to legitimate creditors, including shareholders, do not violate the prohibition 
of wrongful trading,107 as long as both the assets and liabilities diminish in 
equivalent proportions.108
What appears to be the majority opinion is that payments to related persons (first of 
all to the shareholders of the debtor company) are not acceptable.109 A number of 
judgements agree that from the point of view of the liability for wrongful trading 
a distinction must be made between outsider creditors on the one hand and the 
shareholders of the company. The repayment of the shareholder’s loan may not 
frustrate the settlement of claims belonging to outsider third party creditors. Some 
judgements and authors have emphasised that a director, when deciding about 
payments to be performed during the critical period, should make sure that the 
specific payment serves the restoring of the solvency, the enabling of the continued 
operation, thus the interests of the general body of the creditors.110 
Hungarian courts appear to accept that payments to those secured creditors 
whose claim would be covered by the assets anyway in a hypothetical insolvent 
liquidation scenario does not trigger liability for wrongful trading.111 
As with the English law, the fact that some payments to selected creditors do not 
constitute wrongful trading liability does not mean that the payment in question 
would not be targeted by provisions on preferences.112
4.5.3 “Pull the Plug” Scenario
Sometimes a decision whether to continue the operation or to shut down the 
business can be difficult indeed. This is the situation if the company is insolvent 
or is in the state of imminent insolvency, the survival is rather questionable and 
the chances are that, if the attempt to trade out of insolvency turns out to be 
unsuccessful, then the general body of creditors finds itself in a situation worse 
than it would have been if the debtor had filed for insolvency earlier. What are 
directors expected to do in such situation? 
107 But it may well be incompatible with the rules on preferences, see § 40, HIA.
108 Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 12.Gf.40.469/2013/5; Pécsi Ítélőtábla Gf.IV.30.117/2013/8; Pécsi Ítélőtábla 
Gf.IV.40.022/2015/4.
109 Kúria Gfv.VII.30.193/2013/8; Debreceni Ítélőtábla Gf.IV.30.008/2015/5; Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf.III.30.401/2014/2; 
BDT2014. 3241 (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30 509/2012); Győri Ítélőtábla Gf.II.20.117/2015/3; BDT2013. 2881 
(Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30 276/2011.). Similarly, Csőke, above note 43, p. 132.
110 BDT2014. 3241 (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30 509/2012); Győri Ítélőtábla Gf.II.20.117/2015/3; Debreceni 
Ítélőtábla Gf.IV.30.008/2015/5. Similarly, Csőke, above note 43, p. 132.
111 Kúria Gfv.VII.30.040/2012/3; ÍH 2013.37. (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30.344/2011).
112 See § 40, HIA; BH2016. 179 (Kúria Gfv. VII. 30.254/2015); ÍH 2013.37 (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30.344/2011); 
Pécsi Ítélőtábla Gf.IV.30.117/2013/8; Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf.IV.30.105/2013/5.
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The emblematic sentences of Park J., which sum up the diverging incentives 
influencing the decision of the managers, are worth citing in this regard:
“An overall point which needs to be kept in mind throughout is 
that, whenever a company is in financial trouble and the directors 
have a difficult decision to make whether to close down and go into 
liquidation, or whether instead to trade on and hope to turn the corner, 
they can be in a real and unenviable dilemma. On the other hand, if 
they decide to trade on but things do not work out and the company, 
later rather sooner, goes into liquidation, they may find themselves in 
the situation of the respondents in this case—being sued for wrongful 
trading. On the other hand, if the directors decide to close down 
immediately and cause the company to go into an early liquidation, 
although they are not at risk of being sued for wrongful trading, they 
are at risk of being criticised on other grounds. A decision to close 
down will almost certainly mean that the ensuing liquidation will be 
an insolvent one. Apart from anything else liquidations are expensive 
operations, and in addition debtors are commonly obstructive about 
paying their debts to a company which is in liquidation. Many 
creditors of the company from a time before the liquidation are likely 
to find that their debts do not get paid in full. They will complain 
bitterly that the directors shut down too soon; they will say that the 
directors ought to have had more courage and kept going. If they had 
done, so the complaining creditors will say, the company probably 
would have survived and all of its debts would have been paid. 
Ceasing to trade and liquidating too soon can be stigmatised as the 
cowards’ way out.”113
What appears to be certain in the context of the English law is that there is, of 
course, no obligation to cease operating once the company becomes insolvent, 
even if the situation is so hopeless that there is no prospect of saving the company. 
In this case, the continuation of operations may still diminish the net deficiency 
so that the general body of creditors is better off than it would have been in the 
event of an early filing.114 Even if the continued trading happened to increase the 
net deficiency, the director who tried to save the business may still have some 
chance to rely on the statutory defence by proving that he took every step with a 
113 Re Continental Assurance plc [2001] BPIR 733 at paragraph 281.
114 Ralls Builders [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch) at paragraphs 185, 268-270.
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view to minimising the potential loss to the creditors, assuming it was designed 
appropriately so as to minimise the risk of loss to individual creditors.115
The risks connected to the opposite situation, i.e. when the manager decides to 
stop trading and file for insolvency even though there was still reasonable prospect 
to avoid going into insolvent liquidation, is less clear. As we have seen above, 
Park J. seems to suggest that in this case directors are not at risk of being sued 
for wrongful trading.116 This appears to be logical. Wrongful trading liability is 
attached to the continuation of trading in the critical period, i.e. when the director 
knew or ought to have concluded that insolvent liquidation cannot reasonably be 
avoided. If there is no such critical period or it is very short simply because the 
director filed for insolvency once the situation started to become critical, there 
appears to be no basis for the application of section 214 of the IA. 
In Hungary, the “pull the plug” scenario is sometimes regarded as a safe harbour 
by advisers and directors striving to avoid personal liability for wrongful trading. 
Indeed, while on the one hand wrongful trading provisions do not seem to restrain 
directors from attempting to save debtor companies through continuing operation 
as long as the operation and the associated payments are not contrary to the 
interests of the general body of creditors, on the other hand, those provisions do 
not prohibit or penalise early filing, either. Having said that, directors may be 
liable vis-à-vis the company (thus indirectly to the shareholders and the creditors) 
on a legal basis different117 from wrongful trading if they let the company go into 
insolvent liquidation despite the opportunity to dissolve the company through 
solvent liquidation proceedings.118
5 The Diverging Case Law
Despite the visibility of the wrongful trading concept both in England and abroad, 
section 214 of the IA has not been often used. There have only been a small number 
of reported cases.119 What generally can be said about the case law is that courts 
do not appear prepared to impose liability on directors, and this is particularly so 
if the directors have sought and obtained advice from professionals. Accordingly, 
115 Ibid, at paragraph 245.
116 Goode, above note 35, pp. 667, 673-674 is of the opposite view. 
117 E.g. a derivative claim for compensation brought by the liquidator on behalf of the insolvent debtor company, § 
3:24(1), Civil Code; or a shareholder’s claim for compensation vis-a-vis the director, § 3:117(3), Civil Code.
118 BDT2012. 2782. (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30 346/2011.)
119 A. Keay and P. Walton, Insolvency Law, Corporate and Personal (2012, Jordan Publishing, Bristol), p. 659.
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in most cases where directors have been found liable they have been found to have 
acted irresponsibly.120 As Park J. summarised:
“Typically they have been cases [where directors have been held to 
be liable] in which the directors closed their eyes to the reality of 
the company’s position, and carried on trading long after it should 
have been obvious to them that the company was insolvent and that 
there was no way out for it. In those cases the directors had been 
irresponsible, and had not made any genuine attempt to grapple with 
the company’s real position.”121
In Produce Marketing,122 the directors ignored the warning of the auditors and 
continued trading. Beyond, the affairs of the debtor were conducted in a way which 
reduced the indebtedness to the bank, to which one of the directors had given a 
guarantee, at the expense of trade creditors. In Re Purpoint,123 the director failed to 
ensure that proper records were kept and that proper cash flow calculations and net 
worth calculations were made, therefore it was impossible to ascertain the extent 
to which the net liabilities were increased by the continuance of the company’s 
trading. In Re Bangla Television,124 instead of causing the company to cease trading, 
the directors caused the company to deal or purportedly trade with its assets so that 
the company parted with £250,000 worth of them for no consideration. 
By contrast, there have been a relatively high number of cases reported in Hungary 
in the recent years. It appears that more than 300 cases reached the courts of appeal, 
most of them after 2010. Taking into consideration the difference in size of the two 
countries, we can say that wrongful trading litigation is much more widespread 
in Hungary than it is in England. Based on the review of the cases, it can be said 
that in Hungary, a successful wrongful trading litigation presupposes an element 
of fraud in a wide sense, the term including preferential payments to affiliated 
entities as well.
Among other things,125 Hungarian courts held directors liable who had repaid 
shareholders’ loans in the critical period while no assets were available for 
120 Morris v Bank of India [2005] EWCA Civ 693 at paragraph 103; ibid, p. 659.; A. Keay, above note 23, p. 130.; 
Doyle and Keay (eds.), above note 87, p. 298.
121 Re Continental Assurance plc [2001] BPIR 733 at paragraph 106.
122 Produce Marketing Consortium (In Liquidation) Ltd, Re (No.2) [1989] 5 BCC 569. 
123 Purpoint Ltd, Re [1991] BCC 121.
124 Bangla Television Ltd (In Liquidation), Re [2009] EWHC 1632 (Ch).
125 On the behaviours of executives normally giving rise to personal liability see Summary Opinion, above note 44, 
pp. 21-23.
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unsecured creditors.126 Also, providing loans to affiliated companies and/or (asset-
less) third parties without any security interests, thereby diminishing the asset pool 
available to the creditors, amounted to wrongful trading.127 Similarly, directing 
payments originally due to the debtor company to another (affiliated) entity in the 
vicinity of insolvency may trigger the director’s personal liability.128 Entering into 
notional contracts in order to dissipate the debtor’s assets129 or a fraudulent transfer 
of real estate for no real consideration to another (affiliated) company130 qualified 
as wrongful trading. Should the director be unable to give an account of the assets 
indicated in the annual accounts he has to be prepared to be subject to wrongful 
trading litigation, too.131 
6 Possible Reasons For Diverging Case Law
As has been shown, there are significant differences in the case law between 
England and Hungary, both in terms of the number and the substance of the cases. 
As to the low number of reported cases in England, the findings of the Leeds 
Report132 are instructive. The Report identified a number of obstacles to enforcement 
vis-à-vis directors who breached their insolvency-related duties.133 In relation to 
the United Kingdom, these obstacles seem to be: impecunious directors, cost of 
litigation, lack of evidence, burden of proof, and lack of funding. The problem of 
funding and the litigation costs as important obstacles are highlighted by other 
authors, as well. Because only office holders (liquidators and administrators) have 
the right to initiate the litigation and no public funding is available, they are rather 
cautious of risking the debtor’s already inadequate assets on litigation unless there 
is a very strong chance of success.134 Possibly, the reforms of 2015 giving office 
126 BH2016. 179 (Kúria Gfv. VII. 30.254/2015); BDT2013. 2881 (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30 276/2011); Debreceni 
Ítélőtábla Gf.IV.30.008/2015/5; Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf.III.30.401/2014/2.
127 EBH2011. 2326 (Legf. Bír. Gfv. IX. 30.249/2010); Kúria Gfv.VII.30.253/2014/6; ÍH 2013.76 (Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 
13. Gf. 40.002/2012/15); BDT2010. 2282 (Pécsi Ítélőtábla Gf. II. 30 266/2009/7); BDT2016. 3499. (Debreceni 
Ítélőtábla Gf. IV. 30 369/2015/6).
128 BH2014. 188 (Kúria Gfv. VII. 30.247/2013).
129 BH2012. 101 (Legf. Bír. Gfv. X. 30.361/2010); BH2013. 222 (Kúria Gfv. VII. 30 036/2013).
130 Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 12.Gf.40.013/2015/6-II.
131 Legfelsőbb Bíróság Gfv.IX.30.432/2010/4; BDT2008. 1767 (Szegedi Ítélőtábla: Gf. I. 30.099/2006).
132 Above note 20.
133 Ibid, pp. 62 ff.
134 Davies, Worthington and Micheler, above note 80, pp. 217-218; Keay and Walton, above note 118, pp. 659-660. 
The abolition of the “Jackson exemption” for insolvency in April 2016 is expected to have a negative impact on 
the insolvency litigation in the UK, see Walton Report, above note 24, p. 11. By contrast, the new section 15A of 
the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 creates a new alternative way of director’s liability by giving the 
court a new power to make a compensatory award against a director at the time it makes a disqualification order.
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holders the statutory right to assign wrongful trading claims or the proceeds of 
such action135 will somewhat improve the situation. 
In relation to Hungary, the Leeds Report mentioned all the obstacles identified in 
relation to England plus a time factor. Without calling into question that all of these 
factors may play some role in the initiation of wrongful trading litigation, it must 
be noted that the high number of cases in Hungary seem to suggest the relative 
insignificance of such obstacles. The huge gap in terms of the number of cases 
heard in England and Hungary necessitates some explanation, however.
First of all, the Hungarian wrongful trading litigation is not reserved for office 
holders. By contrast, both the liquidator and any creditor have the right to bring 
actions for a declaration of liability for wrongful trading.136 In reality, a significant 
percentage of the reported cases were commenced by creditors, not infrequently by 
the tax authority.137 The fact that the pool of the claimants is bigger may increase the 
number of cases by itself. Beyond this, in some cases the wide pool of the potential 
claimants, particularly those with “deep pockets” like the tax authority, contributes 
to overcoming obstacles like the lack of funding and the costs of litigation. Also, 
the relatively modest cost of the litigation may be a factor contributing to the 
popularity of this remedy in Hungary.138
Beyond these above points of a somewhat “technical” nature, there are also some 
substantive differences that may potentially explain the high number of cases. In 
this regard two main factors should be referred to. First, as we have seen above, the 
level of knowledge “expected” from directors, i.e. what they could or should have 
been able to foresee, is rather different in Hungary from the English model. While 
in England, in order to activate liability for wrongful trading, it is necessary that the 
director knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect to 
avoid going into insolvent liquidation or administration (on balance sheet basis), 
while in Hungary a much lower level of knowledge suffices: the period of imminent 
insolvency begins when the directors were or should have been reasonably able 
to foresee that the debtor company would not be able to satisfy its liabilities when 
due (on cash-flow basis). As a consequence, this element of the wrongful trading 
materialises frequently. Second, the statutory presumption in Hungary, according 
135 Section 246ZD, IA; Davies, Worthington and Micheler, above note 80, pp. 218.
136 § 33/A(1), HIA.
137 Summary Opinion, above note 44, p. 16; R. Muzsalyi, “A joggyakorlat-elemző csoport által vizsgált ítéletek 
alapján levonható statisztikai következtetések [Statistical Conclusions from the Judgements Analysed by the 
Expert Group]” (2016) (Annex No 9 to the Summary Opinion), pp. 99-104.
138 The stamp duty to be paid for the first instance declaratory action is approx. GBP 100. See §§ 39 and 42, Act 
XCIII of 1990 on Duties; 1/2013. (II. 28.) Polgári jogegységi határozat [Civil uniformity decision].
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to which the violation of the interests of the creditors is presumed if the director has 
not deposited and published the debtor’s annual accounts prior to the opening of 
liquidation proceedings or breached his obligation to cooperate with the liquidator 
and to provide him with the relevant information and documentation, plays an 
important role in a not insignificant number of wrongful trading litigations.139
Looking at the substances of the cases it can be observed that most (if not all) of 
the cases where the courts have established the personal liability for wrongful 
trading involved an element of fraudulence by the director. However, this 
element of fraudulence is to be understood widely: cases in which the defendant 
prioritised affiliated entities or shareholders over outsider creditors seem to suffice 
to trigger the liability for wrongful trading, assuming the further ingredients are 
also present.140 
It appears that the implementation of the wrongful trading provisions in Hungary 
making possible to sue former directors for compensation of the damage caused to 
the creditors of the company during the period of imminent insolvency opened an 
invisible door for lawsuits against directors. This is most probably because prior to 
the implementation of the rules on wrongful trading there were no efficient civil law 
remedies protecting the interests of the creditors in the vicinity of the insolvency.141 
Undoubtedly, liquidators had been (and still are) free to initiate a kind of derivative 
claim for compensation in the right of the insolvent company.142 However, the 
scope of those derivative actions are somewhat different from the wrongful trading 
actions. The prohibition of wrongful trading is designed to protect the interests 
139 E.g. BH2012. 101 (Legf. Bír. Gfv. X. 30.361/2010); Kúria Gfv.VII.30.059/2015/5; Kúria Gfv.VII.30.024/2015/4; 
ÍH 2013.37 (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30.344/2011); ÍH 2013.76 (Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 13. Gf. 40.002/2012/15); 
BDT2012. 2619. (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Pf. I. 20.498/2010); Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 12.Gf.40.013/2015/6-II; Fővárosi 
Ítélőtábla 15.Gf.40.043/2015/5/II. In around 36% of the cases the statutory presumption applies, see Lakatos, 
above note 76, p. 82.
140 See above under the heading 5 The diverging case law.
141 2006. évi VI. törvény indokolása a csődeljárásról, a felszámolási eljárásról és a végelszámolásról szóló 1991. évi 
XLIX. törvény módosításáról [Statement of reasons given for the Act VI of 2006 amending the HIA]. Having 
said that, in some cases courts have decided to lift the corporate veil on the basis of the general civil law declaring 
that the defendant-directors abused the shield of limited liability. See Szegedi Ítélőtábla Polgári Kollégium 
2/2008 (XII. 4) számú kollégiumi véleményével módosított, egységes szerkezetbe foglalt 1/2005. (VI. 17) számú 
kollégiumi véleménye a jogi személy elkülönült felelősségéről és a felelősség „áttöréséről” [1/2005 (VI. 17) 
opinion of the Regional Court of Appeal Szeged (Civil Division) about the separate liability and the “lifting of 
the corporate veil” as amended and consolidated by 2/2008 (XII. 4) opinion of the same court]; BDT2002. 631 
(Csongrád Megyei Bíróság 1. Gf. 40 298/1999/3); BDT2012. 2707 (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30 146/2011). Some 
authors argue that this case law is contra legem, see Sz. Patai and S. É. Szabó, “A működő jogi személy elkülönült 
felelősségének áttörése az EDB 2014.11.G3. ítélet tükrében [Lifting of the corporate veil of an operative (i.e. 
non-insolvent) company in the light of decision EDB 2014.11.G3]”, (2016) (3) Polgári Jog [electronic journal]. 
After the entering into force of the new Civil Code this case law appears to be unsustainable, see P. Gárdos and 
L. Vékás (eds), Kommentár a Polgári Törvénykönyvről Szóló 2013. évi V. törvényhez [Commentary on the Civil 
Code] (2014, Wolters Kluwer, Budapest) [electronic edition], Chapter LXIX.
142 § 3:24(1), Civil Code.
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of the creditors by making directors liable for the diminution of the asset pool, 
thus for losses suffered, indirectly, by the unsecured creditors in the period of 
imminent insolvency. By contrast, the derivative action initiated by the liquidator 
on behalf of the company is designed to make the directors liable for losses caused 
to the company itself. In the latter case the fact that the directors disregarded the 
interests of the creditors is irrelevant. Consequently, it is more than questionable 
whether a director following the instructions of the majority shareholder or acting 
in compliance with the resolutions of the shareholder’s meeting could be held 
liable, without the special rules on wrongful trading, for losses suffered by the 
company. E.g. paying off due and lawful shareholder’s loans prior to outsider 
commercial creditors, while this is apparently a violation of the wrongful trading 
rules, it seems to be out of the scope of the derivative compensatory action.143 
7 Some Conclusions
Should the Hungarian legislation on wrongful trading therefore be regarded 
as a legal transplant of its English counterpart? The answer is yes, with some 
reservations. It was the apparent decision of the Hungarian legislature to create 
special rules on director’s liability vis-à-vis creditors in the context of insolvency. 
Both the wording and certain basic ingredients of the Hungarian provisions suggest 
that the Hungarian rules were inspired by the English example. Both provisions 
are intended to protect creditors’ interests in the vicinity of insolvency, the basis 
of the liability is the loss caused to the creditors in the critical period, the starting 
point of the liability, at least in theory, precedes the factual insolvency etc. On the 
other hand, on at least at one crucial point, the Hungarian legislator deviated from 
the English template. In England, the insolvent trading in itself does not trigger 
personal liability. Should the director reasonably believe that the company can 
trade out of difficulties, so that balance sheet insolvency is avoidable, there is no 
liability. By contrast, in Hungary the mere knowledge or anticipated knowledge 
about an, even temporary, cash-flow insolvency is enough for directors to enter 
into the danger zone.
The differences in the case law, first of all in terms of the quantity of cases in 
Hungary appears to be attributable, principally, to the broader pool of the potential 
defendants stemming from the widely formulated statutory provisions regarding 
the critical period, the broader pool of the claimants arising from the legal standing 
143 By contrast, there appear to be misconducts which may trigger either types of liability; see BDT2013. 2897 
(Debreceni Ítélőtábla Gf. III. 30 617/2012/6); BDT2008. 1767 (Szegedi Ítélőtábla: Gf. I. 30.099/2006); EBH2011. 
2417 (Legf. Bír. Pfv. X. 21.462/2011).
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of creditors, the statutory presumption supporting the claimants’ case and the 
modest litigation costs.
However, if we have a look at the substantially different nature of the case law, 
it becomes apparent that this may not follow from the differences of the statutory 
provisions. As we have seen, while English directors are normally found liable 
where they have acted irresponsibly, in Hungary courts tend to hold directors 
personally liable when an element of fraudulence in a wide sense can be detected. 
At the first sight, it may seem a paradox that the caseload is more substantial 
in Hungary despite the higher threshold of misconduct (fraudulence instead of 
irresponsibility). However, the real reason behind this phenomenon is probably 
different. It appears, that the provisions on the personal liability of directors for 
wrongful trading, imported by Hungary back in 2006 with no ancestors in the 
Hungarian law, have found their place in the Hungarian legal system covering 
a wider circle of misconduct and incorporating actions which would fall within 
the scope of other actions in England, first of all that of the fraudulent trading 
or misfeasance.144 This demonstrates that the transfer of certain legal institutions 
from one country to another without having regard to the wider context of the 
legal systems, however successful they are, does not necessarily result in legal 
harmonisation. Perhaps the term “legal naturalisation” may be more appropriate 
to describe the story of the liability for wrongful trading in Hungary.
144 See above note 24.
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Chapter 6
Directors in the Twilight Zone - Kornhaas and 
“Beyond” – some Observations from a Dutch 
Perspective
Loes Lennarts
1 Introduction
In its judgment in the Kornhaas1 case the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) ruled that the liability of company directors under German company law 
for making payments after the “moment of truth” falls within the scope of Art. 
4 of the European Insolvency Regulation.2 This means that when insolvency 
proceedings are opened against a company in Germany, the German provisions on 
director liability for making payments after “the moment of truth” apply as part of 
the lex concursus. The fact that these provisions are part of German company law 
(par. 64 of the German Act on Private Limited Liability Companies (GmbHG))3 
is not considered decisive for their qualification under the regime of the EIR. In 
this contribution, I will analyse the implications of this judgment from a Dutch 
perspective and I will link these implications to the perspectives for European 
harmonization of insolvency-related directors liability rules.
I will start with a brief outline of the Kornhaas case (section 2). Then I will 
make some observations on the phenomenon of ‘insolvencification’, relabeling 
or characterising provisions of company law as insolvency law provisions, so 
they can be applied to foreign-incorporated companies subjected to domestic 
insolvency proceedings (section 3). I will explore what this judgment means for 
claims brought against directors of insolvent companies under Dutch law. To this 
end, I will discuss the liability risks that may arise for directors in the twilight zone 
under Dutch law. I will show that they may be faced with a fairly broad range of 
potential director liability claims, based on provisions of company law and tort law 
1 Simona Kornhaas v Thomas Dithmar als Insolvenzverwalter über das Vermögen der Kornhaas Montage und 
Dienstleistung Ltd (C-594/14) [10 December 2015] CJEU (Kornhaas). 
2 Council regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings (OJ L 160) (Hereafter referred 
to as the EIR).
3 Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (hereafter referred to as the “GmbHG”).
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(section 4). Particular attention will be paid to claims against directors for making 
(or allowing) preferential payments. I will show that the Kornhaas judgment does 
not answer the question which law applies to director liability claims for making 
preferential payments based on Dutch law (section 5). I will then sketch a few 
scenarios to illustrate the uncertainties that may arise in cross-border corporate 
insolvencies in respect of the law applicable to insolvency-related director liability 
claims (section 6). In the final part of this essay I will look “beyond” Kornhaas 
by discussing the perspectives for harmonisation of insolvency-related director 
liability (section 7). 
2 CJEU Kornhaas
The facts of the Kornhaas case are straightforward. Ms. Kornhaas was the 
director of Kornhaas Montage und Dienstleistung Ltd (KMD). This company was 
incorporated under English law but it was mainly active in Germany, where a 
branch of KMD had been entered into the companies register. Main insolvency 
proceedings were opened in Germany in respect of KMD and Mr. Dithmar was 
appointed as the trustee (‘Insolvenzverwalter’). Mr. Dithmar brought a directors’ 
liability claim against Ms. Kornhaas, stating that Ms. Kornhaas had - in her capacity 
as director - made payments on behalf of KMD to the amount of €110,151.66 
during a period before the opening of insolvency proceedings when the company 
was already insolvent. This claim was based on Par. 64 of the GmbHG, which 
prohibits directors from making payments after the ‘moment of truth’: cash flow or 
balance sheet insolvency. It should be noted that when the litigious payments in the 
Kornhaas case were made, Par. 64 GmbHG still consisted of two sections, the first 
of which contained an obligations for company director to file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings within 21 days from cash flow or balance sheet insolvency. 
This section was transferred to Par. 15a of the German Insolvency Statute in 2008.4 
The former second section was retained in Par. 64 GmbHG and reads as follows: 
“The directors shall be obligated to compensate the company for 
payments made after the company has become illiquid or after it is 
deemed to be over-indebted. This shall not apply to payments which, 
after this point in time, are compatible with the due diligence of a 
prudent businessman. The same obligation shall affect the directors 
in regard to payments to shareholders if these led to the company 
4 The text of the German Insolvency Statute is available in English at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
englisch_inso/.
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becoming illiquid, unless this was not recognisable whilst observing 
the due diligence referred to in the second sentence. [...]”5
Mr. Dithmar’s claim against Ms. Kornhaas was successful in first instance. On 
appeal, this judgment was confirmed by the Higher Regional Court of Jena, which 
gave permission to have the case reviewed by the German Federal Court of Justice 
on a point of law. 
The German Federal Court of Justice referred the case to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling on the following questions:
(1) Does an action against the director of an English private limited company that 
is subject to insolvency proceedings opened in Germany fall within the scope 
of Art. 4 EIR, having regard to the fact that the action is brought by the trustee 
of the insolvent company and that the trustee seeks reimbursement of payments 
made by the director before the opening of the insolvency proceedings but 
after the date on which the insolvency of the company was established?
(2) Does an action as referred to above infringe the freedom of establishment 
under articles 49 and 54 TFEU6?
2.1 The First Question
In answering the first question, the CJEU refers to its decision in the case H. v 
H.K.7 relating to jurisdiction in respect of claims based on par. 64 GmbHG. In 
its judgment in that case, the CJEU held that the courts of the Member State in 
the territory of which main insolvency proceedings regarding a company’s assets 
have been opened also have jurisdiction on the basis of Art. 3(1) EIR to hear and 
determine an action based on par. 64 GmbHG brought by the trustee against the 
managing director of the insolvent company. That decision was based on the view 
that par. 64 GmbHG derogates from the common rules of civil and commercial law 
and that an action brought on this provision, brought in the context of insolvency 
proceedings, is an action deriving directly from and closely connected with 
insolvency proceedings. In addition to this, the CJEU stresses the link between 
the (then) two sections of par. 64 GmbHG, the first of which contains a duty to file 
for the opening of proceedings. Art. 4(2) EIR provides that the lex fori concursus 
determines the conditions for the opening of the insolvency proceedings. This 
means, according to the CJEU, that rules designating the persons who are obliged 
5 The text of the German Limited Liability Companies Act is available in English at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gmbhg/englisch_gmbhg.html#p0408.
6 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ C 326).
7 H v HK (C295/13) [4 December 2014] CJEU.
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to file and the consequences of an infringement of such an obligation fall within the 
scope of Art. 4(2) EIR. Secondly, the CJEU stresses the link between (then) section 
2 of pa. 64 GmbHG and provisions allowing for the avoidance of pre-insolvency 
transactions. According to the CJEU, par. 64(2) GmbHG appears at least similar 
to a rule laying down the “unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all the 
creditors” which, under Art. 4 (2) (m) falls within the scope of the lex concursus. 
The arguments mentioned above bring the CJEU to the conclusion that the claim 
for reimbursement brought by Mr. Dithmar against Ms. Kornhaas is governed by 
the lex concursus: German law. This means that directors of English limiteds with 
their centre of main interests in Germany should in the event of insolvency have 
due regard to the duty laid down in par. 64 GmbHG. The Kornhaas judgment 
has shed some light on the question to what extent director liability provisions 
connected to insolvency fall within the scope of Art. 4 EIR/7 EIR (Recast). 
Uncertainty will remain, however, because the Kornhaas judgment is quite fact-
specific. Member States’ company statutes will contain insolvency-related director 
liability provisions that are very different from par. 64 GmbHG. In respect of 
those provisions, the question may still arise whether they are governed by the lex 
concursus or the lex societatis. What if, for example, a particular director liability 
claim arises only upon insolvency of the company but both the trustee and creditors 
have standing to bring the claim?
2.2 The Second Question
In respect of the second question, the CJEU ruled that the application of par. 64 
GmbHG to a company incorporated under the law of another member state does 
not affect the freedom of establishment because it: 
“in no way concerns the formation of a company abroad or its 
subsequent establishment in another Member State, to the extent that 
that provision of national law is applicable only after that company has 
been formed, in connection with its business, and more specifically, 
either from the time when it must be considered, pursuant to the 
national law applicable under Article 4 of regulation 1346/2000, to be 
insolvent or from the time when its over-indebtedness is recognised 
in accordance with that national law.”
This decision was met with criticism. Ringe commented that the distinction the 
CJEU makes between rules affecting the formation or establishment in another 
country and those relating to the conduct of the company’s business is not 
appropriate because Art. 49 TFEU applies to the right to take up and pursue 
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activities and to set up and manage undertakings.8 As to the fact that the CJEU 
seems to ‘carve out’ measures that operate only when the company is insolvent: 
this can be seen as an open invitation to Member States seeking to apply certain 
creditor-protecting provisions to companies incorporated in other Member States 
to ‘insolvencify’ these provisions.
3 Insolvencification
Member States can use and have9 used the technique of ‘insolvencification’10 to 
facilitate domestic liability provisions to directors of foreign companies in the 
event that they are subjected to domestic insolvency proceedings. This trend was 
triggered by case-law11 of the CJEU on freedom of establishment of companies 
that virtually outlaws attempts of member states to apply domestic provisions 
of company law to companies incorporated under the law of another member 
state to situations.12 Attempts to apply domestic provisions of company13 law 
to companies incorporated in other Member states must pass scrutiny under the 
so-called Gebhard14-test. This means that the provisions must be applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner, they must be justified by imperative requirements 
in the public interest and they must be suitable and necessary for achieving the 
envisaged purpose.
Where the CJEU case-law means that founders of companies within the EU are 
free to choose the law that will apply to their company, this is different for the law 
8 Wolf-Georg Ringe, “Kornhaas and the Limits of Corporate Establishment”, (25 May 2016) Oxford Business Law 
Blog, available at https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog.
9 An example was mentioned above: the transfer in 2008 of the duty for German company directors to file for the 
opening of insolvency proceedings from the company statute to the insolvency statute (clearly motivated by the 
desire to be able to apply this provision to English limiteds that were used to do business in Germany). I note 
that the Belgian legislator is contemplating a shift from the real seat doctrine to the incorporation theory. This 
shift may involve the insolvencification of certain liability provisions, in order to enable the application of these 
provisions to foreign-incorporated companies subjected to insolvency proceedings in Belgium. See Marc van de 
Looverbosch, “Real Seat Theory v Incorporation Theory: the Belgian Case for Reform”, (2017) I.C.C.L.R., at 6.
10 The term insolvencification was coined by L. Enriques and M. Gelter in “Regulatory Competition in European 
Company Law and Creditor Protection”, (2006) 7 EBOR, at 450.
11 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen (Case C-212/97) [9 March 1999] CJEU (Centros); Überseering 
BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC) (Case C-208/00) [5 November 2002] CJEU 
(Überseering); CJEU 30 September 2003, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art 
Ltd (Case C-167/01) [30 September 2003] CJEU (Inspire Art).
12 See Loes Lennarts, “The Review of the EU Insolvency Regulation - Time to Recognize the Ties that Bind 
Company Law and Insolvency law?” in M. L. Lennarts & F. Garcimartin (eds), The Review of the EU Insolvency 
Regulation: some Proposals for Amendment, (2012, Report NACIIL), p. 75, available at http://www.naciil.org.
13 It can be argued that domestic insolvency law provisions must also pass the Gebhard-test if they are applied to a 
company incorporated under the law of another Member State. See Enriques and Gelter, above note 10, p. 450 and 
W.-G. Ringe, “Forum Shopping under the European Insolvency regulation”, (2008) 9(4) EBOR 579-620, at 609.
14 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano (Case C-55/94) [November 
1995] CJEU (Gebhard).
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that will apply in the event of insolvency of the company. This law is linked to 
the Member State where insolvency proceedings will be opened in respect of the 
company. Under the regime of the EIR, main proceedings in respect of a company 
can be opened by the court of the Member State in which the company has its 
centre of main interests (COMI), being the place where the debtor conducts the 
administration of its interests on a regular basis and which is ascertainable to third 
parties (Art. 3 (1) EIR (Recast))15. This is presumed to be the Member State where 
the company has its registered office, but rebuttal of the presumption is possible. 
This means - for example - that a UK private limited company may be subjected 
to insolvency proceedings in Germany if facts are provided that place the COMI in 
Germany. In this event, according to Art. 4 EIR/7 EIR (Recast), German law will 
apply to the insolvency proceedings and their effects. The fact that Art. 4 EIR/7 
EIR (Recast) does not contain an exhaustive list of matters that are governed by 
the lex concursus creates an incentive for Member States to argue that certain 
director liability provisions should be characterised as insolvency law. They may 
try to strengthen this argument by relabeling provisions, by moving them from a 
company law statute to an insolvency law statute. As was predicted some years 
ago, the fight against abuse of legal personality has shifted from company law to 
insolvency law.16
The trend of insolvencification is not unproblematic. First, it can be argued that 
simply characterising or relabeling provisions cannot be a way of avoiding the 
consequences of Art. 49/54 TFEU. No matter whether a provision is characterised 
as company law or insolvency law, if it represents a significant impediment to 
the establishment of a company in another member state, the application of such 
a provision to a company incorporated under the law of another member state 
may infringe the freedom of establishment enshrined in the TFEU. It has been 
submitted by several authors that the Gebhard-test applies not only to provisions of 
company law, but also to other provisions that may have the effect of obstructing 
the freedom of establishment.17 It is not the aim of this essay to further explore 
the freedom of establishment aspects of the Kornhaas judgment. In the remainder 
of this paper the focus will be on a second problem attached to the application 
of domestic provisions of insolvency law to companies incorporated in another 
Member State: the inefficiencies caused by the misalignment of director liability 
provisions in the various domestic laws of Member States. 
15 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings (OJ L 141).
16 Sandra van den Braak, “Creditor Protection at the Crossroads of Company law and Insolvency Law: The Dutch 
Example”, (2008) 5 European Company Law 229-236, at 236.
17 See Enriques and Gelter, above note 10, p. 450 and Ringe, above note 13,p. 609.
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4 Director Liability in the Twilight Zone under Dutch Law
4.1 The Twilight Zone and Risks for Company Creditors
In the so-called ‘twilight zone’ or ‘vicinity of insolvency’ there is an incentive for 
shareholders to engage in opportunistic behaviour. This incentive can be explained 
by the fact that in the event of insolvency of the company, the shareholders will lose 
the contributions they have made to the company. They are ‘residual claimants’, 
who will only receive payment after all of the company’s creditors have been paid. 
There are two main types of opportunistic behaviour of shareholders in the twilight 
zone that may create risks for company creditors. 
The first risk is that shareholders will try to have assets of the company shifted 
to them.18 Legal systems typically try to regulate this behaviour by imposing 
restrictions on asset shifting. Common forms of such restrictions are transaction 
avoidance rules in insolvency law and company law rules imposing limits on 
distributions to shareholders. Because the cooperation of company directors may 
be necessary to effectuate a transfer of assets to shareholders, legal systems may 
also impose personal liability on directors who are implicated in asset transfers 
to shareholders that harm the company’s creditors. Typically, asset shifting to 
shareholders occurs in closely held companies, where the shareholders are directors 
or can control the board.
The second risk of opportunistic behaviour is wrongful trading, i.e. continuing 
to trade when there is no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation, 
thus increasing the deficit of the company. This behaviour can be described as 
‘gambling with the creditors’ money’. Given that trading decisions belong to the 
power of the company’s directors, legal measures aimed at preventing wrongful 
trading are typically targeted at company directors.19
There are two common techniques the legal systems deploy to counter wrongful 
trading. The first is a duty for company directors to file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings after the ‘moment of truth’, which can be defined in 
different ways. This method, strengthened by directors’ personal liability in case 
of violation of the duty, suits systems that have a strong preference for court-
supervised insolvency proceedings. The underlying presumption is that filing for 
18 See L. Lin, “Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors”, 
(1993) 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, at 1494. See Paul Davies, “Directors Creditor-Regarding Duties in Respect of 
Trading Decisions Taken in the Vicinity of insolvency”, (2006) 7(1) EBOR 301-337, at 306.
19 Sometimes the scope of the measures is extended to so-called ‘shadow’ directors. Shareholders that pull the 
strings behind the scenes may qualify as such.
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court-supervised insolvency proceedings is the best way to serve the interests of 
the creditors.20
The second technique, a duty to refrain from wrongful trading, is less prescriptive. 
A good example is Section 214 of the UK Insolvency Act.21 This does not prescribe 
that directors file for the opening of insolvency proceedings when it is (cash flow or 
balance sheet) insolvent. Instead, it requires directors who (should) have concluded 
that there is no prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation “to take every step with a 
view to minimising the potential loss to the company’s creditors”. This means that 
they can decide that it is in the best interests of the company’s creditors to petition 
the court to order the company’s winding up, but they can also take another course 
of action as long as this is in the interest of the company’s creditors. This approach 
fits a system that takes a more favourable view to out-of-court solutions and court-
sanctioned schemes of arrangement, that are not regulated in insolvency law.
Aside from the two risks described above - asset shifting and wrongful trading - 
there is the risk of mismanagement of the company that may cause the company’s 
insolvency. Some Member States have director liability provisions aiming to 
prevent company directors from taking irresponsible decisions that lead to the 
company’s insolvency.22 These provisions are interesting from the perspective of 
the Kornhaas decision because they are linked to general director liability for 
violation of the duty of care owed to the company. Liability for violation of the 
duty of care owed to the company belongs to the domain of company law. On the 
basis of case-law of the CJEU it can be submitted that mismanagement claims that 
can only be brought by the liquidator in insolvency and the proceeds of which must 
be paid into the estate belong to the realm of insolvency law.23
4.2 Overview of Claims against Directors of an Insolvent Dutch Private Limited 
Company that May Arise under Dutch Law24
20 See Alexander Schall, “The Forthcoming ECJ Decision of the Kornhaas Case (C-594/14) - The Final Chapter of 
the European Traveller’s Tales?”, (2015) 12(2) ECFR 280-298, at 288.
21 1986 c. 45.
22 Examples are the Netherlands (Art. 2:138/248 DCC), Belgium (Art. 530 Belgian Company Code) and France 
(Art. L. 651-2 French Commercial Code).
23 Henri Gourdain v Franz Nadler (Case C-133/78) [22 February 1979] CJEU (Gourdain/Nadler); Christopher 
Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV (C-339/07) [12 February 2009] CJEU (Deko Marty); H. v H.K.; Kornhaas.
24 For a more elaborate description of directors’ liability rules in the Netherlands see: Yvette Borrius, “Directors’ 
Liability: The Netherlands”, (2011) 8(6) European Company Law, 246-252 and the country report on Directors’ 
Duties and Liability in the Netherlands prepared for the 2013 LSE study on Directors’ Duties and Liability 
commissioned by the European Commission DG Markt, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/company-
law/corporate-governance/index_en.htm. I note that the country report is limited to Dutch public limited 
companies and therefore does not discuss the directors’ liability in case of unlawful distributions to shareholders 
that since 2012 applies to private limited companies. 
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4.2.1 Liability Claims Targeted at Preventing Unlawful Asset Transfers 
to Shareholders
First of all, directors who approve a distribution to shareholders when they know 
or should have known that the company will not be able to continue to pay its 
debts as they fall due may be held liable for the damage caused to the company’s 
creditors. According to the text of the relevant provision, Art. 216 (3) of Book 2 of 
the Dutch Civil Code (DCC), this is a liability towards the company. In the event 
of insolvency of the company, it is the liquidator who has standing to bring the 
claim on behalf of the company. Although claims on the basis of this provision 
will typically be brought in insolvency, it is submitted that such claims do not fall 
within the scope of Art. 4 EIR/7 EIR (Recast). The only argument that can be made 
in favour of an insolvency law qualification is that there is an analogy between Art. 
2:216 (3) DCC and transaction avoidance provisions. However, there is no mention 
of this analogy, or any link with insolvency law, in the parliamentary history of Art. 
2:216 DCC. Therefore, it can be concluded that this provision belongs to the lex 
societatis. Consequently, it only applies to private limited companies incorporated 
under Dutch law.
Next to being held liable for allowing distributions infringing Art. 2:216 DCC, a 
director may be sued on the basis of tort law for involvement in transactions (with 
shareholders or others) that harm the company’s creditors. The tort of negligence 
is regulated in Art. 162 of Book 6 of the DCC. For a successful claim the plaintiff 
needs to show that in engaging in the allegedly detrimental transactions, the 
directors violated a duty of care owed to the company’s creditors. Furthermore, 
the plaintiff needs to show for each defendant that he or she can be seriously 
blamed for violating this duty of care. Detrimental transactions can take the form 
of transactions at an undervalue or preferences. In the event that the loss caused by 
the tortious behaviour has been suffered by the creditors collectively, the liquidator 
has the right to bring a claim against the tortfeasor(s).25 The Dutch Supreme Court 
has ruled that this is not an exclusive right, but that, in the event of a competing 
claim by one or more individual shareholders, the court may decide to hear the 
liquidator’s claim first.26 If the liquidator brings such a claim, the proceeds will 
be paid into the estate and distributed in accordance with the rules on ranking 
of creditors.
25 Dutch Supreme Court, 14 January 1983, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1983, 597 (Peeters/Gatzen).
26 Dutch Supreme Court, 21 December 2011, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2005, 95 (Lunderstädt/De Kok).
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4.2.2 Director Liability for Continuing to Trade after the ‘Moment of Truth’
Dutch law does not require directors to file for the opening of insolvency 
proceedings when the company is cash flow or balance sheet insolvent. Neither 
does Dutch law contain a specific provision aimed at preventing wrongful trading. 
This does not mean, however, that Dutch law does not contain any instruments 
aimed at preventing directors from allowing companies to trade at the expense of 
its creditors. On the contrary: in the event that directors have engaged in wrongful 
trading, two types of claims can be brought, which are both based on tort law (Art. 
6:162 DCC).
The first option, tried and tested in Dutch practice, is for individual creditors 
to bring a negligence claim for ‘reliance loss’. This has become known as the 
Beklamel27-claim. For such a claim to succeed, the plaintiff needs to show that 
the director knew or should have known that the company would not be able to 
perform (and would not offer recourse) when he allowed the company to incur an 
obligation. If the plaintiff succeeds in proving this, it means that the director can 
be seriously blamed for violating a duty of care owed to the creditor who never 
received payment. Dutch practice shows that the Beklamel line of case-law poses a 
real threat to directors and is a strong incentive for directors to file for bankruptcy 
or seek advice on the possibility of restructuring.28 Therefore, the conclusion in a 
recent study that the Netherlands is a Member State lacking sanctions for wrongful 
trading is misleading.29 
The second option, which is less frequently used, is for the liquidator to bring a 
negligence claim against the directors for ‘rate reduction loss’30 caused to the joint 
creditors. The proceeds of such a claim are paid into the estate and distributed by 
the liquidator.
Opinions are divided on how to qualify director liability claims based on tort 
law in Dutch private international law. Where it concerns a tort claim against 
a director that is brought by an individual creditor, such as a Beklamel-claim, 
the prevailing opinion is that such a claim falls within the scope of Art. 4 of the 
27 Dutch Supreme Court, 6 October 1989, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1990, 286 (Beklamel).
28 Borrius, above note 24, at. 251: “this type of liability urges management to take action to avoid the risk of liability 
if fundamental cash flow problems are foreseen”.
29 Study on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency - Comparative Legal Analysis of the Member State’s 
Relevant Provisions and Practices, University of Leeds, 2016, available at http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/home, 
table 2.1. at 60. This example shows that conclusions in comparative studies should not be taken at face value. 
30 This means that the liquidator has to calculate - for each creditor - the difference between the rate received in the 
insolvency proceedings and the rate the creditor would have received in case of timely filing. This corresponds 
with the damage the German trustee can claim in case of a violation of the duty to file laid down in Par. 15a 
Insolvency Statute (the so-called ‘Quotenschaden’ (lit.: ‘percentage damage’).
123
Rome II-Regulation.31 32 In respect of tort claims brought against directors by the 
liquidator for loss suffered by the creditors collectively, opinions are divided on 
the question as to whether such a claim falls within the scope of Art. 4 EIR or the 
aforementioned articles of the Rome II-Regulation.33
4.2.3 Director Liability for Mismanagement of the Company
In case of mismanagement of the company, directors can be held jointly and 
severally liable on the basis of Art. Art. 2:9 DCC. The claim belongs to the company 
but in case of insolvency it will be brought by the liquidator. The liquidator needs 
to show that there has been improper management (‘onbehoorlijk bestuur’), which 
can be attributed to the directors because they can be ‘seriously blamed’ (‘ernstig 
verwijt’). The requirement of serious blame is meant to ensure that directors are not 
held liable for every mistake they make in managing the company. The liquidator 
further needs to establish causation between the improper management and the 
loss he claims to have been suffered by the company. There is no dispute as to the 
nature of this provision: it belongs to company law. According to Dutch private 
international law application will be determined by the lex societatis34.
In the event that the company is subject to bankruptcy proceedings, the liquidator 
can also bring a mismanagement claim based on Art. 248 of Book 2 of the DCC, 
provided that certain requirements are met. This claim was introduced as part of a 
series of laws targeting abuse of legal persons. If the liquidator succeeds in proving 
that these requirement are met, he can claim the full deficit. First of all, the liquidator 
needs to show that there has been manifestly improper management (‘kennelijk 
onbehoorlijk bestuur’) within a time frame of three years prior to the opening 
of the bankruptcy proceedings. Proof that the manifestly improper management 
was an important cause of the bankruptcy is required, unless the liquidator shows 
that the annual accounts have been published too late or the bookkeeping duties 
have been neglected. If the liquidator succeeds in showing that one (or both) of 
these duties have been neglected, manifestly improper management is established 
and it is presumed that this was an important cause of the bankruptcy. Directors 
may still escape by proving that another circumstance that cannot be attributed to 
improper management was an important cause of the bankruptcy. If the directors’ 
defence does not succeed, they are jointly and severally liable for the full deficit. 
Individual directors may try to exculpate themselves but this is difficult. As a last 
31 Regulation 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, (OJ L 199/40).
32 See the country report in above note 24, at 635.
33 Ibid, at 636.
34 See Art. 10:119 DCC. See also the country report in above note 24, at 635.
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resort, directors can ask the court to mitigate the amount of compensation to be 
paid to the estate.
When Art. 2:248 DCC was introduced, the legislator seemed to hold the view 
that this provision belongs to the lex societatis, meaning that it only applies to 
companies incorporated under Dutch law. Therefore it was deemed necessary to 
introduce a special provision enabling application of this special form of director 
liability to companies incorporated outside the Netherlands in the event that they 
are subjected to Dutch bankruptcy proceedings.35 The relevance of this provision 
can be called into question because strong arguments plead in favour of qualifying 
a claim on the basis of Art. 2:248 DCC as a matter belonging to the lex concursus 36:
• the claim only exists when the debtor company is subject to bankruptcy 
proceedings;
• only the liquidator can bring the claim; 
• the liquidator cannot assign the claim to a third party;
• the proceeds of the claim must be paid into the estate. 
This overview of director liability claims shows that, under Dutch law, directors 
may be faced with a variety of claims in the event of insolvency of the company. 
The grounds for these claims can be found in two distinct parts of the DCC, book 
2 (law of legal persons) and Book 6 (law of obligations). None of the claims is 
founded on a provision of the Dutch Insolvency Act. Claims against directors for 
involvement in transactions detrimental to creditors as well as claims for engaging 
in wrongful trading are primarily founded in tort law. In the light of the above, it 
was surprising to see that the authors of the 2013 LSE Study on Directors’ Duties 
and Liabilities conclude that the Netherlands belong to the Member States where 
the rules aimed at restricting or regulating near-insolvent trading can be primarily 
classified as company law (for the purpose of private international law). These are 
the white Member States in the figure opposite. 
35 This special provision was Art. 5 of the Act on Conflicts of Laws in respect of Corporations. In 2012, when Dutch 
private international law was codified in Book 10 of the DCC, this provision was transferred to Art. 10:121 DCC
36 S.M. Van den Braak, above note 16, at 234.
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[Source: LSE Study on Directors Duties and Liability, 2013, p. 235]
It is submitted that the Netherlands do not belong to the white group (taking the 
company law approach) nor to the medium grey group (taking the insolvency 
law approach). The Netherlands belong to the dark grey Member States, where 
the approach to regulating near-insolvent trading is mixed or disputed. This is an 
important conclusion because it means that from a Dutch substantive and conflicts 
law perspective, insolvency-related director liability is an area that is not at all 
straightforward to harmonise. Lawmakers in Brussels should have due regard 
for this.
Looking at Dutch practice, the following are the liability claims that are typically 
brought against directors of insolvent companies:
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• Claims for the full deficit brought by the liquidator, typically based on a 
number of provisions simultaneously (2:9, 2:138/248 and 6:162 DCC), the 
essence of the claim being that the company has been mismanaged;
• Beklamel-claims brought by so-called ‘new’ creditors (those creditors with 
whom the company entered into agreements after the ‘moment of truth’);
• Tort claims brought by the liquidator or by an individual creditor against 
directors for making ‘selective’ payments on behalf of the company.
Legal advisors involved in the Dutch restructuring and insolvency practice 
frequently have to advise clients on the latter two forms of personal liability. These 
are the key director liability issues arising in restructuring attempts as well as in 
(pre-packaged) going concern asset sales. When the company is on the brink of 
insolvency, directors want assurance that they can enter into new obligations on 
behalf of the company and they want to know to what extent they can selectively 
pay creditors without running the risk of being held personally liable.
5 Director Liability for Payments Made after ‘the Moment of Truth’
A form of director liability that is much discussed in the Netherlands is the tort 
liability of company directors for engaging in ‘selective’ (preferential) payments. 
The rationale for this liability is that the pari passu principle must be upheld after 
‘moment of truth’. In this sense there is a link with avoidance law. Art. 47 of the 
Dutch Insolvency Act only allows for the avoidance of due payments if a) the 
creditor knew that the debtor had already filed for bankruptcy when the payment 
was made or b) creditor and debtor conspired to give a preference. This begs the 
question whether a company director can be held personally liable for allowing 
preferential payments when the director knows that the company is on the brink 
of bankruptcy, in the absence of any conspiracy with the creditor. The Dutch 
Supreme Court has ruled that directors may be held liable on the basis of tort law 
if the allow selective payments to related parties if there are serious reasons to 
expect a deficit. It has been argued that selective payments to unrelated parties can 
lead to liability if there is no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation. 
The latter implies that preferential payments may be justified by showing that the 
payments were part of a feasible turnaround plan. It is important to note that a 
liquidator bringing a claim against directors for allowing preferential payments can 
claim the losses suffered by the joint creditors as a consequence of the preferential 
payment. This means that the amount to be paid by the director cannot be more 
than the amount needed to make up for the difference in recovery rate caused by 
the preferential payment. A simplified example: company X has assets worth 200 
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and 4 creditors to whom it owes 100 each. The recovery rate is thus 50% for each 
of the creditors. If company X makes a preferential payment of 100 to one of the 
creditors, this leaves 100 for the remaining 3 creditors to share. Their recovery rate 
drops from 50% to 33.3%. To make up for this, the liquidator can claim what is 
necessary to restore the recovery rate to the original 50%, which is (150-100=) 50.
It is interesting to compare the Dutch tort-based director liability for ‘selective’ 
payments to the German director liability for making payments after the moment 
of truth at issue in the Kornhaas case. Under Par. 64 GmbHG, the duty to refrain 
from further payments is triggered by balance sheet or cash flow insolvency. The 
rationale of this duty is to preserve the assets of an insolvent company (‘save what 
can be saved’). The duty is a complement to the duty to file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings (Par. 15a German Insolvency Statute). Until fairly recently, 
the liability was quite harsh because directors could be made liable for payments 
infringing Par. 64 GmbHG, regardless of any consideration that was received by 
the company in return for the payment. This was much criticized in doctrine and 
in 2014, the German Federal Court of Justice held that there should be no liability 
if the company received direct and fair consideration at the time the payment was 
made.37 Directors can also escape liability under Par. 64 GmbHG by showing that 
any prudent business man would have made the payment. This is interesting from 
a Dutch perspective, because it seems to be similar to the possibility under Dutch 
law to justify ‘selective’ payments made as part of a feasible turnaround plan.
6 Hypothetical Scenarios
6.1 Case I
A Dutch private limited company has its COMI in Germany. It does not have an 
establishment in the Netherlands. The sole director of the company is domiciled in 
the Netherlands. The director makes a payment to one of the company’s creditors 
when there is no reasonable prospect of avoiding bankruptcy. No direct and fair 
consideration is received by the company in return for the payment. The director 
cannot justify the payment by showing that it is part of a feasible turnaround plan. 
Main insolvency proceedings are opened in Germany. The German liquidator can 
bring a Par. 64 GmbHG-claim against the company’s director before a German 
court according to the judgments of the CJEU in the cases Kornhaas and H. v H.K.. 
One or more creditors in the Netherlands may under certain circumstances bring 
37 Federal Court of Justice 18 November 2014 (BGH II ZR 231/13).
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claims against the director in a Dutch court (Art. 4(1) Brussels Ibis) for allowing 
selective payments based on Dutch tort law (Art. 4 Rome II38).
The result is a possible accumulation of claims against the director handled by 
courts in different Member States.
6.2 Case II
A German private limited company has its COMI in the Netherlands. It has an 
establishment in Germany. The sole director of the company is domiciled in 
Germany. The director pays a dividend to shareholder knowing that company will 
not be able to pay its debts as they fall due. Main insolvency proceedings are 
opened in the Netherlands.
Can the Dutch liquidator bring a claim against the director based on Art. 2:216 
(3) DCC? The answer is ‘no’ if Art. 2:216 (3) DCC only applies as part of the lex 
societatis. Can the liquidator try to convince the Dutch court to apply a similar 
German provision instead? Par. 64 GmbHG specifically prohibits payments to 
shareholders leading to insolvency (illiquidity) of the GmbH (this is the German 
solvency test for distributions), but this does not apply either as it only applies 
as part of the lex concursus. A further question: can the Dutch liquidator solve 
the conundrum by requesting the opening of secondary proceedings in Germany? 
Other options may also be available. The liquidator may try to sue the director 
who has engaged in a transaction detrimental to the joint creditors before a Dutch 
court on basis of Dutch tort law (Art. 7(2) Brussels Ibis and Art. 4 Rome II39) or 
try to claw back the distribution from the shareholder using Dutch transaction 
avoidance law.
These were just two hypothetical scenarios, limited to selective payments and 
to just two Member States. Many more scenarios can be designed and analysed. 
Some work has already been done40, but it is not enough. I believe that any attempt 
at harmonisation of director liability provisions should be based on a thorough 
analysis of the problems that lawyers working on cross-border insolvency and 
restructuring cases across the EU actually encounter in practice. Which problems 
related to director liability are really pressing in practice? Are clashes between 
38 Unless this claim should be regarded as falling outside the scope of the Rome II Regulation, see Art. 1(2)(d) Rome II.
39 Ibid.
40 Study on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency - Comparative Legal Analysis of the Member 
State’s Relevant Provisions and Practices, University of Leeds, 2016, available at http://bookshop.europa.eu/
en/home and Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, Philipp Paech and Edmund Philipp Schuster, Study on Directors’ Duties 
and Liability, LSE, London, April 2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/company-law/corporate-
governance/index_en.htm.
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systems causing problems? Are certain domestic director’s duties (such as a duty 
to file for the opening of insolvency proceedings) causing problems because they 
make it risky for directors to undertake a restructuring attempt? This is what the 
focus of the Commission should be on before putting forward any proposal to 
harmonise directors’ liability.
7 Beyond Kornhaas: Perspectives for Harmonization? 
Looking at the problems and inefficiencies that may be caused by clashes of 
systems, the question rises what can be done to ‘streamline’ insolvency-related 
director liability claims. It seems that there are three options. 
7.1 ‘Synchronizing’ the Connecting Factors for Company Law and 
Insolvency Law
A first option would be to ‘synchronise’ the connecting factors for company law 
and insolvency law. There are - theoretically - two ways of doing this. The first way 
is to maintain the current concept of COMI as the connecting factor for insolvency 
law but switch to the real seat as the connecting factor for company law. It needs no 
explanation that this is not a viable option, in the light of the CJEU’s interpretation 
of Art. 49/54 of the TFEU. The second option is to tie the COMI to the registered 
office. This has been suggested by a number of authors41 but it should also be 
regarded as a mere theoretical option, given the choice that was only recently made 
by the lawmakers in Brussels to retain the possibility to rebut the presumption that 
a legal person’s COMI is at the place of its registered office. I note that even if any 
of the two options just discussed were feasible, this would not solve all problems. 
For example: clashes might still occur between applicable company/insolvency 
law and tort law (see the hypothetical cases discussed above). 
7.2 Adopt a Specific Conflict Rule in the EIR
It could be considered to expressly include in Art. 7 EIR (Recast) director liability 
claims that derive directly from and are closely connected with insolvency 
proceedings. I am quite sceptical about this option because it would mean that 
the lawmakers in Brussels need to pick up what the CJEU (understandably) 
refrained from doing in its Kornhaas judgment: to clearly define what the passage 
in italics means. Must (de facto) insolvency be a precondition for claim to arise? 
Must only liquidator have standing? Must the proceeds of the claim go to the 
41 I suggested it myself in my report “The Review of the EU Insolvency Regulation - Time to Recognize the Ties 
that Bind Company Law and Insolvency law?” in: The Review of the EU Insolvency Regulation: some Proposals 
for Amendment, at 57, available at http://www.naciil.org.
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estate? If the lawmakers in Brussels would bring certain director liability claims 
within the scope of Art. 7 EIR, should there be a possibility for directors to defend 
themselves against a claim by showing that they would not be liable under the 
applicable company law, similar to the defence available under Art. 13 EIR/16 
EIR (Recast)?42 I refrain from answering these questions. I merely present them to 
illustrate that it is unlikely that a specific conflict rule covering insolvency-related 
directors’ liability will be introduced in the EIR in the near future.
This leaves the third option:
7.3 Substantive Harmonization
Let me start by saying that full harmonisation of all ‘insolvency-related’ director 
liability claims seems not feasible. What the Commission could do is to harmonise 
certain core duties of directors of near-insolvent companies. A first choice that 
the Commission would need to make is whether to opt for specific rules aimed 
at preventing specific behaviour or broad standards. Should there be an EU-wide 
duty to file within a specific period of time after the ‘moment of truth’ has arrived 
or should directors be under a duty ‘to take every reasonable step’ to protect the 
creditors from harm? Should there be a duty to refrain from making (preferential) 
payments or a duty ‘to act in best interest of creditors’? The problem with 
prescribing more or less clear-cut rules is that it seems hard to formulate clear rules 
on which all 28 (or 27) Member States can agree. The problem with standards is 
that they give much discretion to courts and do not give clear guidance to directors. 
In my view, meaningful harmonisation requires further study. What is needed in 
particular is an in-depth analysis of the risks for directors when they are involved 
in restructuring attempts and reorganisation through (pre-packaged) going concern 
sales. The study should not be limited to the duty to file and the wrongful trading 
rule as it exist in the UK, it should be broader. It should also include the risks 
involved in allowing payments when the company is close to insolvency. Not 
only civil liability should be studied: serious risks may also exist under director 
disqualification rules and under criminal law. The study should include the 
possibility for directors (or their companies) to insure the risk of insolvency-related 
director liability. 
The common denominators found through in-depth scenario analysis should be 
used to draft rules that give guidance to directors of companies in distress. I give 
a (simplified) example. Scenario analysis may show that uncertainty for directors 
42 See Schall, above note 20, p. 297.
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as to the liability risks they run when making preferential payments is a problem 
in the insolvency and restructuring practices of a large number of Member States. 
In this case, any attempt at harmonisation should at least clarify: 
• the point in time when the duty to have regard to the pari passu rule kicks in;
• whether it is possible for directors to justify a preferential payment because it 
was made on the basis of a feasible restructuring plan; 
• which conditions a restructuring plan used as a justification for making 
preferential payments must meet.
In November 2016, several months after the INSOL Europe conference where 
this paper was presented, the Commission published its Proposal for a Directive 
on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase 
the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending 
Directive 2012/30/EU.43 To my surprise, this Proposal also aims to harmonise the 
duties of directors in connection with negotiations on a preventive restructuring 
plan. Art. 18 of the proposed directive provides the following: 
“Member States shall lay down rules to ensure that, where there is 
a likelihood of insolvency, directors have the following obligations:
a) to take immediate steps to minimise the loss for creditors, workers, shareholders 
and other stakeholders;
b) to have due regard to the interests of creditors and other stakeholders;
c) to take reasonable steps to avoid insolvency;
d) to avoid deliberate or grossly negligent conduct that threatens the viability of 
the business.” 
I believe that directors will not find much guidance in this provision. It does not 
offer them assurance on the two key issues identified above: wrongful trading and 
‘selective’ payments. Instead, it will only confuse and it may even scare them. I 
looked for guidance in the preamble but did not find it there either. I quote from 
recital 36: 
“Where the debtor is in the vicinity of insolvency, it is also important 
to protect the legitimate interests of creditors from management 
decisions that may have an impact on the constitution of the debtor’s 
43 COM(2016) 723 final.
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estate, in particular where those decisions may have the effect of 
further diminishing the value of the estate available for restructuring 
efforts or for distribution to creditors. It is therefore necessary that in 
such circumstances directors avoid any deliberate or grossly negligent 
actions that result in personal gain at the expense of stakeholders, 
agreeing to transactions at under value, or taking actions leading to 
unfair preference of one or more stakeholders over others.”
In practice, directors nor their advisors will be able to rely on this. I therefore 
suggest that Article 18 be removed from the proposed Directive and that the 
Commission refrain from isolated and vague attempts at regulating directors’ 
duties in the vicinity of insolvency.
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Chapter 7
Reflections on a European Proposal for a  
Pre-Insolvency Restructuring Directive Based 
on the Experience out of the Banking Industry 
in Germany and Italy in the Period 2007-2017
Paolo Castagna
1 Introduction
As Europe faces the next round of changes, which will involve the attempts 
for a deeper integration of the member-countries at every level, the European 
Commission is trying to push the countries to a unification of the steps and tools that 
form part of the process that we identify as “debt restructuring”, and specifically 
during a so called “pre-insolvency phase”. As it can be noticed already in the 
initial stage of the definition of the process to be adressed, the main challenges 
faced by the European Commission derive from the most basic elements of this 
ensemble of countries that is called European Union: the differences in the culture 
and languages. The simple translation of the word “restructuring” is difficult as 
it is transferred down in the national legal frameworks. To these cultural and 
philological differences, a further deeper one needs to be added: the different 
economical and financial situation in which the single countries live, after the 
global financial crisis started, in its more evident stage, in 2008.
Documenting the difficulties of the challenges faced by the Commission, this work 
would like to offer some reflections deriving from the ten years (incidentally started 
in the years of the Lehman driven crisis) experience in the debt restructuring. 
Among the countries in which such experience was collected, Germany and Italy 
were chosen for the numbers of managed cases, but even more so because of the 
currently contrasting economic situation of the two countries; the different culture 
facing the notion of “debt” within their own legal cultures and traditions; and in 
the ways and steps that the two countries decided to take to find a solution to the 
forecasted huge wave of insolvency in the corporate environment, which has and 
continues to happen in Italy.
Further, looking at individual European Union countries regarding the need for the 
introduction of a regulation of a “pre-insolvency” restructuring process, Germany 
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and Italy could be considered as being at a different stages as well: while, for 
example, in England we can find the scheme of arrangement and in France the 
“mandat-ad-hoc”, in Germany we can find no specific regulation for such a phase 
(though the Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen 
(EsUG) is available within the remit of insolvency law). In Italy art.67 and 182bis 
of the Italian Insolvency Law show the different tools legally regulated within a 
process that ends with concordato in bianco.
2 Targets and Assumptions of the European Commission for the Proposal1
In the introductory chapter of the Proposal, the reasons for the directive are 
explained and the major drivers could be identified and summarized as follows:
(1) A huge amount of unpaid debt is leveraging the financials of the industrial and 
real estate of European companies. Difficulties in finding agreements among 
the stakeholders, and especially among the debt holders, result in forcing many 
“unguilty” debtors into declaring insolvency, causing the disappearance of 
industrial realities in a phase of the already huge unemployment situation 
throughout Europe. This would take place without giving a “last chance” 
to the debtor, especially in the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
segment, to find a solution.
(2) The “restructuring within insolvency” is considered mostly as a negative 
aspect as it is viewed in the entrepreneurial environment as “stigmatic” and 
the “declaration of insolvency” opens in the majority of the cases the worst 
possible scenario, leading to the liquidation with losses borne by customers 
and suppliers and other stakeholders.
(3) The current national legal environments do not allow a fair competition 
among the individual countries, as the investors will look for the most certain 
and easier to understand or faster to implement process in their investment 
decision in relation to distressed companies as well in their decision in relation 
to the financial liabilities structure to be given to the industrial companies.
(4) Companies operating in the European Union are mostly financed through 
bank debt. A declaration of the insolvency of a big portion of the debtors 
would not only destroy decades of experience and knowledge in industry, but 
would weaken further the balance sheets of the banking world. In order to 
1 COM2016/723 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring 
frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge 
procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU
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avoid the recurrance of such a situation, the European Commission considers 
it reasonable to increase the role of the capital market (ie. financing through 
bonds and investment funds, either as private equities or debt funds) as a 
sourcing player in the future of financing of the industrial environment.
(5) One of major hurdles to the implementation of an efficient process in the 
capital market is represented by the assumed inefficiency present due to the 
lack of rules; of cramming down dissenting voteson the restructuring proposal; 
of financial lenders, single or in class, which enables “free-riders” with minor 
stakeholders able to endanger the process of the “debt-restructuring”. 
In the next sections we will offer some reflections of the above mentioned 
arguments.
3 Situation of Distressed Companies and the Economic Environment
The global financial and economic crisis, initiated following the “Lehman crisis”, 
caused an abrupt destruction throughout the corporate world in the European 
countries. While it struck with an unseen (in peacetime) force in companies with a 
healthy business model and no strategic crisis before 2008, no doubt was left that, 
as a result of the liquidity and credit crisis, it hit the weaknesses that economic 
systems had been able to survive in the previous years.
The German economy is characterized by its structurally export oriented industries, 
of much bigger dimension in the Mid Caps Segment (Mittelstand) than the Italian 
competitors, was hit at first in the banking industry, where players like Hypo 
Real Estate and some major Landesbanken were relying on ample liquidity and 
availability in the credit markets for investing in assets of different durations and 
terms. Other players were found in the middle of transformation without a clear 
business model (like Dresdner Bank merged with Commerzbank requiring the 
support of the German State, or WestLB). This happens in a phase in which the 
Italian Banks, whose assets were more based on lending to domestic companies of 
small dimensions and therefore with portfolios more similar to the ones present in 
the German savings banks, were considered as safer.
After the crisis developed from the international markets mostly drying up the 
inter-banking money market, some big industrially operative companies in the 
leveraged buy-out (LBO) market went into a distressed situation, as their owners 
could not find in the LBOs funds market any partner willing to or financially strong 
enough to enter into a new acquisition that would have ensured, as co-product of 
a new debt structuring, new working capital financing.
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The German legal environment at that point, aside from not yet foreseeing 
any regulations for debt/equity swaps (usually the most relevant collateral in 
a LBO financing are the shares of the holding and operative companies in the 
structure, that in a distressed situation requires a strong haircut from the lenders 
to counterbalance the now unsustainable goodwill originated by the exacerbated 
“take and pass” model in the balance sheet of the debtors), was still based on 
an old Insolvency Law, that principally foresaw an asset deal (“Uebertragende 
Sanierung”) as a restructuring in the insolvency: the alternative being liquidation 
during the insolvency.
Aside of the LBO financed companies, which in Germany because of their 
dimension were seen as more interesting assets for the LBOs funds in comparison 
to the relatively smaller dimension of the Italian industrial realities (see below), 
some Germany based multinational industrial groups found themselves wrongly 
positioned in the middle of acquisitions (or speculation), financed almost totally 
through debt. Groups like Schaeffler and Merkle, with a huge numbers of 
employees, were on the verge of collapse.
The reduction of liquidity and credit in other countries reduced dramatically the 
orders for the whole industrial German automotive and machine tooling mid sized 
companies, whose working capital financing was structurally too high relying on 
the planning of the multinational German exporting masters.
Germany reacted in a very short time and in a very decisive way with the 
following measures:
(1) The Government recognised the immediate danger in the banking sector, by 
reassuring the savers about the healthiness of the banks, but contemporaneously 
developed guidelines that enabled debt for equity swaps in banks enabling the 
takeover of shareholding by the German State in banks such as HRE and 
Commerzbank, as well as Lone Star into IKB, and moved fast in setting up 
bad banks such as FSM or Portigon for the parking of portfolios to be run off. 
For other Landesbanken, such as BLB and HSH, the danger was considered 
limited to a structurally regional problem or a short term phase in a long term 
cycle (and hoping for a market rebound in the shipping financing).
(2) The insolvency of some LBO financed structures, when no agreement was 
reachable because of too high a request from free-riders, was taken into account, 
with the insolvency administrators showing their ability in finding solutions 
via asset deals and repositioning the operative companies where possible
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(3) Through the rapidly implemented Restructuring Refinancing Programme 
via the KFW companies that were identified, on clear parameters, as worthy 
of restructuring, many companies in the SME segment were saved. The old 
lenders, mostly existing banks, had to accept constraints in the ranking of 
their financing (KFW financing was granted a supersenior position) and 
limitations to a future sale of their existing financing (KFW was granted a no 
objection right to a sale of the receivables of the other banks). The concept of 
overindebtness (Ueberschuldung) was diluted.
(4) The German banks recognized that to stop the crisis, where legally allowed, 
would require supporting the major industrial groups.
(5) The industrial companies dramatically reduced their capacity, resorting 
to tools that enabled the flexibilisation of the worked hours (tools already 
foreseen during the crisis of the reunification years), while capital infusions or 
thésaurisation of the profit strengthened the equity base as much as possible. 
Investment cycles were postponed.
(6) The reduction of investment in government bonds in other countries in the 
bank balance sheets enabled the banks to free up resources for the financing 
of industry.
(7) A new insolvency law, protecting the rights of the creditors in first place, 
but enabling new tools as a shield for the creditors (Schutzschirmverfahren) 
and debtor in possession (Eigenverwaltung), within the insolvency legal 
framework (EsUG) was issued. The opposing stakeholders within the 
insolvency would have their interestes protected through the consideration in 
alternative scenarios, mostly based on liquidation, or practical evaluation of 
the equity value of an insolvent company (shareholders rights).
Because of the help from the Central Banks worldwide, sustaining the demand 
in the export markets, and in Europe where the European Central Bank shielded 
the German financing houses from the exposure to the risks represented by the 
southern European countries, the capital flows to Germany did not stop. The 
LBOs were replaced by the interest in the very small SMEs, which quickly 
issued corporate bonds, and later through strategic investors looking for industrial 
operative companies owning the Made in Germany Brand.
As a result, in 2016 Germany had the lowest level of insolvency declarations in the 
last 20 years and the exit from the crisis was evident after 3 years deep crisis a “V” 
shaped recovery. Even though it cannot be excluded that in future crisis (shipping 
financing is just entering the final chapter of its drama, with workout scenarios) 
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the solutions adopted in Germany could have similar positive results, especially in 
a prolonged crisis hitting firstly and principally SMEs. The first argument of the 
European Commission is not felt as strongly as in Italy. Nevertheless the positive 
approach of the banking world, within a system that had a coordinated view, was 
able to find solutions without endangering a culture that had the protection of the 
rights of the single creditor to find solutions to that crisis and without questioning 
the discipline resulting from the principle that “pacta sunt servanda”.
In Italy, as shortly described, the local banks, coming from a traditionally more 
commercial banking oriented lending approach and within dimensions more 
similar to those of local saving banks rather than a more volatile and sophisticated 
investment banking approach, were seen as a proof of a (wrongly assumed) 
solidity of the economic system facing the effects of a crisis caused from the 
volatility of badly managed investment banking institutions. Consequently, the 
Italian authorities did not concentrate on developing solutions for endangered 
banks (the Italian Government in some way declared their surprise in the “sudden 
implementation” of the European CRR Directive2 in 2016!), while they were 
still facing the growing difficulties of finding investors for Italian government 
bonds, especially after the Greek crisis. The Italian Banks were therefore, as in 
the 70s, required to increase their exposure in the refinancing of a state lending, 
contemporaneously with a moment in which Italy itself was asked to contribute 
substantially to the restructuring of the Greek Government. Until that point their 
exposure was almost inexistent in comparison to the levels in the books of German 
and French Institutions. 
The effects of increasing spreads towards the German Bund, combined with the 
almost disappearing of USD funding possibilities, increased the feeling in the 
financial markets that Italian banks, whose equity was disappearing like snow 
at the sun, were, after the Spanish saving banks, the next weakest link of the 
chain. This reduced further the lending capabilities of the local banks towards the 
Italian industries.
In the meantime, Italian SMEs, whose dimensions are much smaller than the 
German ones, were affected by the same reduction of orders as in Germany. 
Unfortunately, the Italian SMEs are far more reliant on domestic demand, which 
principally disappeared because of the uncertainty about the risk of insolvency of 
the Italian State, considering what happened in Greece and the Government crisis 
in Italy. The family based Italian capitalism was used to uncertainty in the financial 
2 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework 
for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190–348. 
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environment, due to the periodical devaluation of the Lira, and tended to increase 
the leverage of the operating company to extreme levels, and because of stability 
of the Euro and availability of banking debt, increased the leverage even further. 
Facing the dramatic drop in orders, most of the companies, instead to resorting 
to capital increases, asked more financing from the banks. The banks agreed, 
hoping that the crisis would have finished in a short period. The banks, within 
their regional relevant financing role, refinanced on their own balance sheets the 
maturing debt, asking for further collateral or advising to transfer the existing 
assets to leasing companies with a further increase of the value in the transfer.
While in Germany the LBOs restulted in medium sized companies bought and 
sold, increasing the goodwill in their balance sheet due to the appetite of the 
investment funds, in Italy the increase of leverage and further model of investment 
banking were used for small sized companies, in order to compensate with fees the 
business risks of already high leveraged companies with exposure of their turnover 
to the national demand. This consequently influenced the value of goodwill and 
fixed assets. Not rarely the lending from local banks to the SMEs was “linked” to 
the purchasing of other risky products, such as banking tier 2 bonds, derivatives 
and sometimes even shares of the lending bank itself. This kind of “refinancing” in 
this phase was usually based on pure reframing of documentation with the lenders, 
while the SME was increasing the term of payment towards the suppliers and 
postponing the payment of taxes.
With the continuing, and worsening, of the crisis, as the banks started to feel 
uncomfortable with the overall failure to realise the assumptions based on their 
business plans, multiple changes of the insolvency and commercial code took 
place. This made a number of new tools available, such as debt restructuring under 
Art.67 (without publicity of the plan and agreement out of court) and further debt 
restructuring under Art.182bis (which is usually referred to when over the 12-24 
months earlier an approved Art.67 restructuring has failed), in which a court 
publicly approves the restructuring plan, ensuring the position of the participating 
lenders from delay of insolvency processes. Debt/equity swaps were mostly 
unused in Italy due to the possibility of issuing shares and equity-like instruments 
of different classes and rights (“strumenti participativi di capitale”), without 
obliging the owner of the company to leave the company.
Finally, in an economic environment in which the Italian State was more and 
more under the examination of the European Commission for its debt levels and 
its incapability to pay its debt towards the tax credits of Italian companies in a 
structural way, a new reform of the Insolvency Law gave a final opportunity 
to the debtors for finding a restructuring solution. This included postponing a 
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distressed liquidation, creating the institute of Concordato Aziendale, of which 
the form concordato in bianco foresees up to 9 months of a moratorium of any 
enforcing actions from the lenders, granting time for the generation of a “new” 
restructuring plan. In such an environment, after 9 years, it is no surprise that the 
non-performing loan situation in the books of the banks degenerated up to a point 
that the banks themselves are now a distressed case and that the assets in the books 
of companies in distress are of a difficult realisation and therefore of a significantly 
reduced value.
While it is difficult to understand the argument of the Proposal in looking for 
granting a “final chance” to the debtor, it is certain that Italian SMEs are facing 
final liquidation in a pre-workout scenario. The identification of “guilt” is difficult 
in a financial environment, but it is clear that banks have not represented any model 
of financial discipline in the recent past in Italy. On the other side, the dimensions 
of the involved companies and the proved concerting of all the stakeholders and 
the shareholders (in some but not all cases), show that all attempts for out of court 
pre-insolvency restructuring have already been tried and what remains now is the 
implementation of haircut in the debt level. Whether for such steps a new European 
Directive is required or could just be left to the local states eventually within the 
insolvency framework, our view would prefer the discipline of the insolvency 
framework, as this would after many years remind the shareholders the risk of 
business and that “pacta sunt servanda”.
4 The Stigma of Restructuring within Insolvency
Even underlying the importance of not repaying debt in Germany, a country in 
which the language itself uses the same word for identifying debt as for guilt, 
(“schuld”), our experience did not allow a difference in the Italian and German 
environment among the entrepreneurs facing the distress situation. For most of the 
businessmen to communicate the phase difficulty of the company is surely a very 
relevant factor and seen as a personal failure.
This surely postpones the reference to the relevant instruments and tools provided 
in both the national insolvency laws.
On the other side, different considerations could be included in the analysis:
(1) While Germany did not reform their legislation to the extent Italy did with 
Art.67, the impacts on the customers’ and suppliers’ relationships start already 
with the slowing down of payment and investment and not only with the 
declaration of insolvency. The company is easily recognized as in distress in 
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the region in which it is based. As a matter of fact many Italian debtors did 
not approve the request of the Art.67 from the banks, initially arguing that it 
would be too public. Would a “pre-insolvency” restructuring really change the 
situation? When does the stigma start to taek effect?
(2) Is the downside of a “insolvency stigma” not intrinsically linked to the business 
risk undertaken by any enterprenuer?
(3) In order to reduce the stigma for the shareholders, even for the ones that 
are struggling for the last 9 years, not strongly diminishing the effect of the 
other stakeholders, typically the banks in a banking financed environment, 
to convince the shareholders, and increasing the responsibility of the 
management in such a delicate moment, to agree to a proposed restructuring 
of the debtor company?
(4) Instead of identifying the means that could reduce the stigma for the 
shareholders and management in asking in a timely fashion for restructuring 
within insolvency, would it not make sense to increase the discipline on the 
lending side? In other words, rely on banking and funds and suppliers (we 
do not dare to think about the employees and their representative) to identify 
the crisis in a timely fashion, with stringent banking and lending regulations, 
and proposing alternative restructuring within insolvency? Considering 
how many insolvencies were required by the banks in the two countries, it 
looks like that the lenders almost fear the reactions of asking a restructuring 
within insolvency.
(5) The stigma will remain until it is possible to convince the public that 
restructuring within is not a negative action for the operative company, but 
that it can show positive future, while it can have adverse impact on the 
shareholders of the same company.
Based on these reflections, our experience does not consider the argument of the 
Proposal as a relevant one, on the balance of pros and cons, and we believe the 
problem will remain, endangering the rights of other stakeholders.
5 Competition among Countries in the Choice of Investors 
During the crisis, and even today, some debt restructuring was transferred to other 
locations, mostly London, in order to obtain an easier debt restructuring, or at least 
it was planned as such.
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The city of London with its the scheme of arrangement has always been perceived 
as a better location for many cases.
The reason for such perception are in our opinion different from the existence or 
less of a regulated pre-insolvency restructuring process:
• Most of the investors in the debt were already London based at the time of 
entering into the distress, and not always at the moment of underwriting the 
debt at the moment of issue. This can be derived from London being the base 
for a Credit Distressed Trading Desk, an activity typical of investment banking. 
For such desks, trading distressed debt is the same that trading other assets. To 
follow such desks would mean to follow future insolvency legislation to the 
USA or Asia as the investors could be concentrated there.
• The restructuring of debt always requires a very long considerable time, and 
London offers the concentration of lawyers, insolvency practitioners, external 
consultants, etc that can support the investors in their need and even more 
everything is English language based.
• Especially for corporate bonds, LBOs and high yield bonds, the liquidity of 
the instrument is derived from the dimensions and from the transferability of 
the title on a certain almost standardized documentation.
• The liquidity of the debt instruments tends to enable a quick exchange of 
positions, near to exchange of favour among dealers. This is very important 
in the evaluation of the net present value of the fund, looking for market-
to-market prices instead of keeping the receivables on bank books for the 
long term.
As a result the London based investors do not have the feeling of “games behind 
the scenes” typical of bank driven restructuring, especially in different local 
languages and national legislation.
On the other side, as some products are till now typically (still) offered by the banks 
only, such as ancillary business (performance bonds, guarantee letters, etc) as well 
as derivatives, it was not easy, just by transferring the centre of main interests 
(COMI) to London, to make the investments into a country more attractive.
As seen in the Italian experience, a regulated pre-insolvency debt restructuring 
package can be introduced, but the investors are not, till now, looking at Italy as 
place where to allocate their money with high priority. What is for them more 
important, are factors like government stability, technology and business model 
of the debtor, financial health of the banking sector, and even for very volatile 
145
activity such as the credit distressed debt, the formation of transparent price, 
which is the derivate of a shortly implementable insolvency and certainty about 
the flows deriving from the liquidation. This needs to happen through specialized 
concentrated and unified courts and related practitioners of a sufficient capacity 
and capability.
Considering the differences in the current legal frameworks in commercial, 
banking, tax and insolvency law among the European countries, it is more than 
understandable that the Commission was obliged to compromise and to leave great 
space for implementation to the different local legislative powers. But just how 
such a compromise will avoid influencing their investors in their decision is still 
to be clarified.
For this aspect there are no differences between the German and Italian realities, 
with the exception of the sizes of the possible targets of the investors. Few Italian 
companies could represent a liquid asset for such investors, much fewer than 
in Germany. Further, the few cases are quite relevant for the national politics 
that identify in Commissariamento through Legge Marzano a further phase in 
the reorganization of a company before declaring insolvency, depending on the 
dimension (workforce etc).
6 Increasing the Financing through Capital Markets and Reducing the 
Relevance of the Banking Debt
The phase after 2010 saw even in Germany, while the banks were repositioning 
themselves in an uncertain situation, an increase of issuing corporate bonds from 
midsize companies that either found insufficient banks ready to increase their 
financing in a riskier environment or the need to refinance equity-like instruments 
such as the mezzanine debt that were issued in the years 2004-2007. In Italy 
as above described the banks were keen to refinance the debts of the midsize 
companies, even if with dimension not comparable with the German ones, through 
the issuance of high yield debt.
As a result of these and similar aspects, many companies were given access to 
capital markets without always having the capability in reporting and consequently 
the transparency for managing the phase of a debt restructuring. The increase 
in the complexities deriving from a multilayered structure of financing, where 
banks, bondsholders, factoring and leasing companies, were financing different 
subsidiaries of a industrial group linked eventually by a cash pooling or 
intercompany financing scheme, is challenging the traditional praxis of the debt 
restructuring. The decision of reducing the financing through banks, aiming at 
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similar situations as in USA, could eventually protect the banks’ balance sheet 
from national or international financial crisis that can transmute into economic 
crisis, but at the same time reduces the turnover of the banks and their capability 
to sustain the company in a distressed situation. Even more, assuming that the 
banks are, like mostly in the USA, reducing their lending to the industrial partners 
to the financing of working capital lines, it will be very difficult to have a future 
debt restructuring that will be driven by the banks. Their exposure will either be 
correctly collateralized and therefore with less downside risk, or will be part of 
a class in which their amount will not be so significant to manage the process of 
the restructuring.
With the introduction of the International Financial Reporting Standard 9, the 
banks will be more and more interested in handling the loans and receivables 
exposures like a market instruments, as they will have to face a very volatile 
market-to-market evaluation, even worse in the case of the debt being restructured, 
with de-recognition and rebooking of the remaining debt. 
This has been already seen in case such IVG in Germany, where at the end no bank 
was left but only investment funds, either distressed or commercial real estate. 
In such an environment, it is clear the need of a regulated pre-insolvency debt 
restructuring process, as such investors are mostly interested in a pure financial 
debt restructuring, in which clean and fast haircuts of the existing debt, enables the 
remaining stakeholders to re-launch the company, or to book their profit or loss in 
a speedy way, with a lower debt.
Some reflections could be considerable though: 
(1) How such situation could currently help SMEs, which because of their 
dimension cannot reach the capital market dimension of the Proposal, not 
univocally identifying what is meant by financial lender, will cause the banks 
to reduce their efforts in forcing a industrial restructuring of the companies 
en bloc?
(2) Further, it has to be hoped that the haircuts that are needed will find sufficient 
solidity in the balance sheet of the banks, as they will reduce the provision 
fund and impact their capital ratios and evaluation of migration of portfolios, 
of the vintage before the introduction of the directive.
(3) Certainly, in a situation in which the banks have already decided to abandon 
their role as a driver in the debt restructuring, the Proposal is filling an empty 
space within the unification plan in Europe and at a moment in which the 
banks have difficulty in identifying their future business model and role.
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7 Cramming Down and Qualified Majority 
As a logical consequence for the haircuts, needed because of the extensive leverage 
with complex liabilities structures and of the request of the investors in the issued 
capital market instruments, the regulations for the cramming down of disturbing 
factors is totally correct and logical. Considering the difficulties in identifying the 
holders of the debt in the months during an exercise such as debt restructuring, 
the search for a unanimously accepted agreement is sometime similar to the 
search for the Holy Graal. Having said that, and without entering the discussion 
whether the majority should be represented by 75% or 90%, the challenges that the 
implementation of the directive will face will be major.
First of all, in a country like Germany, the protection of the rights of the creditors 
is a absolute fundament of the local legislation. Until now, the solution was found 
either through other stakeholders buying out the dissenting ones, even against any 
financial logic, or menacing and finally implementing an insolvency procedure, 
with the possibilities of using the restructuring within the insolvency. The losses 
due to not being able to reach an agreement were accepted in view of the defense 
of the importance of the protection of right of each single creditor. This is in a 
mostly coordinated national environment, in which the restructuring and financing 
are banks driven make senses, having the investment funds learned that a long term 
relationship with the national system was the top priorities for being recognized 
as long term investors. In the last years, nevertheless, the cases of free-riders, 
unwilling to consider the arguments of the more traditional players (almost lobby), 
are showing an increase at the same time during which the number of banks is 
reducing on the German stage.
In Italy, the original agreement among the banks disappeared with the worsening of 
the crisis while the cases of declaration of insolvency let the “open bills” among the 
lenders add up. Currently the concordato enables the qualification of the majority 
among lenders and classes of lenders (75%). The point in the praxis is anyway 
more challenging than can be be solved through amounts and percentages. In many 
cases an industrial restructuring at the base of a debt restructuring has to include 
strategic customers and other business factors (employees). Their exposure, being 
much more difficult to quantify, is often of even a bigger strategic importance 
than the one of the financial lenders, assumed to be defined as existing banks 
and bonds investors. The situation of original equipment manufacturers (OEM) 
in the automotive business, having given advance payment for future investment 
tools, the credit insurers for the existing suppliers and whose “virtual” receivables 
become due in an insolvency, or the communitiess having to grant the permission 
of developing the ground for the future investment cycle in a real estate company 
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within a urban development plan require clear definition of how these stakeholders 
need to be considered, if dissenting from the plan approved by the financial lenders.
A final question regards the way of identification of the class of creditors to be 
crammed down: in some cases the collateral linked to the financing is of different 
nature among the secured creditors (because of cash flow and of the rank of 
importance of such collateral in enabling a further existence of the debtor); 
therefore to set up a single class for all secured creditors can be misleading. The 
creditor with a better collateral should be allowed to get his rights recognized in a 
different class reducing the possibility to be watered down in a cramming process. 
In Italy such arguments have, thanks to the correct interpretation of specific 
courts, allowed new jurisprudence limiting the rights of cramming down. If the 
difference is to be made through jurisprudence by, yet to become specialized, 
single national courts, the introduction of cramming down and qualified majorities 
will not represent a unifying factor among Europe but a divisive one (as is already 
happening in Italy).
In summary, the European Proposal for a Directive on preventative restructuring 
frameworks will surely change dramatically the tradition and praxis of debt 
restructuring in the EU, but it can be doubted that it will reach the proposed 
targets in their completeness. The risk of endangering the current role of the banks 
as a driving force in the restructuring, possibly enabling a further delay in the 
declaration of insolvency. Some of the targets could be reached better eventually 
through enhancements in the current frameworks within the insolvency laws. In 
both ways a much deeper specialization of the courts that will be asked to decide 
on the matter of the debt restructuring, as well as an increase of their capacity, will 
be unavoidable and necessary.
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Chapter 8
Insolvency Office Holders’ Qualification, 
Regulation, and Remuneration in the UK
Christina Fitzgerald and Tania Clench*
1 Becoming a Licensed Insolvency Practitioner (“IP”) in the UK
Since 1986 all IPs have been required to be licensed by a recognised professional 
body (“RPB”) or the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (“DBIS”) 
in England and Wales, or the Department of Enterprise Trade and Investment 
(“DETI”) in Northern Ireland. An individual’s licence can be revoked if the 
holder ceases to be a fit and proper person to act as an IP. Only Licensed IPs are 
authorised to take appointments as administrative receivers, Scottish receivers, 
administrators, liquidators, trustees in bankruptcy or sequestration, supervisors of 
voluntary arrangements, and trustees under deeds of arrangement and trustee deeds. 
There are seven RPBs who can license IPs as well as DBIS in England and 
Wales and DETI in Northern Ireland. Licensing, discipline and ethics are the 
responsibilities of these bodies. The commitments made by the RPBs are set down 
in a “Memorandum of Understanding” which records the agreement between the 
RBPs and the Secretary of State. 
Licence holders have considerable responsibilities. Cases are always taken in the 
name of the individual IP. They are then personally responsible for all the cases 
taken in their name and for the actions of everyone working on those cases. 
Before applying for a licence, you must pass the Joint Insolvency Examination 
Board (“JIEB”) examination and satisfy either one of the RPBs, DBIS or the DETI 
that you have the necessary practical experience. 
The JIEB Exams are held once a year, usually in November.
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There are 3 papers:
(1) Liquidations;
(2) Administrations, Company Voluntary Arrangements (CVAs) and 
Receiverships; and
(3) Personal Insolvency. 
To pass JIEB you have to pass all 3 papers, though you do not have to sit them all 
at once. Candidates who have not passed any of the papers may opt to sit one, two 
or three papers in one sitting. Candidates who have passed a single paper at any 
sitting of the exam from 2007 onwards will be allowed to carry forward that pass, 
but must pass the remaining two papers at the same sitting. They will have five 
years in which to pass the other two papers.
Candidates who have passed two papers at a single sitting will be allowed five 
years in which to pass the third. The JIEB exam is notoriously difficult and the 
average age at which the exam is passed is 33 years old. It is recommended that 
candidates have at least 3 years’ practical experience in all areas examined.
There are four compulsory questions to each paper and Questions 1 & 2 carry 20 
marks each and questions 3 & 4 carry 30 marks each. The overall emphasis of the 
papers is practical and numerical and Candidates must demonstrate the ability to 
prepare balance sheets, cash flow forecasts, and profit and loss accounts. The pass 
mark in each paper is 50%.
IPs must also amass a certain number of hours experience in insolvency work 
and the amount varies according to the body issuing the licence. For example, the 
Insolvency Practitioners Association requires not less than 600 hours of experience 
in the 3 years preceding the application for a licence. IPs must have a “bond” in 
place, a form of insurance against which a claim could be made if the IP acts 
fraudulently or dishonestly. All IPs are subject to regular monitoring visits, at least 
once every 6 months, by their RPB and the Insolvency Service visits each RPB and 
has the power to revoke the RPB’s status. 
Change may be coming to the UK sector. The new section 390A of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 allowed the granting of new partial authorisation. This was aimed to 
encourage those who only practice personal insolvency or Individual Voluntary 
Arrangements (IVAs) to qualify into the profession. The exam diet in 2016 will 
remain the same format as recent years. This is because the JIEB is conscious 
that the administration of either a personal insolvency or a corporate insolvency 
requires an awareness and understanding of the ethical environment in which any 
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appointment takes place and of all forms of formal and non-formal insolvency 
procedures. This will remain under review for 2017 and onwards.
In addition to their responsibilities for the administration of the cases, licence 
holders are responsible for getting the best possible outcome in each case whether 
it is a small liquidation, a large group administration, an IVA or a complicated 
bankruptcy. In every case, their ultimate responsibility is to the creditors, but there 
are also legal, ethical and moral obligations to employees, directors and other 
stakeholders to consider. Typically IPs are very proud of their work and thrive on 
the challenges that they face in their chosen profession - most of them would not 
wish to do anything else! 
2 Regulation 
Insolvency in the UK is a very highly regulated profession. There are over 120 
pieces of legislation extending to some 2000 pages which govern insolvency 
practice. In addition, IPs are required to comply with Statements of Insolvency 
Practice (“SIP”s), a series of documents setting out standards of professional 
conduct with which IPs are required to comply. If IPs depart from the standards, 
they can face disciplinary action from their regulator. As discussed above, there are 
7 RBPs together with DBIS and DETI who regulate IPs. The Insolvency Service 
is also the “regulator of regulators”. The Joint Insolvency Committee (“JIC”), 
which comprises of representatives from each of the regulatory bodies, and the 
Insolvency Service meet on a quarterly basis to discuss matters of mutual interest 
and concern.
IP regulation in the UK is a complex and sometimes contentious area and the 
regulatory regimes efficacy and potential reform represent a key challenge for 
policy makers, regulators and members of the profession over the coming years. 
The Office of Fair Trading’s (”OFT”) recent study into the corporate insolvency 
market recommends certain changes to insolvency regulation and it is likely 
that the Government, through DBIS, will explore options for reform during the 
current Parliament.
In the UK there are currently concerns over consistency of approach from one 
regulator to the next and that the regulatory structure can be confusing to anyone 
who is not familiar with it.
We would welcome effective reform and rationalisation of the regulatory system, 
with the possibility of reducing the number of regulators and/or introducing a single 
regulatory framework, under which anyone advising on and acting in insolvency 
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cases would operate. We certainly believe that the vast majority of IPs undertake 
their statutory functions diligently and professionally but as with all industries, it is 
important that the regulatory regime is capable of strong enforcement to deal with 
misconduct in order to protect the integrity of the profession. 
3 Remuneration of IPs in the UK
IPs act as office-holders in insolvency procedures and are given extensive powers 
by legislation. They take decisions that can have a significant impact on the funds 
available to creditors; their fees are paid out of the assets in cases. 
The statutory provisions relating to the remuneration of IPs are set out in the 
Insolvency Rules 2016. Rules 18.15 to 18.38 of the Insolvency Rules 2016 deals 
with remuneration principles, fixing of remuneration, challenges by creditors and 
applications to Court by officeholders in relation to their remuneration. SIP 9 was 
one of a series of guidance notes produced to maintain standards by setting out 
agreed best practice. Concerns have been expressed about the level of IP charges 
and the consequential impact on unsecured creditors. 
The Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) launched a market study into corporate IPs 
in 2009. A review was undertaken and the Report of Professor Kempson was 
published in July 2013 supporting the OFT’s findings.1 The Report concluded that, 
where there was insufficient creditor control of fees, the fees tended to be higher. 
Professor Kempson also noted that reports to creditors were typically formulaic, 
which discouraged meaningful engagement. 
The outcome of the Report is reflected in a new SIP 9 and the Insolvency 
Amendment Rules 20152 which came into effect on 1 October 2015. 
Under the new rules IPs are required to provide a summary of estimated costs, 
the work to be undertaken and, where an hourly rate is proposed, an estimate of 
the expected time. These estimates act as a cap on fees as, once agreed, they can 
only be changed by agreement between the IPs and the creditors. The new Rules 
apply to:
• Administration; 
• Creditors’ voluntary liquidation; 
1 Professor Elaine Kempson, “Review of Insolvency Practitioner Fees” (July 2013, Report to the Insolvency Service) 
available from http://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/geography/migrated/documents/pfrc1316.pdf. 
2 The Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2015, SI 2015/443.
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• Compulsory liquidation (unless the Official Receiver acts as liquidator); and 
• Bankruptcy (unless the Official Receiver acts as trustee in bankruptcy). 
In addition to accommodating these legislative changes, the new SIP 9 provides a 
significant shift in emphasis towards the importance of the narrative explanations 
provided to creditors. This largely reflects what creditors have said they wish to 
receive, namely, less formulaic reporting, with meaningful explanations of:
• What has or will be done by the office holder;
• What the office holder has achieved or expects to achieve; and
• What the office holder expects the costs will be.
In keeping with the prevailing theme of transparency, the SIP contains a new 
provision:
“Where it is practical to do so, the office holder should provide an 
indication of the likely return to creditors when seeking approval for 
the basis of their remuneration.”
This reflects what creditors groups have reported namely, that this is the key piece 
of information from their perspective.
The provision of an indication of the likely return to creditors is perhaps the most 
significant addition to the consultation draft, and reflects the wishes of creditors to 
be told at an early stage whether there is any significant prospect of a distribution 
to them.
The SIP has been written in such a way as to guide practitioners as to the qualitative 
nature of what is required. In that sense, it is perhaps less onerous than it could have 
been, as it does not specify a format or a detailed list of matters to be covered (as 
does SIP 16, for example). It seeks to encourage practitioners to take a meaningful 
approach to their compliance with the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2015. One 
size will most definitely not fit all in this context.
The added challenge relates to the need to submit fees and expenses estimates 
before the determination of basis upon which the IP’s fees are to be calculated, 
thereby requiring accurate estimates early on. As stated above, too low an estimate 
will place a cap on fees and will require further recourse to creditors for approval 
at a later stage. 
It is often difficult to estimate fees at a very early stage when the precise work an 
insolvency job may produce is unknown and where there is limited (or incorrect) 
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information. Questions to be asked will include ‘Is litigation likely to be needed? 
Will the directors comply or prove hostile? Will there be difficult creditors to deal 
with?’ It is not clear whether it will be possible to caveat or qualify estimates in 
order to allow the increases in the estimated amount without the need to refer back 
to creditors.
While there has been some disquiet in the profession about the absence of a 
template or suggested format for fee estimates, this is fully intended to reflect the 
fact that a fee estimate in a simple case might be little more than a few lines of 
text, while such a brief explanation will almost certainly be inadequate in more 
complex scenarios. Explanations cannot be scripted in advance and the level of 
detail required will vary from case to case. Another situation where one size will 
not fit all.
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Chapter 9
Ranking of Creditors in Insolvency:  
An Empirical Debate on Optimal 
Harmonization Practices
Eugenio Vaccari 
1 Introduction
The European Commission and Parliament have long advocated for substantive 
and substantial changes in national insolvency1 practices, on the premises that 
disparities between national systems create obstacles to the functioning of an 
efficient internal market, hinder economic growth (or recovery), and impact the 
availability and cost of investments.2 Furthermore, there is a general understanding 
that integration of capital markets is seriously jeopardized by lack of sufficient 
harmonization in insolvency law.3
These calls have triggered some changes to insolvency law within Member States. 
However, unsatisfactory and uneven progress has been achieved, with the subject 
of creditors’ ranking proving one of the most resistant to harmonization.
With reference to ranking of creditors, the academic community seems to support 
the proposal of “whitewashing” existing statutory privileges, with very few notable 
exceptions.4 Priorities recognized by the law should be reduced to a minimum, 
1 Depending on the jurisdiction, there are different understandings of the meaning of ‘insolvency law’. This paper 
adopts the English version of the notion. Therefore, the term ‘insolvency law’ is used to refer to corporate practice, 
while the term ‘bankruptcy law’ is relegated to cases dealing to individuals. Occasionally, in direct quotations 
from other authors, this distinction may not be respected.
2 EC Communication “Towards the Completion of the Banking Union” Com (2015) 587.
3 “Five Presidents’ Report” on “Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union”, 22 June 2015.
4 See, among others: Alan Schwartz, ‘Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories’ 
(Jan. 1981), 10(1) The Journal of Legal Studies 1; Jacob S. Ziegel, ‘Preferences and Priorities in Insolvency Law: 
Is There a Solution?’ (1994-1995) 39 St. Louis University Law Journal 793; Vanessa Finch, ‘Security, Insolvency 
and Risk: Who Pays the Price?’ (Sept. 1999) 62(5) The Modern Law Review 633. 
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or should not be recognized at all, a position mildly supported by international 
organizations, more cautious in their recommendations.5
This paper looks at Italian treatment of statutory priorities in insolvency law. 
It focuses on the priority ranking granted to a particular category of small 
entrepreneurs, collectively defined as ‘artisans’ (section I). While not questioning 
the validity of the proposed harmonization process, and the recommendation for 
getting rid of statutory priorities, it evidences the hurdles that have to be overcome 
in the process of repealing these mechanisms from Italian law (sections II and III). 
Accordingly, it proves that, if European institutions adopt a soft, as opposed to a 
hard harmonization approach, the Italian legislator may more easily achieve the 
market integration goal, without disposing of domestic distinctiveness (sections 
IV and V).
2 Italian Insolvency Law
Under the existing Italian insolvency legislation, there are roughly 114 statutory 
exceptions to the principle of rateable distribution among unsecured creditors. This 
is without considering rights in rem and the preferential treatment of the expenses 
accrued during the insolvency procedure.6
Commentators have tried to determine the reasons that push some legislation to 
single out so many claimants from the wider category of unsecured creditors, and 
from the rateable principle that should guide the distribution of proceeds among 
them. It has been rightly observed that in some countries, priority claims “perform 
the function undertaken by security credits in other systems”.7 Nevertheless, in 
my opinion such an exorbitant and striking deviation from equality in distribution 
can be satisfactorily explained only as the by-product of ongoing political and 
economic pressures, a point of view shared in other contexts and documents.8
5 In reality, this conclusion is fully supported by the UNCITRAL, which in its Legislative Guide on Insolvency 
Law, Parts One and Two, states that “[m]aintaining a number of different priority positions for many types of 
claim has the potential to complicate the basic goals of insolvency and to make efficient and effective proceedings 
difficult to achieve”. More recent documents from the World Bank - namely the ‘Principles for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes’ (2016) and the ‘Revised Principles for Effective Creditor Rights and 
Insolvency Regimes’ (2011) - adopt a more cautious approach, and simply advocate for the establishment of clear 
rules for the ranking of creditors, including prioritized ones.
6 Available at http://fallimento.it/redazione/Privilegi/index.htm (last viewed 21 July 2016).
7 José M. Garrido, ‘The Distributional Question in Insolvency: Comparative Aspects’ (1995) 4 International 
Insolvency Review, 25, p. 41.
8 UNCITRAL, ‘Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law - Parts One and Two’ (2004), where it is written that “priority 
rights, which are often based upon social, and sometimes political, considerations, militate against the principle 
of pari passu distribution and generally operate to the detriment of ordinary unsecured creditors by reducing the 
value of the assets available for distribution to them” (270).
161
Irrespective of the majority position against the recognition of priority claims in 
the law,9 Italian legislation recognizes a priority ranking to certain Micro, Small, 
or Medium Enterprise (MSME) claimants, should one of their debtors enter into 
an insolvency procedure. An ex ante approach aimed at protecting companies 
considered at high risk of insolvency.
According to article 2751 bis (5) of the Civil Code, 
“[a] general privilege on movable property is granted to claims 
relating to […] claims of an artisan enterprise [as defined according 
to the enforceable law] and of cooperative societies or institutions for 
production and work, for the compensation of services rendered and 
the sale of manufactured products”.10
This article was introduced by means of law no. 426/1975, to grant additional 
protection to certain creditors (including artisan entrepreneurs) who were 
considered “worthy” of special consideration by the Italian Constitution.11
This rule represents a serious obstacle to the European Commission’s call for 
closer approximation in substantive insolvency practice. While it is undeniable that 
rules can change, whenever they are the expression of established principles and 
values they prove more resilient to modification. The next sections demonstrate the 
issues that had to be taken into consideration in reforming the priority treatment 
of artisan entrepreneurs.
3 Artisans - Peculiarities
The profession of ‘artisan’ has always been associated with the making of art 
(it. “artefatto”, lat. arte + factu, made in an artistic fashion) and hand works (it. 
“manufatto”, lat. manu + factu, made by hand). The Italian legislature developed 
the legal notion of ‘artisan’ against this background. Therefore, it comes as no 
surprise that the first legal understanding of ‘artisan’ was closely related to the 
commonly accepted belief of this labourer as a craftsman, who primarily made his 
living in a workshop, relying mainly on manual work.
9 For a summary see (among others): Ziegel, above note 4; Garrido, above note 7; José M. Garrido, ‘No Two 
Snowflakes the Same: The Distributional Question in International Bankruptcies’ (2011) 46 Texas International 
Law Journal 459.
10 Susanna Beltramo, The Italian Civil Code and Complementary Legislation (West/Thomson Reuters, 2012), at 
699. The words in brackets were added by law no. 35/2012, and were translated into English from Italian by the 
author of this note. The term “cooperative societies” should be translated as “cooperative companies”.
11 Article 35(1) of the Italian Constitution lays down that “The Republic protects work in all its forms and practices”, 
while article 45(2) specifies that it is up to the law to “safeguard and promote artisanal work”. These are the 
translations in English of the Italian text made by the author of the present note. 
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This is the position adopted by the first “modern”12 statute that mentioned this 
group of workers. Pursuant to law no. 830/1925, the notion of ‘artisan’ was to 
be used only with reference of those self-employed people, who exercised their 
craft in an artistic workshop, alone or with the exceptional assistance of a salaried 
apprentice, and with the occasional use of ‘mechanical means’.13
Neither the Civil Code (enacted in 1942) nor the Constitution (enacted in 1948) 
provide a specific definition of ‘artisans’. Only article 2083 of the Civil Code lays 
down that the category of ‘small entrepreneurs’ is formed by 
“farmers who personally cultivate the land, artisans, small tradesmen 
and those who engage professionally in an activity organized mainly 
with their own work and that of the members of their families”14 
(emphasis added).
It would seem, therefore, that artisans have been treated similarly to several other 
categories of entrepreneurs. In reality, this conclusion would be fallacious, for the 
following reasons.
Firstly, later amendments in the law prove that their corporations have constantly 
lobbied for (and succeeded in) obtaining particular consideration by the government. 
They have efficaciously conveyed the message that artisans are substantially 
similar to salaried workers, thus achieving significant fiscal, administrative and 
legal advantages for their members.15
As part of this process, law no. 426/1975 recognized the priority treatment in 
insolvency for these entrepreneurs, by means of an amendment of Civil Code rules. 
Quite unsurprisingly, the ranking of priority recognized to these entrepreneurs is 
substantially similar to the ranking of salaried workers. 
Secondly, they campaigned for, and managed to amend the legislative definition 
of their category, to include as many self-employed entrepreneurs as possible. 
Even the original definition of ‘artisan’, while narrow for contemporary standards, 
12 ‘Modern’ refers to legislation enacted after the unification of the different states that formed the Italian peninsula, 
and the settlement of a central government in Rome (17 March 1861). 
13 For an analysis of the preliminary evolution of the legislation on artisans, see F. Cavazzuti, ‘Le Piccole Imprese’ 
in F. Galgano (eds), Trattato di Diritto Commerciale e di Diritto Pubblico dell’Economia (1978, Cedam, Padova).
14 Beltramo, above note 10, p. 441.
15 These advantages originally included the exemption from keeping accounting entries, the registration in a special 
section of the Companies’ House register, and the exemption from insolvency procedures. 
163
was less so if we contextualize it within the economic and social situation that the 
country experienced in the first half of the 20th century.16
The 1956 amendments17 allowed artisans to avert the risk of losing legislative 
protection and financial benefits. The new law recognized the industrialization 
of the artisan practice,18 and provided a definition of artisan entrepreneur valid 
“for any purpose of the law”.19 This trend has also been reinstated in following 
reforms. Law no. 443/1985 further extended the notion of ‘artisans’, and anchored 
it to quantitative rather than qualitative criteria (even though the definition was no 
longer valid for any purpose of the law). Later on, laws no. 133/1997 and 57/2001 
conceded that artisans could incorporate their workshops and activities in the form 
of limited liability companies, even with more than one shareholder. 
More recently, partly in reaction to the dissatisfaction of the business community 
(namely: the artisan lobbies), and partly out of a need to provide a higher degree 
of certainty in the judicial interpretation of legal standards, law no. 35/2012 - 
which amended art. 2751 bis (5) of the Civil Code - specified that there is only one 
definition of ‘artisan’, and that is the definition set out in the special law (“as defined 
according to the enforceable law”).20 In other words, the most recent legislator 
opened the floodgates to the recognition of a wide category of beneficiaries of the 
priority status in insolvency. This is despite the opposing call for reforms from the 
European Union and UNCITRAL, but partially in accordance with the guidelines 
provided by the World Bank.
16 Mechanical instruments were expensive, people tended to live in small villages in the county, and Italy was 
still in the early stages of industrialization. It is therefore safe to assume that a relevant part of autonomous, 
self-employed workers fit in the definitions of ‘artisan’ and ‘small entrepreneur’.
17 Law no. 860/1956.
18 Entrepreneurs could subsequently still be qualified as ‘artisans’ despite: incorporating themselves in some of the 
existing corporate forms; employing a limited number of salaried workers; and making use of more sophisticated 
mechanic tools to produce goods and services.
19 This specification appears tautological, but in reality is extremely important. Law no. 860/1956 was mainly 
enacted to determine the criteria that certain self-employed entrepreneurs should respect in order to benefit from 
tax rebates and other preferential treatments. The specification that the definition is valid ‘at any effect of the 
law’ means that, in the legislator’s view, the judiciary should have looked only at the statutory criteria set out in 
the 1956 law to determine if an artisan is a small entrepreneur according to art. 2083 of the Civil Code. Another 
proof of the effective lobbying activities of this corporation.
20 This is the translation in English of the Italian text made by the author of the present note. 
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Law Content
Law no. 830/1925 Notion of ‘artisan’ as self-employed craftsman; little 
mechanical help.
Civil Code (royal decree no. 
262/1942)
Art. 2083: ‘artisans’ are small entrepreneurs, if 
personal work prevails over the work of the members 
of their families and over capital.
Constitution (1947/1948) No definition of ‘artisan’.
Law no. 860/1956 ‘Artisan’ defined for any purpose of the law as a self-
employed entrepreneur or a company, which may 
produce goods and provide service while employing 
salaried workers and making use of mechanical tools.
Law no. 426/1975 Introduction of art. 2751 bis in the Civil Code. 
‘Artisans’ (as defined by art. 2083 c.c.) are recognized 
a priority ranking among unsecured creditors in 
insolvency proceedings.
Law no. 443/1985 ‘Artisans’ no longer defined for any purpose of the law, 
but definition is anchored to loose quantitative criteria 
and procedural requirements.
Laws no. 133/1997 and no. 
57/2001
‘Artisans’ could enjoy the benefits of limited liability.
Law no. 35/2012 Amendment to art. 2751 bis (5) of the Civil Code: to 
identify artisans, it is necessary and sufficient to look 
at the criteria set out in the special legislation (e.g. law 
no. 443/1985 as subsequently amended). 
Thirdly, artisans have successfully campaigned for a change in the judicial 
understanding of the notion. This is not yet the position of the Supreme Court 
which, back in 2000,21 held that 
“the qualification of an individual entrepreneur as an artisan […] 
requires the prominence of the contribution of labour over invested 
capital, and of personal or even manual work, from the owner of 
the enterprise”.22
Additionally, back in 1998,23 the Supreme Court clarified that 
“law no. 860/1956 […] shall be considered as a natural integration, 
specification and clarification of article 2083- both under a qualitative 
21 Eraldo c. Fall. soc. Ocn - PPI, C. Cass. no. 15785/2000, in Giust. Civ, Mass. 2000, 2598.
22 This is the translation in English of the Italian text made by the author of the present note.
23 Ditta Allibardi Salotti c. Fall. Gherardi, C. Cass. no. 456/1998, in Giust. Civ. Mass. 1998, 105.
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and […] a quantitative perspective. However, an enterprise cannot 
be defined as ‘artisanal’, merely because it matches the quantitative 
requirements set out in articles 1 and 2 of law no. 860/1956”24 
(emphasis added).
The Supreme Court25 and the majority of lower courts26 have been consistent in 
ruling that only those ‘artisan enterprises’, which possess both the qualitative 
criteria set out in the Civil Code (article 2083) and the quantitative criteria set out 
in the special legislation (law no. 443/1985), are entitled to the priority ranking.27 
Despite that, some courts28 (backed by some commentators29) seem to favour the 
opposite solution, according to which only the definition provided in the special 
law is relevant to determine the beneficiaries of priority treatment in insolvency. 
It appears that the 2012 amendments would result in a change of the consolidated 
jurisprudence, in favour of the adoption of this understanding of the notion of 
artisan for insolvency law purposes. 
4 Further Obstacles to Repealing Priority of Artisans in Insolvency Law
The previous section has shown that artisans successfully campaigned for 
obtaining specific consideration from both the law and the judiciary. Irrespective 
24 This is the translation in English of the Italian text made by the author of the present note. 
25 See among others F.lli Zanchetta S.n.c. c. S.V., C. Cass. no. 7116/2015, in Diritto & Giustizia, 10 April 2015; 
Soc. Battocchia Termo c. Fall. soc. Edil 200, C. Cass. SS.UU. no. 5685/2015, in Giust. Civ. Mass. 2015; Annapiù 
Tricot di Carrer Anna Maria & C. S.n.c. c. Fallimento Harold S.r.l., C. Cass. no. 11024/2013 (unreported). Similar 
conclusions were reached in older judgments, such as Fall. Deiani e altro c. Leonesio, C. Cass. no. 11963/1990, in 
Giur It., 1991, I(1), 1014; and Soc. De Benedetti c. Fall. soc. Rossi, C. Cass. no. 7366/1998, in Giust. Civ. Mass. 
1998, 1603. Unfortunately, all these judgments refer to the law applicable before the 2012 amendments. In fact, 
despite some of them being given after the enforcement of the modifications, the Supreme Court clarified that 
the new version of art. 2751 bis (5) does not apply to insolvency procedures filed before 2012 (see Cass. SS.UU. 
no. 5685/2015, cited above in this note). As such, the Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to clarify 
whether the 2012 amendments modified the commonly accepted criteria for determining whether a company is 
an ‘artisan’ or not.
26 Among others, see Trib. Udine, 11 June 1982 and 22 August 1983, in Giur. Comm., 1984, II, 49; and Trib. 
Genova, 4 August 1982, Banca Borsa Titoli di Credito, 1983, II, 567.
27 In other words, the prevailing opinion in the judiciary is that – for the purposes of art. 2751 bis (5) of the Civil 
Code - ‘artisans’ should be small entrepreneurs whose work (and that of the members of their family) prevails 
over the work of any other employee and on the assets (as per art. 2083 of the Civil Code). Additionally, their 
company should meet the criteria set out in law no. 443/1985. But this understanding is likely to be revised for 
post-2012 cases.
28 Decreto Tribunale Milano 14 June 2013, Eredi di Frigerio Angelo di Leonardo Frigerio & C. S.n.c. c. Fall. 
Immobiliare Costruzioni IM.CO. S.p.a. (unreported), available at: http://www.ilcaso.it/giurisprudenza/
archivio/9874.pdf [last viewed: June 14, 2016]; App. Torino, 30 April 1986, in Fall., 1987, 817; Eraldo c. Fall. 
soc. Ocn - PPl, C. Cass. no. 15785/2000 in Giust. Civ. Mass., 2000, 2598; and Ditta Allibardi Salotti c. Fall. 
Gherardi, C. Cass. no. 456/1998, in Fall., 1986, 915.
29 G. Bozza and G. Schiavon, L’Accertamento dei Crediti nel Fallimento e le Cause di Prelazione (1992, Giuffré, 
Milano), at 928.
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of the power of their lobby, this section illustrates other, tangible obstacles that 
may hinder repealing this statutory priority from the law. 
The first aspect is the relation between statutory laws enacted by the Parliament 
and Italy’s fundamental law, the Constitution. While the priority ranking in 
insolvency for artisans was introduced only by means of law no. 426/1975, the 
Italian Constitution mentions artisans in two different articles (even if in one case 
only indirectly). These references are particularly surprising given it is a relatively 
short piece of legislation with only 139 articles, which are very broad in scope. 
Article 35(1) of the Constitution clarifies that “The Republic protects work in all 
its forms and practices”. Artisanal practice is included in this notion of “work”, 
as clarified by the case law30. Furthermore, pursuant to article 45(2) “The Law 
safeguards and promotes artisanal work” (emphasis added).31
These articles are not sufficient to claim that the statutory priority for artisan 
entrepreneurs enjoys a “constitutional” protection. Nevertheless, it is undeniable 
that the legislation, which has introduced this mechanism into the Civil Code, has 
aimed to transplant a mandate specified in the Constitution.
Furthermore, the choice to introduce this priority ranking by means of an 
amendment to the existing Civil Code should not be underestimated. The Civil 
Code, despite its lack of hierarchical prominence over other statutes, is remarkably 
more prestigious than any other legislative instrument.
Finally, the Constitutional Court has proven very resilient in allowing the legislator 
to amend the “rights” of Italian citizens. For instance, it took the government three 
attempts32 to establish a “solidarity contribution” on retirement benefits exceeding 
the threshold of €90,000 per year. If the Constitutional Court considered that the 
priority ranking of artisan entrepreneurs aims to safeguard and promote artisanal 
work, its repeal might prove problematic. In truth, this is a remote and unlikely 
30 Adriano Patti, I Privilegi (2003, Giuffré, Milano), at 201. The belief that priority treatments granted by means of 
art. 2751 bis of the Civil Code represent the enforcement of the constitutional principle according to which ‘work 
in every forms and practices’ needs to be protected, is supported by the prevailing jurisprudence (see the judgment 
no. 1/2000 rendered by the Constitutional Court).
31 This is the translation in English of the Italian text made by the author of the present note. Article 45 in particular 
entrusts the legislator to define the statutory measures to not only protect, but also promote the development of 
artisanal work. This attention to this typology of enterprise has, for some authors, resulted in “iper-regulation” – 
P.F. Lotito, ‘Commentary to Art. 35 of the Italian Constitution’ in R. Bifulco et al (eds), La Costituzione Italiana 
(2007, Strenna Utet, Milano) at 927.
32 The first attempt (law no. 111/2011) was quashed by the ruling no. 116/2013 in the case B.G. et al c. Inps et al. 
(Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 2013, 3, 1886). The second attempt (art. 1(1), law no. 214/2011) was successfully 
challenged in C.G. et al c. Pres. Cons., C. Cost, no. 70/2015, in Foro Amministrativo 2015, 4, 1004. 
167
hypothesis, but there are precedents, and a legal basis for it being advocated in a 
courtroom.
The second aspect to be taken into account is the relevant role that micro-
enterprises and, in particular, artisan enterprises play in the current economy. In the 
case of artisans, there are also political considerations closely linked to sustaining 
the economic relevance of this category of entrepreneur.
According to the most recent available data33 (that refer to the situation as at 
31 December 2013), micro-enterprises (with less than 10 people employed) 
represent 95.3% of active enterprises, 47.45% of number of persons employed, 
and constitute 25.85% of total turnover generated by companies in the country. 
Among these micro-enterprises, there are 2.4 million employing only one person, 
which contributes a third of the global turnover generated by this class.
Small and medium enterprises (10-249 people employed) provide work to 
32.88% of the total labour force and account for 43.18% to turnover, while larger 
enterprises (250+ employees) grant a workplace to 19.7% of the workforce, and 
account for almost 31.0% of the global turnover.
Size 
Classes
No. of 
Enterprises %
No. of Persons 
Employed %
Turnover 
(ml €) %
0-9 4,094,444 95.27 7,518,178 47.45 762,497 25.85
10-19 127,998 2.97 1,679,039 10.6 316,186 10.72
20-49 50,760 1.19 1,510,447 9.53 343,315 11.64
Total (1) 4,273,202 99.43 10,707,664 67.58 1,421,998 48.21
50-249 20,897 0.49 2,021,059 12.75 614,279 20.82
250+ 3,383 0.08 3,116,677 19.67 913,555 30.97
Total 
(1+2) 4,297,482 100 15,845,400 100 2,949,832 100
In summation, companies with up to 49 employees, which are, for the largest part, 
potentially eligible under current legislation to be classified as “artisan enterprises”, 
represent 99.43% of Italian companies, despite employing “only” 67.58% of the 
workforce and contributing less than half of global business turnover.
33 ISTAT, Report on the Structure and Competitiveness of the Industrial and Services Enterprises, available at: 
http://www.istat.it/en/archive/175960 (last viewed 20 July 2016).
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These represent quite remarkable numbers, although not dissimilar to those 
experienced in other jurisdictions.34 Nevertheless, it is the role that these companies 
play in the society (section III) and their constitutional prominence (first half of 
section IV), which push the Italian legislator to continue to recognize their priority 
within insolvency law.
5 Perspectives of Reform
The political influence, statutory protection, and economic relevance that artisan 
enterprises have been able to obtain in Italy have also affected the scope and 
content of recent reforms in the field of insolvency law. 
Italian authorities have undertaken successive reforms in recent years35. What has 
always been lacking is a “global view”. More recently, however, on February 10, 
2016 the Cabinet adopted a draft statutory instrument (‘the bill’36) to reform the 
Italian insolvency framework from the grounds-up.37 
To be enforced, this bill shall be approved by the Parliament, and published on the 
Official Gazette (‘the act’). At that point, the Government will have the authority 
(and twelve months) to amend the current legislation by means of one or more law 
decrees (‘the decrees’), which have to conform to the requirements and directions 
set out in the act. It is the enactment of these decrees that will determine a change 
in the applicable law. If enacted, the act will be binding only with reference to the 
content of the reform. The Government will not be forced to issue the decrees, and 
the delegation may expire without any amendment to the law being introduced.
34 According to the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills’ study on Business Population Estimates for 
the UK and Regions 2015, small businesses accounted for 99.3% of all private sector businesses at the start of 
2015, and 99.9% were small or medium sized (MSMEs). Department of Business, Innovation & Skills, Business 
Population Estimates for the UK and Regions 2015, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/467443/bpe_2015_statistical_release.pdf (last viewed 20 July 2016). Similar 
data were collected by EUROSTAT with reference to other countries within the European Union - available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/structural-business-statistics/structural-business-statistics/sme (last viewed 20 
July 2016).
35 For a summary, see José Garrido, IMF Working Paper on Insolvency and Enforcement Reforms in Italy, 
WP/16/134, at 7 - available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16134.pdf (last viewed 29 July 
2016). The Author notes that “[t]he frequent and sudden modifications of the law have, however, come at a cost 
of undermining legal certainty”, p. 8.
36 More precisely, it is a ‘proposal for delegated legislation’.
37 The bill has already been interested by significant amendments. At the moment, debate is taking place over two 
proposals: (i) C-3671 bis - available at: http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg17/lavori/stampati/pdf/17PDL0041360.
pdf (last viewed 26 July 2016) which deals with the main body of the reform; (ii) C-3671 ter - available at: http://
www.camera.it/_dati/leg17/lavori/stampati/pdf/17PDL0041370.pdf (last viewed 26 July 2016) which reforms the 
discipline of a rescue procedure for large corporations only.
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This call for reform has been justified not only by “conventional” reasons, such 
as the need to reduce inconsistencies between old and more recent provisions; to 
ease administrative burdens; or to streamline judicial practice. In the explanatory 
documents attached to the bill, the Italian Ministry of Justice has urged for 
implementing a system of best practices and recommendations that have emerged 
at the international and regional/European level. 
It is not surprising, therefore, to read that one of the purposes of the act should be 
to repeal or reduce statutory priorities.38 However, it is interesting to observe that 
the subject of statutory priorities has hardly been mentioned in the hearings in 
front of the Parliamentary Commission in charge of drafting the bill. It is highly 
questionable, therefore, if the final act will contain any reference (apart from 
general ones) to this subject. 
Furthermore, even if that was the case, the government would have to be able 
to overcome the fierce opposition of artisan lobbies to enact a reform, which 
cancelled their priority status, or reduced their economic and administrative 
privileges in general law. This in a period, which is likely to be close to the next 
general elections. 
6 Conclusion
This paper speculated why artisans’ ranking in Italian insolvency law has proven 
so incredibly resilient to reform. It investigated the social and legal obstacles that 
have prevented in the past, and still prevent at present, the enactment of a law, 
which repealed their priority status in insolvency.
It appears from the reasons highlighted in the main body of the article that any 
such proposal is unlikely to be enforced in the short term, since it would cause 
much havoc in the economic community, and it would trigger extensive litigation 
in courts. 
A less troublesome alternative, however, may be possible.
38 Introductory explanation to the V Commission of the House of Parliament (“Camera dei Deputati”) of the 
purposes and scope of the proposal for delegated legislation rendered by the Ministry of Justice, Leoluca 
Orlando - Camera dei Deputati, Atti Parlamentari XVII Legislatura n. 3671, available at: file:///C:/Users/Vale/
Downloads/17pdl0039820.pdf (last viewed 22 October 2016). The section dedicated to priority rankings in 
insolvency is no. 13 out of 15. It seems that matters were organized in order of importance/urgency.
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If the Italian legislator wanted to restrict the priority treatment to those small39 
artisans, who find themselves in a situation substantially similar to that of unskilled 
salaried workers, it could rephrase art. 2751 bis (5) of the Civil Code40 as follows:
“Hanno privilegio generale sui mobili i crediti riguardanti: […] (5) 
i crediti dell’artigiano (…) che esercita un’attività professionale con 
il lavoro proprio e dei componenti della famiglia, per i corrispettivi 
dei servizi prestati e della vendita dei manufatti”.
“A general privilege on movable property is granted to credits 
relating to […] claims of an artisan (…) who engages professionally 
in an activity organized mainly with his/her own work and that of the 
members of their families, for the compensation of services rendered 
and the sale of manufactured products”.
Laws should be sufficiently flexible to allow both judiciary and practitioners 
to exercise adequate discretion in their implementation. As a result, the Italian 
legislator may explore the opportunity of introducing in its insolvency framework 
a provision similar to 11 U.S. Code §.105(a), like the one that follows:
“L’autorità giudiziaria competente può adottare ogni ordinanza, 
decreto o sentenza che appaia necessario o appropriato per 
implementare le disposizioni [della presente legge]”.41
“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary 
or appropriate to carry out the provisions [of this law]”.
This proposal for reform is unlikely to be rejected a priori from the associations 
and corporations, which defend the interests of artisans. Even if that was the 
case, the government may argue that it is simply working to introduce new rules 
designed to better achieve the general purposes of the law, and to recognize a more 
effective protection to artisan entrepreneurs. This would significantly reduce the 
risk of lengthy litigations in courts.
–
This paper has therefore illustrated the merits of adopting a soft law harmonization 
approach on the subject of creditor priorities in insolvency law. While the 
alternative solution (a single law for all European Member States) would be harder 
39 According to the European standards set out in the EU Recommendation 2003/361.
40 The Rordorf Commission advocated for grouping the insolvency discipline in a single piece of legislation, outside 
the Civil Code. Nevertheless, this provision can easily be accommodated within this yet-to-be-drafted bill. 
41 This is the translation in Italian of the English text made by the author of the present note.
171
to negotiate, and could lead to non-uniform interpretations at national level, this 
soft law harmonization approach may yield results in a shorter timeframe, without 
unduly repressing domestic peculiarities. Furthermore, its implementation would 
prove less troublesome at national level.
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Chapter 10
Time to Renew the Debate on Cross-Border 
Insolvency Law: Out with Theoretical Ideals, 
in with Pragmatism
Emilie Ghio*1
1 Introduction
The difficulties caused by cross-border insolvency cases and the search for a 
viable solution are not new. The effective handling of insolvencies involving 
multinational companies operating in various countries is an unresolved problem 
of international insolvency law. As far back as 1888, John Lowell wrote: 
“It is obvious that … it would be better in nine cases out of ten that all 
settlements of insolvent debtors with their creditors should be made 
in a single proceeding, and generally at a single place.”2
Over the last couple of decades, academics have vigorously debated which 
approach to cross-border insolvency is best. The debate usually centres on 
questions of predictability, certainty, national sovereignty, fairness, and efficiency. 
In this academic discourse over the most appropriate design for an international 
insolvency system, two theoretical approaches have traditionally been identified: 
universalism and territorialism. Universalism means that one jurisdiction should 
administer the insolvency proceedings and the debtor’s assets should be dealt with 
on a worldwide basis. Since universalism requires a single law to be applied, it 
goes hand in hand with harmonisation of insolvency law, both procedural and 
substantive. The most eloquent3 and effective proponent of universalism in the 
last decade has been Professor Jay Westbrook. Territorialism on the other hand 
means that any State in which the debtor’s assets are located has jurisdiction 
to open insolvency proceedings, applying its own domestic insolvency law 
to distribute the assets for the benefit of local creditors. In the most recent past 
* BCL, LLB, LLM, PhD Candidate working under the supervision of Professor Irene Lynch-Fannon, School of 
Law, University College Cork. 
2 J. Lowell, “Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments of Creditors” (1888) 1 Harvard Law Review 259-264, p. 264.
3 See J.A.E. Pottow, “The Myth (and Realities) of Forum Shopping in Transnational Insolvency” (2007) 32 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 785-818, p. 785. 
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Professor Lynn LoPucki has traditionally been the main advocate for a territorialist 
insolvency system.
Even though it has widely been accepted in academic literature that universalism 
is preferable, the reality of the international insolvency scene is quite different. 
The substantive differences in domestic insolvency laws have precluded the 
development of a uniform approach to multinational default: 
“[t]he ensuing diversity of [insolvency laws] has been unusually 
intense, even by the standards of private international law, with 
the result that the quest for unifying principles has so far proved to 
be elusive.”4 
As a matter of fact, if universalism has been advocated as the ideal solution to the 
issue of cross-border insolvencies, it is now also accepted that it is an unreasonable 
objective in the foreseeable future. Recent international developments, such as 
the European Insolvency Regulation5 in particular, show that it has largely been 
discarded and replaced by a more reasonable, grounded approach, trying to achieve 
solutions which, although more modest than the initial goal of universalism, are 
also more achievable in the present circumstances. 
2 The Theoretical Debate
The debate on universalism versus territorialism has been, in the end, quite heated 
in the United States.6 If we look at the different approaches proposed by scholars, 
they all come from the United States: Professor Westbrook – from the University of 
Texas at Austin - is the main proponent of universalism, Professor LoPucki – from 
UCLA - the main advocate for a territorialist system, Professor Rasmussen – from 
the university of Southern California - proposed a system based on a contractual 
4 I. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (1999, Clarendon Press, Oxford), p.10.
5 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 (OJ 2000 L160/1) (hereafter referred to as the “EIR”).
6 See e.g. L.A. Bebchuk & A.T. Guzman, “An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies” (1999) 42 
Journal of Law & Economic s 775; A.T. Guzman, “International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism” (2000) 
98 Michigan Law Review 2177; L. LoPucki, “Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist 
Approach” (1999) 84 Cornell Law Review 696; L. LoPucki, “The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in 
International Bankruptcy” (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 2216; J.A.E. Pottow, “Procedural Incrementalism: A 
Model for International Bankruptcy” (2005) 45 Virginia Journal of International Law 935; J.A.E. Pottow, “Greed 
and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Problems of and Proposed Solutions to ‘Local Interests’” (2006) 
104 Michigan Law Review 1899; R.K. Rasmussen, “A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies” (1997) 
19 Michigan Journal of International Law 1; R. K. Rasmussen, “Resolving Transnational Insolvencies through 
Private Ordering” (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 2252; J.L. Westbrook, “A Global Solution to Multinational 
Defaults” (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 2276; J.L. Westbrook, “International Judicial Negotiation” (2003) 
38 Texas International Law Journal 567; J.L. Westbrook, “Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 
15, The ALI Principles, and the EU Insolvency Regulation” (2002) 76 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 696.
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approach to cross-border insolvencies and Professor Janger – from Brooklyn 
Law School - envisioned a regime of procedural universalism. Other American 
authors have also put forward ideas such as the use of protocols and the concept 
of procedural consolidation of insolvency proceedings. However, in the EU, the 
debate has been quieter and the embrace of one side or another more restrained.7
2.1 Universalism
Universalism in its purest form promotes an idealistic world in which each legal 
system and their courts are compelled to enforce the orders of the court which 
manages the case. That is why 
“most proponents of universalism do not advocate the pure form 
of the model, because of the practical recognition of the enduring 
differences among political and economic systems, legal regimes, and 
court systems…”8
As a result, pure universalism is a model confined to the theoretical realm, since it 
would require States to surrender their sovereignty, agreeing ex ante that only one 
jurisdiction can handle the insolvency proceeding and all other domestic courts 
would merely assist in the collection of assets. That is why the more usual form of 
universalism advocated 
“refers to a […] system where a single court, that of the debtor’s 
home country has jurisdiction over a debtor’s assets, wherever 
located in the world, and distributes them in according with the law 
of that country.”9
7 European academics who have written on the topic include: G. McCormack, see “Universalism in Insolvency 
Proceedings and the Common Law” (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 325; “Jurisdictional Competition 
and Forum Shopping in Insolvency Proceedings” (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 169; “Reforming the 
European Insolvency Regulation: A Legal and Policy Perspective” (2014) 10 Journal of Private International 
Law 41; P. Omar, see “The Landscape of International Insolvency Law” (2002) 11 International Insolvency 
Review 173; “New Initiatives on cross-border insolvency in Europe” (2000) 5 Insolvency Lawyer 211; “The 
New European Legal Order in Insolvency: Fundamental Legal Bases and Harmonisation Initiatives” (2004) 17 
Insolvency Intelligence 17; “The European Insolvency Regulation 2000: A Paradigm of International Insolvency 
Cooperation” (2003) 15 Bond Law Review 214; B. Wessels, see “Contracting Out of Secondary Insolvency 
Proceedings: The Main Liquidator’s Undertaking in the Meaning of Article 18 in the Proposal to Amend the EU 
Insolvency Regulation” (2015) 9 Brooklyn Journal of Corporate Finance and Commercial Law 236; “Amending 
the EU Insolvency Regulation: Shaken or Stirred?” in R. Parry (ed.), The Reform of International Insolvency 
Rules at European and National Level (Nottingham: INSOL Europe, 2011) 125; “The Changing Landscape of 
Cross-Border Insolvency Law in Europe” (2007), available at http://www.juridicainternational.eu/the-changing-
landscape-of-cross-border-insolvency-law-in-europe. 
8 E. Adams and J. Fincke, “Coordinating Cross-Border Bankruptcy: How Territorialism Saves Universalism” 
(2008) 15 Columbia Journal of European Law 43-88, p. 48. See also J.L. Westbrook, “Universal Priorities” (1998) 
33 Texas International Law Journal 27-46, p. 28.
9 E. Adams and J. Fincke, ibid., p. 48.
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Professor Jay Westbrook is the most eloquent proponent of a universalist model 
for cross-border insolvency, which he described as “the administration of 
multinational insolvencies by a leading court applying a single bankruptcy law.”10 
In a nutshell, the 
“case for universalism relies on efficiency grounds: clear rules 
decrease lending costs and do not skew investment choices, and a 
single forum provides a number of administrative savings.”11
2.2 Territorialism
The idea that universalism was the best approach to cross-border insolvency law 
was hardly contested until Professor LoPucki did so in his March 1999 article in 
the Cornell Law Review. He advocated that territorialism was actually the best 
approach to solve cross-border insolvency issues. According to LoPucki, assets 
located in different countries should be administered by local courts, for the benefit 
of local creditors. This is based on the idea that local creditors will not receive 
their fair shares of the assets in a foreign insolvency and as a result, a local court 
must provide for them and distribute the assets within the jurisdiction in which 
they are situated.12
LoPucki claims that the advantages of such a system are: 
(1) it offers greater ex ante predictability for lenders and investors since they 
would only need to know the countries in which their debtor has assets and 
the distributional priorities in these countries
(2) the costs of proceedings are not high since courts would deal with assets 
located in their jurisdiction only
(3) it allows creditors to litigate in a closer and more convenient forum. 
Universalism and territorialism are not the only two approaches proposed by 
academics to solve the issues arising from cross-border insolvency cases. They 
are merely the two ends of the theoretical spectrum.
10 J.L. Westbrook, “A Global Solution to Multinational Default” (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 2276-2328, p. 
2277.
11 R.K. Rasmussen, “A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies” (1997) 19 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 1-36, p. 27.
12 L. Perkins, “A Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-Border Corporate Insolvencies” (2000) 32 New York 
University Journal of International Law & Politics 787-828, p. 813. See L.M. LoPucki, “Cooperation in 
International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach” (1999) 84 Cornell Law Review 696-762.
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2.3 Corporate Charter Contractualism
In 1997, Professor Rasmussen put forward a new approach to cross-border 
insolvency issues, which was quite a shift compared to the growing movement 
favouring universalism. Basically, he stated that companies should be given the 
right to decide which insolvency system should apply to its potential insolvency. 
He is of the view that companies are better positioned than governments to select 
the insolvency laws that will maximise firm value. The claimed advantages of this 
contract approach is that it focuses on efficiency, which in turn results in higher 
likelihood of success for rescues, decreased strategic removal of assets and an 
overall race to the top. 
2.4 Procedural Universalism
Professor Edward Janger put forward another approach to cross-border insolvency, 
based on the idea that the uniform lawmaking process should: 
• limit its aspiration to seeking procedural and transactional efficiencies; 
• promote legislation based only on broad-based consensus; and 
• shy away from legal questions with important distributional consequences.13
He seeks a middle ground between territorialism and universalism in international 
insolvency cases by placing administration of the case in one main proceeding 
while dividing the debtor’s assets into local pools, each governed by local 
priority rules.
Janger claims that his model will bring several advantages, notably those attached 
to universalism, since the insolvency case would be centralised. This would 
result in a decrease in costs, increased likelihood of success for rescues and a 
maximisation of assets value. It would also reduce forum shopping and make 
international cooperative instruments more attractive for policymakers.14
2.5 Conclusion
The academic debate has generally focused on the respective strengths and 
weaknesses of each system. The analytical framework for evaluating transnational 
insolvency is traditionally analysed in terms of their conformity with the two 
ends of a theoretical spectrum: universalism and territorialism. My point is not 
to determine which approach is best but rather to show, by looking at recent 
13 E.J. Janger, “Predicting When the Uniform Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom” 
(1998) 83 Iowa Law Review 569-632, pp. 630-31.
14 See generally E.J. Janger, “Virtual Territoriality” (2010) 48 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 401-441, p. 432.
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developments such as the European Insolvency Regulation and the current 
European reforms, how complex and unsolved the debate is. To sum up, in the 
1990s, an idealistic concept emerged which sparked a (re)newed theoretical debate 
on cross-border insolvency. It was followed by criticisms in the late 1990s, and 
alternative approaches were proposed up to the mid-2000s. However, since then, 
no new approach has been put forward. 
I am also of the view that more discussion is taking place at the academic level 
than in international practice. Even though the European Insolvency Regulation 
endorses a modified version of universalism, in practice, territorialism remains 
vibrant as a matter of domestic policy in many countries. Whatever convergence 
may be emerging in the academic community, no such international consensus has 
been reached at the legal policymaking level so far. 
3 The Future of the Theoretical Debate in the European Union 
As can be seen from the previous debate, the difficulties caused by cross-border 
insolvency cases and the search for a viable solution are not new, and the best 
approach to effectively handle the insolvency of multinational companies is an 
unresolved problem. Even if it appears that universalism has been deemed to be 
preferable in the academic literature, it is now also internationally accepted that it 
is an unreasonable objective in the foreseeable future. 
Additionally, since the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, cross-border 
insolvency filings have been on the rise, reviving the debate as to the best 
approach to create an efficient international insolvency regime. The recent crisis 
shows that the theoretical debate has largely been discarded and replaced by a 
more reasonable, grounded approach, which has tried to achieve solutions which, 
although characterised as more modest in their scope, are also more attainable 
in the present circumstances. In fact, these developments were necessary and 
address immediate problems. International developments show that international 
institutions have recognised the limits beyond which the sovereign States are not 
willing to go at the present stage. The debate has therefore shifted, especially within 
the European Union, from the traditional universal versus territorialism divide to a 
more feasible approach to cross-border insolvency: pragmatism and cooperation. 
The debate on the divide between universalism and territorialism is not new 
and will likely not be settled anytime soon. Nations are stubborn regarding their 
regulatory sovereignty and policy-makers are cautious. However, different points 
can be made regarding this theoretical debate.
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First, it is worth noting that there is a significant difference in the debate between 
the United States and the EU. Even though nowadays there are many similarities 
between the EU and the US in the field of insolvency law, since companies have 
more and more multinational and cross-continent dimensions, a shift seems to 
have happened: the US theoretical debate on the universalism/territorialism divide 
seems to be more prominent and is still very much alive, whereas the EU seems to 
have a much more pragmatic outlook on how to settle the issues stemming from 
cross-border insolvency cases.15 This could be due to the main difference that 
remains between the EU and the US in terms of insolvency law. In this field, the 
latter is a true federal state, whereas the EU is a sui generis, sometimes qualified 
as a “quasi-federal” supranational entity. In the US, bankruptcy law is federalised, 
whereas in the EU, insolvency law remains a competence of the Member States 
and their domestic courts. 
Additionally, since there is no EU Constitution, like there is in the US, the 
European institutions need to compromise to a larger extent to get Member 
States’ approval. That is why the European institutions have long understood 
the need to look beyond theory to focus on pragmatic solutions to cross-border 
insolvency cases. This is the reason why they decreased the scope of the reform 
instruments and adopted an incrementalist approach, since they considered that 
the most important, at the end of the day, was to promote and reach co-operation 
of Member States and national courts, greatly needed in cross-border insolvency 
cases. Therefore, even though the debate around the universalism/territorialism 
divide has been historically more prominent in the US compared with the EU, 
this can be explained by the constitutional differences between the two entities: 
insolvency law in the EU remains a competence of the Member States and that 
can explain why in the end, the EU institutions have not grasped the debate like 
American academics have. 
This leads to the second point. On this side of the Atlantic, the theoretical debate 
has been much more cautious from the start, as is evidenced by the small amount 
of contribution on the subject. Additionally, recent publications on the topic of 
European/international insolvency law seem to have skipped the debate altogether. 
15 Legal pragmatism is not anti-theoretical and has been considered by some academics as being a theory in itself. 
Perhaps instead of opposing pragmatism to theory, it should be understood as “experience”. See e.g. P.S. Atiyah, 
Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (1987, Sweet & Maxwell, London). See also J.L. Coleman, The Practice 
of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory (2001, OUP, New York); B.Z. Tamanaha, 
Realistic Socio-Legal Theory: Pragmatism and a Social Theory of Law (1997, Clarendon Press, Oxford); R.A. 
Posner, “What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?” (1990) 63 Southern California Law Review 1653; D. Lind, “The 
Mismeasurement of Legal Pragmatism” (2012) 4 Washington University Jurisprudence Review 213; S.D. Smith, 
“The Pursuit of Pragmatism” (1990) 100 The Yale Law Journal 409. 
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Therefore, the point made by many academics, both in the EU and in the US, 
that the theoretical debate regarding universalism and territorialism is ongoing16 
can be contested. The debate started in the 1990s in the US and the majority of 
the contributions happened in that decade. In fact, Professors Westbrook’s and 
LoPucki’s main contributions were published between 1990 and 2003. Other 
American academics, such as Anderson, Adams and Fincke, Guzman, Janger, 
Pottow and Rasmussen, for example, have kept the debate alive for a little bit 
longer. However, since the mid-2000s, the theoretical debate in the US seemed 
to have died slowly, and it is interesting to note that no new major publication on 
the controversy has been issued. Therefore, it appears that the theoretical debate 
regarding universalism and territorialism in cross-border insolvency cases is not 
ongoing anymore, but rather buried, especially in the EU.
Third, as a consequence of this abandonment by academics, especially on this 
side of the Atlantic, it is not surprising that no mention of it is made by the 
European institutions in their efforts to reform the EIR. Indeed, an examination 
of the Recast Regulation,17 of the Restructuring Recommendation,18 and of other 
preparatory documents drafted by the European institutions19 reveal that the 
debate has been pretty much ignored. One of the only mentions made in relation 
to the debate is when the European Commission acknowledged the “difficulty 
to strike a balance between the universality of the debtor’s insolvency and the 
territoriality of proceedings” in its Consultation on the Future of European 
Insolvency Law.20 However, even when the European institutions deal with the 
concepts of universalism and territorialism, they appear not to do so in a purely 
16 J.A.E. Pottow, “Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy” (2005) 45 Virginia Journal 
of International Law 935-1016, p. 937; F. Tung, “Is International Bankruptcy Possible?” (2001) 23 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 31-102, p. 90. 
17 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings (recast), OJ L141/19.
18 European Commission, Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency, 12 March 
2014, C(2014) 1500 final. 
19 See e.g. European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, Report with Recommendations to the Commission 
on Insolvency Proceedings in the Context of EU Company Law (A7-0355/2011) and related resolution of 
the European Parliament of 15 November 2011 (2011/2006(INI)); European Commission, Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on the 
application of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, COM(2012) 
743 final (12 December 2012); European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council ame4nding Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, CON(2012) 744 
final (12 December 2012); European Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying the document Revision of 
Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings (Commission Staff Working Document), SWD(2012) 
416 final; Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets 
Union”, COM(2015) 468(final), 30 September 2015. 
20 European Commission, Consultation on the Future of European Insolvency Law, 30 March – 21 June 2012, at 
p.1, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/files/insolvency_en.pdf (last viewed 5 September 2016).
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theoretical manner but from a pragmatic and realistic standpoint. In the Executive 
Summary accompanying the Revision of the EIR, the European Commission put 
forward two policy options: updating the existing Regulation while maintaining 
the current balance between creditors and debtors; or changing the basic premises 
of the Regulation and requiring some approximation or convergence of national 
insolvency laws and proceedings. The Commission acknowledged that even 
though the latter was potentially more effective than the former in achieving the 
objectives and providing economic and social benefits for the single market, the 
former was also a more proportionate option at this stage of European integration.21 
The Commission has a realistic outlook on the current political circumstances 
across the EU and that explains why the European documents, since the passing 
of the EIR in 2000, reveal some element of frustration with the lack of success in 
achieving any of the two ends of the theoretical spectrum, as well as pragmatic 
acceptance that these theories are theories only: they do not work in practice and 
are not symmetrical to current developments. Indeed, the theoretical debate that 
emerged from the US is grandiose and idealistic but the worldwide focus is now on 
rescue and cooperation and the debate is clearly outdated and counterproductive. 
“The debate on the cross-border insolvency theories essentially reflects issues 
that have been raised in the past.”22 That is why the fact that no mention of the 
various theoretical approaches is made by the European institutions, neither in their 
various preparatory documents, nor in the EIR and its Recast version, does not 
seem to decrease the regulatory quality of such legal agreements. The theoretical 
approaches do not seem essential at this stage to solve issues in cross-border 
insolvency law.
Fourth, it can be acknowledged, however, that the theoretical debate provides an 
additional tool to assess the significance of the European institutions’, in particular 
the Commission’s role in the EU regulatory landscape, and their position towards 
academia. It appears that academia’s influence on this European policy-making 
body is potentially not particularly strong. Academics may not be as prominent 
in shaping the future of EU regulation as one may think. European institutions 
do value legal professionals’ and academics’ point of view but they seem to do 
21 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Executive Summary on the Impact Assessment 
Accompanying the Document Revision of Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, SWD(2012) 
416 final, at 8, 12 and 13. 
22 B.S. Masoud, “Theoretical Aspects of the Cross-Border Insolvency Landscape: Issues 
and Perspectives for Sub-Saharan Africa”, (2010) Submission for the III Prize in 
International Insolvency Studies, available at https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/
theoreticalaspectsofthecrossborderinsolvencylandscapeissuesandperspectivesofsubsaharaafrica.pdf, p. 11 (last 
viewed 5 September 2016). 
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so in very specific settings, such as organised EU conferences, consultations or 
other funded studies. However, the European Commission seems less interested in 
pure theoretical debate such as the universalism and territorialism one, and more 
focused on particular issues arising from practice. 
The best approach to adopt to solve the issues of cross-border insolvencies has been 
a matter of debate among academics for a long time. However, as stated above, it 
has not really been grasped by legal professionals and the European institutions. It 
is undeniable that there are pros and cons to each respective approach. However, 
they are idealistic theories. Even though the world is more and more interconnected, 
political differences remain stark, rendering universalism impossible considering 
the continuous protectionist position of States, and territorialism quite obsolete 
at this advanced stage of globalisation. Universalism and territorialism are quite 
naïve approaches to cross-border insolvency law since these extremes do not 
reflect an adequate picture of the real world. Therefore, they should not be used as 
tools or aims for regulatory decision-making. 
To conclude, the debate surrounding the universalism and territorialism divide is 
not new and will likely not be settled anytime soon. It is however, a tired debate, 
which fails to tackle the real current issues of insolvency cases, i.e. problems 
due to the lack of cooperation among courts and insolvency professionals, the 
lack of focus on rescue proceedings or the lack of efficient mechanisms dealing 
with groups of companies. The current status quo would be unsustainable over 
a very long period of time and the need for harmonisation in the field is certain. 
However, “[i]t seems unrealistic to think that universalism will be accepted absent 
roughly similar laws.”23 This is why EU policy-makers are remedying the situation 
by basing the reform of the EIR on an incrementalist approach and focusing on 
procedural harmonisation of European cross-border insolvency law. The persistent 
disinterest with cross-border theories, notably from the European institutions, 
should be perceived as a welcome invitation to close the old theoretical debate 
and focus on new theories and realistic developments. 
4 Conclusion
It was not my purpose in this article either to pick a side, or to elaborate a new 
approach to cross-border insolvency cases, but rather to point out the state of the 
debate. The argument presented here is that even though the theoretical debate has 
been ongoing for decades now, it has not really moved forward for years. No fresh 
23 J.L. Westbrook, “Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum” (1991) 
65 American Bankruptcy Journal 457-490, at 485.
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approach or arguments have been put forward for a long time and the theoretical 
debate has been unable to generate international consensus. That could explain 
the caution of European academics and more importantly, the lack of engagement 
with the debate by the European institutions, who have only acknowledged that 
the Regulation follows modified universalism, but who have not mentioned the 
theoretical divide. The conclusion reached may be that the academic debate 
described the characteristics of the various regimes but did not offer any practical 
solution for settling the issues stemming from cross-border cases. 
Maybe, it is the European compromising approach, more anchored in pragmatism 
than principle, which should be taken as a sign of the end of the debate. Looking at 
it from an optimistic perspective, we should gladly welcome this move from the old 
fashioned debate and embrace pragmatism, which represents “a triumph of the ‘art of 
the possible’ in the delicate field of international treaty negotiation…”24 Therefore, 
the efforts made notably by the EU with the Restructuring Recommendation and 
the Recast EIR should not be reprimanded for their modest contribution, but on 
the contrary, should be applauded for abandoning a theoretical position which 
was not moving forward and for taking an extra step, a practical step. It is time to 
look at the European Insolvency Regulation and other initiatives for what they are: 
attempts – however cautious – at making the cross-border insolvency scene better, 
instead of always measuring them against the yardstick of universalism, which has 
long been established as unrealisable in the current stage of European integration. 
The development of European insolvency law is an ongoing process. Looking 
at the history of the EU, we can see that crises are often followed by increased 
integration. However, this is not always the case. In addition, the 2008 global 
economic and financial crisis will not lead to any positive aftermath without some 
political resolve. The EU is at a crossroads: it can either follow the path of the 
1980s, when following the post-war challenges, the European institutions and 
national politicians came up with numerous successful policy innovations, such as 
the creation of the single market or the progresses made in the field of consumer 
law; it could also follow the path of political and economic stagnation, such as the 
empty chair crisis which impeded reforms for a long time in the 1960s and the 
energy crisis in the 1970s. The European institutions seem to hope that modest 
reforms in insolvency law will appease sovereign mistrust, but they could also 
eventually stall.
24 I. Fletcher, “European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: Choice-of-Law Provisions”, (1998) 33 Texas 
International Law Journal 119-140, p. 124.
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Chapter 11
Back to Basics – The Role of the Core 
Principles of Law in the Clarification 
and Harmonisation of Preventive 
Restructuring Frameworks
Catarina Serra
1 Foreword
It is submitted that, in the field of preventive restructuring frameworks, a certain 
degree of harmonisation or convergence is recommendable, given the fact that 
legal systems are used by increasingly global entities and the differences cause 
disincentives for business and cross-border investments.1
One possible way to achieve this harmonisation / convergence would be the design 
of a principle-based framework, with rules supported by the core principles of Law 
which are common to European jurisdictions.2
A framework of this kind would imply putting in place a clear system of duties 
and liability likely to induce subjects to act in accordance with the core principles 
of law and developing expedients aimed at removing the obstacles to restructuring 
that may be considered unjustified in light of the core principles of law, and, 
conversely, admitting to the contrary in the remaining cases. A principle-based 
framework could have the further use of serving to clarify the doubts and fill the 
gaps of domestic frameworks. 
1 For the (economic) reasons that justify uniformity in pre-insolvency frameworks see, among others, M. C. Carcea 
/ D. Ciriaci / C. C. Caballero / D. Lorenzani / P. Pontuch, “The Economic Impact of Rescue and Recovery 
Frameworks”, (2015) European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European 
Commission Discussion Paper 004, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/eedp/
dp004_en.htm (last viewed 13 October 2016). 
2 The text should reflect the common elements “which exist, to a surprising degree, in European systems”. See W. 
W. McBryde, “The Principles of European Insolvency Law: An Exercise in Drafting”, (2004) 8 Edinburgh Law 
Review, p. 111.
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2 The Contractually-Based Instruments as an Ancillary Solution to Distress: 
a Brief Reference to the Roman cessio bonorum to Illustrate it
In ancient times, when a sole trader was insolvent or on the verge of insolvency he 
gathered all his creditors (around a solid oak table, I like to picture it) in order to 
reach an understanding. The trader could either try a plain moratorium or a general 
reduction of his liabilities or, if this proposal was not accepted, the negotiation of a 
contract whereby he disposed of his assets in favour of the creditors. The contract 
implied the voluntary transfer of all of the debtor’s property to the creditors in trust, 
so that they would sell the assets and apply the money received to the payment of 
the debts, returning any surplus to the debtor. Until such sale, the debtor remained 
the sole proprietor of the assets and had the possibility to regain possession (if he 
managed to pay his debts through alternative means).
The origins of this contract are easily traced back to Roman Law. The cessio 
bonorum (literally meaning, disposal of the assets) appeared then, as some say, for 
humanitarian reasons3 and, consequently, for social reasons, since it led to a general 
stay in enforcement actions, therefore allowing the debtor to avoid the painful 
effects of an insolvency situation (eventual imprisonment and personal infamy).4
Later on, cessio bonorum was recreated and inspired the Italian and the Portuguese 
legislators to accommodate contracts of the kind in the respective Civil Codes.5 The 
contract calls upon values that seem long dissolved due to the pace of economic 
development, from which stand out dignity, integrity, and honesty.6 The attempt 
to negotiate with the creditors showed that the debtor was honest7 (the “ehrlicher 
3 See M. Leitão, “A cessão de bens aos credores”, (1987, Associação Académica de Lisboa, Lisboa), p. 22.
4 One must keep in mind that, in this period, enforcement of creditors’ rights involved the person of the debtor and 
not yet exclusively his patrimony. Depending on the seriousness of the default and the degree of his guilt, the 
debtor could be subjected to corporal punishments, imprisoned, made slave, expelled from the city of Rome or 
sentenced to death.
5 Regretfully, the contract was never very popular in Portugal, for reasons beyond the direct utility of the instrument 
and strictly concerning the contours of the legal framework.
6 Still, in the majority of European insolvency laws, honesty is valued: discharge is still reserved to deserving 
debtors – to the “honest but unfortunate debtor”. What is more, the Commission Recommendation of 12 March 
2014 on a new approach to business failure and insolvency sets out rules to be applied to honest entrepreneurs. 
The reference to honest debtors maybe traced back to the French Code Civil, where the cessio bonorum was 
exclusive of the “débiteur malheureux et de bonne foi”. See A. Bénabent, “La Question de la Bonne Foi dans les 
Procédures Collectives”, (2003) 57-58 Gazette du Palais, p. 37. It was later embraced by the Anglo-American 
systems. See, for instance, B. Rothschild, “The Illogic of No Limits on Bankruptcy”, (2007) 2 Emory Bankruptcy 
Developments Journal, pp. 483 and 502. 
7 As some recall, the honest tradesman is (should be) the first to seek a remedy for his situation, disclosing his 
difficulties to the creditors so that they may guarantee their rights and, all together, find the least harmful solution. 
See P. S. Macedo, Manual de Direito das Falências, vol. I (1964, Almedina, Coimbra) p. 317.
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Kaufmann” of whom Kant spoke8) or, to be realistic, that the debtor treasured his 
reputation (for its economic value). The acceptance of the contract by the creditors, 
on the other hand, was a sign that they sympathised with the debtor, that they were 
willing to let him have a dignified way out and probably give continuity to the 
business relation. In sum, there was trust (fiducia) and cooperation on both sides, 
which is crucial for the development of all contractual relations and, in particular, 
business relations.9
At this point, it may be asked: how is this related to preventive restructuring 
frameworks? Cessio bonorum seems to work as an alternative to a court-ordered 
asset liquidation and not as a rescue tool.10 The interesting thing is that there are 
references to a similar contract, commonly known as “ABC” (Assignment for 
the Benefit of Creditors), being used in some American states (e.g. Florida) to 
sell the business as a going concern, thus as a means of rescue.11 The instruments 
share, in addition, a couple of features. They have a contractual basis and they rise 
from, and give rise to, certain fiduciary duties between the parties.12 Considering 
the pre-existing relation, both parties (debtor and creditors) must be available to 
negotiate, to cooperate, and to enter a reasonable compromise, one that balances 
the fundamental interests at stake and does not entail the disproportionate sacrifice 
of any party’s interests.
Bearing in mind cessio bonorum, it is possible to say that when it comes to modern 
workouts, namely out-of-court and even hybrid proceedings, nothing was actually 
8 According to Kant, the merchant should act honestly by conviction and not with the intention to withdraw any benefits 
from it: if the merchant does not fool his clients just because he fears he will lose them, his behaviour has no moral 
value for it is driven by an egoistic aim; if instead the merchant acts honestly because he believes he has the duty to 
act honestly, then his behaviour has indeed moral value. See I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Mataphysik der Sitten (1785), 
available at: https://korpora.zim.uni-duisburg-essen.de/kant/aa04/385.html (last viewed 13 October 2016).
9 Although in its origins the contract was available to debtors of any kind, it soon developed into a resource 
exclusive of merchants / tradesmen. See A. Castana, La cessione dei beni ai creditori nelle diverse fattispecie 
(1957, Giuffrè, Milano) at 44.
10 A couple of other features distinguish cessio bonorum from typical rescue tools: cession bonorum is not restricted 
to pre-insolvency situations and, whereas preventive restructuring instruments are usually characterised by the 
persistence of the debtor in possession of his patrimony (DIP) involves the disposal of the debtors’ assets 
11 According to A. Dawson, although the conventional wisdom is that these procedures provide an alternative to 
liquidate the business, debtors are, in fact, using these procedures not to liquidate a business but to sell the business 
as a going concern, free and clear of creditors’ interests in their assets. These going concern sales, particularly 
when they involve insiders of the debtor, are actually more like corporate reorganisation than liquidation. See 
A. Dawson, “Better than Bankruptcy?” (2017) Rutgers Law Review (forthcoming), University of Miami Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 16-24, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2778282 (last viewed 13 October 2016).
12 An additional aspect – one that should not be undermined – is the fact that, pursuant to the contract, the creditors 
(who are parties in the contract and who come afterwards) are prevented from bringing enforcement actions 
against the debtor. Under the Portuguese law (and unlike under Italian law), creditors may still bring enforcement 
actions involving assets other than those that are object of the contract. This represents a significant distancing 
from the historical function assigned to the institute and explains why it is not very appealing to the debtor and 
was never very successful in Portugal. See M. Leitão, above note 3, pp. 97-98.
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invented. Very early on, there was a quest for alternative means to deal with 
the risk of default – alternative to individual enforcement and ultimately to the 
dramatic insolvency proceedings.13 The answer has been a variety of instruments 
built upon consensus, notwithstanding further developed and enhanced by Law. 
For better and for worse, preventive restructuring instruments are bound by “the 
logic and limits”14 of private law.15
3 The Case for Convergence through a Principle-Based Framework
3.1. Putting in Place a System of Duties and Liability Adjusted to Preventive 
Restructuring Instruments
The advantages of contractually-based instruments do not need to be enumerated.16 
The debate is instead centred on their limits. How are these instruments supposed to 
allow debt restructuring and lead to business rescue if each creditor may act freely? 
Despite what some may think, contract law is not all about freedom of contract. 
Every contractual relation entails a multiplicity of duties, most of which derive 
from the core principles of law. The parties are expected not merely to fulfil the 
main obligations arising from the contract but are also expected to adopt the 
appropriate behaviour, that is, the behaviour that, in view of normative values like 
proportionality, equality, fairness and, above all, good faith, are appropriate to the 
case. If they do not act accordingly, there may be a breach of contract, thus giving 
the injured party a cause for legal action – a liability action.
Considering the present sophistication of credit relations, it is legitimate to ask: is 
such an action viable in court? The time of atomistic relations (strictly creditor-to-
debtor) is long gone. Sole traders were definitely replaced by companies, or even 
worse, groups of companies, as a result of wonderful as well as wicked expedients 
13 For obvious reasons, the availability of such means is particularly important when a business is at stake (to avoid 
the loss of value).
14 This is a clear reference to T. H. Jackson and his famous work entitled, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 
(2001, BeardBooks, Washington DC).
15 See C. Serra, “A Contratualização da Insolvência: Hybrid Proceedings e Pre-Packs (A Insolvência entre a Lei e a 
Autonomia Privada)”, in AAVV, II Congresso – Direito das Sociedades em Revista (2012, Coimbra, Almedina), 
pp. 265 ff. 
16 Talking about the “privatization of bankruptcy”, Prof. Eidenmüller takes the view that it “promises flexible, 
tailor-made and fast solutions that come with significantly reduced bankruptcy costs”. See H. Eidenmüller, 
“Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law”, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) – Law Working 
Paper No. 319/2016, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2799863 (last viewed 13 October 2016).
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like legal personality, limited liability and so on, making it rather difficult to 
identify the players, let alone hold them liable.17
On the other hand, legal principles tend to be vague, to lack determination. Are 
principle-based rules likely to be effective?
To tackle these difficulties, the principles have indeed to be translated into 
standards of conduct adapted to the preventing restructuring scenario. In particular, 
the general duty to act in good faith should develop, in what regards the debtor, 
into the duties to disclose and to report all relevant information, to foster the 
participation of the creditors in the negotiations, to cooperate with the creditors in 
the quest for the most suitable solution and to treat the creditors equally throughout 
the process.18 It should develop, in what regards the creditors, into the duties to 
engage in the negotiations, to cooperate with the debtor in the quest for the most 
suitable solution (considering seriously the proposals presented by the debtor and 
voting them conscientiously) and to accept all necessary restrictions to their rights 
as long as they are fair and proportionate (e.g. stay of enforcement actions).19
It is well-acknowledged that, both at international and European level, there is a 
significant number of documents20 corresponding to this paradigm, standing out 
17 See C. Serra, above note 15. Professor Eidenmüller talks about the changing of debt structures and financing 
techniques (bond financing also for SMEs, debt trading, activist investors, credit default swaps, etc. See H. 
Eidenmüller, above note 16. On this topic see also B. Wessels, “Business Rescue in Insolvency Law – 
Setting the Scene” (2014, European Law Institute Projects Conference, Croatia), available at https://www.
europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/General_Assembly/2014/Business_Rescue_in_Insolvency_
Law___Setting_the_Scene.pdf (last viewed 13 October 2016).
18 Prof. Wessels (also) regrets the absence of some of these principles in the Commission Recommendation: 
 “(…) there is no clear principle that the debtor should not take any action which might adversely affect the 
prospective return to relevant creditors (either collectively or individually) as compared to a certain reference 
date or that the debtor should provide, and a principle that would allow relevant creditors and/or their professional 
advisers reasonable and timely access to all relevant information relating to its assets, liabilities, business and 
prospects, in order to enable proper evaluation to be made of its financial position and any proposals to be made 
to relevant creditors”. 
 See B. Wessels, above note 17.
19 On the principle of good faith and the duties that arise from it, in particular the duty to renegotiate see A. M. 
Cordeiro, “O Princípio da Boa-Fé e o Dever de Renegociação em Contextos de ‘Situação Económica Difícil’”, 
in C. Serra (ed), II Congresso de Direito da Insolvência (2014, Almedina, Coimbra), p. 11 ff.
20 Standing out from the initiatives undertaken by international organisations, although in the broader field of 
insolvency, there is the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, forwarded in 1997 by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), a soft law instrument which provides for a worldly 
standard for cooperation in cross-border insolvency.
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the Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor Workouts,21 
issued early on (in 2000), by INSOL International.22
From a strictly scientific perspective, if no other, the Statement of Principles (the 
INSOL Principles) is a remarkable contribution to the increase of transparency 
and accountability in restructuring workouts. It lays down eight principles 
that, together, consubstantiate the desirable behavior on the part of debtor and 
creditors.23 Notwithstanding the soft law nature of this document, the fact is that 
the subjects generally act accordingly.
There may be a variety of explanations.
Firstly, any standards that are evidently based in principles form what might be 
considered a self-enforcing system. Principles are largely intuitive, which makes 
principle-based standards easy to understand, thus more likely to be accepted by 
the general public.
Then, there is the issue of reputation. The entities / persons normally involved in 
business restructuring are eager to have opportunities to profit. Any deviation to 
the standard conduct / good practice is regarded as poor behaviour. The “dissident” 
will most likely be excluded from future projects by the others. This is to say 
that some instruments acquire normative force, not as a consequence of classic 
21 The Statement of Principles was allegedly modelled after the London Approach. The London Approach is a set 
of non-binding principles that worked as guidelines for out-of-court restructurings. They were initially conceived 
by the Bank of England in the 70’s, amended in the 90’s and used mainly in the Easter Asian countries (Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, South Chorea and Hong Kong, the Filipines, Singapore and Taiwan), where, during the 
“Asian crisis” (1997), there were no rules applying to insolvency.
22 Strictly at the European level, again on the broader area of insolvency, there are important documents such as 
the Principles of European Insolvency Law, issued, in 2003, by the International Working Group on European 
Insolvency Law, with B. Wessels as the contributing editor. The International Working Group on European 
Insolvency Law spelled out fourteen principles which deal with the fourteen following topics: insolvency 
proceeding; institutions and participants; effects of the opening of the proceeding, management of the assets; 
obligations incurred by, and fees of, the administrator; treatment of contracts; position of employees; reversal 
of juridical acts; security rights and set-off; submission and admission of insolvency claims; reorganization; 
liquidation; closure of the proceeding; and debtor in possession. Still worth mentioning are two main studies 
recently conducted: the INSOL Europe Study on a new approach to business failure and insolvency – Comparative 
legal analysis of the Member States’ relevant provisions and practices, issued in 2014, and the Study on a new 
approach to business failure and insolvency – Comparative legal analysis of the Member States’ relevant 
provisions and practices, issued in 2016, and written, among others, by Gerry McCormack and Andrew Keay. 
These and other documents surely represent extremely valuable contributions to the consolidation of standards 
and practices in the field of insolvency Law. If nothing else, they have the merit of clearing the way.
23 Broadly speaking, the principles concern the creditors’ duty to cooperate with the debtor (first principle), the 
creditors’ duty to refrain from enforcement actions (second principle), the debtors’ duty to refrain from actions 
that might affect return to creditors (third principle), the creditors’ duty to act coordinately (fourth principle), 
the debtor’s duty to disclose and report to creditors (fifth principle), the duty to act in accordance with the law 
(sixth principle), the creditors’ duty to treat, in principle, all information disclosed by the debtor as confidential 
(seventh principle) and, finally, the recommendation that funding during negotiations be given priority status 
(eight principle).
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sanctions, but, using the words of Professors Armour and Deakin, as a result of 
“‘mutual aid’ games in which co-operation is enforced by the threat of exclusion 
from future business”.24
In any case, and in order to avoid any doubts as to the binding effect of the duties, 
any framework on preventive restructuring should contain strong liability rules. 
3.2 Clarifying the Scope of Preventive Restructuring Instruments
A two-folded system of duties and liability would certainly reduce the risks of poor 
behaviour but would not exclude them entirely. It would still be possible for one 
or more creditors to oppose the restructuring plan and, given their position, put the 
restructuring at risk.
The usual solution (i.e., the solution set out by the majority of Member States 
providing norms on these matters) has been the creation of a specific instrument 
allowing the restructuring plan to be sanctioned by the court and, thereby, to 
become binding on all subjects.
Cram down, in itself, appears as a reasonable solution. It is presumed that 
the restructuring plan accepted by the majority – because it was accepted by 
the majority – is in the best interests of every subject. It is arguably not fair / 
proportionate to allow a single creditor / a single group of creditors to obstruct the 
whole plan.
This presumption is, however, not unconditionally valid, leaving room for 
minority protection.
If we take the German or the Portuguese laws roughly as models, the court 
sanctioning of the restructuring plan should be refused at the request of any 
interested party, at least, in two situations: when he / she shows to the satisfaction 
of the court that he / she is likely to be placed at a disadvantage by the restructuring 
plan compared with his situation without it25 and when he / she shows to the 
satisfaction of the court that, under the plan, another creditor is likely to receive 
what might be considered excessive payment.26
24 See J. Armour and S. Deakin, “Norms in Private Insolvency: The ‘London Approach’ to the Resolution of 
Financial Distress” (2001) 21 Journal of Corporate Law Studies, p. 22.
25 See Section 251 (1) of the German Insolvency Act and Article 216, 1, a), of the Portuguese Insolvency Act.
26 See Article 216, 1, b), of the Portuguese Insolvency Act.
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In the end, the principles that justify the presumption that the plan accepted by the 
majority is in the best interests of every subject are the principles that set out the 
presumption’s limits.
In the situations above mentioned, but others are conceivable, the restructuring 
plan should be rejected because there would be a lack of conformity with the 
principle of proportionality and with the principle of equality or, to use Chapter 
11’s terminology, the restructuring plan would not be “fair and equitable”. In the 
first situation, the plan would lead to an undesirably onerous burden. In the second, 
it would lead to a payment without reasonable justification. 
At this point, several questions arise. Which should be the majority required for 
the approval of the plan? Would simple majority be sufficient or should there be 
additional requirements? Should creditors be divided into different voting groups 
in order to allow cross-class cram down?27 And what about the facts that hinder 
the sanctioning of the plan? If the concepts of “undesirably onerous burden” and 
“payment without reasonable justification”, and concepts of the kind, deserve to 
be given any relevance, they should be stated and developed. In short, a principle-
based framework should determine the conditions under which a restructuring 
plan might be imposed upon the subjects despite their lack of consent and the 
conditions under which the court should abstain from sanctioning. Concepts like 
fair, equitable, reasonable, proportional, justified (and, of course, their antonyms) 
would provide the necessary support.
27 Cross-class cram down consists of a majority of classes binding the rest. This corresponds to the solution adopted 
in Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. Under Section 1129(a)(8), the acceptance of the plan by each class is 
required in order for the plan to be confirmed under Section 1129(a). However, Section 1129(b)(1) provides that a 
plan that satisfies all of the other applicable provisions of Section 1129(a) may be confirmed despite the rejection 
of the plan by a class or classes. In order for such a plan to be confirmed under Section 1129(b), the plan must meet 
two criteria: The plan (1) must not unfairly discriminate and (2) must be fair and equitable. These tests only apply to 
a class as a whole and not to individual creditors. Thus, the court need not consider whether the plan discriminates 
unfairly against a class or is not fair and equitable with respect to a class if such class accepts the plan, even if an 
individual creditor or interest holder within the class rejects the plan. A plan unfairly discriminates against a class 
if another class of equal rank in priority will receive greater value under the plan than the non-accepting class 
without reasonable justification. The requirement that a plan be “fair and equitable” involves two concepts: (1) the 
absolute priority rule and (2) no payment in excess of the allowed claim. The absolute priority rule provides that 
a non-accepting class of creditors or interest holders cannot be compelled to accept less than full compensation 
while a more junior creditor or equity holder receives anything or retains its interest in the debtor under the plan. 
This rule is intended to ensure that the priority rules set forth in Section 507 are followed. The second concept (no 
payment in excess) was included in the requirement of fair and equitable by bankruptcy courts. It comes down to 
a prohibition against paying the holders in a senior class more than the full value of their claims or interests while 
cramming the plan down on a more junior class. A similar solution is accommodated in the German Insolvency 
Act (see Section 244 and, under the title “Prohibition to Obstruct”, Section 245).
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3.3 Serving as Guidelines to Remedy the Shortcomings of National Frameworks
A principle-based approach would have still one further use: to serve as guidance, 
helping to clarify the doubts and fill the loopholes of national frameworks. This 
can be illustrated through the example of existing principle-based documents: the 
INSOL Principles (already mentioned) and the Portuguese Guiding Principles of 
Out-of-Court Restructuring,28 allegedly designed after the former.29
One of the many topics concerning the preventive restructuring framework in 
Portugal, as elsewhere, is the regime of new financing. It is, for instance, debated 
whether pre-existing creditors should be given a pre-emptive right to provide new 
financing. The question is pertinent (whomever provides new finance is usually 
given a priority right and additional protection over the other creditors). Yet, the 
law is absolutely silent in this regard.
Based on the INSOL Principles or the Portuguese Guiding Principles, it is possible 
to come up with an answer. According to the second, the third and the sixth INSOL 
Principles, all relevant creditors are entitled to expect that their position relative 
to other creditors and each other will not be prejudiced.30 The sixth and the ninth 
Guiding Principles state basically the same. In other words, both point to the 
conclusion that such a pre-emptive right should be admitted. Pre-existing creditors 
may, therefore, encounter support in these principles to impose such a right.
4 The Assessment of the Commission Recommendation of 12 March 2014 in 
Light of a Principle-Based Approach
One final reference is due to the Commission Recommendation on a New 
Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency of 12 March 2014. To some extent, 
28 The document took the form of a Resolution of the Council of Ministers. Under the Portuguese constitutional 
system, resolutions are deprived of normative force. Yet, as there are legal norms referring to them, the Guiding 
Principles are enforceable in some circumstances, that is, in the context of the Portuguese out-of-court and 
hybrid proceedings.
29 The Portuguese Guiding Principles develop the duty to cooperate, the duties to disclose and to report and the 
duties of loyalty. See N. M. P. Oliveira, “Entre o Código da Insolvência e ‘Princípios Orientadores – Um Dever 
de Renegociação”, (2012) II / III Revista da Ordem dos Advogados, pp. 677 ff., and “Responsabilidade pela Perda 
de uma Chance de Revitalização?”, in C. Serra (ed), II Congresso de Direito da Insolvência (2014, Almedina, 
Coimbra), p. 153 ff.
30 According, furthermore, to the Commentary to the Eighth Principle, it could be argued that “[t]he provision of 
New Money (…) can impact upon the position of relevant creditors. This is because its priority treatment may 
affect the prospects of other non-prioritised debt being repaid. Ideally, where appropriate, all relevant creditors 
participating in the process should be given the opportunity to participate in the provision of, and should accept the 
risks associated with, the provision of New Money on a proportionate basis (i.e., proportionally to the perceived 
exposures which each of them has to the debtor as at the Standstill Commencement Date)”.
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the Recommendation31 seems to correspond to the model above described, a 
principle-based document or a document guided by principles. It admittedly aims 
at establishing a common framework and, unlike other documents, has normative 
– a sort of normative – value.32 In spite of this, it was not implemented, not even 
partially, in all member States.33 As duly noticed by Professor Madaus, “none of 
the Member States fully complies with the Recommendation”.
The resistance it encountered should not be surprising, especially on the part of 
large (self-confident) Member States like France, Italy, Germany and the United 
Kingdom.34 The official explanation, for example in Germany, is that the German 
Insolvency Act is working well as it is.35 In the German government’s view, it is 
satisfactory to have a pre-insolvency solution within the insolvency proceedings.36 
Coming to think of it, why should a stand-alone pre-insolvency framework be 
mandatory? It is generally believed that the insolvency order compromises the 
31 Unlike other kind of documents (regulations and directives), recommendations from the Commission are not 
binding on member States. Still, in this particular case, the Commission Recommendation invited member States 
to enact appropriate measures within one year (by March 2015) and announced that the Commission would assess 
the situation eighteen months after adoption of the Recommendation (by September 2015), based on the reports 
from member States. 
32 According to M. Thierhoff and R. Müller, when the Commission started the project in 2013, its original intention 
was to introduce a directive and make it compulsory for member States to implement the rules within a certain 
timeframe. The decision to refrain from a directive and to use instead a recommendation was driven by the view 
that some member States were in the process of implementing reforms to their insolvency regimes and that a 
directive could delay the national reforms. See M. Thierhoff and R. Müller, “A New Approach to Business Failure 
and Restructuring: Pre-Insolvency Restructuring vs. Early Filing in Germany”, Practical Law Restructuring and 
Insolvency Multi-Jurisdictional Guide 2014/15, available at www.http://uk.practicallaw.com/1-573-5547 (last 
viewed 13 October 2016).
33 In September 2015, the Directorate-General Justice & Consumers of the European Commission issued, 
as announced, a report disclosing the results of the evaluation of the implementation of the Commission 
Recommendation. The report shows that only partial implementation has taken place. Some member States have 
launched reforms and tried to accommodate the requirements set out whilst in some other the Recommendation 
was unable to trigger any changes to the current insolvency laws.
34 In the United Kingdom several have manifested against the Commission Recommendation. The scheme of 
arrangement falls short on a number of requirements (for instance, it does not trigger a stay on individual creditor 
enforcement action) but the general feeling is that the instrument should remain unchanged. See A. Wilkinson, K. 
Ewer, and K. Stephenson, “What’s next for insolvency law reform in Europe: a pan-European insolvency law?”, 
(2015) Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, p. 435 ff., available at www. http://
eurorestructuring.weil.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Whats-next-for-insolvency-law-reform-in-Europe-
JIBFL-Aug-2015.pdf (last viewed 13 October 2016). In contrast, recent reforms carried out in Spain ensure the 
compatibility of Spanish law with the Recommendation. See J. P. Ezquerra, “El Nuevo Paradigma Concursal 
Europeo y su Incorporación al Derecho Español”, in Estudios Sobre el Futuro Código Mercantil: Libro Homenaje 
al Profesor Rafael Illescas Ortiz. (2015, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Getafe) p. 253 ff., available at www.
http://hdl.handle.net/10016/21082 (last viewed 13 October 2016).
35 Some argue that “the [German] Protective Shield Proceeding has managed to escape the insolvency stigma and, 
despite being a proper insolvency process, is viewed by the larger public and even the media as an informal 
restructuring process” See M. Thierhoff and R. Müller, above note 32.
36 The insolvency proceedings provide an instrument for early restructuring (Protective Shield Proceeding). See M. 
Thierhoff and R. Müller, above note 32.
197
chances of a successful restructuring but we may have to admit it might not always 
be the case.37
First of all, although it is often said that the Commission Recommendation sets 
out common principles38 (see, for example, Professor van Zwieten’s brilliant 
analysis39), what it sets out is, in reality, a variety of standards or prescriptions, 
some of which with a considerable degree of detail.40
In spite of this, the Commission Recommendation may be considered an inspiring 
first step towards a minimum harmonisation or convergence.41
37 Under the (more generous) Portuguese Law, not only one but two stand-alone pre-insolvency proceedings are 
legally provided. Following the classification forwarded by Prof. Madaus, one is modelled after the English scheme 
of arrangement (but without the classes of creditors) and the other is modelled after the “expedited (pre-voted) 
insolvency” (but without the insolvency order). The latter was recommended by UNCITRAL in the Legislative 
Guide on Insolvency Law. See S. Madaus, “The EU Recommendation on Business Rescue – Only Another 
Statement or a Cause for Legislative Action Across Europe?”, (2014) 27(6) Insolvency Intelligence, p. 81 ff.
38 Not by chance the German Minister of Justice argued that the Commission Recommendation contained too many 
details. See M. Thierhoff and R. Müller, above note 32.
39 According to K. van Zwieten there are six core principles emphasised in the Commission’s recommendations: 
early recourse; minimised court involvement; debtor-in-possession; court-ordered stay; ability to bind dissenting 
creditors to a restructuring plan; and protection for new finance. See K. van Zwieten, “Restructuring Law; 
Recommendations from the European Commission”, (2015) Law in transition online (EBDR publication), p. 
1 ff., available at www.http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/law/lit114e.pdf (last viewed 13 October 
2016). It should be said that van Zwieten’s approach is illuminating, achieving the reduction of the Commission 
Recommendation – the multiplicity of recommendations thereby presented – to its essentials. In any case, it is 
plain to see, the six elements thereby encountered correspond to core rules rather than legal principles.
40 The distinction between “standards” and “rules” is usually considered analogous to the distinction between 
“principles” and “rules”, which is more common among European scholars. On this analogy see, for example, 
D. Kaplow, “Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis”, (1992) 42 Duke Law Journal, p. 557 ff., and V. 
Fon / F. Parisi, “On the Optimal Specificity of Legal Rules”, (2007) 3(2) Journal of Institutional Economics, 
p. 147 ff. In this case, however, the term “standards” is used to designate something in between principles and 
rules, based on the conviction that the recommendations laid down in the Commission Recommendation do have 
a higher degree of specificity when compared to principles. This does not mean that the standards laid down in 
the Recommendation are not based on principles. As a matter of fact, it is not difficult to unveil the principles 
underlying some of the standards. Just for one example, according to recommendation 13, the duration of the stay 
should strike a fair balance between the interests of the debtor and of creditors, and in particular secured creditors. 
It is fairly clear that such as standard calls upon the principles of fairness, proportionality and equality.
41 “Hence, a case can be made for ‘minimum harmonization’ with respect to jurisdictions’ provisions of pre-
insolvency restructuring regimes. […] By and large, the substantive insolvency regimes of the Member States 
would be left intact, potentially reducing the political resistance that is to be expected”. See H. Eidenmüller, 
above note 16. In this respect, some talk about the “modesty” of the initiative. See, among others, B. Wessels, 
above note 17, and S. Madaus, above note 37. See also H. Eidenmüller and K. van Zwieten, “Restructuring 
the European Business Enterprise: The EU Commission Recommendation on a New Approach to Business 
Failure and Insolvency”, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) – Law Working Paper No. 301/2015; 
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 52/2015, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2662213 (last viewed 
13 October 2016). Quite surprisingly, the last pair of authors criticise the scope of the harmonisation proposal of 
the Recommendation, arguing that “sketchy minimum harmonisation of restructuring rules leaves huge potential 
for residual diversity in Member States’ restructuring laws”. According to them, “regulatory competition is not 
a sensible regulatory alternative in this area”. Yet, in a more recent article, Professor Eidenmüller not only 
emphasises the benefits of regulatory competition in the field of corporate insolvency Law but also seems to take 
the view that harmonisation with respect to pre-insolvency frameworks is best kept to a minimum, at the risk 
of a “stifling effect on regulatory competition between the Member States and on the benefits that could bring 
(‘laboratory for the best solutions’)”. See H. Eidenmüller, above note 16.
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Certainly, the underlying principles would benefit from being more explicit and 
taken a few steps further (extended and deepened). The principles could easily 
support a wider range of rules: on the impact of the stay on individual enforcement 
actions; the contents of the restructuring plan; the extent to which shareholders 
could be bound by the restructuring plan; the criterion for the composition of 
creditors and shareholders in classes; the conditions under which the restructuring 
plan could be approved and sanctioned; and the treatment of new finance, just to 
name some.
In short, a principle-based framework could or should have more rules and rules 
more clearly based on the existing common principles of law. Still remaining an 
“opened” framework, that is, allowing the determination of the law’s content and 
substance ex post, it would be more likely to generate consensus.42
It is quite obvious that providing a framework guided by principles may prove 
to be an extremely challenging task. Handling principles (setting them out and 
developing them for the purpose of drafting rules) is, to adopt and adapt Professor 
McBryde’s wording,43 a real “exercise in drafting”.44 Nevertheless, it should 
be feasible. 
As to the effect of future initiatives (hard law or soft law), there are good arguments 
on both sides. Against diversity, it could be argued that, as long as it persists, 
debtors “in different Member States have different opportunities to access efficient 
restructuring proceedings”.45
It should be clear, once and for all, that efficiency is not a self-sufficient concept. 
Its meaning depends, among other factors, invariably on the policy objectives set 
down.46 And, as Professor Paulus rightly pointed out, not all insolvency laws are 
premised on the same policy objectives.47 What might be considered efficient in 
a legal system that aims to achieve the best possible satisfaction of the creditors 
42 From a law and economics’ perspective, the degree of specificity of rules implies variable costs. Standards are, 
in principle, less costly for the legislator because, unlike rules, they are given a specific content only afterwards. 
See V. Fon and F. Parisi, above note 40.
43 See W. W. McBryde, above note 2.
44 The rule to just keep it simple could prove to be useful. See W. W. McBryde, above note 2, p. 114.
45 See H. Eidenmüller / K. van Zwieten, above note 41.
46 “A system is shaped not only by the rationality itself, but also by the particular economic framework which 
is composed of historical, cultural, political and legal systems. So, the efficiency of the system is relative”. 
See X. Zheng, “Could the Different Countries’ Corporate Governance Regimes be Harmonised?”, (2009) 3(2) 
Management Science and Engineering, p. 32.
47 See C. Paulus, “Group Insolvencies – Some Thoughts About New Approaches” (2007) 42(3) Texas International 
Law Journal, p. 821.
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might not work well nor be the most efficient solution in a system primarily 
focused on giving the debtor a fresh start or on fostering entrepreneurship.48
In view of all this, I would say that until the most efficient restructuring framework 
is found, the most “efficient” for all member States, it is recommendable that some 
space be left to member States, so that they may search for the solution that most 
suits them.49
48 In the words of Prof. Eidenmüller, “[i]f anything, the absence of empirical evidence for dysfunctional regulatory 
diversity cautions against too much zeal in pursuing harmonization projects in the field of corporate insolvency 
law. Regulatory competition with respect to corporate insolvency law systems has certain benefits of its own, 
and what appears ‘dysfunctional’ may be an expression of completely different (but legitimate) insolvency 
philosophies”. See H. Eidenmüller, above note 16.
49 In any case, as Prof. Wessels recently demonstrated, even in the absence of binding measures, legislation in a 
considerable number of member States is actually converging to the same kind of solutions – the kind that is being 
fostered in the Commission Recommendation. See B. Wessels, above note 17.
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Chapter 12
Restructuring Reform with Pre-Insolvency 
Proceedings – Where is the EU Heading?
Stephan Madaus*1and Bob Wessels**2 
1 Shifting Centuries - Shifting Focus
In Europe, during the last two decades of the last century, liquidation of a business 
(of a corporate debtor) was nearly the only option for financially distressed 
companies in many EU Member States. The goal of liquidation is not survival of 
the business, as under such a liquidation or winding-up regime the related assets 
are sold piece-meal. The liquidity (money) received is distributed to creditors 
according to the ranking of their claims. This one-sided approach to corporate 
distress is clearly reflected in the EU Insolvency Regulation of 2002, which, for 
instance, allows the opening of secondary proceedings, which must be winding-up 
proceedings. The one-sidedness of the aforementioned approach is also indicated 
by the chosen name for the responsible insolvency office holder in either main 
or secondary insolvency proceedings: “liquidator”. In 2005, a non-EU academic 
scholar, still observed: “Compared to U.S. bankruptcy laws, many countries’ laws 
read like penal codes”.3 
In the first decade of the 21st century, however, many European countries have 
come to understand that the existing legal framework does not meet the challenge: 
“… to achieve economic results that are potentially better than those 
that might be achieved under liquidation, by preserving and potentially 
improving the company’s business through rationalization.”4 
* Professor Dr Stephan Madaus, Professor of Civil Law, Civil Procedure and Insolvency Law, Martin Luther 
University Halle-Wittenberg, Germany.
** Professor Dr emeritus Bob Wessels, University of Leiden (NL); Counsel to the European Commission; External 
Scientific Fellow Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law.
3 See Natalie Martin, “The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The Perils 
of Legal Transplantation”, (2005) 28(1) Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 1-78, p. 46.
4 Rebecca Parry, “Introduction”, in Katarzyna Gromek Broc and Rebecca Parry (eds.), Corporate Rescue: An 
Overview of Recent Developments from Selected Countries in Europe, (2004, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague / London / New York), p. 2. 
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Substantial revisions have taken place in countries like Germany (1999 and 2012)), 
England (Enterprise Act 2002), Poland and Romania in 2003 (and 2006), Spain 
in 2004 (and 2013), France in 2006 (and 2014), Belgium in 2010 (and 2013) and 
quite recently in countries such as Denmark, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, 
whilst in some countries legislative changes are underway (the Netherlands, since 
2011).5 Although even more recent insolvency laws in several European countries 
continue to show substantial differences in underlying policy considerations, in 
structure and in content of these new enacted laws, in most of these jurisdictions 
there is an openess towards corporate rescue procedures, as an alternative to 
liquidation procedures. We will get back to this observation later. 
Furthermore, in many of these countries the USA’s Chapter 11 procedure has 
served as a model for legislators. Generally, these laws are based on the principle 
of a composition or an arrangement concluded between the insolvent debtor and 
his creditors, which is binding upon a given percentage on a dissenting minority 
of creditors, sometimes referred to as “cram-down”. A characteristic feature of 
these types of proceedings, aiming at reorganization of the debtor’s business, is 
the fact that attempts to restructure or reorganise enterprises can only be initiated 
by the debtor himself, or at least not against his will. The traditional “post-
mortem autopsy” approach (liquidation; winding-up), slowly, is supplemented 
by instruments which allow for “real time action” and domestic laws nowadays 
contain several proceedings which reflect different goals of a company in a rescue. 
Quite rightly it has recently been observed that in most Member States insolvency 
laws have been modernised:
“… to fit with the new economic context: beside traditional collective 
insolvency proceedings decided by the court on the basis of the 
debtor’s insolvency, new schemes applicable to a group of main 
creditors (for example banks, public bodies) at a pre-insolvency 
stage are regarded as being more efficient for the purposes of business 
continuation and preservation of jobs.”6
5 See e.g. Otto E. Fonseca Lobo (ed.), World Insolvency Systems: A Comparative Study, (2009, Sweet & Maxwell); 
Christopher Mallon (ed.), The Restructuring Review, 3rd edition (2013, Law Business Research, London).
6 See page 1 of the Terms of Reference for the EU Group of Experts on Cross-border Insolvency (http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/newsroom/contracts/files/2012_expert-group-insolvency/terms_of_reference_group_insolvency_en.pdf). 
See in this respect also Bob Wessels, “Europe Deserves A New Approach To Insolvency Proceedings”, in A. 
Bruyneel et al., Bicentenaire du Code de Commerce – Tweehonderd jaar Wetboek van Koophandel, uitg. (2007, 
Larcier, Brussel), 267ff; Cornelia J. Doliwa, Die geplante Insolvenz. Unternemenssanierung mittels Prepackaged 
Plan und Eigenverwaltung, Diss. (2011, Nomos, Berlin). 
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2 Chapter 11 U.S. Bankruptcy Code under the Magnifying Glass
Most remarkably, the USA Chapter 11 proceeding is being criticised more and 
more since some three years. There is a consensus, on the other side of the Atlantic 
Ocean, that the time has come to study whether Chapter 11 is in need of reform. 
The basic model of Chapter 11 has been introduced in 1978. Since the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code’s enactment, however, there has been a marked increase in the 
use of secured credit, placing secured debt at all levels of the capital structure. 
Chapter 11 assumes the presence of asset value above the secured debt, but asset 
value is often not present in many of today’s Chapter 11 cases. The debt and 
capital structures of most debtor companies are more complex, with multiple levels 
of secured and unsecured debt, often governed by equally complex inter-creditor 
agreements. Also, the market in the USA has changed. It is acknowledged that the 
growth of distressed debt markets and claims trading introduced another factor, 
which was absent when the 1978 Code was enacted. 
The nature of businesses has changed: Chapter 11 was developed in an era when 
the biggest employers were manufacturers with domestic operations. Today, many 
of the biggest employers are service companies. Many of the remaining American 
manufacturers are less dependent on hard assets, and more dependent on contracts 
and intellectual property as principal assets. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code does not 
clearly provide for the treatment of such assets and affected counterparties. And 
of course, debtors are much more often multinational companies than 30+ years 
ago, with the means of production and other operations offshore, constituting 
international law and choice of law implications. Today’s “debtor” is likely to 
be a group of related, often interdependent, corporate entities. For instance, in 
Chrysler, the “debtor” was a group of some 25 companies. And finally, the original 
intention of Chapter 11, being the rehabilitation of businesses, and the preservation 
of jobs and tax bases at the state, local and federal level, is eroded. Presently, the 
emphasis is “maximization of value” as an equal, sometimes competing or even 
exclusive goal, e.g. by using “fire sales” in the meaning of Section 365 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code.
All these developments have called in the USA for a fresh assessment of the 
purposes and goals of a U.S. restructuring regime, which is undertaken by a special 
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Commission of the American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI).7 The ambitions of the 
Commission are anything but small: 
“… the study of the need for comprehensive chapter 11 reform, 
by which we mean consideration of starting from scratch and re-
inventing the statute.” 
By looking at the substantive topics identified, one gets a good sense of the topics 
that are under further study and discussion: 
(1) Financing Chapter 11;
(2) Governance and Supervision of Chapter 11 Cases and Companies;
(3) Multiple Enterprise Cases/Issues;
(4) Financial Contracts, Derivatives and safe Harbours;
(5) Executory Contracts and Leases;
(6) Administrative Claim Expansion, Critical Vendors and Other Pressures on 
Liquidity; Creation and / or Preservation of Reorganization Capital;
(7) Labor and Benefit Issues;
(8) Avoidance Powers;
(9) Sales of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets, Including Going-Concern 
Sales;
(10) Plan Issues: Procedure and Structure;
(11) Plan Issues: Distributional Issues;
(12) Bankruptcy Remote Entities, Bankruptcy-Proofing and Public Policy;
(13) The Role of Valuation in Chapter 11.
In 2013 the ABI Commission has established a Working Group on Comparative 
Law with the task to address questions raised by the Commission and the other 
Advisory Committees regarding how particular issues are addressed in several 
countries, where the country’s approach may be relevant to the Chapter 11 model. 
7 ABI is the organisation of choice to undertake such an effort. It has some 13,000 members coming from all 
parts of the legal world. The ABI Commission itself is composed of some twenty members. It is co-chaired 
by Bob Keach and Albert Togut, whilst prof. Michelle Harner (University of Maryland) serves as the primary 
investigator.
205
The countries identified include e.g. Australia, Canada, China and Japan. The 
participating European countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Spain.8 
3 European Union: Rapidly Changing Political Landscape
In Europe, the start of the second decennium of this century has shown a dramatic 
increase of political attention for matters of insolvency. We are referring to 
the following.
3.1 Revision EU Insolvency Regulation
On 12 December 2012, the European Commission published its proposal for a 
Regulation amending the EU Insolvency Regulation (COM(2012)744). This 
Regulation was enacted 10 years earlier, in 2002. The Commission has detected 
five main shortcomings of the Insolvency Regulation in the current economic 
climate, the first one being the “scope” of the Insolvency Regulation. The 
Regulation should, in future, have a wider application: 
“The proposal extends the scope of the Regulation by revising the 
definition of insolvency proceedings to include hybrid and pre-
insolvency proceedings as well as debt discharge proceedings and 
other insolvency proceedings for natural persons that currently do 
not fit the definition.”9
In the Explanatory Memorandum, the European Commission notes as its view 
that the Insolvency Regulation is generally considered to operate successfully in 
facilitating cross-border insolvency proceedings within the European Union, but 
that the consultation of stakeholders and legal and empirical studies commissioned 
by the Commission revealed a range of problems in the application of the 
Regulation in practice. Moreover: 
“… the Regulation does not sufficiently reflect current EU priorities 
and national practices in insolvency law, in particular in promoting 
the rescue of enterprises in difficulties.”
8 The Working Group on Comparative Law has been coordinated by Dr. Rolef de Weijs (University of Amsterdam) 
and myself as Chair. See Bob Wessels and Rolef de Weijs (eds.), International Contributions to the Reform of 
Chapter 11 U.S. Bankruptcy Code, Volume to in the European and International Insolvency Law Studies, (2015, 
Eleven International Publishing, The Hague).
9 In addition to “Scope”, the other improvements relate to Jurisdiction, Secondary proceedings, Publicity of 
proceedings and lodgments of claims, and, Groups of companies. See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/commercial/
insolvency/index_en.htm.
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Therefore, in addition to the overall objective of the revision of the Insolvency 
Regulation to improve the efficiency of the European framework for resolving 
cross-border insolvency cases, the presented improvements are set in a policy 
context: amending the Insolvency Regulation: 
“… in view of ensuring a smooth functioning of the internal market 
and its resilience in economic crises. This objective links in with the 
EU’s current political priorities to promote economic recovery and 
sustainable growth, a higher investment rate and the preservation of 
employment, as set out in the Europe 2020 strategy. The revision 
of the Regulation will contribute to ensuring a smooth development 
and the survival of businesses, as stated in the Small Business Act 
[COM2008)394].”
After a relativly short, but intensive review proces, the final text of the new 
Insolvency Regulation entered into force on 26 June 2017.10
3.2 Renewed Policy: Enable Financially Distressed Enterprises to Survive
The revision is also one of the key actions listed in the Single Market Act II11, 
within which Key action 7 (“Modernise EU insolvency rules to facilitate the 
survival of businesses and present a second chance for entrepreneurs”), includes 
the following text: 
“Businesses operating in Europe benefit from an overall positive 
business environment, which the EU is further improving through its 
better regulation agenda. But more can be done. Europe needs modern 
insolvency laws that help basically sound companies to survive, 
encourage entrepreneurs to take reasonable risks and permit creditors 
to lend on more favourable terms. A modern insolvency law allows 
entrepreneurs to get a second chance and ensures speedy procedures 
of high quality in the interest of both debtors and creditors. We thus 
need to establish conditions for the EU-wide recognition of national 
insolvency and debt-discharge schemes, which enable financially 
distressed enterprises to become again competitive participants in 
the economy. We need to ensure simple and efficient insolvency 
proceedings, whenever there are assets or debts in several Member 
States. … However, we need to go further. At present, there is in 
10 See Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings (recast) (EIR Recast or EIR 2015), [2015] OJ L 141/19. 
11 Available from http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smact/index_en.htm.
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many Member States little tolerance for failure and current rules do 
not allow honest innovators to fail ‘quickly and cheaply’. We need 
to set up the route towards measures and incentives for Member 
States to take away the stigma of failure associated with insolvency 
and to reduce overly long debt discharge periods. We also need to 
consider how the efficiency of national insolvency laws can be further 
improved with a view to creating a level playing field for companies, 
entrepreneurs and private persons within the internal market.”12 
We will return to this subject shortly below.
4 In Europe: Rescue On The Rise
4.1 Differences in National Insolvency Laws
The Insolvency Regulation is an instrument of a private international law. It tries to 
overcome the huge differences in the national laws of the Member States. Recital 
11 in the present text of the Regulation provides: 
“(11) This Regulation acknowledges the fact that as a result of widely 
differing substantive laws it is not practical to introduce insolvency 
proceedings with universal scope in the entire Community. The 
application without exception of the law of the State of opening 
of proceedings would, against this background, frequently lead to 
difficulties. This applies, for example, to the widely differing laws 
on security interests to be found in the Community. Furthermore, 
the preferential rights enjoyed by some creditors in the insolvency 
proceedings are, in some cases, completely different …”
On a global level, it has been recognised that with all national insolvency systems 
having so many differences, these 
“… hamper the rescue of financially troubled businesses, are not 
conducive to a fair and efficient administration of cross-border 
insolvencies, impede the protection of the assets of the insolvent 
debtor against dissipation and hinder maximization of the value of 
those assets. Moreover, the absence of predictability in the handling 
12 Available from http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smact/docs/single-market-act2_en.pdf. See Communication, 
dated 12 December 2012, re “A new approach to business failure and insolvency” [COM(2012) 743]: http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/commercial/insolvency/index_en.htm.
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of cross-border insolvency cases impedes capital flow and is a 
disincentive to cross-border investment …”
This view forms the foundation for the creation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-border Insolvency.13 This Model Law, presently, is applied in over twenty 
countries, including Japan, Australia, USA, and in Europe: UK, Poland, Romania 
and Greece. 
Since 2011 the book of rules for European insolvency law turns to a next page: 
harmonisation of insolvency law. Harmonisation by the way has been a term that 
until then was carefully avoided in insolvency circles.14 
4.2. Growing towards an Aligned Approach to Business Rescue 
On 15 November 2011 the European Parliament (EP) approved a “Motion for 
a European Parliament resolution with recommendations to the Commission on 
insolvency proceedings in the context of EU company law”. In its motion the EP 
requests the Commission to submit to Parliament one or more legislative proposals: 
“… relating to an EU corporate insolvency framework, following 
the detailed recommendations set out in the Annex hereto, in order 
to ensure a level playing field, based on a profound analysis of all 
viable alternatives.”15 
These harmonisation-proposals have been the object of a different study.16 Although 
“harmonisation” sounded new, actually many EU countries’ national laws share 
several tendencies in renewing their national rescue legislations. And “…[t]he 
pace of insolvency law reform has been fast and even, at times, relentless.”17 
In a 2012 study, University of Heidelberg professor Andreas Pieckenbrock 
compares insolvency laws of England, Italy, France, Belgium, Germany and 
13 See its Guide to Enactment (1997), nr. 13. 
14 “The H-word is out!”, see Bob Wessels, “Harmonization of Insolvency Law in Europe”, (2011) 8(1) European 
Company Law, 27ff.
15 See Motion for a European Parliament resolution with recommendations to the Commission on insolvency 
proceedings in the context of EU company law (2011/2006(INI). See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-0355&format=XML&language=EN. 
16 See Ian F. Fletcher and Bob Wessels, “Harmonisation of Insolvency Law in Europe”, Reports presented to 
the Nederlandse Vereniging voor Burgerlijk Recht (Netherlands Association of Civil Law), (2012, Kluwer, 
Deventer). Summarised findings and presented conclusions are separately published, see http://bobwessels.nl/
wordpress/?attachment_id=2409.
17 See Catherine Bridge, “Insolvency – a second chance? Why modern insolvency laws seek to promote business 
rescue”, in Law in Transition 2013, 28ff., mentioning (non-EU) changes in insolvency laws over the last five years 
in Albania, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine.
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Austria. He concludes that there are several common tendencies in these 
rescue proceedings:
(1) Early recourse: sometimes there is an earlier moment of starting a rescue 
process, for instance in the French sauvegarde: the debtor must encounter 
problems that he can not solve, which is earlier than the traditional moment 
that the debtor can not pay its financial obligations when they are due;
(2) Debtor in possession: the board is not fully replaced by the insolvency 
administrator - n certain proceedings the board stays in control of the business, 
what we call “debtor-in-possession”;
(3) Stay: in these countries one finds a moratorium or a stay either automatic like 
in the sauvegarde or at request (for instance the concordato preventivo or 
réorganisation judiciare);
(4) Protecting fresh money: there are special provisions to protect fresh money 
available for the company while trying to work itself out of its misery;
(5) Debt for equity swap: the possibility of a debt for equity swap, i.e. the 
conversion of a creditors’ claim into shares in the capital of the company;
(6) Binding disapproving creditors: generally, as Pieckenbrock explains, such 
a rescue is based on the principle of a composition or an arrangement 
concluded between the insolvent debtor and his creditors. Such a rescue plan 
is binding for those creditors who voted in favour of the plan, but is also 
binding – as indicated earlier – upon a (given percentage) of a dissenting 
minority of creditors or a watering down (“bail-in”) for altgesellschafter (ie. 
existing shareholders).18 
In April 2014, INSOL Europe published a study on a new approach to business 
failure and insolvency. The reporters (University of Milan professor Stefania 
Bariatti and Robert van Galen) have studied 28 EU Member States. It is interesting 
18 Andreas Pieckenbrock, Das ESUG – fit für Europa?, NZI 22/2012, 906ff. By the same author the theme has 
been presented in a broader context with focus on Germany, as a continuous work in progress, see Andreas 
Pieckenbrock, Das Insolvenzrecht zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts: ein Dauerbaustelle, in Werner Ebke, 
Christopher Seagon, Michael Blatz (eds.), Solvenz – Insolvenz – Resolvenz, (2013, Nomos, Baden-Baden), 79ff. 
Restructuring Reform with Pre-Insolvency Proceedings – Where is the EU Heading?
210 Harmonisation of European Insolvency Law
to note that generally professor Piekenbrock’s characteristics are available in new 
or renewed recovery proceedings in nearly all member states.19 
4.3 EU’s Response: A New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency 
On 12 December 2012, the European Commission responded to the harmonisation-
challenge of the European Parliament and stated a new policy, named “A new 
European approach to business failure and insolvency”. Via a public consultation, 
opened in July 2013, the European Commission seeks to identify the issues on 
which the new European approach to business failure and insolvency should focus 
“… so as to develop a rescue and recovery culture across the Member States”. It is 
stated that many European restructuring frameworks “… are still inflexible, costly 
and value destructive”.20 
Using the outcomes of this public consultation the European Commission presented 
on 12 March 2014 its Recommendation on a new approach to business failure and 
insolvency. The Recommendation has 20 recitals and 36 recommendations.21 
5 Recommendation of 12 March 2014 on a New Approach to Business 
Failure and Insolvency
5.1 Major Objects
Let”s look at the Recommendation more closely. It has two major objects. First 
of all to:
“… ensure that viable enterprises in financial difficulties, wherever 
they are located in the Union, have access to national insolvency 
frameworks which enable them to restructure at an early stage with 
a view to preventing their insolvency, and therefore maximise the 
19 For instance, debtor in possession proceedings (in certain cases supervised by an insolvency practitioner 
appointed by the court), a rescue plan in which creditors, sometimes even secured creditors, can be crammed 
down provided a certain qualified majority is reached, the ability to order a stay of the enforcement of claims, 
the possibility of attracting new loans, although these reporters have generally found that no super-priority was 
granted to new financing. The study is available via www.insol-europe.org. For an eyewitness account of the 
machinations behind tendering for and successfully delivering a report to the European Commission: Michael 
Tierhoff, “Love me tender: How a project rocked INSOL Europe”, (2014) spring, eurofenix, 16ff. Harmonising 
continental European insolvency law therefore seems much less illusory as some 10 years ago, observes Eric 
Dirix, Het insolventierecht anno 2014, in H. Braekmans, E. Dirix, M.E. Storme, B. Tilleman, and M. Vanmeenen 
(eds.), Curatoren en vereffenaars: actuele ontwikkelingen III, Antwerpe, (2014, Intersentia, Cambridge), 3ff, at 7.
20 See Impact Assessment (“Impact Assessment 2014” or “IA 2014”) accompanying the document Commission 
Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency”, 12.3.2014, SWD(2014) 61 final, at 2. 
21 For the text, see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/news/140312_en.htm. For an overview, see Stephan 
Madaus, “The EU Recommendation on Business Rescue – Only Another Statement or a Cause for Legislative 
Action Across Europe?”, (2014) 27(6) Insolvency Intelligence, 81ff. 
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total value to creditors, employees, owners and the economy as a 
whole. The Recommendation also aims at giving honest bankrupt 
entrepreneurs a second chance across the Union.” (recital (1))
In order to achieve these aims, the Commission deemed it necessary to:
“… encourage greater coherence between the national insolvency 
frameworks in order to reduce divergences and inefficiencies which 
hamper the early restructuring of viable companies in financial 
difficulties and the possibility of a second chance for honest 
entrepreneurs, and thereby lower the cost of restructuring for both 
debtors and creditors. Greater coherence and increased efficiency 
in those national insolvency rules would maximise the returns 
to all types of creditors and investors and encourage cross-border 
investment. Greater coherence would also facilitate the restructuring 
of groups of companies irrespective of where the members of the 
group are located in the Union.” (recital (11))
5.2 Introducing Minimum Standards on Preventative Restructuring Frameworks
The Recommendation seeks to reach these goals by encouraging Member States 
to put in place 
“… a framework that enables the efficient restructuring of viable 
enterprises in financial difficulty and give honest entrepreneurs a 
second chance” (R1).22 
The Recommendation provides for “minimum standards” on “preventative 
restructuring frameworks” (R3(a)) to be implemented in all Member States. 
Through promoting adherence to these standards throughout the Union, the 
Commission”s hopes are three of a kind: 
• for national insolvency systems: to improve the existing means for resolving 
distress in viable enterprises (R5) and encourage coherence in initiatives or 
reviews of “corporate rescue framework” in all Member States (R10);
• for businesses (debtors): to improve access to credit (R4), encourage 
investment (R8) and to smoothe “… the adjustment for over-indebted firms, 
minimizing the economic and social costs involved in their deleveraging 
process” (R12); and 
22 Recommendations 30-33 relate to a second chance for honest entrepreneurs. These are not discussed here. “R” 
stands for Recommendation.
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• for creditors: to improve mechanisms for resolving financial distress efficiently, 
with reduced delays and costs and limited court formalities (“… to where they 
are necessary and proportionate in order to safeguard the interests of creditors 
and other interested parties likely to be affected”) (R17). 
5.3 Six Core Principles
Oxford associate professor Kristin van Zwieten has analysed the Recommendation 
in greater detail with as a result that she concludes that there are six core principles 
on which the minimum standards of the Commission’s recommendations for a 
preventative restructuring framework are based.23 I will follow her analysis below. 
These principles apply to any debtor (“… any natural or legal person in financial 
difficulties when there is a likelihood of insolvency”; R5(a)), excluding financial 
institutions.24 The scope of these core principles is “restructuring”, which means 
“… changing the composition, conditions, or structure of assets and 
liabilities of debtors, or a combination of those elements, with the 
objective of enabling the continuation, in whole or in part, of the 
debtors’ activity” (R5(b)). 
5.3.1 Early Recourse
A debtor should be able to have recourse to the restructuring framework at an early 
stage (R6(a)). The framework only is open to a debtor that is already in “financial 
difficulties” (R1), such that there is a “… likelihood of insolvency”(R6(a)).
5.3.2 Minimised Court Involvement
A debtor should have recourse to the restructuring framework without the need to 
formally open court proceedings (R8). More generally, a restructuring procedure 
should not be lengthy and costly and court involvement should be limited to 
circumstances where necessary and proportionate to safeguard the rights of 
creditors and others affected by a proposed restructuring plan (R7). On the other 
hand, involvement of a court in some other circumstances may be necessary, 
including the granting of a stay.
23 Kristin van Zwieten, “Restructuring Law: Recommendations from the European Commission”, in Law in 
Transition (2015, EBRD publication).
24 Recital 15: “It is appropriate to exclude from the scope of this Recommendation insurance undertakings, credit 
institutions, investment firms and collective investment undertakings, central counter parties, central securities 
depositories and other financial institutions which are subject to special recovery and resolution frameworks 
where national supervisory authorities have wide-ranging powers of intervention …”. See: Matthias Haentjens & 
Bob Wessels (eds.), Bank Recovery and Resolution – A Conference Book, The Hague, (2014, Eleven International 
Publishing, The Hague); Matthias Haentjens & Bob Wessels (eds.), Research Handbook on Crisis Management 
in the Banking Sector (2015, Edward Elgar, London). 
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5.3.3 Debtor in Possession 
A debtor “… should keep control over the day-to-day operation of its business” 
while the restructuring framework is used (R6(b)).25 This principle provides an 
incentive for a debtor to use the procedure early and ensures minimum disruption to 
the operations of the debtor and allows him to carry on his day-to-day operations.26 
Restructuring is a management tool, rather then a signal of failure.27 
5.3.4 Court-Ordered Stay
A debtor should have the power to seek a temporary stay of individual creditor 
enforcement actions (including those by secured and preferential creditors), 
by application to a court (R6(b) and R10). From a debtor’s perspective a stay 
is designed to enable the assets of the business to be kept together, preventing 
their piecemeal dismemberment by creditors. A stay improves the chances of 
negotiations for a restructuring plan by the debtor, but it should be balanced by the 
need to adequately protect secured creditors” interests, by allowing them to request 
a relief from the stay under certain specified conditions. The Recommendation 
recommends a set of safeguards, including timelimits (initial stay of up to four 
months, subject to renewal up to a maximum duration of 12 months; R13), and an 
obligation to lift the stay when it is not longer necessary to facilitate the adoption 
of a restructuring plan (R14). In Member States which make the granting of the 
stay subject to certain conditions, a debtor should be able to be granted a stay in 
all circumstances where: (a) creditors representing a “significant amount” of the 
claims likely to be affected by the restructuring plan support the negotiations on 
the adoption of a restructuring plan; and (b) a restructuring plan has a reasonable 
prospect of being implemented and preventing the insolvency of the debtor (R11).
5.3.5 Ability to Bind Dissenting Creditors to a Restructuring Plan
A Member States’ preventive restructuring framework should provide for a plan to 
be negotiated between debtor and creditors (secured and unsecured), and – where 
approved by the requisite majority as described by national law of creditors in 
affected classes – sanctioned by a court, with the effect that dissenting creditors 
are bound by it (R6(d), 16, 20, 21, 26). Secured creditors are to be treated as a 
seperate class to unsecured creditors (R17). When a restructuring plan is adopted 
unanimously by affected creditors it should be binding on “all those affected 
25 The Recommendation does however contemplate (not compulsory, but on a case by case basis) the appointment 
by a court of a “supervisor” to oversee debtor activity and safeguard creditor interests: R9(b).
26 IA 2104, 10.
27 See Madaus, above note 19, at 82. 
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creditors”, which seems to provide support for a fully out-of-court contractual 
restructuring, also for those creditors that did not participate in the adoption 
process itself. 
A framework should also allow for the sanctioning of a plan approved by some 
classes but not others, with the result that it would be possible for a majority of 
classes to bind dissenting classes (i.e. for those classes to be “crammed down”). 
The conditions under which a restructuring plan can be confirmed by a court 
should be clearly specified and should include at least that the restructuring plan 
(a) has been adopted in conditions which ensure the protection of the legitimate 
interests of creditors, (b) has been notified to all creditors likely to be affected 
by it, and (c) does not reduce the rights of dissenting creditors below what they 
would reasonably be expected to receive in the absence of the restructuring, if 
the debtor’s business was liquidated or sold as a going concern, as the case may 
be (the HLR-test, the hypothesis liquidation result-test). In addition (d) any new 
financing foreseen in the restructuring plan is necessary to implement the plan and 
does not unfairly prejudice the interests of dissenting creditors (R22). Procedural 
requirements should safeguard rights of creditors to ensure creditors are notified 
of the plan, can object to it, and can appeal against it, except that an appeal should 
“… not in principle suspend the implementation of the restructuring plan” (R24).
5.3.6 Protection for New Finance 
Those parties who provide new finance to a debtor in accordance with the terms 
of a court-sanctioned restructuring plan should be shielded from the operation 
of avoidance provisions, paulian actions etc. in national insolvency law (R6(e) 
and 27), as well as from “civil and criminal liability relating to the restructuring 
process” (R28) except in the case of fraud (R29). 
5.4 Relation to the Insolvency Regulation
The Recommendation is supposed to dovetail with the (amendments to the) 
European Insolvency Regulation. As explained, one of the proposed amendments 
to the European Insolvency Regulation is the widening of its scope, to include 
certain debtor-in-possession and pre-insolvency procedures. If this amendment is 
made, the “preventive restructuring framework”, drafted in national insolvency 
systems in line with the Commission’s Recommendation, could potentially come 
within the scope of the (new) European Insolvency Regulation. The system of 
the Regulation governing jurisdiction to open proceedings, and the effect of 
proceedings once opened could therefore apply to these restructuring procedures. 
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6 Turning a Recommendation into a Directive 
The Recommendation, formally, reflected a rather soft approach. It invited Member 
States to take or continue legislative action. Within twelve months (so before 
April 2015) EU Member States were invited to implement the Recommendation’s 
“principles” (R34). In September 2015 it became clear, after a study by the 
Commission, that the Recommendation of March 2014 has not succeeded in 
having the desired impact in facilitating the rescue of businesses in financial 
difficulty. The Commission seems nevertheless determined to harmonise certain 
aspects of insolvency law. It has launched a public consultation in June 2016 and 
with regard to the scope of the harmonisation of insolvency laws its present views 
are that it could deal with: 
(1) preventive restructuring procedures and a discharge of debt (second chance) 
for entrepreneurs as provided for by the Insolvency Recommendation, and 
(2) key areas of insolvency beyond the scope of the Insolvency Recommendation 
such as (related to corporate insolvency): 
(a) common minimum rules for directors’ duties and liabilities in anticipation 
of insolvency, as well as their disqualification due to breach of those duties;
(b) common minimum rules for the ranking of claims in insolvency and 
avoidance actions, with a view to bringing more legal certainty in cross-
border flow of capital; 
(c) a simplified approach to SMEs insolvency, for example by providing 
standard forms for filing claims and putting in place electronic means to 
reduce costs; 
(d) common minimum rules for insolvency practitioners with the aim of 
allowing both easier exercise of this profession in different Member States 
and set standards ensuring proper conduct of these professionals; and 
(e) protection of investors’ rights by ring-fencing securities from the 
insolvency regimes of intermediaries with whom investors deposited 
their securities.28
Recently, the European Commission announced a new legislative instrument to 
be published by the end of October 2016. While details of this instrument are 
28 See for related documents http://bobwessels.nl/2016/03/2016-03-doc8-rescue-recommendation-after-2-years/, 
and http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/commercial/insolvency/index_en.htm
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still unknown, it should cover the topics of the Recommendation. There will be a 
framework for pre-insolvency restructurings as well as an approach to facilitate 
a second chance for entrepreneurs. It remains to be seen whether additional 
topics mentioned in the consultation of June 2016 find their way into a legislative 
proposal as well.
7 ELI Project on Business Rescue in Insolvency
In the lingering economic crisis in many Member States, legal instruments are 
required that allow viable businesses to restructure of a strangeling debt burden 
efficiently in order to begin investing, hiring and flourishing again. Along the 
developments in Brussels, the European Law Institute (ELI) initiated a research 
project that aims at identifying the best practices and worst hinderances when 
trying to rescue a struggling business across Europe. Here, Professor Bob Wessels, 
Professor Stephan Madaus, and Associate Professor Kristin van Zwieten act 
as Reporters.
The ultimate aim of the project is to present a set of recommendations to European 
and national lawmakers as well as involved private institutions that will push for 
the further development of coherent and functional rules for business rescue in 
Europe. These recommendations will include certain statutory procedures that 
could better enable parties to negotiate solutions where a business becomes 
financially distressed. The project will also determine in which procedures and 
under which conditions an enforceable solution can be imposed upon creditors and 
other stakeholders despite their lack of consent. The research done in the project 
has a broad scope. It extends to consider frameworks that can be used by (non-
financial) businesses out of court, and in a pre-insolvency context. 
The project produces two major outcomes that will be published in 2017/18 by 
Oxford University Press. First major outcome is set of inventory and normative 
reports on the status quo of the national insolvency and restructuring law in 13 
representative EU Member States produced by expert national correspondents. 
These reports cover the law on the books as well as the law in practice. They 
are accompanied by a complementary inventory report on international soft 
law frameworks for business rescue. Altogether, these reports form the basis 
of the comparative analysis of the three reporters which is the second project 
outcome. Here, the project Reporters identify best practices and formulate specific 
recommendations that would improve the existing legal framework for a business 
rescue in many Member States.
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8 Conclusion
The legal environment for the restructuring of failing business has changed 
significantly in many jurisdictions and obviously keeps changing. Insolvency and 
debt restructuring law seems to be a constant construction site. The ELI Project 
on Business Rescue in Insolvency has influenced this process when Reporters 
participated actively in conferences and discussions across Europe and beyond. 
With the EU Commission acting as an observer to the project, preliminary results 
of the project have been shared with the Commission. The final outcome of the 
project should be able to add value to the discussion that will surround a legislative 
proposal from the Commission in late 2016. The aim of the project goes beyond 
that. Its purpose is to inform lawmakers at all levels about recommended principles, 
instruments and institutions in a flourishing business rescue framework. Being a 
truly academic endeavour, one may only speculate about its actual impact.
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Chapter 13
Corporate Restructuring and Corporate 
Dissolution of Companies in Financial 
Distress: From Preventing to 
Circumventing Bankruptcy
A Comparison of the UK and the Dutch 
Systems from a European Point of View
Dr S Renssen*
1 Introduction
In the EU, national restructuring and insolvency rules vary greatly in respect 
of the range of procedures available to companies in financial distress aiming 
at restructuring their business. According to the European Commission, it is of 
great importance that companies in financial distress have access to a framework 
enabling them to restructure with the objective of preventing insolvency.1 Effective 
restructuring of viable companies in financial distress contributes to saving jobs 
and also benefits the wider economy. It is also important to encourage greater 
coherence between the national insolvency frameworks, as this would maximise 
the returns to the creditors and investors, and encourage cross-border investment. 
On 12 March 2014, the European Commission published a recommendation on a 
new approach to business failure and insolvency,2 which provides for minimum 
standards on schemes of arrangement. The report on the follow-up to the above 
mentioned recommendation of the European Commission, issued in March 2016, 
shows that the Member States have not fully adopted the recommendations. This 
means that without action at EU level differences between Member States will 
continue to exist. As a consequence, legal uncertainty would continue to exist 
as well as additional costs for investors looking for investment opportunities in 
other Member States. Moreover, the Commission is of the opinion that this would 
1 Commission Recommendation on a new approach to business failure and insolvency, COM(2014) 1500 final. 
2 Ibid. 
* Assistant professor of company and insolvency law at Maastricht University, research fellow at the Institute for 
Corporate Law, Governance and Innovation Policies (email: samantha.renssen@maastrichtuniversity.nl).
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continue to create barriers to the efficient restructuring of viable companies in 
financial distress in the EU, which would lead to a high amount of accumulated 
private debt. Harmonisation in this field is thus needed. Therefore, the European 
Commission adopted its legislative proposal on preventive restructuring, 
insolvency and second chance.3
In general, in insolvency practice, the UK insolvency system is seen as rather 
sophisticated. In the UK, viable companies can make use of the following three 
formal procedures: the pre-pack procedure, the scheme of arrangement, and 
the company voluntary arrangement procedure. However, not all European 
jurisdictions provide for formal rescue procedures. Current Dutch law, for 
example, still lacks appropriate and efficient methods to restructure viable 
companies in financial distress successfully. At present, the Dutch legislator is 
working on the development of a framework for companies in financial distress. 
Despite the fact that the development of restructuring options for companies in 
financial distress is welcome in Europe with respect to economic and labour market 
policies, the question arises whether creditor protection is sufficiently ensured in 
restructuring proceedings. 
In case of unviable companies in financial distress, the European national systems 
provide for several dissolution methods. In most European jurisdictions unviable 
companies in financial distress can be dissolved very quickly and cheaply. In the 
Netherlands, a company can be dissolved without pursuing liquidation proceedings 
if there are no longer any assets at the time of dissolution. This quick and cheap 
dissolving procedure - laid down in Article 2:19 sub 4 of the Dutch Civil Code 
(hereinafter: DCC) - is also referred to as ‘turbo liquidation’. In the UK it is possible 
to strike off a company from the Companies Register and thereby terminate its 
existence, also known as the voluntary striking off procedure.4 This procedure is 
considered inexpensive and easy in its process. Currently, harmonisation in the 
field of dissolution of companies is lacking in the EU. The question arises whether 
creditor protection is ensured in these quick dissolving methods. Another question 
is whether these dissolving methods are in fact an open invitation to commit fraud 
and to circumvent bankruptcy procedures.
In this contribution, the questions mentioned above will be answered for the UK 
system and the (proposed) Dutch system. I will therefore – first – successively 
3 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, 
second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and 
amending Directive 2012/30/EU, COM(2016) 723 final, 2016/0359 (COD).
4 Section 1003 CA 2006.
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review the formal corporate rescue procedures in the UK, and the proposed rescue 
procedures by the Dutch legislator. I will then – secondly – successively review 
corporate dissolution in the UK, and in the Netherlands. 
2 Corporate Rescue in the UK 
A company in financial distress may be subjected to the following formal rescue 
procedures in order to restructure its business successfully: 
(1) The pre-pack procedure based on the Enterprise Act 2002 (hereinafter the 
“EA 2002”);
(2) The scheme of arrangement as laid down in Part 26 of the Companies Act 
2006 (hereinafter the “CA 2006”);
(3) The company voluntary arrangements procedure laid down in Part 1 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (hereinafter the “IA 1986”). 
2.1 Restructuring by Pre-packaged Administration
There is no clear statute providing the legality of a pre-pack; the pre-packaged 
administration is developed in practice.5 During a pre-pack procedure, selling a 
company’s business is arranged prior to the commencement of the administration 
procedure and thus a swifter implementation and completion of the deal is laid 
down in the statutory proceedings.6 An administrator or administrative receiver 
will be appointed, who will then execute the restructuring transaction on behalf of 
the company in financial distress.7
According to Paragraph 2 Schedule B1, an administrator can be appointed by 
the court under Paragraph 10, by the holder of a floating charge under Paragraph 
14, or by the company or its directors under Paragraph 22.8 Whether or not the 
administrator is appointed by the court, he is an officer of the court and must act 
as an agent of the company.9 According to Paragraph 6 Schedule B1, a person 
may be appointed as an administrator only if he is qualified to act as an insolvency 
practitioner in relation to the company. The administrator must perform his 
5 B. Xie, “Regulating Pre-Packaged Administration - a Complete Agenda”, (2011) 5 Journal of Business Law, pp. 
513-527. 
6 C. Shuttleworth, ‘’Pre-Packs: the Latest Wave of Reform’’, (2015) Corporate Rescue and Insolvency, pp. 61-63. 
7 V. Finch, “Pre-packaged administrations: bargains in the shadow of insolvency of shadowy bargains”, (2006) 9 
Journal of Business Law, pp. 568-588. 
8 J. Armour, “The Rise of the ‘Pre-Pack’: Corporate Restructuring in the UK and Proposals for Reform”, in R.P. 
Austin & F. JG Aoun, Restructuring Companies in Troubled Time (2012, Ross Parson Centre, Sydney), pp. 43-78. 
9 Paragraph 5 and 69 Schedule B1. 
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functions with the objective of (i) rescuing the company as a going concern; or 
(ii) achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be 
likely if the company were wound up (without first being in administration); or 
(iii) realising property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or 
preferential creditors.10 Furthermore, the administrator must perform his functions 
in the interests of the company’s creditors as a whole and as quickly and efficiently 
as is reasonably practicable.11
Under Paragraph 46 Schedule B1, the appointment of the administrator has to 
be announced to the company and creditors as well as advertised in the Gazette. 
The administrator shall make a statement setting out proposals for achieving the 
purpose of the administration, which has to be sent to the creditors of the company 
accompanied by an invitation to a creditors’ meeting.12 The meeting must be held 
on a two-weeks’ notice. However, such a meeting does not need to be held in case 
the company is able to pay all creditors in full, in case it has insufficient property 
to make a distribution to unsecured creditors, or if it is not possible to rescue the 
company as a going concern, or to achieve better results than when winding up. 
Using pre-packaged administration does not eliminate the need for the 
abovementioned statutory procedures as laid down in Schedule B1, but it does 
create at least the risk that the administration procedure will be reduced to a formal 
role rather than one offering real protection to creditors.13 In jurisprudence, courts 
try to ensure creditor protection by underlining the importance of consulting with 
major creditors ahead of completing a pre-pack sale.14 Another major criticism 
of the pre-pack is that the procedure lacks transparency, is open to abuse and is 
morally wrong, particularly considering concerns that the business may have been 
undersold with a disproportionate prejudice towards the interests of (generally 
unsecured) creditors.15 The negative impression surrounding the pre-pack was 
increased by the fact that in many cases the business is bought by the company’s 
current or former shareholders or directors (also referred to as phoenix pre-
packs).16 Despite the criticism, a pre-pack may prove useful in case the majority of 
10 Paragraph 3 sub 1 Schedule B1.
11 Paragraph 3 sub 2 and 4 Schedule B1. 
12 Paragraph 49-51 Schedule B1. 
13 V. Finch, above note 7, pp. 568-588.
14 DKLL Solicitors v. HM Revenue and Customs [2007] EWHC 2067 (Ch); [2007] BCC 908; Clydesdale v. Smailes 
(No.1) [2009] EWHC 1745 (Ch); [2010] BPIR 62. 
15 B. Xie, above note 5, pp. 513-527.
16 Ibid.
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creditors make negotiating on a scheme of arrangement or a company voluntary 
arrangement impractical or impossible.17
2.2 Restructuring by the Scheme of Arrangement 
A scheme of arrangement is a compromise between a company and its creditors 
or members or any class of them under Part 26 of the CA 2006.18 The scheme of 
arrangement procedure commences with an application to the court, which may be 
made by the company, any creditor or member of the company, or if the company 
is being wound up or an administration order is in force in relation to it, the 
liquidator or administrator.19 The scheme of arrangement thus applies to insolvent 
debtors as well as solvent debtors.20 The application must be accompanied by a 
statement explaining the effect of the compromise or arrangement. Moreover, the 
statement has to declare any material interests of the directors of the company 
(whether as directors, or as members, or as creditors of the company, or otherwise), 
and the effect on those interests of the compromise or arrangement, in so far as it is 
different from the effect on the equivalent interests of other persons.21
The proposing party should also determine the correct classes of the creditors and 
members of the company.22 According to Section 896 CA 2006, the court may 
then order a meeting of the creditors or of the members of the company (or any 
class of them). During this meeting the court will decide whether the division of 
the creditors or members into different classes for voting purposes is appropriate.23 
Section 899 sub 1 CA 2006 requires approval by at least 75% in value in each 
class of the creditors or members voting on the scheme, which will also be at 
least a majority in number of each class. Only the creditors and members who 
will be affected by the scheme of arrangement will be able to discuss and vote 
on the proposed scheme.24 If the aforementioned majority is reached, again, an 
application to the court has to be made. During this second hearing the court will 
decide whether to sanction the scheme of arrangement. 
17 V. Finch, above note 7, pp. 568-588. 
18 C.G. Paulus, “Das englische Scheme of Arrangement - ein Neues Angebot auf dem Europäischen Markt für 
Aussergerichtlichen Restructurierungen” (2011) ZIP, p. 1077 ff; G. O‘Dea J. Long & A. Smyth, Schemes of 
Arrangements. Law and Practice (2012, Oxford University Press, Oxford), p. 3. 
19 Section 896 sub 2 CA 2006. 
20 S. Madaus, “Rescuing Companies Involved in Insolvency Proceedings with Rescue Plans” (2012) NACIIL Reports. 
21 Section 897 CA 2006. 
22 B. Wessels, “Scheme of Arrangement: a Viable European Rescue Strategy?” (2010) 154 Ondernemingsrecht.
23 Ibid. 
24 R. Richards & J. Tribe, “Members’ Voluntary Liquidations - Part 2: MVLs Compared” (2005) 26(11) Company 
Lawyer, pp. 322-325. 
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According to Section 899 sub 2 CA 2006, such an application may be made by 
the company, any creditor or member of the company, or if the company is being 
wound up or an administration order is in force in relation to it, the liquidator or 
administrator. During this hearing, creditors may challenge the scheme on the 
ground that the meeting is improperly constituted, that the creditors were not given 
sufficient information, or on the ground that the scheme is unfair. The court will 
sanction the proposed scheme if it is fair,
“i.e. a scheme that an intelligent and honest person, a member 
of the class concerned, and acting in respect of his interest might 
reasonably approve.”25 
According to Section 899 sub 3 CA 2006, a scheme sanctioned by the court is 
binding on all creditors/members or the class of creditors/members and on the 
company or, in case of a company in the course of being wound up, the liquidator 
and contributors of the company. 
2.3 Restructuring by Company Voluntary Arrangements
According to Section 1 sub 1 and 3 IA 1986, the directors of a company, the 
administrator where an administration order is in force, or the liquidator where a 
company is being wound up, may make a proposal to the company and its creditors 
for a composition in satisfaction of its debts or a scheme of arrangement of its affairs 
(also referred to as a voluntary arrangement).26 A nominee has to be appointed. The 
nominee must be a person who is qualified to act as an insolvency practitioner in 
relation to the company.27 While the directors of the company remain in charge 
of the management of the company, the nominee is responsible for assisting the 
directors with the development of the voluntary arrangement and its implementation. 
According to Section 2 sub 2 IA 1986, the nominee shall, within 28 days after 
being given notice of the proposal for a voluntary arrangement, submit a report 
to the court stating whether, in his opinion, meetings of the company and of its 
creditors should be summoned to consider the proposal, and the date on which, 
and time and place at which, he proposes the meetings should be held. The person 
calling the creditors’ meeting must summon all creditors of the company whose 
claims and addresses he is aware of.28 Notices are to be sent to the creditors at least 
25 M. Kierce, H. Martin, A. Cotter & N. Montgomery, “Schemes of Arrangement and their Ongoing Currency” 
(2010) Insurance and Reinsurance, pp. 13-16; Wessels, above note 22.
26 See also: R. Mokal & L. Chan Ho, “Interplay of CVA, Administration and Liquidation”, available from http://
papers.ssrn.com/ (last viewed: 2 April 2017).
27 Section 1 sub 2 IA 1986. 
28 Section 3 sub 3 IA 1986. 
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two weeks in advance of the meeting, together with the following documents: a 
copy of the proposal, a copy of the statement of affairs or a summary statement 
of affairs, a voting form, a notice of claim form and a proxy form to be completed 
and returned, and the nominee’s report on the proposal. During the meeting, the 
creditors will decide whether to approve the proposed voluntary arrangement.29 
The proposal must be approved by a simple majority of the shareholders and 75% 
in value of the creditors present and voting. 
If the decisions of the meeting of shareholders and the creditors differ, the 
decision of the creditors will prevail. The arrangement will bind every person 
who was entitled to vote at the meetings as well as every person who would have 
been so entitled if he had had notice of it, as if he were a party to the voluntary 
arrangement.30 According to Section 7 sub 2 IA 1986, the appointed nominee shall 
in principle act as the supervisor of the agreed arrangement. Under Section 6 IA 
1986, any person entitled to vote at the creditors’ or the shareholders’ meeting 
is able to challenge the implementation of the arrangement within four weeks 
of the approval being reported to the court. In order to challenge the approved 
arrangement successfully, it must be shown that the arrangement unfairly 
prejudices the interests of a creditor, member or contributor of the company, or 
that there has been some material irregularity at or in relation to either of the 
meetings. An important difference with the scheme of arrangement is that under a 
company voluntary arrangement, the secured and preferential creditors cannot be 
bound by the scheme.31
3 Corporate Rescue in the Netherlands 
Current Dutch corporate and insolvency law lacks appropriate and efficient 
methods to restructure companies in financial distress successfully. In order 
to facilitate possibilities to effectively restructure those companies, the Dutch 
legislator has proposed two Acts:
(1) Act on the Continuity of Companies I on pre-pack proceedings;32 
29 Section 4 sub 1 IA 1986.
30 Section 5 IA 1986. 
31 Section 4 sub 3 and 4 IA 1986. 
32 Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 43 218, nr. 2. 
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(2) Act on the Continuity of Companies II on the scheme of arrangement outside 
bankruptcy proceedings.33
3.1 Restructuring by Pre-Packing 
Currently, Dutch insolvency law does not provide for an explicit legal basis for 
the appointment of a trustee prior to the opening of formal insolvency procedures. 
However, some district courts have developed a policy in which they allow pre-
packs. Since 2012, there have been a number of successful pre-pack restructurings 
in the Netherlands.34 The companies were restructured through a transaction that 
was prepared before the formal bankruptcy of the companies. A district court 
appointed ‘silent’ prospective trustee prepared the transaction. Once the transaction 
was agreed upon, the companies filed for their own bankruptcies. Immediately 
after the companies were declared bankrupt, the transactions were closed. 
The main advantage of a pre-pack is that the transaction can be prepared relatively 
calmly and quickly, thus creating the best chances for continuation of the company 
or of its viable parts. In order to maximise the chances of restructuring viable 
companies in financial distress, the Dutch Minister of Justice and Security 
proposed the Act on the Continuity of Companies I.35 The goal of the Act is to 
facilitate restructuring of (the viable parts of) companies in financial distress and to 
preserve the value of the companies in order to ensure a more efficient liquidation 
of the company - if needed. 
The proposed Article 363 DBC provides for a legal basis for the appointment of 
a prospective trustee by the district court for a specific term. The appointment 
is silent, i.e. confidential. A request for the appointment of a prospective trustee 
can be made by a debtor. The district court will grant the request if it is likely 
that the appointment of a prospective trustee has added value. This is the case 
if the appointment is in the interest of the creditors as a whole or in the public 
interest, and if the continuity of the company and the preservation of jobs will be 
served. The debtor also has to clarify why the appointment of a prospective trustee 
is preferable to immediate bankruptcy. During a pre-pack, the directors of the 
company are in full control and retain the exclusive possession of its assets. This 
means that the prospective trustee has no authority over the company nor powers 
33 Voorontwerp voorstel van wet tot wijziging van de Faillissementswet in verband met de invoering van 
de mogelijkheid tot het algemeen verbindend verklaren van een buiten faillissement gesloten akkoord ter 
herstructurering van schulden. 
34 For example: retail chain Schoenenreus, lingerie manufacturer Marlies Dekkers, flower exporter Florimex, 
printing company Dijkman and the Ruwaard van Putten hospital.  
35 Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 43 218, nr. 2. 
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to represent it. Moreover, the prospective trustee is not an agent of the company. 
According to the proposed Article 364 sub 1 DBC, he performs his tasks towards 
the interests of the company’s creditors. The proposed trustee is not obliged to 
carry out the debtor’s or the company’s creditors’ instructions.36
A prospective trusteeship can only serve its purpose if the company is willing 
to disclose all relevant information to the prospective trustee. Hence, the debtor 
has to provide the prospective trustee with all relevant information.37 Together 
with the appointment of a prospective trustee, the district court will appoint a 
prospective supervisory judge, who supervises the prospective trustee.38 The 
prospective trustee will report to the prospective supervisory judge. According to 
the proposed Article 367 DBC, the salary of the prospective trustee will be paid 
by the company, and in case of bankruptcy out of the estate as administrative 
expenses. Once the prospective trustee has prepared a transaction, the company 
will file for its bankruptcy. In most cases, the asset transaction will thereupon be 
closed on the same day. 
With regard to the proposed Act, Dutch authors have expressed several points of 
criticism. There is a lack of transparency. The creditors are completely bypassed 
during the pre-pack procedure while the objectivity of the prospective trustee 
is questioned.39
3.2 Restructuring by the Scheme of Arrangement ‘Dutch Style’
Currently, in order to prevent bankruptcy, companies in financial distress may 
offer an arrangement to their creditors on an informal basis, which usually entails 
postponement of payment or remission of debts. However, Dutch law does not 
provide for an explicit legal basis for such a company voluntary arrangement. 
Therefore, creditors are free in their choice whether to accept or refuse such a 
proposal. Only in very exceptional situations is a creditor obliged to cooperate 
with a company’s voluntary arrangement. According to the Supreme Court, a 
creditor can only be compelled to cooperate in case he abuses his right (Article 
3:13 DCC).40 As a result, one creditor can frustrate a restructuring through an 
arrangement. In order to prevent a single unwilling creditor from frustrating or 
preventing a restructuring by an arrangement, even if the arrangement is accepted 
36 Proposed Article 364 sub 2 DBC. 
37 Proposed Article 364 sub 3 DBC. 
38 Proposed Article 365 DBC. 
39 Ibid.
40 Supreme Court 12 August 2005, NJ 2005/230 (Payroll). 
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by the majority of the creditors, the Dutch Minister of Justice and Security 
proposed the Act on the Continuity of Companies II.41
The Act aims to ensure efficient restructuring of companies in financial distress 
whilst guaranteeing creditor protection.42 The proposed Article 368 DBC lays down 
provisions for a legal basis for the scheme of arrangement between a company in 
financial distress and its creditors and shareholders, whereby the creditors’ and 
shareholders’ rights are amended. According to the aforementioned article, the 
scheme can be proposed by the company or, if certain conditions are met, by its 
creditors or shareholders. The scheme can involve an arrangement offered to all 
creditors and shareholders or just to certain classes of creditors or shareholders. 
According to the proposed Article 368 DBC, the creditors and/or shareholders can 
be divided into classes. Those classes must be confined to those persons whose 
rights are similar, in a way that it is possible for them to come to an agreement 
together with a view to their common interests. A proposed scheme of arrangement 
is accepted if all classes agree to it. A class is considered to have agreed if at least 
50% of the members of the class vote in favour, and if this majority represents at 
least two thirds of the amount of the outstanding claims included in the class.43 If 
the scheme of arrangement is accepted, both the company and the creditors and 
shareholders can ask the court to adopt the scheme.44 The court will refuse to adopt 
a scheme if: 
(1) The interests of one or more creditors or shareholders would be damaged 
disproportionally by adopting the scheme; 
(2) The compliance of the scheme is not sufficiently guaranteed; 
(3) The scheme is based on deception; or
(4) Other material reasons give grounds for refusing to adopt the scheme. 
According to Article 373 DBC, it is even possible to ask the court to adopt a 
rejected scheme. The court will only adopt a rejected scheme if all classes of 
creditors and/or shareholders receive at least the amount they would receive if 
the company were to be declared bankrupt. Once a court adopts the scheme of 
41 Voorontwerp voorstel van wet tot wijziging van de Faillissementswet in verband met de invoering van 
de mogelijkheid tot het algemeen verbindend verklaren van een buiten faillissement gesloten akkoord ter 
herstructurering van schulden. 
42 R. Hermans & K. Sixma, “New Restructuring Opportunities in the Netherlands: the Dutch Scheme of Arrangement 
is Coming” (2014) Corporate Rescue & Insolvency, p. 231 ff. 
43 Proposed Article 372 DBC. 
44 Proposed Article 373 sub 1 DBC.
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arrangement, it is binding on all creditors and/or shareholders within the scope, 
regardless of their participation in the voting process. 
4 Corporate Dissolution in the UK: Voluntary Striking Off Procedure 
According to Section 1003 CA 2006, it is possible to strike off a company from 
the Companies Register and thereby terminate its existence, also known as the 
voluntary striking off procedure. This procedure is considered inexpensive and 
easy.45 It is for this reason that many directors have used the voluntary striking off 
procedure to terminate companies.46 The procedure commences with a meeting of 
the board of directors. An application for striking off a company must be made on 
behalf of the company by the majority of the directors. Under Section 1004 sub 1 
CA 2006, it is not permitted to strike off a company if at any time in the previous 
three months, the company has:
(1) Changed its name; 
(2) Traded or otherwise carried on business; 
(3) Made a disposal for value of property or rights that, immediately before ceasing 
to trade or otherwise carry on business, it held for the purpose of disposal for 
gain in the normal course of trading or otherwise carrying on business; 
(4) Engaged in any other activity except activities necessary for the purpose of:
(a) Making an application for striking off the company or deciding whether 
to do so;
(b) Concluding the affairs of the company; or
(c) Complying with statutory requirements.
The application has to be made through a prescribed form, which has to contain 
certain information. The completed form should be sent to Companies House 
accompanied by a £10 fee to cover the costs of providing the service. According 
to Section 1006 CA 2006, the applicant must secure that, within seven days from 
the day on which the application for voluntary striking off is made, a copy of the 
application is provided to every member of the company (usually the shareholders), 
employee of the company, creditor of the company, director of the company who 
45 P. Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (2003, Sweet & Maxwell, London), pp. 
864-870. 
46 Richards & Tribe, above note 24, pp. 322-325.
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did not sign the application form, and manager or trustee of any pension fund 
established for the benefit of the company’s employees. 
As soon as the Registrar has received and considered the application to strike the 
company off, he will publish a notice in the London Gazette stating the intention to 
strike off the company and inviting any person to show cause why that should not 
be done (Section 1003 sub 3 CA 2006). Objections against the company’s striking 
off should be lodged within three months. In case no (reasonable) objections are 
lodged, the company will be dissolved, upon which the Registrar will publish a 
notice thereto in the London Gazette (Section 1003 sub 5 CA 2006). 
I think creditor protection is ensured in the voluntary striking off procedure by 
Section 1003 sub 3 and 6 together with Section 1006 CA 2006. Because of the 
provision of Section 1006 CA 2006, the creditors are informed about the intention 
to strike off the company. Because of the provisions of Section 1003 sub 3 CA 
2006, they may lodge objections against striking off the company. The same 
applies to the company’s shareholders. Yet, because of the three-month period 
from Section 1003 sub 3 CA 2006, the voluntary striking off procedure is not as 
‘turbo’ as the Dutch turbo liquidation.
5 Corporate Dissolution in the Netherlands: Turbo Liquidation 
Since 1994, it is possible to dissolve a company in one day: turbo liquidation. 
Article 2:19 sub 4 DCC offers the option of dissolving a company without 
pursuing liquidation proceedings if there are no longer any assets at the time of 
the dissolution. The turbo liquidation procedure consists of three steps. First, 
the general meeting of shareholders has to adopt a dissolution resolution under 
Article 2:19 sub 1a DCC. In addition, the board of directors has to certify that the 
company no longer has assets at the time of the dissolution.47 Finally, the board 
of directors has to file a statement of dissolution with the Chamber of Commerce. 
The company ceases to exist immediately after the board of directors has issued 
this statement. As no liquidation proceedings need to be pursued, turbo liquidation 
is often seen as a quick and cheap way to dissolve a company. It is also seen as 
a safe way to dissolve a company, because turbo liquidation - and thereby the 
disappearance of the company - is only published in the commercial register. The 
question arises whether these assumptions are correct. In my opinion, the opposite 
is the case: dissolving a company through turbo liquidation is not as easy as is often 
47 Supreme Court 27 January 1995, ECLI:NL:HR:1995:ZC1631, NJ 1995/579, (Adjuncten Properties v. Söderqvist). 
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suggested.48 On the contrary, the decision whether or not to dissolve a company 
through turbo liquidation requires substantial legal knowledge. At the same time 
there are several flaws in the law applicable to turbo liquidation.
The wording of Article 2:19 sub 4 DCC seems to suggest that in order to dissolve a 
company through turbo liquidation only one condition needs to be met: at the time 
of the dissolution the company must not have any assets. Currently, the prevailing 
doctrine is that companies without assets, but with outstanding debts, may be 
dissolved through turbo liquidation.49
Nevertheless, in my opinion the option to dissolve a company through turbo 
liquidation as offered by Article 2:19 sub 4 DCC is only meant for situations 
in which companies have neither assets nor outstanding debts at the time of 
dissolution.50 Provided that it is possible to dissolve a company with outstanding 
debts through turbo liquidation, this has major consequences for creditors. If 
a company is allowed to be dissolved with outstanding debts, it is easy to take 
advantage of this dissolving method and to commit fraud. All that needs to be 
done, is to divert all assets out of the company in order to dissolve it cheaply and 
quickly under Article 2:19 sub 4 DCC – resulting in the disappearance of the 
company without liquidation proceedings – and to ensure the company will not 
become insolvent. As the company ceases to exist without liquidation proceedings, 
no insight is obtained into the company’s administration and its financial state.51 
This would be quite different in case of bankruptcy. During a bankruptcy procedure 
the receiver will investigate the administration, financial state and affairs of the 
company. The receiver will also look for any acts of fraudulent conveyance.52 
If the receiver uncovers wrongdoing on the part of the board of directors, he 
may bring proceedings for wrongful or fraudulent trading and hold the directors 
personally liable.
48 S. Renssen, De turboliquidatie van de Besloten Vennootschap. Serie vanwege het Van der Heijden Instituut. Deel 
131 (2016, Kluwer, Deventer). 
49 Court of Rotterdam 21 March 2014, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:2548; Court of Rotterdam 20 May 2014, 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:4427; Court of Rotterdam 10 February 2015 ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:1570; Court 
of The Hague 10 February 2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:1976; Court of The Hague 11 March 2015, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:2569; Court of Appeal The Hague 2 July 2015, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:1846; Supreme 
Court 18 December 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:3636.
50 Renssen, above note 48, pp. 49-58.
51 Indeed, Articles 2:23-23b DCC are not applicable in case of turbo liquidation. 
52 Article 42 et sec. DBC. 
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6 Conclusion
Despite the fact that the development of possibilities to restructure companies 
in financial distress in Europe is welcome in respect of economic and labour 
market policies, the question arises whether creditor protection is sufficiently 
ensured in pre-pack and scheme of arrangement proceedings. In my opinion, 
creditor protection is not (yet) sufficiently ensured in the UK pre-pack nor in the 
proposed Dutch pre-pack. In the UK, the courts try to ensure creditor protection 
by underlining the importance of consulting with major creditors ahead of 
completing a pre-pack sale. Furthermore, the UK Insolvency Service drafted the 
SIP 16 Report, in order to ensure that creditors are informed on the reasons why a 
practitioner decided on a pre-packaged sale. Nevertheless, some legal experts still 
think that the UK pre-pack procedure lacks transparency and is open to abuse. In 
the Dutch proposal, the creditors are not at all involved in a pre-pack procedure. 
As a result, creditor protection is lacking. I think the Dutch legislator needs to 
make some changes in order to ensure transparency of the pre-pack procedure and 
to ensure creditor protection. Taking into consideration the points of criticism of 
the pre-pack procedures, I consider it important that the European Commission 
makes a proposal to harmonise the rules for restructuring companies by a pre-
pack procedure. 
In accordance with the Commission Recommendation on a new approach to 
business failure and insolvency, creditor protection is ensured in the UK scheme 
of arrangement procedure as well as in the proposed Dutch procedure. In the UK, 
creditors can challenge the proposed scheme of arrangement on the ground that 
the meeting is improperly constituted, that the creditors were not given sufficient 
information, or on the ground that the scheme is unfair. The court will only sanction 
the proposed scheme if it is fair, 
“i.e. a scheme that an intelligent and honest person, a member 
of the class concerned, and acting in respect of his interest might 
reasonably approve.”
According to the proposed Article 373 DBC, in the Netherlands the court will 
refuse to adopt a scheme if the interests of one or more creditors or shareholders 
would be damaged disproportionally by adopting the scheme. 
The second question that arises is whether quick dissolving methods as alternatives 
for restructuring possibilities in case companies are too broke to restructure are in 
fact an open invitation to commit fraud and to circumvent a bankruptcy procedure. 
Another question that arises is whether creditor protection is ensured in these 
dissolving methods. In my opinion, the Dutch turbo liquidation is indeed an open 
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invitation to commit fraud and to circumvent a bankruptcy procedure. Currently, 
the prevailing doctrine is that companies without assets, but with outstanding debts, 
may be dissolved through turbo liquidation. If a company is allowed to be dissolved 
while there are outstanding debts, it is easy for fraudsters to take advantage of this 
method of dissolution, because it enables them to avoid bankruptcy by making the 
company disappear. This is quite different in the UK legal system. 
In the UK legal system, creditor protection is ensured because of the requirement 
that creditors and shareholders must be informed about the intention to strike 
off the company. They may lodge objections against striking off the company. 
A drawback is that the procedure is not as ‘turbo’ as the Dutch procedures: in 
the UK, companies cannot be dissolved and liquidated in one day. Surprisingly, 
there is currently no EU harmonisation in the field of dissolution of companies. 
Taking into consideration the consequences of corporate dissolution for creditors 
of a company, especially in case of turbo liquidation, I consider it important that 
the European Commission propose harmonisation of the rules for dissolution and 
liquidation of companies.
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Creating Norms
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1 Introduction1
The state of insolvency office holder (“IOH”) regulation worldwide is a matter 
of some concern to the international bodies active in the insolvency field. The 
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) held a conference on 
7 November 2014 to disseminate the findings of a two-year project into the IOH 
regulatory environment in its client group, of which 27 out of 35 were the subject 
of an assessment.2 While the laws of many of these states have been the subject 
of scrutiny with a view to reform, this was apparently the first time that research 
had been undertaken into the structure of the IOH profession in these jurisdictions. 
As such, the holistic view enabled as a result of the work contains some interest 
for those keen on understanding how IOH regulation is performing worldwide, 
not just in the countries surveyed, but as representative overall of the practice 
in a range of jurisdictions emanating from across the emerging, developing and 
developed worlds.
The most essential component of the project’s findings was the great diversity in 
terms of status, qualification and training of IOHs, as well as in the framework 
or frameworks for their registration, supervision and discipline. Nonetheless, 
some indications of cross-jurisdictional trends in these countries was possible, 
1 The authors intended that this paper be presented at the IEAF Lisbon Conference on 21-22 September 2016. 
Owing to a variety of circumstances, the authors regrettably could not be present in Portugal on that occasion. 
Nonetheless, the authors wish to thank the organising committee and the Editor of this publication for kindly 
agreeing to publish this paper as part of the conference record.
2 A copy may be seen at: http://assessment.ebrd.com/insolvency-office-holders/2014/report.html.
* Senior Technical Research Officer, INSOL International. 
** Senior Lecturer, Nottingham Law School. 
*** Consultant, International Financial Corporation.
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a notable example being that where a self-regulatory model or state-sponsored 
regulatory agency was used, there was a strong correlation with performance 
overall across the criteria being measured. While most states had some form of 
licensing regime in place, less performing countries tended to include those where 
Government directly exercised supervision over the IOH profession, or where a 
regulatory framework was weak or wholly absent. The tension between private and 
public control was evident in a number of the jurisdictions surveyed, particularly 
given the diverse views of the role of IOHs, whether as private practitioners or as 
representatives or agents of the courts or other regulatory bodies.
Overall, while minimum educational standards and professional entrance exams 
were often prescribed, the project revealed weak performance in areas such as 
continuing professional development and training needs. Similarly, lacunae also 
existed at the level of the development of professional associations and of ethical 
rules. In many places, however, even where regulatory regimes were sufficiently 
robust, issues with resources tended to restrict active supervision of IOHs to 
the context of individual proceedings with the effectiveness of such monitoring 
dependent on the courts’ own supervisory capacity. The role of the courts in the 
conduct of proceedings was also identified as an issue, particularly in the balance 
of control and supervision between creditors and the courts. Over-monitoring was 
stated as potentially a problem where it inhibited IOHs in the performance of 
their duties. Finally, the structure of the appointments system in cases, as well 
as remuneration, were felt to be insufficiently encouraging of competition in the 
market for IOH services.3 In summary, the terms of the report revealed that there 
was much to do in relation to improving the environment and framework for 
practice in almost all of these states, which also included 10 member states of the 
European Union.4
Some of the issues reflected in the EBRD assessment were pre-figured in work 
carried out by the professional associations, including INSOL Europe which, as 
representative of the European insolvency community, has a watching brief on 
behalf of their membership over matters connected with reforms to insolvency 
law and practice. Although written in the context of the then anticipated review 
of the European Insolvency Regulation,5 INSOL Europe’s 2010 Report on the 
topic of harmonisation, presented to the European Parliament Committee on Legal 
3 Ibid., Executive Summary, at 7-9.
4 Out of 13 countries acceding as Member States between 2004-2013 (the exceptions being Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic and Malta).
5 EC Regulation 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 (“EIR”), now replaced by Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of 20 May 2015 
(“Recast EIR”).
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Affairs, largely advocated consideration of substantive harmonisation in a number 
of areas of insolvency law. In dealing with insolvency practice qualifications, 
however, it concluded that the different systems, especially for remuneration, 
in the member states surveyed did not cause any difficulties, obstacles or 
disadvantages for companies with a cross-border dimension operating in the 
European Union. Harmonisation of this area was not deemed necessary pending 
greater harmonisation in the insolvency and company law fields.6 Nonetheless, an 
issue of concern, which has since been reflected in work by the Leiden Law School 
commissioned by INSOL Europe, is that of a possible ethical code at European 
level for IOHs. The work has now resulted in the production of a set of IOH 
Principles and Best Practices that are still being reviewed for adoption by the 
professional body.7
By way of contrast, however, the European Parliament’s Report in 2011, which 
also picked up the harmonisation theme for insolvency law, did consider it 
worthwhile to deal with insolvency practice qualifications, insofar as qualification 
and competence were concerned. Other issues to which reference was made 
included the desirability of good reputation, independence and the need to avoid 
conflicts of interests.8 A small jump from the European Parliament’s position saw 
IOH regulation appearing as one of the sub-themes in a project on “Substantive 
Insolvency Law and the Prospects for Greater EU Harmonisation”, which was 
funded by the European Commission and carried out by the University of Leeds.9 
In this project, which arose from the need to analyse member state compliance 
with the 2014 Recommendation,10 mention is made of the need potentially to re-
examine the “caution” explicit in the 2010 INSOL Europe report.11 In fact, the 
IOH-related component of the study is also reflected in the scope of the recently 
formed European Commission Experts’ Group on Restructuring and Insolvency 
(“EC Experts’ Group”), which began its work in January 2016, whose (ambitious) 
mission includes the development of, inter alia, common principles and rules in areas 
connected to insolvency, such as the qualifications of insolvency practitioners.12
6 See INSOL Europe, Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at EU Level (April 2010), at 23.
7 The IOH Principles and Best Practices, available at: http://www.tri-leiden.eu/project/categories/ioh-project/.
8 See K-H. Lehne (Rapporteur), Report with Recommendations to the Commission on Insolvency Proceedings in 
the context of EU Company Law (Document A7-0355/2011) (17 October 2011), p. 10.
9 See Project website at: http://www.law.leeds.ac.uk/research/projects/study-on-substantive-insolvency-law.
10 Recommendation on a New European Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency (Document COM (2014) 
1500 Final) (12 March 2014).
11 Interim Report 3 of the Study on Substantive Insolvency Law (2016), at 58.
12 Call for Expressions of Interest in the Experts’ Group (September 2015), at paragraph 3.
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2 The IP Project
It is on the basis of the interest shown by the various bodies above that the 
insolvency practitioner regulation project (“IP Project”) was conceived in late 2015, 
with the project beginning in earnest in 2016. The IP Project is an international 
collaborative project involving the Centre for Business and Insolvency Law at 
Nottingham Law School, as well as the Business Law Research Centre at Radboud 
University Nijmegen, the Centre for Advanced Corporate and Insolvency Law 
at the University of Pretoria and the Commercial and Property Law Research 
Centre at the Queensland University of Technology. The project has received 
funding from INSOL International and has the support of both that organisation 
as well as some interest shown in the project by the World Bank. The intention 
behind this project is to conduct a global doctrinal study of insolvency office-
holder regulation in some 40 countries in four regions around the world, chosen to 
reflect jurisdictions from across the emerging, developing and developed worlds 
at varying stages of development.
The IP Project’s main purpose was to ascertain trends in IOH regulation under 
a number of practice-related headings, including selection and appointment, 
qualification and training (including continuing professional development needs) 
as well as whether a code of ethics or professional conduct governs professionals 
operating in the sector. Other issues include the perennially thorny one of 
remuneration, liability and disqualification, removal and replacement as well as the 
review of practice standards, including information on the institutional, court and 
supervision frameworks in place. With the information collected, a series of reports 
will be produced dealing with regional trends as well as common developments 
across each category (emerging, developing and developed).13 Ultimately, the 
intention is to make recommendations for minimum standards of regulation 
appropriate for jurisdictions at various stages of development and to feed into the 
process by which such standards are developed. A further and later phase of the 
IP Project’s work would seek to actively engage with the international bodies and 
key stakeholders with view to achieving the goals of the project.
3 The European Commission Submission
While the IP project was ongoing, an opportunity arose to feed into the work 
of the EC Experts’ Group, on which a number of the IP Project team members 
were represented. The EC Experts’ Group had from the outset begun reviewing 
13 The initial findings of the reports cumulatively were presented at the INSOL International Sydney Conference 
(March 2017) with regional findings being presented at appropriate subsequent events.
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material within its scope of action with view to determining the process and 
form in which the initiative might take shape. One of the ways of doing this was 
to invite submissions on discrete themes taken from the Call for Expressions 
of Interest and the 2014 Recommendation. The submission that came from IP 
Project members was couched on the basis that many Member States already had 
developed insolvency practitioner frameworks and did not require much further 
guidance. However, the submission was predicated particularly on the fact that 
some Member States where institutional and regulatory frameworks were in their 
infancy would need to be encouraged to develop a professional corps of insolvency 
practitioners in order to reinforce the institutional framework as an indispensable 
part of the insolvency process. This was seen as particularly true in the need to 
reinforce the adoption of professional and ethical standards.
Given that the IP Project was not at a sufficiently advanced stage to come to any 
firm conclusions on trends in the field, the submission rested particularly on a 
number of standard setting international texts, including the World Bank Principles 
for Effective Creditor/Debtor Regimes 1995, the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
2004 and the EBRD Insolvency Office Holder Principles of 2007. It also 
considered in passing the IOH Principles and Best Practices (emanating from the 
Leiden Project),14 though these were admitted as not being at a sufficient level 
of detail that could lend itself to ready adaptation as the basis of a legislative 
text. Other texts considered included the various reports noted above and the 
generally prevailing themes of the discourse in the literature on IOH regulation.15 
With the guidance of these texts, the submission addressed four key matters: (i) 
selection and appointment; (ii) qualification and professional standards; (iii) ethical 
standards; and (iv) remuneration.
The submission, addressed in point form to the Member States, as would be the 
case for a Directive text making recommendations for action, first stated that 
Member States should ensure that IOHs were appropriately qualified and trained in 
insolvency and restructuring matters. IOHs should also be subject to requirements 
of continuing education. It went on to require that Member States ensure that the 
process for the appointment, removal and resignation of IOHs is clear, predictable 
and fair. In particular, the grounds for eligibility and the grounds upon which 
an IOH may be ineligible for appointment, should be clear. Furthermore, where 
14 Above note 7.
15 Including, by members of the IP Project, such as: P. Omar, “Une petite histoire des défis dans la profession 
des praticiens du droit de l’insolvabilité au Royaume-Uni” (2013) 5 Revue des Procédures Collectives 41; D. 
Burdette and J. Calitz, “4:3:2:1... Fair Distribution of Appointments or Countdown to Catastrophe? South Africa’s 
Ministerial Policy for the Appointment of Liquidators under the Spotlight” (2015) 3 Nottingham Insolvency and 
Business Law e-Journal 24.
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IOHs are appointed by the court, clear guidelines should be available concerning 
the manner in which the court selects an IOH. In selecting an IOH for a particular 
case, due consideration should be given to the experience and expertise of the 
IOH. In insolvency proceedings with cross-border elements, due consideration 
must be given to the ability of the IOH to communicate and cooperate with 
foreign insolvency practitioners and courts. Finally, taking into account variations 
in practice across the Member States, the submission recommended that, where 
appropriate, the wishes of the debtor and creditors in the selection of the IOH 
should be taken into consideration.
Moving on to the issue of professional and ethical standards, the submission 
recommended that Member States ensure that IOHs are obliged to observe 
professional and ethical standards in the conduct of their work, and that 
appropriate sanctions are imposed where this is not the case. This includes acting 
independently, impartially, honestly and with integrity, with an open mind in 
the interests of all stakeholders. Furthermore, Member States should also ensure 
that IOHs are accountable towards all stakeholders and provide regular public 
reports on the administration of the case. To this end, the submission required 
that Member States ensure that the work of IOHs is appropriately supervised 
and, in particular, that the members of the judiciary dealing with insolvency and 
restructuring matters are appropriately qualified, trained and that they perform 
their tasks independently, impartially and effectively. Finally, on remuneration, the 
submission suggested that Member States ensure that IOHs are entitled to a fair 
and reasonable remuneration and that expenses properly incurred in an insolvency 
proceeding are reimbursed. Moreover, Member States should ensure that the rules 
on and the process for determining the remuneration of IOHs are fair, clear and 
transparent, while also requiring that Member States ensure that IOHs at all times 
maintain an appropriate level of professional indemnity insurance cover.16
4 The 2016 Draft Directive
In the interval between the submission and the publication on 22 November 2016 
of a draft Directive, matters rested. There was no guarantee that the submission 
would be adopted, given the many matters competing for attention within the 
scope of action of the EC Experts’ Group, nor was there any certainty that the issue 
would be taken up in the form the submission presented, given the likely principal 
orientation of the text towards making progress on matters identified in the 2014 
16 This is the point at which the presentation in Lisbon would have ended, with some further concluding remarks 
on how the submission might be taken to represent early steps towards a European minimum standard for 
IOH regulation.
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Recommendation as priorities. In that light, it is not surprising that the text which 
resulted, published a little later in 2016 than first scheduled, focuses chiefly on 
proposals aimed at introducing Europe-wide preventive restructuring frameworks. 
The intention behind the text is to bring focus on the problems facing enterprises 
at a stage prior to formal insolvency when non-performing loans constitute a 
major threat to their success. Though affecting enterprises of all sizes, a particular 
concern is paid in the text to the situation of small- and medium-enterprises, which 
are said to constitute the lifeblood of European commerce.
In the wake of the 2014 Recommendation, which this text is designed to complement 
and further extend into legislative form, attention will undoubtedly now be paid 
to how the various member states respond to the call for the institution of new 
frameworks or the overhaul of existing legislation so as to improve the chances of 
businesses in financial difficulties. However, interest in the text should go beyond 
the preventive restructuring and second chance measures it promotes. Included 
in Title IV of the Draft Directive are proposals aimed at addressing perceived 
lacunae in support structures for restructuring (as well as other insolvency 
procedures) across the European Union, chiefly associated with the qualification 
and training of insolvency professionals and the support for restructuring measures 
through the courts. How the proposals justify the extension of scope to include 
insolvency practice is by making reference to the need to address issues with a 
“direct impact” on the duration of procedures, the specialisation of the judiciary 
and the professionalism of practitioners being the two specifically mentioned in 
the Explanatory Memorandum.17 In this respect, specialisation of both courts and 
IOHs, as well as reinforcement of the judiciary, are seen as helping to speed up 
procedures and reduce their overall length and costs, thus leading to procedures of 
better quality with more effective supervision, a consequent improvement of the 
residual value for creditors18 and, importantly, a reduction in the legal uncertainty 
creditors face which are said to lead to low recovery rates at present.19
Title IV, which is meant to address this overall concern, is relatively short, with 
only 5 draft articles, the last one of which addresses the incidental use of electronic 
communication at various stages of proceedings.20 At first sight, the proposals do 
not contain much that should alarm the world of insolvency practice. Pleasingly, 
they echo to a great extent the IP project submission, incidentally underlining the 
utility of the exercise and the practical nature of the recommendations. Thus, the 
17 Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2016) 723 final (22 November 2016), p. 6.
18 Ibid., at 5.
19 Preamble recital (39), Draft Directive.
20 Ibid., Article 28.
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proposals state that judicial and administrative authorities should receive training 
(both “initial and further”, addressing foundational skills as well as continuing 
professional development needs) to a level appropriate for the responsibilities they 
are to undertake.21
With the caveat that preventive procedures need not involve judicial or 
administrative authorities, excepting insofar as there is a need to safeguard the 
interests of stakeholders through supervision or to intervene punctually for the 
purposes of expediting matters,22 the proposals suggest that the focus of the 
training should be, for the courts at least, to ensure the appropriate expertise 
and specialisation is available, in order to allow for efficient and expeditious 
treatment of cases.23 This is acknowledged as being especially important given the 
“potentially significant economic and social impacts” cases may have.24 
So far as courts are concerned, the approach taken here seems uncontentious, 
particularly as the proposals recognise the differences in court structures across 
the European Union and seek to avoid prejudicing the member states’ competence 
in matters of judicial organisation and the independence of judges themselves. 
Thus, member states are not required to ensure that judges have an exclusive 
competency in restructuring and insolvency matters, but may create specialised 
courts or divisions (chambers) provided their national systems so allow.25
Turning to the status of IOHs, the same concern for retaining as much informality 
in the preventive process is evident, as the proposals do not envisage appointments 
as mandatory, but subject to a case by case appreciation of the debtor’s needs 
and specific circumstances of the case, including, for example, where effective 
supervision is needed to safeguard stakeholder interests.26 The proposals stipulate 
the same “initial and further” training requirements as for judges, suggesting that 
this will lead to an “effective, impartial, independent and competent” provision 
of services.27
The provisions further go on to suggest that member states encourage the 
development of voluntary codes of conduct for practice as well as effective 
oversight mechanisms, which, with appropriate regulatory structures including a 
21 Ibid., Article 24(1).
22 Ibid., Preamble recital (18).
23 Ibid., Article 24(2).
24 Ibid., Preamble recital (39).
25 Idem.
26 Ibid., Preamble recital (18).
27 Ibid., Article 25(1).
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sanctions element, should lead to effective supervision of the IOH.28 What the 
voluntary codes should contain might include, the proposals suggest, guidance 
as to appropriate levels of qualification and training, rules on the transparency 
of the duties to which IOHs are subject, how their remuneration is determined 
and requirements for professional indemnity cover, although, overall, these 
requirements are not intended to impose any particular obligation to create a new 
qualification or profession to accommodate the changes that may be required.29
What this reflects is the fact that, across the European Union, there continues to 
be considerable diversity at present in the way the profession is organised and 
regulated, as revealed, for certain of its members, in the 2014 EBRD Report.30 As 
with the concerns about member state competence and judicial independence, the 
unwillingness to be more prescriptive can be seen to underline these proposals, 
which are firmly intended to avoid harmonisation.31 Where the text has delved 
a little deeper on issues of practice organisation, however, is in connection with 
appointments and remuneration. Here, the proposals require that the process by 
which IOHs are appointed or removed or resign is “clear, predictable and fair”.32 
What this means in practice is that the conditions for eligibility and grounds for 
ineligibility for appointment are “clear and transparent”.33 Furthermore, where 
responsibility for appointments falls to the courts or administrative authorities, 
the criteria should similarly be “clear and transparent”, although the selection may 
be influenced by the experience or expertise of the IOHs under consideration and 
room may be given for appropriate consultation of the debtor and / or creditors in 
the making of that choice.34
Dealing with the specific situation of cross-border instances, other criteria for 
selection the text recommends could include the human and administrative 
resources available to the IOH and, perhaps more importantly, their ability to 
communicate and cooperate with foreign IOHs and courts.35 Insofar as remuneration 
receives a mention in the proposals, the text suggests that the rules in member 
states by which fees and expenses are determined should serve as an incentive 
for the “timely and efficient resolution” of procedures, subject to consideration of 
28 Ibid., Articles 25(2) and 27(1).
29 Ibid., Preamble recital (40).
30 Above note 2.
31 Explanatory Memorandum, above note 17, p. 6.
32 Article 26(1), Draft Directive.
33 Ibid., Article 26(2).
34 Ibid., Article 26(3).
35 Ibid., Article 26(4). Interestingly, despite Article 42 of the Recast EIR, a similar competence is not required of 
judicial or administrative authorities in these proposals.
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the overall complexity of proceedings and the availability of mechanisms for the 
timely resolution of any disputes over remuneration.36
5 Conclusion
Dealing firstly with the Draft Directive: while much in the proposals is seemingly 
uncontentious, questions might be asked as to whether the time is right to lay down 
even these modest rules. Politically, the downplaying of the proposals connected 
to practice, which may be conceived of as ancillary to the main objective of the 
Draft Directive to promote preventive restructuring, suggests the answer to this 
is in the affirmative. In the way the proposals are drafted with very flexible and 
open language, the intention is clearly to make this first step towards establishing 
minimum requirements for oversight and regulation more palatable for the member 
states. In the long run, however, it should be noted that the EBRD considered the 
way in which practice is organised to have an impact on the success of insolvency 
procedures, with jurisdictions where professional organisations were independent 
and active and where less tutelage by state bodies existed being perceived as more 
successful at inspiring public confidence in the good administration of procedures.37 
This would very much advocate for a more profound reflection on this issue when 
the dust has settled on this particular text. There may be then, in light of the way in 
which the text will have been implemented, a better idea of any consensus towards 
further development of practice rules and frameworks.
This is where the role of the IP Project will come to the fore, both at regional 
(such as within the European Union) and global levels. In historical terms, the 
framework for practice for IOHs has been in a state of some flux. While individual 
states have made advances in regulation to deal with particular problems, there is 
as yet no overall sense of whether it is desirable for there to be closer convergence 
between regulatory models and practices. Hopefully, the IP Project, together with 
other studies, both practice- and academic-led, that have informed the debate in 
this area, will point the way to understanding the critical issues that will face those 
desiring to improve standards and the benchmarks for practice. In the long run, 
improvements to practice frameworks can only be of benefit to debtors, creditors 
and other insolvency stakeholders alike.
36 Ibid., Article 27(2).
37 Above note 2.
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